AUTONOMY AND DEPENDENCE IN THE FAMILY

Edited by Rita Liljeström and Elisabeth Özdalga

SWEDISH RESEARCH INSTITUTE IN ISTANBUL 2002

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Back cover: Sara and Albert on board the ship "Yngve Frej," discussing life and marriage. Illustration in "Why not!" [1950] by Gunnar Brusewitz. Permission of reproduction kindly granted by the artist.

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Acknowledgment

This book has come about as a result of a number of seminars and workshops in Turkey and Sweden. The first such events took place at the Middle East Technical University in Ankara during the fall of 1998, and was immediately followed by a seminar at the Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul. These events were associated with the visit by some of the Swedish contributors to this volume to Turkey in order to present Swedish family and gender research to Turkish students and faculty.

The second meeting was held at Göteborg University in Sweden in February 1999. On this occasion, the tables were turned, and it was the Turkish participants who presented Turkish family and gender research to a Swedish academic audience. In addition, the first outline to the present volume was agreed to at a two-day workshop. The third gathering was at the Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul in November 1999, where the final drafts of this volume were discussed.

Major financial support for this venture came from the Swedish Institute in Stockholm, which has generously supported this project at every stage, including publication. We are especially grateful for their willing cooperation. We also want to express our thanks to all the other institutions that have supported this project, both logistically and otherwise: the Middle East Technical University in Ankara; Göteborg University, especially the Department of Sociology; and the Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul, both the board of trustees in Stockholm and the personnel at the Dragoman House in Istanbul. Special thanks are due to the Swedish Consulate General in Istanbul for contributing to the publication of this volume.

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Istanbul and Stockholm in June 2002.

Elisabeth Özdalga and Rita Liljeström

Just a few days before this book went to print, we learned the distressing news that Sharon Başţuğ, one of the contributors, had passed away. She was one of very few internationally known anthropologists active in Turkey, and leaves a void that will be difficult to fill. She is deeply mourned by family, colleagues, students and friends.

This book is dedicated to her memory.

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Introduction

Contrasting Modernities

ELISABETH ÖZDALGA

Many years ago, when I was still a newcomer to Turkey, a woman from the Anatolian countryside who was working as a cleaner in a bank in Ankara told me the following story about her daughter's marriage:

The daughter was about twelve years old when her parents divorced. Her mother moved to Ankara and started to work as a maidservant, while the girl stayed in the village with her father and other relatives. The girl got engaged to a boy from the same village when she was 17 years old. This boy was a couple of years older than the girl. Unfortunately, he died in a road accident shortly before the wedding.

As the woman was narrating her story, she showed me a photograph of a fully grown, rather strongly built young woman in a white bridal dress. At her side was a boy who was between ten and twelve years old. He wore a black wedding suit. I did not understand the meaning of the photograph.

She explained that in the face of the catastrophe of the fiancés death, there was no alternative but to let the girl marry the dead fiancés young brother. That picture of the young, but fully grown bride with the boyish bridegroom, who could have been her younger brother rather than her husband, has engraved itself on my memory.

My first reaction was that this ill-matched pairing was the expression of some exotic cultural pattern, something that should not concern me directly. It was, however, impossible for me to take a neutral position on what I had seen, as it did upset my own moral feelings and sense of justice. Later on, I came to realize that this remarkable marriage arrangement was a manifestation of the fact that the girl was, first and foremost, not married to the boy but to his family.

The practice of matching couples for the good of the family stood out in sharp contrast to how people in my native Sweden formed relationships. I knew from my own experience when I was a student at the end of the 1960s that nobody seemed much concerned about the family or problems related to family life. Of course, most of us were eager to find a partner, but the idea of finding an ideal partner was not related to setting up a future family. What people like myself had in mind was Love, perceived as a wholly spontaneous and almost sacred feeling. A long tradition of literary works and private stories had taught us that the most important factor in getting married was emotional involvement. In addition to this, women of my generation were preparing for independent professional careers, which meant that in contrast to our mothers and grandmothers we did not have to worry about making a good match. As a result, practical concerns about a future living did not have to distract us in our quest for the Select. In this romantic view, practical household concerns were not only ignored, but even seen as offensive to the sacredness of our feelings. The idea of the loving couple overshadowed that

of the family. Nobody would have dreamt of having his or her parents involved in the choice of partner.

In Turkey, however, marriage is still a markedly family affair, and is still largely coloured by practical, long-term concerns for the future of the household. The example of the boy bridegroom is exceptional, deriving as it does from a traditional rural context. It provides but one view of the confusing multitude of existing family practices. Another example concerns a fellow student of mine in Ankara, and gives a more typical view of the perceived significance of the family in Turkish society. As she was finishing at university and thinking about marriage, she listed the many qualities she expected to find in her future husband, from level of education, hobbies, dress, style of conversation, future career prospects and last, but not least, handsomeness. This system of careful planning was carried over to the whole process of getting married, once an appropriate partner had been found: who would buy the kitchenware, the bedroom suite, the living room furniture, and what kind of wedding ceremony and celebration would there be? All these things (and many others related to how to be resolute towards your future husband) were calculated and carefully planned by her and her mother. As a matter of fact, this friend's way of getting married bore some of the marks of older Ottoman times, when marriage arrangements were often delegated to a particular person, who might even be a paid matchmaker. Suddenly, I saw my own way of getting married in a different light. Compared to many young Turkish women, people from my own country appeared to be rather ill-prepared for the realities of marriage and family life. The belief in romantic love was characteristically an ethereal state of mind, which overlooked the importance of practical and rational planning, and so constituted a weaker preparation for the awaiting responsibilities — and hardships — of married life and parenthood. I was struck by the fact that the celebrated values of individual autonomy and self-realization through marital love also exacted a price.

Family relationships vary a lot between different parts of the world and are in that respect culturally sensitive. But family patterns are also sensitive to structural change, and in the modern world change has become an integral part of social life. The problem addressed in this book is, therefore, the one of how family relationships are produced and reproduced under such diverse and ever-changing conditions. What happens to family relationships when people leave their villages in large numbers for the cities, when health conditions improve and birth control becomes available on a large scale, when the level of education increases, and when political conditions become more democratic? In analyzing these questions, the contributors to this volume dissociated themselves from "modernization theories," meaning the various theories of linear, evolutionary social change. The objective is instead to explore an alternative approach that focuses on cultural varieties and emphasizes the contrasting and not the converging patterns of changing family relationships. In this approach, Turkey and Sweden are selected as illustrative cases. Our book also analyzes issues of value assessment, particularly those related to fairness and equity, of the costs and benefits involved in family life.

Critical Aspects of Modernization Theory

Classical evolutionary theories maintained that there was basically one universal form of modernization. Enlightened thinkers of eighteenth and nineteenth

century Europe were fascinated as well as repelled by cultural patterns found in other and apparently exotic parts of the world, but were also attracted to the notion of universalism. They tried to interpret cultural differences by integrating them into a theory of evolution or modernization, which was based on a continuum allegedly leading "citizens of the world" from barbarism to civilization. Based in no small part on Western ethnocentrism, linear modernization theory has had many unyielding followers since then, and has had a strong impact on social scientists. When applied to the different marriage examples above, an evolutionary modernization perspective would see the boyish groom from the Anatolian countryside as representing rural/traditional relationships (traditional society), the university student in Ankara as representing urban/traditional relationships (transitional society), and Swedish students as representing urban/modern relationships (fully developed modern society). According to such a linear modernization theory, Turkey would not yet have reached the final stage. The next step needed to complete that process would be the kind of individualism characteristic of "modern" Swedish family relationships.

Modernization theories thus understood are too simplistic, absurd even, to make sense, given the cultural varieties around the world. Even though today's globalization trends lead to certain convergences in urban life, technological development, production processes, communication systems, and even political values, cultural patterns and social relationships still display important differences. This is especially apparent in family relationships, in which the above forms of marriage, be they based on arranged matchmaking or romantic love or a combination of both, encompass but a minor part of an otherwise complex and multifaceted world of values and practices.

Linear modernization theory will be challenged on three points in this work. The *first* is related to the idea that the extended family belongs to traditional society, while the nuclear family belongs to modern society. This contention, which for a long time was taken as common sense among social scientist all over the world, fell into disrepute during the 1960s, thanks particularly to the work of certain critical historians (MacFarlane). This critical stance has since been adopted and further developed by family sociologists and other social scientists. The above problem is brought to the fore and readdressed in this book both in relation to the Swedish and the Turkish cases. For Scandinavia and major parts of northern Europe the notion of a traditional extended family is perhaps no longer really controversial. But in the case of Turkey, it still needs careful attention: The fact that kinship relations obviously play an important role there may mislead casual observers into thinking that traditionalism in the form of extended family patterns still remain.

There are two misconceptions involved in this way of thinking. First, the emphasis on kinship relations does not mean that the typical family unit is extended. On the contrary, in spite of the salience of inter-generational and other kinship relations, the nuclear family is the predominant family form in modern Turkey. Recent research has shown that the well-being or success of especially those families that have recently migrated to urban centres is dependent on the family's ability to develop and utilize kinship relations on a fairly extensive basis. This is especially true of the lower middle class or poor urban strata of the so-called *gece-kondu* areas. This type of extensive kinship network does not by any means build on extended households, but on truly nuclear family units (see Sema Erder's chapter).

The second misconception is related to the question of when in history the changes from extended to nuclear family households really took place. Historical and anthropological research has demonstrated that the expansion of the nuclear family has not primarily been related to the development of modern urbanization and industrialization, but has been the result of processes of social transformation that began long before modernization proper (see Sharon Baştug's chapter).

Another idea propounded in evolutionary modernization theory –the *second* to be criticized here– is that the nuclear family marks the end, allegedly the happy end, of the modernization process. A crucial theoretical contribution of our study is the demonstration through the analyzes of Swedish experiences in particular that this may not be the case. Strong preferences for individual autonomy, made possible by publicly subsidized welfare programs, seem to split the nuclear unit from within. What has come into existence is what might be labelled an "ex-nuclear" family, a formation consisting of two very independent spouses and their children. This is indeed a vulnerable unit, in which the marriage contract does not last longer than the separate individuals think appropriate to their self-realization, be it in terms of their love for each other and/or their offspring or their ability to meet their professional ambitions.

A *third* contention of modernization theory, which is also criticized in this study, is the idea that economic independence between family members leads to independence in other respects. Turkish data show that this assumption must be seriously questioned and that emotional dependence may very well continue to determine family relationships even where the different generations — parents, children, grandparents — are economically independent (see Çiğdem Kağıtçıbaşı and Diane Sunar's chapters).

By demonstrating some of the crucial weaknesses of so-called modernization theory, this study aims to help in problematizing the concept of the nuclear family and to shed light on the great variety covered by this one concept. It is not the existence of the nuclear family as such that is questioned. On the contrary, this is the basic and dominant household formation in Sweden as well as Turkey. The difference in family structure between the two countries lies in the different forces working on and giving shape to what is basically the same nuclear unit. In the Turkish case it is the nuclear family surrounded by different intergenerational and other kinship relations, whereas in the Swedish case it is the nuclear family being stirred up from within. In Turkey, the family appears to be a relatively strong and viable institution, which means that the interests of the individual are often subordinated to those of the family. In Sweden, on the other hand, the interests of the family often come second to those of individuals, who are relatively more independent and autonomous. The differences between family relationships in the two countries may be epitomized as "interdependence versus individual autonomy." This pair of concepts has been singled out as the main theme of this book.

Most social research is based on comparisons, with stress laid on either the similarities or the differences. In this work the emphasis is on contrasts. It is by discovering the absence of patterns characteristic of one's own society that one's understanding of the other society is deepened, and vice versa.

Turkey and Sweden as Contrasting Cases

Situated at opposite ends of the European continent Turkey and Sweden are widely separated. Geographical as well as cultural distance may easily lead one to

overlook the fact that these two countries share some of their history, in part as a result of the status of both of them as considerable political powers in Europe less than 400 years ago.

The Turks ruled Hungary for more than 150 years (1526-1699), Romania for almost as long (1541-1699), and the Balkans for more than 500 years, from the battle at Kosovo Polje in 1389 until the losses in the Balkan Wars of 1912-13. At the peak of their military power, the Ottomans reached as far as Vienna and laid siege to it on two different occasions, in 1529 and 1683.

For Sweden, the seventeenth century also represented a century of great European influence. During the Era of Greatness, which lasted between 1611-1718, Swedish kings periodically ruled Finland, Poland, Prussia, and other parts of north Germany, and the Baltic states. Sweden, thus, dominated the Baltic Sea. The kingdom reached its peak during the reign of Gustavus Adolphus II (d. 1632), who led the Swedish army during the Thirty Years' War and who was a great reformer and nation-state builder. Early in the eighteenth century, towards the end of the Glorious Era, the Swedish king Charles XII, having lost the battle of Poltava against the Russians (1709), came to Turkey with the aim of obtaining Ottoman support against the Russians. He stayed in Bender, a small place in modern Romania, for about five years, whereafter he returned to Sweden without having been able to fulfil his mission. Some decades after this event, Sweden established permanent diplomatic relations with Istanbul.

Sweden attained its present national borders at the very beginning of the twentieth century (by quitting Norway in 1905). However, almost a century before that (1809), royal power had been limited by a number of constitutional reforms, as result of which Sweden became a constitutional monarchy along the lines of Montesquieu's principles of the distribution of powers. Since then, Sweden has not been involved in any military conflict.

Turkey, on the other hand, has been involved in a large number of wars, mainly leading to defeat, throughout the so called Long Century ending in the First World War. When the very existence of the country was threatened in 1918, the Turkish army under the command of Mustafa Kemal (later Atatürk) managed to summon up its powers for the War of Independence (1919-22). After a successful military campaign, the sultanate was abolished and the modern Turkish republic was set up in 1923. By that time the country was extremely war-weary, the Turkish army having been continuously involved in warfare for ten years.

Turkey in the 1920s was a country with a large rural and a small urban population (only 16.3 per cent lived in cities with more than 10,000 inhabitants, according to the 1927 census). Because most business during the Ottoman times had been in the hands of the non-Muslim minorities who had fled in large number during the convulsive wars and political turmoil leading up to the new republic, Turkey in the 1920s was largely drained of its budding business-minded middle class. Modernizing reforms, like the building of infrastructure and industry, were therefore mainly carried out with state support, that is, from above.

Compared with other European nations, Sweden was also slow in catching up with modern social and economic developments. As late as 1875, almost 90 per cent of the Swedish population still lived in rural areas. Industrial output did not increase much until the very end of the nineteenth century. Repeated crop failures and frequent starvation during the nineteenth century meant that migrants left the country in great numbers, especially for the United States (1 million between

1840-1930, with a peak during the 1880s). However, despite the two countries' common poverty and destitution, conditions for the rural population in Sweden differed from those in Turkey. One important difference was the level of education. In Sweden, school attendance had been made obligatory as early as 1842 (*Folkskolestadgan* - Enactment of Elementary Schools). In Turkey, on the other hand, illiteracy was still very high as late as the 1920s. According to the first census of the new republic (1927) illiteracy stood at 90 percent.

In Sweden, various popular movements began to be organized and to gain momentum during the last decades of the nineteenth century. The labour movement is the best known, because it later gained considerable political power in Sweden together with the Social Democratic Party, and in the 1920s and 30s laid the groundwork for those social reforms that later underpinned the growth of the welfare state. However, the labour movement would not have become so influential had it not been for the example set by the Temperance Movement and the Movement for Adult Education. The Free Church movement was also effective in teaching the masses how to form an opposition and struggle for their own interests using peaceful means.

In Turkey, on the other hand, political opposition based on popular movements never really had a chance to develop. Political opposition in the second half of the nineteenth century was mostly aimed at the absolute power of the sultan and in favour of a constitutional monarchy. In 1876, a new constitution was adopted, in terms of which a representative parliament was established. The problem, however, was that the opposition was often made up of different nationalist interest groups, for whom the struggle for constitutional rights became but a pretext for other agendas, notably national independence and separation from the Ottoman Empire. During the protracted reign of the last really powerful sultan, Abdulhamid II (1876-1909), the constitutional regime was soon dissolved and opposition was harshly controlled in order to prevent the feared dissolution of the empire from within. The result was that the opposition remained clandestine, and it was organized with the objective of seizing power by coup d'état. The famous opposition movement of the Hamidian era, the Young Turks, managed to dethrone the sultan in 1909. The flourishing social and political movements that came out of the shadows after the reintroduction of a constitutional regime in 1908 never really had a chance to cut very deeply into society, because of the successive wars that engulfed the region (Balkan wars 1912-13, First World War, and the War of Independence). The Ottoman's fundamental suspicion of social and political movements spilled over to the republican rulers of Turkey, not only during the one-party regime of the interwar period, but to a certain extent even after the introduction of parliamentary democracy after the Second World War.

In terms of overall social structure there are some fundamental differences between Turkey and Sweden. Two of them will be touched on here. The first is related to the fact that Turkish society is more hierarchical and authoritarian than Swedish society, which is more egalitarian and democratic. Turkey has faced severe crises in running its political system, including several military interventions since the introduction of a multiparty system in 1946. These may be seen as arising in part from deep-seated patriarchal and elitist social structures. Such authoritarian and hierarchical patterns can be observed in everyday life, for example in the relationship between parents and children, where children are expected to respect the authority of their parents (especially their father) even as grown-

ups. It can also be observed in relationships between married spouses, where the authority of the husband as a rule is greater than that of the wife. Until very recently, the husband's authority was even sustained by law, as he had the legal right to prohibit his wife from working outside the home. The hierarchical structure is also seen in schools, where teachers lick their pupils into shape with very few signs of resistance. It is also reflected in the methods of teaching, which are still based on rote learning and cramming. These authoritarian patterns are even reflected at university level, where students, even though not afraid to speak out, do so with a certain reserve and distance, using the respectful *Siz* (Thou), not *sen* (you), in addressing their teachers.

The elitist structure is easily discernible in the relationships and mode of address between people of higher social status and/or education and people of simpler origin. A person working as a cleaner or construction worker, or having any kind of simple manual work, would usually be addressed with *sen*, while the educated person would expect to be addressed with a *Siz*. A person of higher social standing may also raise his or her voice against a person of lower standing, without risk of a response in kind. Similarly, there is a great status difference between people coming from the countryside (peasants and simple farmers) and middle-class urban dwellers. The divisions between rich and poor, educated and non-educated, and urban and rural people still run deep in Turkish society, and combine to form a hierarchical order of dominance.

To be sure, Sweden is also a class-divided society. Still, differences in social status are not as sharp and do not affect relationships as much. Only exceptionally would a superior be able to treat a subordinate harshly. Teachers have great difficulty in keeping the discipline in their classrooms. Since authoritarian ways are shunned, students have to be won over to education and convinced of its worth, not an easy task. Children often tend to go their own way very early, and even parents who are ambitious about their children's future may often have relatively weak parental authority and normative influence.

In terms of work opportunities and consumption patterns, there are certainly great differences between rich and poor people in Swedish society. But within the framework of public institutions, such as hospitals, schools, and other governmental and municipal organizations, the differences between high and low are less marked. The levelling impact of the welfare state on social status differences has been great. A symbolic expression of this was the so-called *du-reformen* – a partly spontaneous, partly state-sponsored campaign – which reached its peak during the 1960s and aimed at abolishing titles and the *Ni* (Thou) form of address in speech and written documents.

The second overall difference between Turkey and Sweden arises from the fact that Turkey is socially and culturally a much more heterogeneous society than Sweden. This is a product of the country's history. Ottoman sultans ruled over a vast and culturally diverse empire, which spanned the Arab world as well as the Caucasus and the Balkans. Therefore, in addition to the already discussed class differences (Turkey has the fifth most unequal distribution of wealth in the world), ethnic identification (like Alevis and Kurds), regional differences (east/west; inner Anatolia/coastal regions), urban/rural settlement, and divergent ideologies (Islamists/secularists) make for a much wider spectrum of social and cultural patterns in Turkey than in Sweden, even though Sweden has become culturally much more heterogeneous, thanks to the immigration of the last two or

three decades (1.6 million of 9 million people living in Sweden are of non-Swedish origin).

By pointing to the heterogeneity or diversity of family relationships in the two countries, and at the same time presenting family relationships in Turkey and Sweden as contrasting examples, this study faces a dilemma. Comparisons must be based on generalizations, but generalizations easily lead to "essentialism," an approach that fosters the use of undue stereotypes. However, our generalizations are only meant to describe certain overall trends. At the level of specific relationships, each country contains a very wide spectrum of diverse relationships. This is especially important to recognize in the case of Turkey, with its higher degree of social heterogeneity.

Value Assessments

The family institution is basic to all societies. It is crucial to the whole socialization process whereby the individual is integrated into society at large. It constitutes a significant universe of meaning, that is, it is very important in the constitution of a direction in life. Family relationships turned sour cause different kinds of distress. A family crisis often leads to the questioning of one's whole existence and may even result in depression. That is why divorce, even though becoming more and more common in most societies, can be such a distressing experience. The family is thus essential to the formation of an individual's identity. The fact that the family is so multifunctional also means that the expectations of family relationships are generally very high.

How do people weigh the pros and cons of family life, and how do they define the good and the bad family? In other words, which are the norms and values involved in the evaluation of family relationships?

During an interview with a Turkish immigrant woman in Göteborg in 1980, I asked if she thought Swedish women, by virtue of the greater freedom they enjoyed, were happier than Turkish women. She replied:

> I don't think that Swedish women are especially happy. There are so many issues on which they cannot come to agreement with their husbands. Turkish women are happier because they are afraid of their husbands. They cannot oppose their husbands. They must obey them. They have no choice, but with time they become happier. Then both (man and woman) can come to an agreement. It can be very difficult in the beginning when one is newly married, but this is something that the women are able to manage by exercising patience. A Swedish woman could protest against this but a Turkish woman must keep quiet, keep quiet, keep quiet ... until there is peace in the family. That may take five years, six years ... and those years could be really difficult ones. There are many families that are never able to come to any agreement. Here in Sweden they can separate when they realize that they cannot make peace with each other. This is not possible for us Turkish women. We must wait. Wait until the discord is over. This can take two or three years, perhaps five or six years. Life can be very difficult during that period.

From the way she answered it was obvious that this question was not new to the interviewee. She had thought about this problem before and had probably also discussed it with her children and other relatives and friends. As against the individual freedom of Swedish women stood the patriarchal order of which she was

part and which, from time to time, had meant harsh treatment and unjust submission. Still, she accepted this order because it rendered her stability and predictability in life. Marriage for her was a long-term, a lifelong project, in which responsibility towards not only elderly and younger family members but also towards her husband had very high priority. For her, the good family was the closely connected family. This normative order sometimes caused her pain and grief, but it also granted her personal confidence and a feeling of security.

The generation of women to which I belong did not have to think about that sort of patriarchal order. Unlike preceding generations of Swedish women, for whom the demands described by the Turkish immigrant woman were not all that unfamiliar, our generation was free to form relationships on our own initiative and premises without special prior arrangements and predetermined expectations. This way of living appeared to be easier at the beginning, but turned out to be no less complicated, because once a relationship was formed there were so many new things to be negotiated as the relationship evolved.

Individual autonomy thus has its price. It means a continuous calling into question of even the most intimate relationships. A firmer normative order challenges the value of freedom, but at the same time it also grants some rest and breathing space.

These are but hints as to the complicated issues that ramify deep into our private lives. Not even as scholars are we neutral on these intricate problems. Consequently, at the seminar in Istanbul in October 1997 where the idea of writing this book first occurred to me, it turned out that the Turkish scholars found their Swedish colleagues surprisingly "pro-family." The question was raised whether there was any division between the Turkish and Swedish researchers at the family-and-gender seminar in terms of their degree of sympathy or antipathy towards the family. One assumes that scholars, in their capacity as intellectuals, generally develop a critical mindset, and it seems that the Turkish and the Swedish scholars respectively held opinions that were coloured by their criticisms of existing family relationships in their own countries. Thus, the Turkish scholars were mainly critical of the limitations arising from patriarchal and authoritarian family control on the freedom of the individual, while the Swedish scholars seemed to be concerned with the effects of far-reaching individualism on family relationships.

Despite their differences in perspective and preference, all the contributors to this book agree that a family structure built on strong individual autonomy is no less problematic than a family structure built on hierarchical interdependence. Each model has its own problems and inner tensions. How is power and responsibility distributed among the different members of the family? What kind of division of labour has been worked out and to what extent is it regarded as fair and just? The appeal for equality has provided feminist discourse with a strong and easily mediated slogan, but this catchword loses much of its usefulness in the analysis of existing family practices. The main objective of radical egalitarian discourse is to break down existing power hierarchies, while the aim of daily family practice is to make family relationships work. This seemingly trivial practice requires and generates more complex conceptions of justice. As is shown in this book, the key to this "practical consciousness," in contrast to the "discursive consciousness" of egalitarianism (Giddens 1984 p. 41) lies in keen, meticulous examination of how fairness and equity are apprehended by people in their respective cultural settings.

Preview of Chapters

The volume opens with a chapter by Çiğdem Kağıtçıbaşı in which the conceptual guidelines of this study are outlined. On the basis of extensive cross-cultural studies of family relationships, Professor Kağıtçıbaşı questions the convergence thesis within modernization theory and family sociology. She expounds her research experiences in the context of concepts of individual autonomy and interdependence, and questions theories that assume that individualism is an inevitable feature of modern society. Individualism or individual autonomy would seem to be a characteristic of certain societies, Sweden being a typical example. What is meant here is that individualism was part of that culture long before the emergence of modern society and that individualism may be weak in other societies, like Turkey, even when they are under the spell of advanced modernization. Noting that growing material independence does not necessarily lead to individual autonomy in other respects, Professor Kağıtçıbaşı focuses on relationships of emotional interdependence and elaborates a theoretical model centred on that concept.

The two following chapters offer analyzes of the conjugal unit in the Swedish context. Historian Gunhild Kyle and the sociologist Rita Liljeström discuss the key role of the couple in family relationships, even far back in history, and elaborate on the idea that the nuclear family is a much older form of household than the defenders of evolutionary theory admit.

Gunhild Kyle bases her discussion of marriage on the famous novel *Det går an* (Why not!) published in 1839 by the early nineteenth century Swedish writer Carl Jonas Love Almqvist (1793-1866). She focuses on the problem faced by the young heroine, Sara, who wants to develop a relationship with her beloved, Albert, but without marrying him, which would cost her her legal majority. In so doing, Kyle sheds light on the extent to which a young woman's struggle for individual independence was already pair-oriented in early nineteenth century Sweden. Until the last decades of the nineteenth century, unmarried women above the age of 21 were in legal terms more independent than married women, who were, politically as well as economically, subordinated to the paternal guardianship of their husbands. Professor Kyle discusses women's long struggle to attain majority status (1884) and the right to vote (1921). Of special significance to the current study is the fact that emancipation took place in a context in which the nuclear family constituted the self-evident backdrop long before industrialization and urbanization, the driving forces of modern society, had really gained momentum.

In the next chapter, Rita Liljeström continues with the same theme but expands the perspective in terms of both time and geography. Sweden and the Scandinavian countries are not unique in emphasizing the role of the individual and the couple. This was a pattern shared by several countries in northwest Europe. Nor was the nuclear family household a new phenomenon in the nineteenth century, but reaches as far back as the Middle Ages. Deeply embedded in history, these traditions have persisted into modern times and the trend during the course of modernization has been towards even greater emphasis on the couple and the autonomy of the individual. Professor Liljeström describes how changes in the division of labour, legal arrangements, welfare state institutions, and control of sexuality (birth control, legal abortions) have stripped the couple of wider family responsibilities. The author questions this situation and draws attention to certain contradictory corollaries. On the one hand, there is a trend towards individual emancipation and liberation, while on the other, there is a lack of given and

well-recognized boundaries, a situation that leads to increasing individual and social insecurity.

There is a striking difference between Turkey and Sweden in the number of divorces. Almost half of all marriages in Sweden end in divorce. In Turkey the number is less than 10 per cent. High divorce rates reflect the dilemma arising from far-reaching individual autonomy, since individual independence tends to jeopardize stable relationships. Professionals who face this dilemma in their daily work practice are the family counsellors. Family relationships are deeply embedded within a wider normative and institutional framework. The importance of individual autonomy and the celebration of the couple in the Swedish context has, as already been noted by the authors of the preceding chapters, to be seen in the context of the role played by the welfare state. It seems that, without support from different public institutions, far-reaching individualism would not have been possible. The role of the welfare state in the development of modern Swedish family relationships will be further elaborated in the discussion of fairness and equity in the second part of the book.

Anna-Karin Kollind's chapter on the development of family counselling in Sweden is especially significant in relation to the problems raised by far-reaching individualism. Initiated in the early 1920s with the aim of healing families on the verge of splitting up, family counselling in Sweden today has been transformed into an instrument serving almost the opposite purpose. Today it is not the family as a unit that forms the object of family counselling, but the well-being of each family individual. The way family counselling now works is more in the direction of helping disturbed individuals reach a higher level of self-understanding. The primary purpose is not to save the family or ensure the continuation of the relationship, but to help the married couple find out whether they really ought to, or are able to, continue their relationship. Anna-Karin Kollind's study not only illustrates the paradox of family counselling when imbued with notions of far-reaching individualism, it also shows how certain professional groups, in this case family counsellors and psychologists, are able to influence the formation of the institutions making up the welfare state.

The following two chapters concentrate on family relationships in Turkey from a historical, anthropological, and sociological perspective. In classical evolutionary theory, modernization was understood to mean development from extended to nuclear family households. This assumption has been seriously questioned as far as European conditions are concerned, and, as we have seen, is discussed in this volume in relation to couple relationships in Sweden (Kyle and Liljeström). Similar reservations have also been expressed in relation to social change in Turkey. With the development of genuine sociological research in Turkey at the end of the 1960s, the stereotype of a traditional society based on extended family households was replaced by other conceptions of Turkish family structure. Different studies showed that the extended family household, consisting of a mother and father and their married sons and their families, was not the dominant pattern even in a rural context. (Duben, Timur, Kiray). Timur (1974) showed that less than 20 per cent of households in rural areas consisted of extended families. The highest percentages were found in the southeastern parts of the country where tribal relationships were still dominant. This meant that among the settled peasant population throughout the greater part of Anatolia, the typical household consisted not of the extended but rather of the nuclear family.

Thus the underlying assumption in this book that family relationships are

stronger and weigh heavier in Turkish than in Swedish society cannot be explained by presuming that Turkish society is one in which the extended family structure predominates. The answers to the questions of the stronger family structure in Turkey have to be sought elsewhere and should be formulated more precisely. In the light of this problematic, Sharon Baştuğ's anthropological analysis of changing kinship systems is of particular significance. The author analyzes the kinship structure of Turkish families by going back to the conditions prevailing in Central Asia at the time of the settlement of Turkic and Turkmen tribes in Anatolia. Baştuğ also analyzes the changes in the tribal character of these people as they settled and mixed with the local Anatolian population. As the population settled and the tribal units shrank, the norm of marriage with close relatives also changed, together with the whole concept of the family. Baştuğ's analysis suggests that the existence of extended families is too insignificant, and the concept itself too simplistic, to do justice to the intricate relationships that give such institutional strength to the Turkish family as a social institution.

Sema Erder makes an important contribution to the analysis of that problematic in a modern context in her chapter on urban migration and the reconstruction of kinship networks. Based on research carried out in two suburbs of Istanbul in the 1990s, the author demonstrates how family relationships are restructured into wider social networks by means of which the stronger immigrant families are integrated into barren, often hostile, urban milieus. Those who are not able to articulate their interests within these new networks become outsiders and turn into a new urban proletariat. Within these reorganized, sometimes even mafia-like networks, patriarchal values and ideologies are often sustained and even strengthened. The prevalence of authoritarian family values and structures in many newly established urban areas in Turkey should be understood in light of the lack of public welfare institutions such as exist in Sweden. Sema Erder's analysis gains extra weight from her references to similar research that she carried out among Turkish immigrants living in Stockholm in the 1980s (Rinkeby) (Erder 1989).

The second part of the book deals with questions of fairness and equity, or, in more concrete terms, how the division of labour within the family is established, negotiated, and legitimized. As women enter the labour market, the traditional division of labour within the family, with women taking care of the children and housework, has been challenged. A large number of families split up owing to the increased, double work burden that women assume when they take on additional responsibilities outside the household. How do Swedish families with two breadwinners cope with the pressures of work and the responsibilities both outside and inside the family? The question of how the so-called "moral economy" of double breadwinner families is formed has to be evaluated against the reality created by the welfare state. What do welfare institutions contribute to this situation and how do these institutions affect the inner structures of families? These questions are discussed in the first chapter of the second section by Margareta Bäck-Wiklund, who offers an analysis of social reforms in Sweden since the 1930s.

The next chapter discusses the question of how problems of fairness and equity are approached and solved in daily life in Sweden today. This chapter, by Ulla Björnberg and Anna-Karin Kollind, is based on a recent empirical study carried out by the authors among young families in the Göteborg area. The study focuses on the principles and rules chiselled out by men and women as they explain their ways of organizing domestic work and a shared family economy.

Too often the problem of division of labour within the family is approached from a woman's perspective. In Torgerdur Einarsdottir's chapter, the focus is on the fathers as caretakers. Referring to two studies, one each in Iceland and Sweden, the author discusses the effect of fathers taking on greater responsibilities within the family, for example by making use of their right to paternal leave after a child is born. Torgerdur Einarsdottir's studies show that more shared work (allegedly meaning greater equality) does not necessarily lead to more harmonious or more strongly knit families. The problem is not only to share work, but also how to share it — that is, with what intentions and expectations the division of labour is effected. Based on these studies, the author questions the effects of shared work, and is thereby able to carry the analysis of fairness of the division of family labour a step further.

The codes of fairness and equity developed in Turkey display both differences and similarities with those developing in Scandinavian countries. However, as already mentioned, there are tremendous differences in this respect between families belonging to different social classes within Turkish society. This is illustrated in the next two chapters. Diane Sunar deals with child-rearing and the norms related to it in upper middle class families in Istanbul, and Hale Bolak deals with the division of labour within working class families in the same city.

Diane Sunar's analysis of upper middle class families is based on a three-generation study. This approach permits the author to analyze patterns of both change and continuity. Although the dominance of the family over the individual would appear to persist through the generations, the psychological value of children, compared to their instrumental or material value, seems to increase. There is also a marked decrease in the authoritarian control exerted by parents over their children. These results are important in light of the fact that the behaviour and manners of the urban middle class often serve as models and ideals for the other sections of the population. These studies, therefore, give a good idea of developing trends in contemporary Turkish society.

In spite of such trends, which may prompt some optimism for the future, Hale Bolak's discussion of working class families in Istanbul tells a different and much harsher story. Urbanization by no means necessarily means an improvement in women's status as it relates to the fair division of labour within the family, especially in low-income families. In addition to shouldering the responsibilities of being a breadwinner, the women in these families often find themselves carrying out household chores that men traditionally undertook, like shopping and running other errands outside the home. Hale Bolak argues that the effects of urbanization, female employment, and the relative reduction in men's economic power leads to a shift in the boundaries between the sexes that is mostly disadvantageous to women, but is more open to bargaining and negotiation than is the case in the traditional rural setting.

The conclusions to be drawn from this work may not be immediately apparent. "Seeing oneself through the eyes of others" is a process that takes time, and it is around that motif that the editors sum up the insights from this study in the last chapter.

Note: Relevant comparative statistics for the subjects discussed throughout this volume together with a chronology of legal arrangements with relevance for the family are contained in an Appendix at the end of the book.

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PATTERNS OF AUTONOMY AND INTERDEPENDENCE

Cross-cultural Perspectives on Family Change

ÇİĞDEM KAĞITÇIBAŞI

This chapter presents a cross-cultural perspective on the family within a social psychological framework and with a comparative theoretical orientation: it examines how ongoing family changes and social transformations influence each other. It also examines the corresponding patterns of change in the self and in human relations. The theoretical perspective refers to a model of family change that I have developed over the last decade. The model is based on my own research and other research evidence from diverse societies. The social transformation of concern here is basically urbanization, which entails significant lifestyle changes. Thus, the focus of attention is the so-called "majority world," i.e., the developing countries with strong family and kinship networks, Turkish society being an example of such a family collectivistic culture. However, as the model is also comparative it involves family patterns from Western industrial societies, not least from the Swedish family. The implications of the model for Turkish and Swedish societies will be considered.

Some current examples from Turkish and Swedish demographic and societal data may help to draw attention to certain social psychological aspects of family dynamics that the model may help to explain. For example, there are striking differences between Swedish and Turkish rates of marriage, divorce, solo living (single-person households), suicide, and birth rates. Some of these are tenfold differences. How can those contrasts be explained? Do they result mainly from macrolevel economic and demographic variables, such as differences in the standard of living and education levels, or are there also other influences that relate to family cultures and go above and beyond such structural macro-variables? The theoretical explanations proposed here may throw further light on these issues.

Social science perspectives are valuable in situating family processes in their socioeconomic and historical contexts. However, the family can also be studied as the central component of individual (self)-family-society linkages, which require psychological analysis as well. In understanding how societal values link with childrearing patterns and human developmental outcomes, including the development of the self, family is the crucial mediator. Nevertheless, the complexity of the family as an intergenerational system moving through time has been a deterrent to its psychological analysis (McGoldrick and Carter 1982). Consequently, there has not been much progress in psychological and social psychological theory on the family except in the more applied clinical approaches, such as family systems theory. Yet, it is exactly this theoretical gap at the level of the self-family-society interface that needs to be filled in order to achieve a better understanding of the family and of some of the contrasts between Turkish and Swedish societies.

In particular, a functional and contextual perspective promises to be useful. An important underlying human dimension emerges as mutuality-autonomy, family collectivism-individualism, or at the level of the "self," as the interdependent-independent self. The so-called independent self is commonly seen in individualistic societies, whereas the interdependent or mutually dependent self is more characteristic of family-collectivistic societies (e.g., Kağıtçıbaşı 1990, 1996a, 1997; Kim et. al. 1994; Triandis 1994). There is a great deal of cross-cultural psychological research pointing to behavioural differences between the interdependent and the independent selves (see Markus and Kitayama 1991). Such research, though providing insights into these two main types of self, does not answer the basic questions of how they develop and why they emerge in different types of sociocultural contexts. When we ask how a particular type of self develops, we need to go beyond the descriptive psychological level into interaction patterns in families, parenting values, and childrearing practices. When we further ask why a certain type of self develops in a particular sociocultural context and not in another, we need to go into the underlying functional links between the socioeconomic contexts and family variables (Kağıtçıbaşı 1996a).

The family change model presented here attempts to find answers to such questions. It may also provide insights into some of the family dynamics underlying the contrasting Turkish and Swedish societal data, which will be taken up again when discussing some of the implications of the model. Indeed, this chapter may also serve as a general heuristic device for some of the discussions in the following chapters, since it presents a general comparative perspective on family diversity and change.

Modernization Theory

The model entails a questioning of some of the main assumptions and predictions of modernization theory regarding the family. Therefore, some comments on modernization theory will place the present discussion in its historical context. Modernization perspective is based on a "convergence" model of change towards the Western pattern, characterized by individualism and independence both at the individual and the familial levels. This prediction is based on two implicit assumptions. The first is a social evolutionist assumption to the effect that whatever is different from the (most evolved) Western patterns is deficient and is thus bound to evolve and change towards it with societal development. It is commonly assumed, for example, that family-collectivistic or interdependent family orientations are not compatible with economic growth. The second assumption is a historical one, arguing that in the West the family had been a collectivistic, interdependent system but that industrialization necessitated a shift towards the nuclear, independent, individualistic family pattern.

Regarding the first assumption, the claim is often made that collectivistic family patterns are not compatible with economic progress (see Sinha 1988 for a review). Such claims are also expressed in empirical studies that find a strong relationship between individualism and societal economic affluence, as shown for example by a correlation of .80 by Hofstede (1980) in a study covering 50 countries. Even though correlation does not show causation, the general interpretation of this finding has been in terms of individualism causing economic development rather than the reverse. More recent evidence has, however, challenged

this assumption with evidence of fast economic growth in some family-collectivistic societies in the Pacific Rim, without cultural shifts towards the Western individualistic pattern (Kao and Hong 1988). In particular, the economic boom in the Pacific Rim has taken place without a corresponding change in culture towards individualism. For instance, Morsbach (1980, p. 342) notes the "remarkable continuity in important patterns of personal relations despite historical changes" among the Japanese. In fact, economic growth in collectivistic societies of East Asia has decreased the overall correlation between individualism and economic affluence from .80 to .50 in about two decades (Shwartz 1994).

The second assumption about the historical evolution of the Western family is also being challenged by recent historical-demographic scholarship that points to individualistic patterns in Western Europe predating industrialization (Razi 1993; Macfarlane 1986; Lesthage and Surkin 1988). This research has documented, for example, how the British family was nuclear rather than extended; the bond between family and land was weak; wider ties of kinship were also weak so that villagers relied on institutional support rather than kin assistance; rural society was highly mobile; children often left home in their teens and spent a few years as living-in servants in other families before starting their own families; and women married later and some never married. Similarly, in other family, marriage, and residence patterns derived from demographic records and court rolls, pervasive individualistic themes are seen (reviewed by Razi 1993), particularly in England but also in other Western European countries and the United States (Aries 1980; Furstenberg 1966; Thornton and Fricke 1987).

Therefore, if individualism is not the necessary outcome of industrialization nor the only pattern that is compatible with industrialization and economic growth, then the shift accompanying socioeconomic development elsewhere in the world does not have to be towards the individualistic Western pattern. Other, possibly more complex patterns of change are probably occurring in the family, and as social scientists we need to understand these patterns. Furthermore, it is not only changes in family structures but also in family interaction patterns and dynamics that need to be studied. Interdisciplinary and cross-cultural comparative perspectives would appear to be more promising for understanding the underlying dynamics than single society studies. In this process, at times new insights take the form of learning from our mistakes. Thoughts like these underlie the *Family Model of Emotional Interdependence* emerging from the *Value of Children Study*.

Value of Children Study

In the mid-1970s I conducted a nationwide study in Turkey on the value of children for parents, as part of a nine-country population research project investigating motivations for childbearing and the values attributed to children. More than 20,000 married respondents were interviewed, using nationally representative samples in Indonesia (Sundanese and Javanese samples), Korea, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, and the United States, and a women's sample from Munich in Germany (Bulatao 1979; Darroch, Meyer and Singarimbun 1981; Fawcett 1983; Hoffman 1987; Kağıtçıbaşı 1982 a, b). Two kinds of basic values attributed to children emerged from the study, namely, economic/utilitarian and psychological.

The utilitarian (economic) value of children entails their material contribution to the family both when they are young (as child labour or help with household chores) as well as their old-age security value when they grow up. This value reflects the dependence of the family on especially grown-up children for its material well-being, and the strong family loyalty of the children, a family-collectivistic pattern. The psychological value of children, on the other hand, is attributed to them by parents on the basis of the joy, pride, fun, companionship, and love derived from children.

A main finding of the study was the greater salience of the utilitarian value of children and especially the old-age security value, in less developed countries. For example, old-age security as a reason for having a child was considered very important among women by 93 per cent and 98 per cent of the two samples in Indonesia, by 89 per cent in the Philippines, by 79 per cent each in Thailand and Taiwan, and by 77 per cent in Turkey: this contrasts sharply with only 8 per cent each in Germany and the United States. The percentages in Korea (54 per cent) and Singapore (51 per cent), though still high, were significantly lower than in the other developing countries, in keeping with their higher levels of economic development. Variations within each country also reflected similar patterns of socioeconomic progress. For example, as the standard of living of the residence area in Turkey rose, the salience of the old-age security value of children decreased dramatically (100 per cent in the least developed areas, 73 per cent in medium developed, 61 per cent in more developed, and 40 per cent in metropolitan centres).

At first glance these findings appear to support a modernization perspective, showing decreased intergenerational dependencies (family interdependencies) and increased separation and nucleation, and pointing to a convergence on the Western individualistic model as socioeconomic development increases. When I wrote about this at that time, I relied on a modernization theory interpretation (Kağıtçıbaşı 1985a).

However, at about the same time, different research results indicated continued family interdependencies (e.g., Duben 1982; Olson 1982). My own impressions also pointed in that direction. This prompted me to reexamine the *Value of Children Study* results, and I discovered that our questions had determined our results. The study had been informed mainly by economic and demographic conceptualizations, because it had been conceived as a population study even though it focused on motivations underlying fertility, and the available theories were mainly demographic and economic. Thus, the questions used in the study dealt mostly with economic and material interdependencies, such as, "Would you expect your son/daughter to support you financially when you grow old?"

Moreover, when the findings showed decreased interdependencies, we wrongly interpreted these as decreasing dependencies in general, not only in economic and material terms, even though only the economic value was found to decrease, not the overall value attributed to children. In fact, it was found that their psychological value either did not change with socioeconomic development (Fawcett 1983) or it even increased with it, as found, for example, in Turkey (Kağıtçıbaşı 1982 a, b). This realization led me to distinguish between material and emotional (psychological) interdependencies. This was a conceptual breakthrough that paved the way for the development of a model of family change.

The *Value of Children* results made it clear that socioeconomic development,

involving increased urbanization, education, and income, decreased the material dependencies in the family, whereas the psychological dependencies remained unchanged. This, in fact, did not support the modernization theory prediction of a general reduction in personal and generational interdependencies and, thus, increased nucleation and separation.

Indeed, research from various societies has also been showing that despite socioeconomic development, urbanization, etc., in family-collectivistic cultural settings the expected individuation/separation of family relations is not taking place (e.g., Erelcin 1988; İmamoğlu 1987; Kao and Hong 1988; Lin and Fu 1990, Morsbach 1980). What is noted in this research is that material interdependencies, both personal and familial, tend to become weaker with growing affluence, while psychological (emotional) interdependencies continue to be important. This general pattern is the basis of the *Model of Emotional Interdependence*.

Reverting to the material versus psychological interdependencies in the family, it is understandable why the former should decrease with increased affluence, urbanization, and economic development. With these lifestyle changes, organized social support systems, such as old age pensions, social security benefits, life and health insurance, etc., become more readily available to the elderly so that they don't have to depend on their grown-up offspring for their survival. On the contrary, there is no reason why emotional or psychological connectedness or interdependencies should decrease with socioeconomic progress in family-collectivistic cultures, where "relatedness" values are cherished. These are not incompatible with socioeconomic development and urban lifestyles. What actually happens with an improved socioeconomic standard, urbaniza-tion, etc., is a reduction in the importance attributed to the economic and utilitarian value but an increase in the importance of the psychological value attributed by parents to the child (Kağıtçıbaşı 1982 a, b). There are important implications of this shift for fertility because the economic and utilitarian value of children is associated with numbers of children while their psychological value is not number-based. For example, if a family has many children, each one's economic contribution to the family or to the old-age security of their elderly parents adds up. Thus, the economic value of children is cumulative. However, one can get all the love and joy one needs from one or two children and one does not need more children, since these psychological satisfactions do not accumulate with child numbers. Therefore, urbanization and socioeconomic development leads to reduced fertility (Kağıtçıbaşı 1982 a, b).

A Model of Family Change

The model of family change involves decreasing material but continuing psychological interdependencies in the family with socioeconomic development (particularly urbanization) in societies with family-collectivistic cultures. This model fits with the above research and with research conducted in Asian countries as well as with ethnic minorities in North America and Europe. The model analyzes two rather well-known prototypical patterns of family functioning, each belonging to contrasting cultural and socioeconomic contexts. I then propose a third pattern which overlaps in some respects with the other two, but is different from them in other important respects (Kağıtçıbaşı 1990, 1996).

The first prototypical family pattern is the *Family Model of Interdependence*,

which is more prevalent in less developed, rural, agrarian socioeconomic settings with "cultures of relatedness" or collectivism (Kağıtçıbaşı 1985b). The contrasting pattern is the *Family Model of Independence*, prevalent in Western industrialized urban settings with individualistic cultures. Each of the family models includes both material and psychological bonds. The interdependence-independence dimension is crucial to an understanding of family relationships, particularly those between generations.

The proposed third *Family Model of Emotional Interdependence* is distinct from the two commonly recognized prototypical models of interdependence and independence. It may be seen as a synthesis of the two. In the *Model of Emotional Interdependence* there is independence in the material realm but mutual dependence in the psychological sense. Thus, this model is in line with research evidence, such as, for instance, the *Value of Children Study*, distinguishing the material and the psychological dimensions of family interdependence. The overall model of family change rejects the modernization prediction of a shift from the model of interdependence to the *Family Model of Independence*. Instead, it predicts a shift towards the family model of psychological/emotional interdependence, particularly with urbanization, social change, and economic growth in family-collectivistic cultures (see figures 1, 2, and 3).

An examination of Figures 1, 2, and 3 shows, first of all that the three patterns are situated in clearly defined contexts, entailing different cultures and living conditions. There are links with different family structures. In particular, in less developed, less affluent settings, with collectivistic mutually dependent family patterns, young adults provide financial assistance to their elderly parents; in demographic terms "wealth flows" are towards parents, especially through patrilineage. This has implications for "son preference" and high fertility, for sons are more reliable sources of old-age security. In contrast, the *Family Model of Independence* is situated in individualistic cultural contexts with industrial, urban lifestyles. With children becoming economic costs rather than economic assets, and provision of other sources of financial support in old age, wealth flows are towards children, not towards the elderly parents. Low fertility and the relatively higher status of women are related characteristics of the independent family structure.

In the *Family Model of Emotional Interdependence*, the context entails shifts towards industrial urban lifestyles and increased affluence with, however, continuing family-collectivistic culture, as is found in the developed metropolitan centres of non-Western societies such as Turkey, Japan, Korea, etc. The resultant family structure entails similarities to the independence model in terms of wealth flows towards children, with decreasing material interdependencies on the grown-up offspring, low fertility, and improved status of women. However, it is also similar to the interdependence model in terms of the more extended family connections.

There are corresponding differences in family systems in the three models. In the *Model of Interdependence*, family loyalties and values of mutuality are important and related to the economic/utilitarian value attributed to the child. In the *Model of Independence*, individual loyalties and independence values come to the fore together with increased salience of the child's psychological value. Again, a synthesis is seen in the *Family Model of Emotional Interdependence*, which combines family loyalties with individual loyalties, where emotional

Figure 1. Model of Interdependence



Taken fom Kağıtçıbaşı (1990) with slight variation

Figure 2. Model of Independence



Taken fom Kağıtçıbaşı (1990) with slight variation

Figure 3. Model of Emotional Interdependence



Taken fom Kağıtçıbaşı (1990) with slight variation

rather than material interdependence values become salient. With changing lifestyles, the psychological value of the child assumes importance.

With regard to family interaction and socialization, childrearing patterns vary correspondingly in these three prototypical family models, with different resultant selves. In the interdependent family, loyalty of the children to the family is of crucial importance to the family's material well-being over the family lifecycle. Therefore, dependency is valued rather than independence. An independent child is more likely to grow up to be a "separated" young adult who might look after his/her own individual needs rather than those of the family, whereas an obedient child is more likely to grow up to be a loyal offspring. Obedience-oriented parenting is, therefore, more functional in the *Family Model of Interdependence.* Intergenerational dependencies shift direction during the family lifecycle. First the child is dependent on the parent, this dependence to be reversed later on as the dependence of the elderly parent on the grown-up offspring. The opposite pattern is seen in the *Family Model of Independence*, where there is relatively permissive parenting and autonomy is valued in childrearing. In the individualistic society, independence of the growing child is functional. A great deal of anthropological, as well as cross-cultural psychological research provides evidence for the above patterns (see Kağıtçıbaşı 1996 for a review).

In the *Family Model of Emotional Interdependence*, parenting is oriented towards both control and encouragement of autonomy, though not independence and separation. This type of parenting is akin to Baumrind's (1980) "authoritative" parenting. Since intergenerational material dependencies decrease in this model, the autonomy of the child is no longer seen as a threat to family loyalty and family livelihood. Thus, autonomy can enter childrearing. However, why *should* it enter? The answer lies in the changing environmental demands that accompany new lifestyles. Specifically, in urban contexts with more schooling and more specialized jobs that require individual decisionmaking, obedience is no longer functional for success; autonomy becomes more expedient. Nevertheless, since relatedness continues to be valued in the collectivistic family culture, separation is not a childrearing goal. The independent separated self is constituted in the context of the *Family Model of Independence*, and the interdependent related self develops in the mutually dependent family. In the *Family Model of Emotional Interdependence*, however, an autonomous-relational self develops.

The Autonomous-relational Self

This model of self reflects a synthesis of two basic human needs, the needs for autonomy and for relatedness. These apparently contrasting basic needs have long been recognized in psychology, especially by conflict theories of personality (Rank 1945; Angyal 1951; Bakan 1968). The *Family Model of Independence* recognizes and satisfies the need for agency, while neglecting the need for relatedness. The model of interdependence satisfies the need for relatedness, while ignoring the need for agency. Thus, the *Family Model of Emotional Interdependence*, which satisfies both, may be seen to be a more healthy model.

A question may be raised as to the possibility of a family model entailing apparently conflicting tendencies, such as dependency and autonomy (relatedness and agency). Indeed, these two needs are often seen to be mutually exclusive,

as, for example, by the existential psychology. The common assumption is that to develop agency, one must be separate from others, as claimed, for example, by the "separation-individuation" hypothesis (Mahler, Pine and Bergman 1975) and family systems theory (Minuchin 1974). However, as I have discussed elsewhere (1996b), agency and relatedness are neither logically nor psychologically incompatible. We can distinguish two dimensions of self relations, *agency* and *personal distance*. The two poles of the agency dimension are *autonomy* and *heteronomy* (being ruled from outside); those of the personal distance dimension are *separateness* and *relatedness*. Given that these are independent (orthogonal) dimensions, it is possible to have different combinations, including the autonomous-related self as well as the heteronomous-separated self as the fourfold table below illustrates:

		Agency	
		autonomy	heteronomy
Personal distance	separateness	independent	separate, but ruled by others
	relatedness	autonomous related	interdependent

It is probably the individualistic bias of psychology that has prevented the ready recognition of these combinations, because it is assumed that separation-individuation is a necessary condition to a healthy self-development. Clearly some early cognitive process of differentiation/separation must take place, because every person is aware of being a separate entity from others. However, psychology, reflecting the individualistic Western ethos, goes beyond this basic existential level in defining healthy human development as further separation of the self from others. Overlapping, connected selves are considered to lack autonomy, even to be pathological. Yet, much cross-cultural research and observation points to closely knit human relations and connected selves to be the common pattern in most non-Western societies (for a review see Kağıtçıbaşı 1996a).

Thus, autonomy and relatedness can be compatible and form a synthesis. Other thinkers have pointed to the same type of synthesis of autonomy (agency) and relatedness (merging with others), for example, S.R.Sinha (1985) in India; C.F.Yang (1988) and K-S Yang (1986) in China; and Westen (1985) from a global perspective.

Other aspects of the synthetic *Family Model of Emotional Interdependence* are also supported by research evidence. Some current research conducted in non-Western countries and with ethnic minorities in the United States provides evidence supporting some aspects of the model (Kuşdil 1991; Jose, Huntsinger, Huntsinger, and Liaw 1999; Lin and Fu 1990; Phinney and Madden 1999). For example, Orung (1998) in comparing young people from modern and traditional backgrounds in Turkey, found them to have equally high levels of emotional

interdependence with close persons (family member and friend), with no decrease in interpersonal emotional ties as a result of modernization. Similarly, Orung (1998) and earlier Erelcin (1988), again with modern and traditional groups in Turkey, found the modern group to be less willing than the traditional group to give material resources to acquaintances (decreasing material interdependencies with modernization) but there was no difference between them in the willingness to give emotional resources (continuing emotional ties). Finally, Goregenli (1997) found collectivistic (relational) orientations mainly in the sharing of non-material resources among modern young groups in Turkey.

New conceptualizations, based on research, point to possible combinations or syntheses of characteristics previously assumed to be incompatible. Another example is the "socially oriented achievement motivation" (Agarwal and Misra 1986; Bond 1986; Misra and Agarwal 1985, 1993; K-S Yang 1986; Yu and K-S Yang 1994).This is different from the individualistic achievement motivation commonly held out in psychology. (McClelland et. al. 1953). Socially oriented achievement motivation involves the exaltation of both the self and the in-group (family) with which the self is closely connected. For example, in a study of Turkish and Belgian youth, Phalet and Claeys (1993) found combined preferences among modern urban Turkish youth for both "loyalty" to the family and "self-realization," contrasted with "self-realization" alone among Belgian youth. Similarly, parenting can also entail seemingly conflicting tendencies, such as control and encouragement of autonomy, as found by Lin and Fu (1990) among Chinese parents both in China and in the United States. On the basis of their work in India, Sinha and Tripathi (1994) proposed the "coexistence of opposites" regarding individualistic and collectivistic orientations, quite similar to independence-interdependence, and a study from Japan (Shwalb, Shwalb and Murate 1991) pointed to the combined importance of individualism and group goals among adolescents. Such findings point to new syntheses of individualistic and collectivistic orientations rather than a shift towards the Western individualistic model.

Implications of the Model for Turkey

In societies such as Turkey with collectivistic "cultures of relatedness," the *Model of Emotional Interdependence* is better than the *Model of Independence* in explaining the emerging family patterns resulting from shifts in lifestyles from rural to urban. With changing lifestyles, new psychological orientations such as autonomy are rendered functional, as described before. However, the closely knit human ties, the collectivistic family culture, and the relational self that are not incompatible with urban modern lifestyles continue to exist, thus engendering the autonomous-relational self. Such modifications in family patterns are implied by the contextual perspective utilized by the model of family change proposed here.

However, there can be deviations from the model, mainly for two reasons. One particularly significant reason is that the traditional family culture can resist change. For example, even though success in school and specialized urban jobs demands autonomy, parents may persist in their obedience-oriented childrearing values. Indeed, this is a rather common problem, especially among recent urban migrants in Turkey and Turkish immigrants in Europe, many of whom have a low education level. Thus, misfits can come about between the requirements of changing lifestyles and rather persistent traditional parenting. In this way, the

shift from the *Family Model of Interdependence* to the *Family Model of Emotional Interdependence* can be stalled.

There are programme and policy implications for dealing with such problems. For example, parent education programmes can provide parents with insights into the issues involved in human development and support them in their parenting roles to promote the optimal development of their children. An example is the Mother-Child Education Program which has been devised on the basis of research and has evolved into a nationwide non-formal parent education programme in Turkey. Presently, it is being implemented all over the country as well as among Turkish ethnic migrants in some European countries (see Beckman 1998; Kağıtçıbaşı 1996a).

The other reason for deviations from the model of family change towards the model of emotional interdependence is cultural diffusion from the individualistic West, promoting the model of independence and the individuation-separation of the self. Particularly poignant is the effect of U.S.-dominated media (mainly TV and cinema), which upholds the individualistic ethos which, in turn, is easily seen as the modern way of life.Thus, even though the *Family Model of Independence* is not the most healthy in satisfying the two main human needs, autonomy and relatedness, it is exported to the majority world as "gospel truth." What is thus imposed from outside can be readily accepted and imitated.

Again, general social sensitization, in the form of non-formal education, creating public opinion, and similar social mobilization may counteract such influences. These measures and precautions can help support the shift in family/human patterns towards the model of emotional interdependence, which is more adaptive to changing, urban, modern lifestyles and more functional in promoting healthy human development.

There are also implications for a better understanding of the ethnic variations in family patterns currently experienced among immigrant groups in Western countries. For example, in social service applications, an awareness of the dynamics of the emotional interdependence model would be valuable in understanding why immigrant Turkish parents resist the separation and independence of their children. It is reported, for instance, that European social workers often insist on the separation-individuation of Turkish children from their parents (Fişek and Kağıtçıbaşı 1999), because they consider this to be the only healthy pattern and necessary for the development of autonomy. This is neither a feasible nor an adaptive approach, given the Turkish family culture of relatedness. A better approach would involve a recognition of the feasibility of the autonomous-relational self and the *Family Model of Emotional Interdependence* (Kağıtçıbaşı 1996 a, b).

Implications of the Model for Sweden and for Turkish-Swedish Contrasts

There is also some evidence that the model has validity in Western, especially European contexts, with rising "soft" postmodern values (Inglehart 1991) replacing competitive capitalistic individualism and materialism (e.g., Bronfenbrenner and Weiss 1983; Cohler and Grunebaum 1981; Fu et. al. 1986; Mogey 1991 in the United States; Saal 1987 and Jansen 1987 in the Netherlands). Thus, a new search for community and closely knit human ties is noted as a reaction to extreme individualism and loneliness, particularly in Sweden (Ehn 1990). For

example, Ekstrand and Ekstrand (1987) found that Swedish parents, compared with Indian parents, stressed the value of group relations for their children because "the Swedes badly miss strong group relations" (p. 179).

From the applied perspective of family clinical psychology, also, similar formulations combining independence and interdependence are proposed. For instance, the importance of both autonomy and relatedness and their integration are emphasized for stable marriages, for the healthy development of children and adolescents (Selman 1989), and for balanced gender roles (Barciauskas and Hull 1989). Similarly Fu, Hinkle and Hanna (1986) considered dependency a valued trait in adulthood for maintaining close family ties. Notwithstanding calls for balancing independence with connectedness, the individualistic culture is deep-seated and resistant to change. In the West, it is instilled in the growing child from an early age and is constantly reinforced throughout life. It is also reflected in public policies, which are focused more on the individual rather than on the family, as seen in Sweden and noted in the chapters 4 and 8 in this book.

Some of the contrasting demographic rates in Sweden and Turkey might be due, at least in part, to their contrasting family cultures. For example, divorce rates in Turkey are very low; whereas those in Sweden are among the highest in Europe. The figures in 1996 are 64 per cent of marriages in Sweden and only 6 in Turkey.[1] The more than tenfold difference is obviously due to many socioeconomic factors, such as the higher educational levels and greater economic independence of women in Sweden. However, the greater individualism in Sweden is also a factor. In marriage this can take the form of conflicts between the individual's own needs and those of the couple/family or seeing intimacy as a threat to one's independence (Vannoy 1991). Solo living (single-person households) constitutes a high percentage of the households in Sweden (41.5 per cent), but is negligible in Turkey (4.5 per cent). The close to tenfold difference is despite the fact that there is substantial mobility of men from rural to urban areas in Turkey for seasonal and other employment. Solo living is made possible by greater societal affluence. However, it is also in line with the higher individualism and independence values in Sweden. On the other hand, solo living may be associated with loneliness and even with suicide. Suicide rates in Sweden are very high; they are very low in Turkey (22.9 versus 2.9 per 100.000, respectively).[2]

In this context a comparative study of elderly Swedes and Turks (İmamoğlu et. al. 1993) is informative. It was found that elderly Turkish people (especially men) had both larger social networks and interacted more frequently with others than did the Swedes. Despite this, however, Turks reported more loneliness. Though apparently paradoxical, these results are explained in terms of the much higher social contact aspirations and desires of the relationally-oriented Turks, which are not quite satisfied even with their more frequent contacts (compared with the individualistic Swedes). There may be the additional (methodological) factor involved in that the Swedes, in contrast to Turks, may have been less willing to disclose private feelings (of loneliness in this case), as "privacy" is an important value for individualists. Indeed, the researchers found that Swedes were "less open with their friends" than Turks in disclosing "private affairs"

1 Source: www.infoplease.com/ipa/a0200806.html

2 Source for Sweden (1995): www.lysator.liu.se/(eur)/nordic/snc/suicides.html; Source for Turkey (1996): DİE, 1998 Ankara, İntihar İstatistikleri 1996.

(İmamoğlu et. al. 1993, p. 37). This is again typical of the greater "interpersonal distance" of the individualistic "separated" self.

Most young people live with their family of origin till marriage in Turkey. In Sweden young people leave their family of origin to live on their own or to cohabit before they marry; some never marry. Marriage rates are much higher in Turkey than in Sweden. Birth rates in Turkey are also much higher than in Sweden (2.8 versus 1.4 per cent, respectively in 1990-95).[3] Though higher than in some other Western European countries, such as Italy, France, and Germany, Sweden's birth rate is half that of Turkey. This is especially notable, given that pronatalist social welfare measures are negligible in Turkey but quite pronounced in Sweden, such as the maternity-paternity leaves of up to a year after childbirth, provision of space at quality childcare centres from an early age, etc.

The more closely knit family ties and the higher value put on family integrity in Turkey are at least partly responsible for the above situation. Birth rates in Turkey are on the decrease, particularly with rural-to-urban mobility and increasing education and income levels. The country has clearly started its demographic transition (UNDP 1996). This is consistent with the characteristics of the *Family Model of Emotional Interdependence*, also, with decreasing economic value of the child among urbanizing groups. However, in line with the increasing psychological value of children, childlessness is a rare phenomenon, and pronatalist values persist even among educated urban groups. They are particularly strong among the large numbers of rural and less urbanized groups where economic/utilitarian value of children and material interdependencies in the family are still important.

Exogenous Factors and Limitations of the Model

It may be claimed that both the model of family change proposed or the discussions thereof do not touch on some important social and cultural factors, such as gender or religion. It is true, of course, that the phenomena under consideration are highly complex and multifaceted, and all the influencing factors cannot be accommodated within the confines of any one model. Nevertheless, a few observations are in order, particularly with respect to religion. In ethnic research, there is a tendency to point to religion (particularly Islam) as an explanation for various societal and ethnic characteristics, so much so that this turns into easy labelling of a whole group of people. This is possibly because being Moslem is an easily observable characteristic of the Turkish (and some other) ethnic groups in Europe, which clearly distinguishes them from others and the autochthonic populations.

Yet, though important, religion is a part of the more encompassing culture and needs to be understood in those terms. The same socioeconomic-cultural background factors that create family patterns, etc., also create religion. Thus, religion may not be the major explanatory variable. For example, the traditional Turkish family is more similar to the traditional Greek family (with different religions) than to the traditional Indonesian family (with the same religion). As one moves away from the modern urban centres into rural areas in both Greece and Turkey, the family becomes more patriarchal, whereas in Indonesia as one moves away

3 The Universal Almanac, Kansas City, MO, 1995

from the city centres, the family becomes less patriarchal. This is because the background family culture in Indonesia is the matrilineal Polynesian/Malay island culture, whereas in the Eastern Mediterranean it is patrilineal. Similarly, it can be claimed that all three monotheistic religions, being the product of the same basic cultural and socioeconomic area (Eastern Mediterranean-Middle Eastern), have all upheld patriarchal values. That these religions have afterwards been more or less subject to reform and change does not change this fact.

Nevertheless, religion is an important factor in the sense that, though a product of basic culture, it serves to legitimize and reinforce it. This often takes the form of upholding conventional values, particularly conservative family and gender ideology. There are other influences such as politics that complicate the issues further and are also outside the scope of the present model. The theoretical family model propounded in this chapter focuses mainly on intergenerational relations and the development of the self. It is also basically social psychological in scope but also takes into consideration the sociocultural-economic context with a functionalist orientation.

Conclusion

Societies upholding individualistic values and reflecting these in their family and childrearing patterns have typically recognized and reinforced the basic human need for autonomy, while ignoring to some extent the basic human need for relatedness and belongingness. Societies stressing family-collectivistic values have done the reverse. Recognizing both of these human needs promises to contribute more to human well-being. The *Model of Emotional Interdependence* involves such a synthesis, and it may not be utopian, as evidenced by recent research and applications.

The model of family change presented here is functional and contextual. Though not claiming a deterministic and rigid functionalism, the model looks into the functional relations among important elements within the sociocultural context. Functional and contextual perspectives are useful in answering some basic questions about the links between the development of the individual self, the family, and society. Thus, as we have seen, the model looks into the demands of the cultural and socioeconomic conditions, that is lifestyles, to analyze family interactions, childrearing values, and the resultant self. Furthermore, changes in these lifestyles are taken into consideration to predict changes in the resultant family interaction patterns and the development of the self. Since the changes in lifestyles show a remarkable level of commonality in the world in terms of increasing urbanization, etc., general trends can be predicted. Current research provides some support for the model presented here, but further work is needed for more conclusive evidence. What is needed, in particular, is work with the family and the self in contrasting sociocultural economic contexts to test the model. For example, Turkish and Swedish family and self interfaces can be studied from such a theoretical perspective. Studying changes in these would be especially challenging. Thus, if as claimed here, the model of emotional interdependence is a more healthy model in terms of serving better the two basic human needs for relatedness and for autonomy, then there should be shifts towards this model not only in Turkey but also in Sweden. The shift in Turkey would be from the *Model of Interdependence* to the *Model of Emotional Interdependence*; but

the shift in Sweden would be from the *Model of Independence* to the *Model of Emotional Interdependence*. This prediction of convergence towards the *Model of Emotional Interdependence* is unique and needs to be tested. Further research into these questions promises to enrich our understanding of self-family-society interfaces and the changes in these. Such insights would throw light on human dynamics in particular societies as well as in terms of common patterns. The emerging similarities and differences promise to be of both theoretical and practical significance.

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Married and Degraded to Legal Minority: The Swedish Married Woman during the Emancipation Period, 1858-1921

GUNHILD KYLE

Sara and Albert

In 1839 a remarkable novel appeared in Stockholm bookstores. Its title was *Why not!* and its author was a well known liberal, C.J.L. Almqvist. The story was about the growing love between two young people, Sara and Albert, but its real theme was the marriage question (Almqvist 1994). Sara and Albert make their first aquaintance on the steamboat *Yngve Frej*, she on her way from Stockholm to her home-town, he on a business trip. In describing what happens between them during their first day, Almqvist very clearly outlines their characters. Chivalrously, Albert tries to court Sara: he buys her a ring, he wants to invite her for dinner, and he insists on paying for their hotel room. In short, he behaves like a young man is expected to do when meeting an attractive girl. But Sara doesn't react as expected. She throws the ring into the sea, and she absolutely refuses to accept his financial offerings. From the beginning, Almqvist emphasizes Sara's strong sense of integrity. This quality in Sara is further highlighted when she tells Albert her life story and her future plans. The daughter of a deceased glazier and a sick mother, she runs her father's workshop, and is allowed to do so as long as her mother is alive. But when her mother dies, Sara must look for something else for a living. She will inherit a small house with some spare rooms to let, and she has invented a sort of putty to make and sell, as its production does not come within the guilds' jurisdiction, but is permissible for women. Albert too has quite promising expectations. Besides the opportunity of becoming a commissioned officer, he has an income from some family estates and is planning to buy a farm. Their mutual affection grows, and everything looks fine until they begin to talk about their future life together. For then it turns out that Sara is decidedly opposed to marriage.

During their weeklong journey, they go into the family problem, above all housework and children. Sara makes it a condition for their life together that they have separate homes (Albert in her spare rooms!) and separate economies. She is convinced that the stresses and trivialities of an intimate, daily life would destroy their love. She has had bad experiences during her childhood, when "a boozing and difficult husband" (p. 35) destroyed her mother's life, driving her into drunkenness, "so shameful for a woman" (p. 37). So Albert will have to take care of himself, procuring his meals and other services from people in the neighbourhood "for a few coins" (p. 89), services that were definitely part of the housewife's duties.

Hesitating to mention sex openly, Albert worries about the children of unmarried parents. In her answer Sara reveals her opinion of the wedding ceremony. The fact that a couple have been "read together" (p. 93) by a pastor is of no importance for parenthood. "Good, sensible human beings" (p. 83) will always take care of their children.

In two paragraphs, Sara gives her idea of marriage in a more fundamental way. The first paragraph describes in general terms the consequences of the matrimonial contract: "It is, and always will be horrible when one human being has the right to be put in a position to destroy another to the point of death. God's beautiful love will certainly never make any progress on earth in this way. I never want to have this power over anybody else, and I don't intend to let anybody have it over me" (p. 83).

The other paragraph is about the gender-specific division of power: "If we were to set about sharing a lot of unnecessary things, I'll tell you what the result would be. If you were to take my little house, my means of support, my household goods and money - well, I'm not going to deny that I could start to get annoyed, for you might not understand how to take care of things. ... Well, let me tell you that as soon as you noticed this sort of thing in me, you'd be raging mad" (p. 90).

The novel aroused a storm of protest, and a large number of pamphlets criticizing it appeared in the 1840s. Almqvist lost his position as headmaster at a secondary school and also the chance of becoming an ordained priest/minister. The reason, of course, was his attack on the holiest of institutions, the family.

Almqvist consistently analyzed the family from the woman's point of view. He revealed its dichotomic character by distributing its blessings and burdens between the sexes. In the prevailing family structure Albert would be the winner and Sara the loser. But Almqvist didn't see the family isolated from the rest of society. On the contrary, he emphasized the correspondence between the subordination of women in the family and in society. Sara has to face a preindustrial labour market, where guild regulations left only a few niches open to women. But, facing the alternative of being supported by a husband, she realizes that it would make her almost nonexistent as an individual. She is a businesswoman, proud of her professional skill, but she also wants love and children. She solves the dilemma by choosing unlegalized cohabitation. Then she will be able to act according to her own interests, in the still limited way that laws and regulations permitted. Also she could live with the man she loved in a kind of equality. Thus she draws the pattern of a new gender order. Sara's statements on the family were identical almost word for word with the articles of the Marriage Act.

"Marriage is by God Ordained"

The power structure of the old Swedish agrarian society may well be described by the metaphor of the three "regimes," a model constructed by theologians. Of a spiritual character was the *Ordo Ecclesiasticus*, the church with its clergy as teachers and interpreters of the words of God. Of the two worldly regimes, the *Ordo Politicus* represented the state authorities. The *Ordo Economicus* or household regime laid down the rules of daily family life. At the head of each regime or power pyramid respectively stood the king, the bishops, and husbands, all authorized by God. The pattern constituted an overall hierarchical system, with its roots in the Old Testament and Lutheran thinking, and it



Sara and Albert on board the ship "Yngve Frej," discussing life and marriage.
Illustration by Gunnar Brusewitz. Permission of reproduction kindly granted by the artist.

became normative in the Christian view of society (Åsbrink 1959). The regime "rules," consisting of Bible texts and explanations, were put together in the Lutheran catechism, which until the 1820s was part of the Swedish hymnbook. People had to learn the catechism by heart, and this was checked and tested by the parish clergy. In times before modern media this was a most effective way of disseminating an ideology.

The first commandment was to obey the authorities, and, in the same way, the relationships of the household were regulated by the rule of obedience, which meant that its members, wife, children, and servants, were subordinated to the husband. In reality he was their guardian with the right to inflict corporal punishment even on his wife. It was in this mental environment that the *Marriage Act* of 1734 was passed, the one applicable to Sara and Albert.

In a pamphlet from 1871, the relationship between spouses was characterized as follows: "Man and wife are one person, and this dual creature is represented by the man" (quote from Wahlström 1933, p.188).

In a popular way those words express the doctrine of the unity of married couples, which at that time was characteristic of the view of marriage (Banks 1986). According to this doctrine, the *Marriage Law* made the husband the spokesman of the wife in court, with the exception of criminal cases and internal marital conflicts. But the legal disability also applied to the wife's position inside marriage. It is true that two reform acts in 1845 improved women's conditions, giving daughters the same right of inheritance as sons, and giving wives the same share as husbands in their joint estate, but as minors women didn't have the right to administer or dispose of their property.

The husbands were totally in charge of the family economy. This appeared to

be all the more unfair as all unmarried women achieved majority status in 1858, with the right to handle their own economy. The dissatisfaction with this situation led to the *Married Women's Right to Property Act* in 1874. But this act was not unconditional. A special marriage settlement was required, and this was only very rarely made. One aim of this law was to make it possible for working class women to use their salaries for the benefit of their families. The legislators trusted wives more than husbands, who were regarded as spending their money in the pub rather than on the family. But in reality the law was valid only for the purchase of food. Things bought for the household became part of the joint estate and were in the hands of the husband (Widerberg 1980).

But the prescriptions of the gender division of work and responsibilities went deeper than the paragraphs on the specified rights of the spouses. The overwhelming, historical identification of women's work with housework and childcare made these seem like a law of nature. Consequently, the law of 1734 laid the duty of providing for the family on the man, and the duty of managing the household on the woman. The husband controlled his wife's working capacity to the extent that she had to have his permission to take a job outside the home. In an agrarian economy this was no problem, since the farmer and his wife were a production unit, but with the growth of urbanization and industrialization, tradition and legislation became a sort of bondage for wives.

Maybe the most humiliating official action against married women took place in 1902, when in a Royal proposal to the Riksdag (parliament) concerning male suffrage, two votes for married men was suggested, as they were seen as representatives for their wives. This attempt to introduce the doctrine of the unity of married couples into the political sphere of power immediately led to the formation of the Swedish Women's Suffrage Movement. Also on its agenda was the claim for majority status for married women and a new marriage law.

The 1734 *Marriage Act* was rooted in a severaly hierarchical social order, characterized by obedience to male authority. From the middle of the nineteenth century this apparently stable order began to crumble. For economic and social reasons many of its institutions and prescriptions became obsolete and were either reformed or abolished. Women, too, were involved in the process through the so-called emancipating reforms. The family, however, remained intact.

I assume that this omission of family was partly a consequence of the female reform policy. Its aim was not to overthrow male hegemony by changing the power relations between the sexes, but to solve specific problems concerning, above all, the support of unmarried women. But even that limited purpose could in the long run weaken the division between men's and women's "proper spheres." The traditional family could then serve as a bulwark against disintegrating factors.

In the following three sections, I present the emancipating reforms concerning women's majority status, education for women, and women on the labour market. In the two last sections, I will show how the family was openly threatened by various rebellious actions.

Splitting up the Female Collective

The expression "coming of age" is not quite clear from a gender point of view, at least not historically. For instance, in 1907 it meant to a Swedish man to have full citizen-ship, but to a woman only the right to control her own economy. This gender-based difference was abolished only in 1920.

On the political level the debates on women's coming of age started in 1809 and con-tinued until 1858, when the first act on this issue was passed by the *Riksdag*. This act still included some restrictions, but these were successively removed and finally abolished in 1884.

The debates followed a pattern well known from other discussions on women's questions. There were the rhetorical, ideological references to the doctrine of natural rights, which were also valid for women. But the decisive arguments were linked to the labour market. On the one hand, the minority status of female employees caused difficulties for employers, as women had to get permission from their guardians to take a job, which used to be a troublesome affair. To remove this obstacle, a number of women exploited the possibilitiy of being declared of age by decision of the High Court, which approach, however, required a lot of time-consuming paperwork for the administration (Qvist 1960). So the decision regarding unmarried women's majority status was in fact taken in order to satisfy the special needs of the labour market. Married women's majority status was mentioned in passing but not discussed.

It may seem a logical contradiction that a woman, declared of age when unmarried, would become a minor when married, but majority had nothing to do with the woman as an individual: It was the family structure that placed her in a position ruled by other values than those of personal freedom. As time went on, however, the term "minority" seemed more and more embarrassing, so the expression "latent majority" was used instead. This notion went back to one of the liberal thinkers of the 1830s, who had analyzed the position of women in society as compared with that of men. Recognizing the married woman's majority status, he even ascribed to her the right to vote, but she had to abstain from that right because of her sacred task as mother. "This," he says, "is the very meaning of woman's emancipation: an emancipation from politics" (Kyle 1983, p. 46). Despite declaring her of age, he at the same time reduced her sphere of influence to the private sphere, which, as a matter of fact, accorded very well with the proposal of two votes for married men.

As a result of this reform, gender-specific work in the family became more definite than before. The reform made home the proper place for the wife. Her biological destiny as childbearer also decided her social destiny. In the course of the nineteenth century, the biological aspects of gender gained ground and were very often used as arguments against women's right to education and work (Kyle 1972, 1979).

As was intended, the reform opened up the labour market to unmarried women, but because of its half-way character it also made them a special category. When married, they lost majority status, and their prescribed duties as housewives under the rule of their husbands restricted their freedom of action. To the employers they became an unstable element of the workforce. Already from the beginning of the industrial era, women had been looked upon as labour reserves (Kyle 1979; Wikander 1988).

The thrust of the reform made unmarried women visible, responsible individuals with a legal identity, while wives remained invisible in a legal sense as subordinate parts of the marital unit. In other words, the female population was split into two categories, each having its own rights. There was, of course, no correspondence to this in the male population. It was an odd situation, which was

destined to last for about sixty years. There were different reactions from the women. From the 1880s, when they began to organize, their associations fought against the grotesque division between married and unmarried women, and claimed majority status for the wives. But there were also women who defended the status quo, pointing to the sanctity of the marriage bond (Kyle 1987).

The Twofold Aim of Educating Girls

In Europe, the Enlightenment had introduced revolutionary ideas, not least concerning the role of knowledge and schools. Philosophers and educators developed theories on what kind of education would be of the greatest advantage to the progress of their countries. One of the most influential was Jean Jacques Rousseau, whose book *Emile* or *Education* (1762) was widely read. Among his opponents, Mary Wollstonecraft, in her book *A Vindication of the Rights of Women* (1792), especially refuted his view on education for girls. Though both of them nourished the idea of a new society of democracy and equality, there was a decisive difference between their interpretations of the terms of education. According to Rousseau, education should develop and strengthen the specific qualities given by nature to men and women. His programme was based on ancient, sexual stereotypes, presented in new psychological form. His suggestion for gender-divided education would have as consequence a dichotomic society, with fixed borderlines between the private female and the public male spheres.

By the time Wollstonecraft refuted Rousseau's ideas, he himself was dead, but his reputation was alive and growing. As against his speculations on the nature of woman, she emphasized her practical experience of girls' education. She had come to the conclusion that what Rousseau perceived as inherited characteristics, such as weakness, intellectual insuffiency, and incapacity for abstract thought, were actually due to the miserable education girls received.

In pure form, their ideas on education represented the two gender theories based on difference versus similarity between the sexes that were to dominate discourse in the ninetenth century. To Rousseau, woman's destiny was determined by her sex, with motherhood as its ultimate aim, which made home her proper place. To Wollstonecraft, the woman was an individual, capable of deciding by herself her sphere of activity. The conflict between their theories most clearly emerged in the school debates.

In 1842 the compulsory elementary school was established in Sweden. It was to replace different types of charity schools, Sunday school,s etc., which until then had been the only schools available to poor people. It was jointly financed by the state and the municipalities (Kyle 1972).

In principle, the curriculum was common for boys and girls, a point that gave rise to debate in the *Riksdag*. The need for farmers' or working class daughters to learn reading and writing was questioned, as was the whole idea of a common curriculum. The arguments referred to the girls' future duties as housewives and mothers (Kyle and Qvist 1974). Finally, the local school boards were entrusted with the decision about whether a girl should attend the "normal" course or the "minimal" course, the latter being intended for the poorest pupils and the "idiots." This policy formally remained in place until 1897, but was by that time obsolete (Kyle 1972).

The elementary school was essentially a dead-end in the educational system,

since until the beginning of the twentieth century the leaving certificate did not qualify its holder for admission to secondary schools. In reality, after leaving elementary school the pupils had to earn their own living in agricultural or industrial work. The girls mostly had household jobs, but to an increasing extent they, too, worked in factories.

Far into the twentieth century the elementary school was looked upon as a school for the poor and not suitable for middle or upper class families, whose sons were prepared for secondary schools by the family or private tutors, but for whose daughters there was a vacuum in the system, as they were not admitted to secondary schools. This vacuum was filled by the great middle class education project, the private girls' schools.

Of course they, too, had their roots in the Enlightenment idea of spreading knowledge to new groups in society. For a long time, the state had accepted the responsibility for the sons of the well-to-do, and later on for the "people," but when it came to middle class daughters, the state remained indifferent. One openly avowed reason for the lack of interest was that the wife's household work did not contribute to the prosperity of the country, as did men's activity in the public sector (Kyle 1972). Consequently, the establishment of girls' schools became a private enterprise, independent of and outside the state school system.

It proved, however, impossible to formulate a definite goal for the education of these girls. A study of the programmes of two of the earliest schools will illustrate the dilemma. One of them was established in Gothenburg in 1819, in a period of economic recession, when many of the city merchants had gone bankrupt. According to the statutes, the school was "for daughters of the better class people (Pauvres Honteux), whose parents because of difficult circumstances, are unable to give them a proper education." The paragraph ends by excluding working class girls. According to minutes from one meeting, the board was urged to get the pupils proper employment (Kyle 1972, p. 43).

The other school was opened in Stockholm in 1831. In a report from 1836 the goal of the school is given as the education "of heart and mind," that of the heart being the most important. But the cultivation of mind was not to be ignored, for without that the woman would be unable to have "a proper relationship to her husband and to hold with dignity the distinguished position in society, which has been destined for her."

The report also emphasized that the aim of education was not to become "learned." Women should be tempted neither by the sciences nor by public life: "Children, hus-band and servants are the realm over which she will govern. Piety and morality are her dearest sciences" (Heckscher 1914, p. 102).

The Stockholm school statement outlines the right way to true womanhood, while the Gothenburg school offers an alternative for poor middle class daughters without particularly good expectations on the marriage market. Whether or not a woman could preserve her feminine nature when working outside the home was a matter of discussion (Kyle 1972). No doubt, the ideal woman was the wife and mother.

The problem for the private schools greatly increased when it became more and more common for young women to work for a couple of years before they married. They had to take special professional courses, arranged by private enterprise or state departments, to qualify for employment. The concept of an education for true womanhood came into conflict with the demands of the labour market.

The girls' schools never really solved the problem. They had to adapt to a changing reality, but the old values remained. In 1889 one of the most prominent and popular women debaters wrote the following: "The life of a housewife is the woman's best and highest vocation, and anything else, may it be a queen's crown, is but a substitute for what she is losing when prevented from fulfilling that task" (from Kyle 1987, p. 51).

The concentration of girls' school education on motherhood was an international trend (Rendall 1985). In Swedish sources it can be studied in full detail. In rejecting scientific education, regular school meetings in the 1880s suggested, for instance, that the main study in physics should be acoustics, as most girls learned to play the piano, that optics above all would "elevate the taste," and that chemistry would be useful in "home and daily life (cooking)" (Kyle 1972, p. 142). Thus, education was not looked upon from the girl's point of view, but was rather intended to make her an asset to the bourgeois family.

But there were forces inside and outside school that the dominant gender ideology could not stop. Many of the founders of female schools were true fiery spirits who aimed much higher than to make their pupils submissive wives, though they had to act very carefully. They were dependent on school fees and dared not challenge public opinion too much. But after the opening of the universities to women in 1870, many of the founders hastened to establish supplementary high school courses to prepare their pupils for academic studies. Around the turn of the century and the following decades, women began to prove competent in areas until then monopolized by men. There were now opportunities for other female careers besides marriage. But marriage still meant the end of a career outside the home.

Probably, there is no other sector of society where the gender and class structure appears as clearly as in the school organization. The politics behind the distribution of knowledge reveals the power structure. In the nineteeth century there were many prominent pedagogical spokesmen for a democratic school, common to the rich and the poor, to boys and girls (Kyle 1972). But their visions disappeared in the face of reality. Sweden, like other industrializing countries, had to balance the need for education for the majority of the population with the inherent social danger of knowledge and insight, an often debated topic (Kyle 1972). Accordingly, the elementary school became literally elementary, and the girls' schools had a far more comprehensive curriculum, which, however, was considerably below that of the boys' secondary schools. The idea of giving each category an appropiate measure of knowledge for its historically determined tasks in society was to dominate the education system up to the 1940s. This caused considerable controversy, especially about the education of girls, for whom the problem of preparation for home or for work, or perhaps for both, continued to be a matter of dispute.

Needed, but Not Welcome on the Labour Market

As the ration of education was dependent on class, the school system directly affected the labour market and caused different problems for working class and middle class women. They will be treated here as two separate categories.

Principally, the whole private market had been opened up to women by the reforms of 1864, with limitations set only by their qualifications. For elementary

school pupils, who could afford the fees, it was possible to attend private courses that offered education in subjects such as writing, mathematics, and book-keeping, subjects that gave them a chance to get jobs as shop assistants, simple office workers, etc. (Kyle 1979). But the majority of working class girls had to choose between domestic or factory work. As servants they continued in the old tradition, but as factory workers they found themselves to be members of a collective, namely the socialist trade unions. There they were only hesitantly welcomed.

The Marxist attitude to women's work was ambiguous. On the one hand, trade unions realized that young women had to support themselves and that wives often had to contribute to the family income. On the other hand, they feared the negative effect of female labour on male wages (Thönnesen 1973). They were still more opposed to the employment of married women, the consequences of which for family and children Marx and Engels had analyzed (Dahlerup 1973). In the 1880s, Clara Zetkin, the leader of the proletarian women's movement in Germany, opposed a suggestion that work by women should be forbidden, remarking that women's social and economic equality depended on their economic independence (Dahlerup 1973). But even though women began to be recognized as part of the workforce, they continued to meet difficulties and harassment in their daily work.

International opinion on the employment of women was reflected in the Swedish labour market. Acceptance was reluctant, as shown by the following quotation from a trade union paper in 1906: "We can't oppose their [women's] encroachment, because it is hopeless to fight the development. Let us instead turn them into loyal comrades. We must make room for them, and help them to join our union, to our benefit and to theirs." (Bohman 1979, p.29) But the loyalty was not to become mutual. The male-dominated unions neglected the special needs of women as mothers (Qvist 1974).

Instead, their special needs were taken up by the Social Democratic Women's Clubs. In 1907, these had their first national congress, at which they demanded an insurance to guarantee pay during the legally prescribed maternity leave for women in industry. They also insisted on homes for unmarried mothers, daycare centres, and free school meals (Bohman 1973). All this was far beyond the interest of the men's unions, which did not take into consideration the conflict between motherhood and work outside the home (Carlsson 1986).

Though single mothers were in an especially difficult situation, working wives shared their difficulties in combining work and motherhood. Unfortunately, the statistics do not treat them separately. Already at the turn of the century, the actual number of working mothers was being questioned, and local studies show different results (Kyle 1984a; Frangeur 1998).

There are indications that employed married women were numerous enough to cause a social problem. In a committee report concerning a proposal for prohibiting industrial night work for women, the absurdly long working day for a wife was used as an example to support the proposal (Kyle 1984a). Consideration for family life became a strong argument for the acceptance of the law, though it remained very controversial. Both the bourgeois and the proletarian women's organizations rejected it as discriminatory, while the political parties were split. In the Riksdag, however, the majority voted for the law (Carlsson 1986).

But most women workers were excluded from labour market statistics

because they had other types of jobs. Probably most of them worked in bourgeois households as cleaning and washing women, badly paid, but with a certain freedom to decide their working hours. There were also a great many women, mostly married, who worked at home on commission for firms, mainly in the clothing industry. They produced special garment accessories and, according to the social investigators of the time, were probably the most exploited of all working women, as these types of enterprises were completely unregulated (Kyle 1984a).

Presumably, the wife's minority status was of less importance in the working class. Consequently, the pattern of two providers for the family developed among them. The socialist women's movement noted the resultant problems for family and children, and argued that the state should take measures to improve their situation. But to skilled workers, the "aristocracy" of the working class, the ideal was the bourgeois family, with the husband as the only provider and the home as the workplace for the housewife (Göransson 1988).

In contrast to the socialist women's movement, its bourgeois counterpart was formally politically neutral, but with strong ideological ties to the Liberals. Liberalism at that time was characterized by a deep consciousness of social evils and was very active in the reform processes. Though far from being indifferent to the harsh conditions suffered by working class women, the middle class women's movement acted primarily in the interest of its own class. Anyway, for ideological and political reasons, socialist women rejected cooperation across class frontiers, which also constituted their international strategy (Dahlerup 1973).

The private sector of the labour market had been opened up to women by one general law, but with the public sector the situation was more complicated. Admission to public posts was regulated by special laws and reserved to men. These laws had to be changed by decisions of the *Riksdag*.

The first crack in the sex wall was made in 1856, when the Riksdag took a decision giving women the right to become elementary school teachers (Kyle and Qvist 1974). Further steps were taken that widened the field of occupation on low and medium levels, where qualifications above elementary school were required. The pupils from girls' schools could supplement their leaving certificate by attending special professional courses at the Post Office department, the Royal Telegraph Service, etc., where women were soon in the majority in subordinate positions (Carlsson 1966).

But after women had been admitted to the universities in 1870, it followed that they were admitted to posts corresponding to their competence. Those posts were high public offices, the holders of which were appointed by the Crown in council, and reserved by constitutional law for Swedish men. At the turn of the century the pressure from the Women's Academic Association to abolish the discriminating clauses became very strong. A royal commission worked on the matter for several years. Several drafts were turned down, among them one that confined the right to offical employment to unmarried women and forced them to leave on getting married. In the final proposal, however, that restriction was removed, but to public opinion the employment of married women seemed offensive: they should stay at home, not become disloyal rivals to the "real" family supporters. Quite commonly they were dismissed when they got married, both in the public and the private sectors. Only in 1938 was this forbidden by law. But as late as the 1960s, during the debates on public daycare, married women's right to work was questioned (Kyle 1979).

In the fight for high office, there were two other crucial questions on the agenda. One of them was women's suffrage. After men got (almost) universal suffrage in 1907, the women's movement intensified its efforts to achieve the same goal. And at last, work on the new family law began. Together, the three reforms formed a whole, and this influenced the character of the debates.

For the previous reforms there had above all been economic reasons. When unmarried women gained majority status, they could more easily make their own living and thus avoid becoming a burden on public poor relief. At the same time, they became available in the public and private sectors as cheap labour at low and medium levels. Despite their obvious economic advantages, each reform had provoked protest, but these were mild breezes compared to the storm blowing up against the remaining reforms, which aimed at the vital heart of male hegemony: the monopoly of scientific and social influence, the right to decide the political agenda, and the power of the husband over family life.

Liberating Love

In the late ninetenth century, discussion of gender relations became more and more intense and new, rather delicate subjects were brought up. Attention was directed to the intimate relations between the sexes, a problem with deep social and moral implications (Rover 1970; Janssen-Jurreit 1982; Levin 1986). The Swedish debate followed the international pattern and concentrated on sex, marriage, and morality.

One reason for taking up the marriage question was the bitterness among married women at their remaining under age when their unmarried sisters had been declared of age. (Boëthius 1969) The *Married Women's Right to Property Act*, passed in 1874, was not enough, for the husband's power not only gave him the right over her worldly goods but over their sex life too. The husband's "marital rights" meant that the woman's body was at his disposal and that she had no right to refuse. John Stuart Mill vehemently condemned this in his book *On the Subjection of Women* (1869), which was widely read and came to be known as the "feminist bible." In its first year of pub-lication, it was translated into Danish and was thus made comprehensible to Swedish readers (Boëthius 1969).

The debates on the sexual relationship in marriage led to another debate, that on prostitution, which was looked upon as a devastating social evil. Prostitutes were assumed to be responsible for the increasing spread of syphilis, and because of that were subjected to sanctions from the authorities in almost all European countries. In Sweden the regulations began in Stockholm in 1859, and were successively enforced in twelve cities, centres for male collectives (garrisons, universities) and young women factory workers (Lundquist 1982).

According to the prevailing moral standards, sex outside marriage, though not allowed, was socially accepted as a safety measure for male sexuality, an opinion supported by the medical scientific establishment (Lundquist 1982). Organized resistance to the regulations was initiated by Josephine Butler, who in 1875 founded The British and International Federation, which in the same year established a Swedish division. The obvious unfairness to and humiliation of women and the freeing of men from all responsibility, appeared to the women as parallel to sexual suppression in marriage.

In the debates, a gulf soon became visible between reformers, who advocated

a new opinion on family and sexuality, and traditionalists, who wanted to keep the family intact as a stronghold against the disintegrating tendencies of the time, such as atheism, socialism, and feminism. The traditionalists spread their message by means of a kind of genre literature, family manuals, directed to middle class housewives, with advice on household work, education, etc. These "easy readers" were very popular and frequently reprinted (Kyle 1987).

Several manuals also dealt with the sexual relationship between spouses. Accepting that men's sex drive was stronger than women's, but also recognizing women as the real sufferers, they realized that the normative male authority/female subordination relationship might become painful in sex life. Ministers and physicians, to whom women had confided, told of marital rapes but only exceptionally did they recommend that sex life should be based on the rights of the woman. Instead, they tried to create a balance between the woman's possible right to refuse intercourse and her duty to her husband and country to bear children. Their stand became even more difficult when they rejected the use of contraceptives. The happiness of motherhood, which ideologically used to be emphasized as the fulfilment of womanhood, clashed with the reality of too frequent and debilitating pregnancies (Kyle 1987).

It must be stressed that the family manuals were strongly normative, since in a concretizing way they translated the gender-stereotyped ideology into everyday behaviour. They were part of the propaganda for the family as the most stabilizing element in society. But their attacks on the women's movement in this respect were unjustified. The mainstream, both in its bourgeois and socialist branches, though criticizing the legalized inequality in the family, did not want to overthrow it. But there was a radical faction, to which a thorough change in the intimate relations between the sexes seemed to be the most important prerequisite to a changed society.

One of its leading members was Frida Stéenhoff, the first woman in Sweden to call herself a feminist, a term that the women's movement rejected. She was married to a physician, whose duties included the supervision of women prisoners in the city jail and the examination of prostitutes in accordance with the regulations, a post that he found humiliating and from which he resigned. Part of his district consisted of the area surrounding the city with a population of poor agrarian workers. Acquaintanceship with the conditions of the most underprivileged of women and the poorest of families was to be decisive in the future work of Frida Stéenhoff. Her contact with advocates of New Malthusianism gave her the required intellectual and analytical tools (Kyle 1984b).

With experience, compassion, and knowledge as her motive power, she constructed an emancipation programme with liberated love at its centre. Her starting point was the "sex slavery" which she saw as the basis of the social structure. "Consideration for men's sexual needs throughout history" had made love a trade commodity in marriage, as in prostitution. By depriving women of their human rights, men had established ruling male collectives such as the church, the armed forces, and politics, and had made laws in accordance with their own interests. To liberate love from economic bondage, women must be given their rights (Stéenhoff 1913).

On this basis, Stéenhoff worked out her social programme, which was to encompass all sectors of society. She demanded free access to schools and work for women to make them economically independent of men. She also demanded

the wife's freedom from her husband's guardianship, and state measures to support the children. Most important of all was access to contraceptives, to free women from the fear of pregnancy and poor families from the burden of too many children. Sex life was made sacred by mutual love, not by the blessing of a priest (Kyle 1984a).

On the whole, Stéenhoff's social scheme was the same as that of the women's movement, but it proved offensive in its addressing of sexuality, a subject that was usually avoided. Her ideas, therefore, became controversial. Her assault on marriage was assumed to jeopardize the credibility of the women's movement, and her demand for access to contraceptives to encourage promiscuity. For the social and political establishment her suggestions were seen as a challenge to God's commandments, to the church, and to all moral values. Her views stirred up a controversy towards which government could not remain indifferent. In 1910 the Riksdag passed a law forbidding not only the sale of contraceptives but also all sexual information. The law was repealed in 1938.

The Rebels

Though marriage deprived women of their identity as individuals, it gave them a social status superior to that of unmarried women. The cult of domesticity and motherhood, though it glorified their work at home, hampered them on the labour market. As a consequence a conflict arose, especially for working class wives. Oneway to make things easier for them was the "Stockholm marriages."

A "Stockholm marriage" is the Swedish term for extra-legal family formation, which was an international phenomenon (Lindgren 1986). It was adopted in the bigger cities, above all in Stockholm, among the proletarian strata of inward migrants. From the strictly controlled parishes, where the clergy supervised moral standards, they migrated to the city, where the church was unable to uphold control over the quickly increasing and mobile population.

In a study of the marriage patterns in Stockholm between 1860 and 1890, Margareta Matovic claims that "a hidden structure of family formation" was revealed when couples went to the parish priest to announce the banns of matrimony (Matovic1984). The alternative of extra-legal cohabitation was a conscious choice made by both parties, Matovic claims, for it meant that they transgressed the moral bounds set by the church and by prevailing morality. Using the sociological theory of marriage as a relation of exchange between spouses, Matovic isolates a number of factors of importance in their choice. One of these was the liberation of the man from the burden of being the sole supporter of the family and the woman from the husband's guardianship, which made it easier for her to get a job. Among these poor families there was no property for the children to inherit so it was of no importance that they were born out of wedlock (Matovic 1984).

In the middle of the century, Stockholm had a bad reputation as a haunt of immorality and vice. One reason for this was the high rate of illegitimacy. Matovic's study indicates that behind this lay a deliberate strategy to get around the consequences of legal marriage.

Parallel to the rebellion of the lower classes were the free unions (in Swedish "marriage by conscience") in the upper classes. These were conscious protests against the subordination of the married woman. The parties usually made a contract of their own, containing conditions such as a mutual obligation to support

the household, mutual support of the children, and the continuance of the union until one of them cancelled the contract. The union was annoounced in the papers (Wicksell Nordqvist 1985).

In 1904, two students at Gothenburg University openly announced their free union, which earned them a warning from the university board and forced them to leave when they were threatened with expulsion. In an open letter, the male student declared, "we took this step as a protest against compulsory church marriage and the wife's lack of legal rights in the prevailing marriage conditions" (Persson 1971, p. 69).

Both the Stockholm marriages and the free unions were directly contrary to official gender policy. In the lower classes, the need for two sources of household support made some people choose extra-legal family formation, and in doing so they rejected the legislators' constant desire to preserve the distinction between married and unmarried women. In the upper classes, the idea of democratization also meant equality between the sexes and, accordingly, the most progressive among them found themselves obliged to attack the traditional family as the social institution where sexual inequality was most manifest.

Public Funds for Granting Women and Children Economic Independence

About a decade after Almqvist had described the subordination of women in the family and in society in *Why not!*, he returned to the theme in a later essay, *The causes of European discontent* (Almqvist 1850). His plan to make a great comprehensive survey of social conditions in Europe was not accomplished, however. Apart from the general introduction, the essay's main thrust is an analysis of the relationships between man and woman in the family and in society. It is here that he systematizes his ideas on the problem and how to solve it.

Almqvist's writings on the eve of the reform period corresponded in many ways to the writings of Frida Stéenhoff, the feminist at the end of it. Not only did they hold similar positions in reform thinking of their time, but their starting points were the same, as were their views on the strategies for the struggle to emancipate women.

Both sympathized with the most radical reform movements of their day. Almqvist was inspired by the pre-Marxist utopian socialists, such as Saint Simon and Fourier in France, and Robert Owens' social experiment in New Lanark (Romberg 1993). Stéenhoff, as a member of the Swedish Women's Suffrage Association had close contact with its English counterpart. Her ideas on society bear the influence of the ideas of Marx and Engels, but more important to her was the cooperation with the radical branch of the German women's movement. Their association, *Bund fur Mutterschutz*, dealt with questions of love, marriage, sexuality, prostitution, and parenthood, themes that were central to Stéenhoff. In 1911, she founded a Swedish section of that association (Melander 1990).

Almqvist and Stéenhoff focused their interest on the intimate life of men and women. In their view, a sexual relationship lost its deepest and most beautiful meaning if it was not based on true love. But all too often marriages were arranged for other reasons, such as money or social conventions. To Almqvist, that meant blasphemy towards the holy wedding ceremony, and to Stéenhoff it

transformed marriage into prostitution. Without love the erotic life of spouses, the very hearth of their joy and happiness, was destroyed. Without using the term "division of power between the sexes," they described its effect on the intimate relationship between man and woman, and they both drew the same conclusion from their observations. The root of the evil was the pervasive ruling authority of males. To liberate women by giving them their rights was the only way to liberate love from its bondage.

Almquist and Stéenhoff might seem quite romantic and not very stringent in their general reasoning about love and family, but when it came to their reform programmes they were very clear and exact. Almquist listed the necessary changes as:

- The right of all children, boys and girls without exception, to get a moral education.
- The right of woman and child to be economically independent of the hu band and father.
- The right to personal freedom and full citizenship for women on the same conditions as men (Almquist, 1850, p. 31 passim).

If implemented, his three points would be steps towards real sex equality. Legal majority for all women, married and not married, would be a blow to the husband's economic dominance. To reduce his power, Almquist suggested a kind of child insurance, possibly financed by changes in the inheritance laws. A public fund could be established from the capital, from which every woman would be entitled to an annual sum for the support of her children. Characteristically, Almquist left the father out of his reform plans. A reason for this was his concern about single mothers. Unlike most of his contemproraries, he did not condemn them. As a journalist in Stockholm he had met many of them, badly paid or out of work, and driven into prostitution by sheer poverty. He refused to see them as "fallen women." To him they were poor, abandoned mothers.

Stéenhoff was of the same opinion. The sexual exploitation of women was the main theme in her writing. She was furious at all those who despised single mothers. Like Almquist, she wished to obliterate the social stigma attaching to these unhappy women and their children. In the Association for the Protection of Mothers and Sexual Information (above p 000) t he principles were the same as Almquist's. The programme of the association contained the following points:

- a state maternity insurance,
- juridical and social equality between children, wether born in marriage or out of wedlock,
  - . efficient legislation to protect children against neclectful parents,
  - . reformation of the marriage law, and
  - . sexual information in the schools (Steenhoff 1912, p. 13 passim).

She also suggested a child insurance, which, she noted was "a new and not tested method" (Steenhoff 1908, p. 26). The security of the mother and child being

Steenhoff's main concern, she did not overlook the importance of traditional emancipation reforms. Women's right to education and work, their legal majority, and their full citizenship were necesary prerequisites for the welfare of mother and child (Steenhof 1903, 1908).

Detween Almquist and Stéenhoff there were 60 years of women's reforms. I willnow look at those reforms in light of the ideas of the two pioneers.

The Order of Reforms

When Almquist wrote *Why not!* Sweden was still an agrarian country, but he was clearsighted enough to place events in an urban setting, for it was in cities that the great changes had to start.

From the beginning, the situation in the cities for women was not very favourable. Preindustrial crafts and commerce were strictly regulated. Women could earn their living as household helpers and in different unskilled occupations, often heavy and low paid work. Some niches of production was reserved for them, for instancebaking and brewing, a continuation outside the home of traditional household duties.

The city schools were for boys only, as was vocational training in guild organizations, so women could not achieve authorized professional competence.

Widows, however, were granted special rights. They were allowed to continue their husband's work under the supervision of a male manager until a grown up son took over. They were part of a female stand-in system, intended to keep property in the hands of the family. There are many such examples in history, from queens and aristocratic ladies to widows of wealthy tradesmen and simple craftsmen. The widow of the glazier in the Almquist's novel, "unfortunately" only had a daughter, so after her death there was no one to take over. By custom, widows constituted the only female category regarded as being of age.

As from 1858 this status was extended to all unmarried women. There were different interacting factors behind this decision. There had been a great increase of the population from the beginning of the century. The number of landless agrarian workers grew rapidly, with serious proletarization as a consequence. The poor migrated into the cities, where a growing industrial labour market offered them jobs. This development coincided with a sharp decrease in marriage frequency. While unmarried men usually are not looked upon as a social problem, unmarried women very much worried the administration (Qvist 1960). Because of their state of legal minority, the lack of institutions for their education and training, and their very restricted right to work, they threatened to become a burden on public poor relief or to fall into criminality or prostitution. The obvious reason for the reform was to reduce the social danger and the financial costs of unmarried, jobless women. The fact that enterprises thereby got access to cheap labour, was a favourable consequence of the reform.

Characteristically, the coming-of-age reform was brought about by working conditions in the cities, where the new types of workplaces were situated. Factories and other urban workplaces were separated from the household sphere, and the owners had none of the responsibilities of a husband in the household. Thus, employees had to take care of themselves. But the wives, who normally worked at home with the husband as "employer," were excluded from the reform. This exclusion, which was also in accordance with the belief that marriage was an institution of divine character, prevented them from benefiting from the ensuing reforms.

The gender hierarchy was maintained in the new schools, but there the picture was blurred by principles of class. The sexes were not segregated in elementary schools and the curriculum was the same for all pupils. At the secondary school level, however, segregation of the sexes was total, and the girl's school curricula were on a lower level and differently oriented than in boy's schools. There were, of course, obvious reasons for the different arrangements. Separate educa-

tion in the elementary schools would have been too expensive, but even more important was the fact that working class women were identified by their class affiliation rather than by their sex. They were unable to attain the standards of middle class women, who were the representatives of real "womenhood." In fact, the concept of "real womanhood" was worked out most evidently in the middle class girl's schools, and to that end the separation of the sexes was necessary. This system weakened from the turn of the century.

Though gender hierarchy was manifest in education, the psychological impact of the girl's schools must not be overlooked. For the first time in history, female pupils got a pedagogically planned education in institutions outside the home. The schools were run by women, mostly unmarried, with great proficiency and authority. Many women testified to the importance of their influence. Furthermore, the schools constituted the starting point for study at universities, thus counteracting the indoctrination of the ideals of marriage and motherhood. No wonder that many leaders of the bourgeois women's movement were former girl's school pupils.

Emancipated from paternal guardianship in the family, young women were confronted by male dominance on the labour market. In the factories they were looked upon as intruders, and in other areas as attempting activities that were incompatible with the normal female pattern of life. For various reasons they were prevented from obtaining executive positions, but the main underlying reason was the impossibility for a man to accept a female superior.

The chronology of the resistance to women's reforms reveals it as being a struggle between retaining male power and increasing female influence. Resistance appeared at a very early date among industrial workers and the trade unions. Women were seen as competitors rather than as comrades. Men's jobs and wages were threatened by poorly paid female labour. Futhermore, women had problems of no interest to men, who did not have to combine work and family duties. The class struggle was also of prime importance in the unions and the Social Democratic Party. The so-called woman question would be solved autonomically when the Social Democrats came to power, but should not be allowed to impede them on their way to victory.

In the first decades of the twentieth century, men belonging to the establishment felt the same threat as working class men had felt before. Women were on their way to becoming competitors for high positions. Already there was unemployment among university and high school teachers, and this would get even worse with women breaking the male monopoly. They began to realize that their very livelihood was at stake.

But in reality much more was at stake than individual men's jobs. The fight for the vote and the work on family law were to combine to change the formal gender structure. The ideological message of the family manuals, therefore, focused on the gender order as the most stabilizing element of society. They made it a duty for middle class wives to support the status quo in the family against the consequences of the women's reforms. Recognizing the existent legal inequality of marriage, they minimized its significance by a theory of harmonization. The status of superiority versus subordination was, on the one hand, consistent with the different natures of the sexes, while, on the other, it was counteracted by the "spiritual equality" of true marital love.

The "rebels" did not accept this harmonizing theory. Recognizing the spouses

as two independent individuals with sometimes conflicting interests, they chose to break the moral rules and live in a free union.

After the turn of the century, however, the entire gender structure became enmeshed in the reforming process. The small steps towards limited goals had slowly undermined the very basis of legalized inequality between the sexes. A result of this process, a new kind of womanliness, was shaped in many ways contrary to the prevailing ideal. Women as self-supporting individuals, no longer dependent on the money and authority of a closely related man, were liberated from the family rule of subordination. The gender hierarchy began to be questioned. The concept of a different "female nature" was not so easily sustained when hundreds of workplaces were occupied by capable women.

In the fierce debates accompanying legislative reform, one frequently used expression seems to summarize the fears of the opponents of reform, the word "feminization." In the schools male pupils would lose their masculinity, in the universities sciences would lose their high standard, politics would lose its power of action, and the family would fall apart. Chaos would follow when the barriers of segregation between the sexes were no longer supported by law.

But the picture of a society in ruins, painted by the last opponents, did not materialize. There was no dangerous feminization, not even real equality. Gender stratification, now supported only by tradition, was to characterize society in the future.

Now back to the pioneers! The reformers' intentions and decisions were very far from Almqvist's and Stéenhoff's visions of a society with women and children at its centre. Instead of beginning with reforming the family, which was the very centre of male power, the legislators tried to keep it intact as long as possible. Their first step, the unmarried women's coming-of-age, showed the direction of the reform road. The crucial point was that wives were left out. As a consequence, a woman generally moved from one legal status to another in her lifetime, thereby being subjected to different judicial rules and social norms. It was a schizophrenic situation, which placed them in the most unfavourable situation, and prevented them from taking full advantage of the new possibilities that had opened up for their unmarried sisters. These were independent, and they could earn their own money and dispose of it. Wives remained dependent of the man they loved — or perhaps did not love. To change this, and so to liberate love, was the very aim of Almqvist's and Stéenhoff's proposals. But that was a too revolutionary idea to be considered by legislators of that time.

Marriage - an Exclusively Civil Affair

It was not until 1921 that a new Marriage Law proclaimed the majority of married women. In 1920, coinciding with the "democratic breakthrough" in Sweden, even marriage, the most traditional of institutions, had to keep up with modernization, and formal equality between spouses was established.

In the old Marriage Act, the subordination of the woman had been formulated in the most crushing judicial terminology that left no doubt of her position in society. The new law, valid from 1921, meant a definite break with the traditional view on wives as inferior to their husbands. A leading lady of the women's movement characterized it in the following way: "This marriage law was the best one in the world for promoting the interests of women, as it was founded on full

legislative and economic equality between the spouses, also as regards the children, and as it looks upon the wife's housework as an equivalent contribution to the support of the family" (Wahlström 1933, p.196).

According to the articles of the law, the guardianship of the husband was abolished and the wife was free to dispose of her own property, to make her own economic agreements, and to take a job without asking her husband's permission. The guardianship of the children was shared between the parents. In cases of divorce, which was now easier to obtain, the mother had a better chance of having custody of the children. In 1920 women had achieved the right to vote, so even as married women they now enjoyed full citizenship.

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The Strongest Bond on Trial

RITA LILJESTRÖM

Many parties have taken part in the historical reconstruction of the Swedish family — spiritual leaders of the church, intellectual rebels, popular movements, and politicians, to mention but a few. They have talked in many voices and their messages have often been polarized and misinterpreted, since the issue is a complex and controversial one. However, this nineteenth century debate is suprisingly up to date in its concerns about the gender relationship.

The church's wedding ritual reflects several key issues. Throughout the centuries, there has been controversy about the conditions for a valid marriage. Is the couple's declared mutual consent worthy of being recognized or do they need the confirmation of the church to be acknowledged as husband and wife? (Holte n.d.). According to an older pre-Christian view, marriage was more a matter for the family than for society. It was living together that constituted the marriage. The church wedding came as confirmation afterwards. In certain regions and especially in northern Sweden, people maintained this custom until railway workers and other outsiders broke down community control of courtship. Thus, popular morality clashed with the church's guardianship of marital legitimacy.

Since the 1960s, nearly all Christian churches have declared consensus to be the decisive matter. According to the modern Christian view, consensus consists of three essential elements: voluntariness, reciprocity, and equality (or equal value). Those values are underlined in the Swedish ritual in which the bride and groom enter the church side by side and take each other's hands. England and the U.S. follow a tradition by which the bride is brought to the church by her father and is entrusted by him to the groom, thus making the marriage appear more like a contract between father and son-in-law (Holte n.d.).

As early as 1811, all patriarchal wording in the Swedish wedding ritual was abolished. While the bride in England and the U.S. promised to obey and serve her husband, the promises the parties give each other in the Swedish ritual were equal and reciprocal. It is worth noting that these symbolic changes in the wedding ritual were accomplished before the Swedish parliament enacted its reforms promoting gender equality, reforms that began in the the mid-nineteenth century.

While the Christian view was normative and expressed an ideal that was far removed from prevailing social conditions, the author August Strindberg revealed the misery of marital life and explored its causes in *Giftas*, two volumes about marital relationships that were written in the 1880s.

Imagine two people of opposite sexes who make a careless promise of lifelong commitment. This is an unreasonable basis for marriage. One of them develops in one direction, the other in another. One remains on the spot, while the other moves on. They are doomed to drift apart. Taking into account men's inclinations towards polygamy, it becomes even more astonishing that many mar-

riages persist. The women need a provider, a man who brings home the money. The parents have a common interest in the child/ren.

Long before a child is born, the couple have realized that the felicity was not so heavenly as they had expected. The relationship turns mawkish. The birth of the child restores it again. But Strindberg asks if the parent has to forgo his or her individuality for the sake of the child/ren, to be everything to them? This, he assumes, is natural for the mother, a part of womanhood.

Among other mammals motherhood lasts for a restricted period, for a year or a couple of years, but the human mother is bound to her role for about twenty years. The discontent with long-lasting motherhood among women in the upper or cultivated classes contains, according to Strindberg, an element of nature. But her seeming opposition to nature is, in fact, an opposition against culture, just as her opposition to the husband's tyranny is simply a revolt against the same enemy her husband rises up against, although in her eyes he personifies societal compulsion.

Strindberg outlines a scenario in which the father and mother are chained in fetters for life. If one of them has a thought that the other does not share, within fifteen years he learns to keep quiet, to become hypocritical. Even a happy marriage rests on something suppressed, some hidden hypocrisy lying beneath a mutual state of slavery. He conjures up the common bedroom as a threat to the couple's relationship: separation of bed and seat should be precribed from the beginning. Something so offensive to decency as a common bedroom and bed will bring punishment on the relationship by causing obscurity, nausea, tedium, and worse. A separate bedroom gives the woman more freedom and enables her to keep ownership of her body.

Strindberg writes with passion. He is ambivalent and contradicts himself. His conciousness of the tensions and unfairness in the relations between the sexes is part of his own life's drama. Both men and women are portrayed as victims of a societal and cultural order. The women's desire for emancipation is the same as men's restless desire for liberation. His vision of the future is vague: in a society with a fair distribution of the richness of nature and provision of the means for living and education for all, marriage will be no longer needed to guarantee these advantages. Here, a man and woman will agree on a union, orally or in writing, and will decide how long they wish to stay together. Each of them has the right to end the relationship without the intervention of the law or the gospel.

How have all these ideas in the air, the new ideals of the church, Strindberg's credo for emancipation; and all the voices on "women's issue" been materialized in the politics of the twentieth century?

Two Challenges, Do They Reinforce or Counteract Each Other?

After the Second World War industry in Sweden was short of labour. A solution was sought by recruiting migrant workers from Turkey, Yugoslavia, Greece, and neighbouring Nordic countries. Simultaneously, people from northern Sweden moved southward, from rural communities to major cities. Large suburbs were built to provide housing for urban newcomers. When the demand for labour continued to grow, the soil was prepared for the idea of replacing migrant workers with local married women. Swedish wives and mothers already had housing and they were well adapted to the prevailing sociocultural setting.

Moreover, the women, living isolated in new suburbs and being deprived of adult interaction, could not agree more with this approach.

The husband-wife unit faced two main challenges in the 1960s and 1970s, when the dual-earner family was established and mass contraception was made available. Since the 1970s, policies have been designed to facilitate the participation of married women in the labour market on equal terms with men. In order to achieve this aim, the complementarity between men and women was called into question, eventually rejected, and substituted by a norm of equal sharing with the aim of making mothers and fathers equal in the eyes of the market. The welfare state now acted as an agent of modernization by intervening in the division of labour between the family and the state as well as between men and women within the family. This implied a redefinition of parenthood and measures to facilitate equal parental sharing. The state introduced legislation, services, and work benefits that made it easier to combine employment and family. These reforms included paid parental leave and the right to be absent from work when children fell ill.

The debate on sexual politics centred for the first half of the twentieth century on abortion and sex education, without ever reaching agreement on these issues. Then, suddenly, in the 1960s, decades of sexual-political confrontation between those who struggled for sexual liberation and those who defended a morality of self-control, ended in the victory of the former. The Pill and IUDs released sexuality from ancient fears of unwanted children. The 1974 *Abortion Law* made abortion legal. The ideal of planned parenthood and every child's right to be wanted had become real.

Sexual relations were perceived as something basically good, adding to the quality of life. Attitudes towards premarital sex were liberal, extramarital relations were viewed with indulgence, and sexual relations among teenagers were accepted and given support by sex education in schools that included teaching about contraceptives. A network of Youth Clinics provided counselling for adolescents without being obliged or entitled to inform parents, not even when a daughter applied for an abortion.

A new foundation was laid for couple relationships. It is tempting to speculate on the significance of the simultaneous introduction of these two major changes. Did they reinforce or counteract each other? We do not know how the situation would have differed if they had been separated by several decades. That said, I intend to look at the impact of women's own income and their access to contraception on marital relationships

Families underwent rapid and drastic transformations. No previous generation had had similar assets. The welfare state supported women's employment, provided public childcare, and offered fathers a chance to take part in caring for their infants. Sexual relations were affirmed as something positive. With the fear of unwanted pregnancies gone, the situation seemed to open the way for mutual pleasure in consensual relationships. How did couples succeed in combining work and love? How far were their expectations met? How did the labour market and sexual policies relate to each other?

A Rapid But Partial Breakthrough

A comparison of figures for female employment shows how rapid the tranformations have been. Even in the late 1960s, 70 per cent of married mothers of preschool children were housewives, while about 30 per cent had paid employ-

ment. In the early 1990s, the figures were almost exactly reversed: 20 per cent of mothers stayed at home while 80 per cent were employed. Education and an income of their own made women economically less dependent on their husbands.

Moreover, the dual-earner family necessitated access to childcare facilities for preschool and school children. In 1975, 18 per cent of children in the age group 3-6 years and 10 per cent of 1-2-year-olds were registered in public childcare (centres or day-mothers). Corresponding figures in 1996 were about 76 and 57 per cent respectively (SCB 1998). The change-over to public daycare mirrors the mothers' employment figures. How then does the tripartite model, mother, father, and public daycare, work in practice?

The relevant policies have been only partially successful. The mother is still mainly responsible for parenting and the one who devotes most time to housekeeeping, and fragmentation of everyday life brings about all the problems of coordination. Usually, it is the woman's role to juggle the diverse activities and time schedules of family members. Many women do this by reducing their working hours or by choosing inconvenient working hours.

Parental leave is mainly taken by mothers, thereby making them less reliable on the market than fathers. In 1996, mothers accounted for 89 per cent and fathers for 11 per cent of all days compensated through parental insurance. In 1995, a special paternal month that can only be used by the father was introduced. So far it has not had much impact (SCB 1998). The results of the policies promoting gender equality are asymmetrical: women are in paid work to a greater extent than men assume their share of familywork.

Because complementarity had meant work specialization based on gender, women's and men's performances were not comparable. They were evaluated by different standards. The transition from complementarity to sharing the same duties has brought men and women into a common arena, where they are measured by the same standards and compete for the same rewards. While complementarity meant mutual dependence, sharing potentially leads to rivalry, competition, and endless negotiation about whose turn it is. While the maternal generation supported their husbands' careers, the daughters invest in their own careers. In this transition, public childcare has played a decisive role.

Public childcare is based on a for-the-good-of-the-children ideology. Tacitly, it serves the purpose of levelling differences in social and cultural capital among children from different economic and educational backgrounds. It aims to compensate for lack of family assets and is programmed to stimulate the child's development. It also introduces a kind of public control over parenting. Still, one must acknowledge that the expansion of daycare facilities had its rationale in children being obstacles to mothers' entering the labour market. The seemingly opposing interests of mothers and children had to be reconciled by investing in professional staff educated to interpret children's needs. Moreover, childhood itself became reinterpreted in terms of greater autonomy.

The time children spend in the family and in public institutions has been likened to the two wings of a butterfly (Dencik 1999). Children's weekdays are divided into two worlds, a public and a private one. Just as parents leave for work in the morning, children leave for daycare, school, and leisure-time homes. According to Dencik, each world has its own logic of interaction. At home, the child is unique and irreplaceable, and relationships are emotional and long lasting. In a daycare institution, the child is one among others and exchangeable. The

relationships are temporary and adult involvement is mainly professional. Children have to cope with daily integration into and separation from both family and daycare. Today, all the family members have experiences from settings they do not share with each other: parents' and children's lives are less transparent, and larger parts of it are hidden.

What conclusions can be derived from this dual socialization? Are children hanging between two worlds or flying on two wings? Both, it seems! Dencik relates his interpretation of this phenomenon to the notion of growing into post-modernity:

> The cultural transmisssion of behavioural patterns, attitudes and social dispositions that traditionally rested with the parents tend to become more and more socially irrelevant, i.e., from an instrumental point of view, such transmissions less than before serve as adequate support for the life orientation of a child growing up in post-modernity. Furthermore, as a model for the child on how to lead one's life, the parental lifestyle becomes increasingly less relevant ... parental models erode in significance ... The rapid modernization process brings with it that children to an ever greater degree are set culturally free to choose their own cultural orientation and even identity (unpublished handout).

The postmodern discourse puts a heavy burden on the child, who must acquire communication skills and be active in constructing her or his own identity. Dencik refers to the child's auto-socialization in terms of the child's coping with its given social contexts. The eroded parental models are compensated for by emphasizing the significance of peer-group socialization (Fröness 1995).

What exatly is self-identity? According to Giddens (1991), it is what the individual is conscious of in self-consciousness. It is something that has to be created and sustained. It is the self, the main figure, as reflexively understood by the person in terms of her or his biography. A person's self-identity is to be found in the capacity to keep a particular narrative going, simply in the ability to tell the individual's biography and to continually integrate and sort out events into the "story" about the self. It is a strong programme of individualization.

But where are the sources of the story about the self when the individual is culturally set free and the previous generations no longer count? Somehow, reflexivity must be present in the already existing world into which the individual is thrown. The author of the story identifying the self usually is part of a larger "we" and some sort of cultural community with a common background. This involvement may be with what sociologists variously call a life world of embedded social practices; or situated human beings being-in-the-world; or a habitus of predispositions and orientations (Lash 1994). Although the do-it-yourself biographers are thrown into an already existing social world, the children are seen as less predetermined, less moulded by socialization, inheriting less from previous generations, more left to make their own choices, more at risk than children who had parental footsteps to follow.

Marriage, an Eroding Institution

In the late 1960s, the number of births out of wedlock increased steeply, while the frequency of marriage fell. Probably about two-thirds of unmarried women lived with their child's father. The choice of a marriage-like form of living with-

out a formal wedding illustrates the weakening of marital legitimacy. Cohabitation without formal marriage became common. By that means, demographers lost the control of family statistics they had gathered since the mid-eighteenth century. In response, lawmakers attempted to entice people to marry by making divorce easier, cheaper, and quicker. However, the 1974 *Marriage Law* failed in this attempt. Today, only a very small percentage of young people marry when they move in together for the first time. Marriage often takes place in connection with the birth of a child. In 1993, 38 per cent of firstborn children were born in wedlock (SCB 1995). Marriage has lost its character as a public institution and become a private personal relationship, a voluntary agreement between two consenting adults. If one of them wishes to renounce the contract, this can be done.

The age for sexual debut has lowered. Whereas adolescents are younger when they make their sexual debut, they wait longer than their parents before having children. In 1999, the average age for women giving birth for the first time was 28.5 years, compared with an average of 24 years in 1974. In the biggest cities, the average age at first birth is 30-31 years. Particularly well educated women tend to have children late.

The psychological significance of the new pattern of postponing birth is not well understood. Fertility falls with rising age, and STDs are another risk of infertility. For women in their thirties, not having a partner or a child is disturbing. The present fertility rate of 1.5 is below the reproduction level (SCB 1998), and may bring the natality issue on to the political agenda. An overwhelming majority of Swedish women state that they want to have children, often one or two more than they actually have. Yet, workload and instability of marriage are reasons women have given for restricting the number of children (Bernhardt 1996).

In Sweden, as in other Nordic countries, the individualistic doctrine is strong. Individual wishes and ambitions are boosted by the availability of new opportunities. This makes the couple vulnerable: expectations of emotional and sexual satisfaction collide with the multiple demands of work and family and the permanent shortage of time. Divorces have risen over the twentieth century. At present, Sweden and Denmark have the highest rates of divorce and separation in Europe. According to estimates, 40 to 50 per cent of those couples who move in together will part within ten years. Of the annual separations and divorces, 40 per cent involved married partners and 60 per cent cohabiting partners. Contrary to previous evidence, the present inclination is increasingly to break up marriage when children are relatively small (SCB 1995). Small children threaten adult autonomy, couple's sexuality, sleep at night, careers, and freedom to be mobile.

The nuclear family with a conjugal and parental relationship is perhaps not as much a core as the term "nuclear" would have us believe. While contraceptives made it possible to separate lust and procreation, they also meant that the bonds of adult love and parenthood could drift apart. Two distinct institutions appear, marriage and parenthood. While marriages are dissolved and cohabiting couples separate, parenthood lasts forever, and legally at least until the child comes of age. In 1997, 77 per cent of the 6-year-olds and 66 per cent of the 16- to 17-year-olds lived with both their parents (SCB 1998). One out of four Swedish children, i.e., nearly half a million children, have parents who no longer live together (Borggren and Svensson 2000).

It has been argued that the family consists of two dyads: the conjugal dyad, husband and wife, and the maternal, mother and child. The maternal dyad is per-

ceived as the original bond and the last one to be broken (Adams 1968). It is the bond between wife and husband that links the man to the family. The maternal unit usually survives after the couple has split. About 85 per cent of single-parent families in Sweden consist of mother and child/ren.

Nevertheless, the state strongly emphasizes the child's right to have contact with both its parents. Since 1983, joint custody is the rule. According to self-reporting by ten-years-olds, 60 per cent have contact with the non-resident parent at least once a week. The figure is higher than co-resident parents reported in 1992-93. According to them, only 20 per cent of the children of 10 to 12 years of age saw their other parent weekly, and another 20 per cent did not have any contact with their other parent (SCB 1998).

The experts used to warn parents against exposing their children to moving between parents on a weekly basis, when the parents wanted to have equal access to the child. Currently, it is argued that it is better for the child to take turns in staying with each of the parents than to let the relationship to the father weaken. According to the media, it has become more common now for children to shift between parents (Svensson 2000).

As more men no longer live with the children they have fathered, a substantial number of new unions are formed involving men whose children live with their former partners and new women who bring their children into the household. The result is that almost one-third of married or cohabiting men in their prime parenting years (30-44 years) either do not live with their biological children and/or are involved in the informal parenting of their current female partner's children (Bernhardt 1996). However, such non-standard parenting is most common among less educated men. Strictly nuclear families are most typical in the highest educational category.

How do the children of a potential partner affect men's repartnering? According to survey data, more than half (55 per cent) of the single Swedish women aged 23-43 were living with at least one child, compared with only 8 per cent of men aged 28-43. Despite the prevalence of potential partners with children, there is no sign of an increased interest in such unions among men. The most educated men are the least likely to enter a relationship when children are involved. By contrast, Swedish women appear open to entering a union with fathers living with children (Bernhardt and Goldscheider 1999).

When one of the partners brings in children, the gender roles tend to become polarized, as it falls to the biological parent, mostly the mother, to be the main caretaker of "her" child (Moxnes 1990). Does it make much difference if most mothers act as the main parent anyway? At least a common child makes it legitimate to claim that the other parent should take his share. Qualitative studies of couples who have brought children from previous relationships to their new partnerships describe tensions between adult love and parental love. For example, rivalry and jealousy between the mother's son and her husband seems to be a significant stumbling-block. (Liljeström and Kollind 1990). The divorce rate in repartnering unions with previous children is especially high, bearing witness to the potential vulnerability of the constellation.

"Liberation of Love"

In the late nineteenth century sex, marriage, and morality were intensely debated. The radicals wanted to liberate love from economic bondage, social

convention, and male authority. They wanted to integrate love and sexuality. The reforms of twentieth century succeeded in making women less economically dependent; convention was broken through cohabitation without formal marriage; and male authority has been severely challenged. To what extent has love been liberated?

Nowadays it is not common to speak about the "liberation of love". What is at stake is "sexual liberation." In affluent and advanced societies like Sweden sexual liberation rests on access to contraception and sex education, i.e., on medico-technical means and knowledge about facts. The cultural meaning of sexuality; the power of emotions, passions, and fears; and the rationale of social mores and ethical considerations are hardly touched upon. We have to turn to literature to find emotional complexities and moral ambiguities. It is often a part of literary plots to unmask tensions and make visible asymmetries in affection and the need for recognition.

In his novel *Why not!* (1839), a narrative about the love relationship between Sara and Albert, the author C.J.L. Almquist exposed the economic dependency and subordination of married women. Similarily, Gun-Britt Sundström in her novel Maken ("The Husband") (1976), brings out the asymmetries, not economical but psychological, in the love relationship between two university students, Martina and Gustav. Here, the emphasis is on asymmetries in love; in the conception of marriage, and in sexual needs. And the power is, as usual, in the hands of the least dependent party. Isn't this why people fear dependency? As Gustav has more at stake and Martina is willing to commit less, she has the upper hand. She sets the limits. The novel is her reflexive account of their relationship which lasted from 1966 to 1973.

In what follows I try to relate the tone and tensions of their relationship by compiling fragments of their arguments, which, by and large, appear fairly familiar. The two disagree about the meaning of love. Gustav regards love as a long-term project, hopefully lifelong. He is a family-man and tries to persuade Martina to marry him. He takes fidelity as given and is very jealous when provoked. He is willing to compromise to meet his parents' standards of decency and accepts sleeping in separate rooms while they visit his parents. After all, Martina and he are not married. Martina finds this riduculous. Gustav is disposed to devotion and self-denial.

Martina is his opposite. She defends her independence, enjoys being alone, and not having to consider others. Martina wants to have command over her time. She feels disturbed when Gustav and she are among other people:"If I turn my attention to something else it becomes evident that Gustav is there too; I can't do what I want because I am not 'I' anymore. I am only a part of a 'we.' There are two of us, namely. I wonder if I will ever get used to it." Luckily, they live singly.

Martina thinks that Gustav is too demanding; makes too much of things, is too dramatic, and too bound by principles. Why can't he play things down and just let them be what they are? "I speak about integrity and dignity and interaction between equal partners, about the necessity to stand up for oneself. Gustav speaks about self-devotion and quotes, 'The one who wants to preserve his life shall lose it, but the one who loses his life for my sake shall preserve it.'"

Martina objects to his pretensions:"I have always felt that there is something terrifying in the words 'I love you,' even as an accusation. I always feel when Gustav says them to me that they are something insistent upon me, demanding,

providing him with rights. I love you (What do you give me for that?); I love you (Are you worth my love?); I love you (Do you love me as much?)."

What is even worse, Gustav's love makes her love beat a retreat:"The more he loves me with such a self-effacing and self-consuming love, the less there remains for me to love. All that is needed is a certain indifference, a certain inciting indifference. For the more the one loves, the more the other's love fades away."

It soon becomes obvious that their sexual needs are asymmetrical too. While Gustav's desire seems unlimited, she tries to withdraw and ration the frequency of intercourse. Martina complains: "My lustfulness, where did it disappear? I do not enjoy the physical act of love as much as I did before. It happens again and again that Gustav has lust and I have not. How do you compromise about that? If I say no it hurts him and he is convinced that I do not love him anymore. Thus, in the end I have to make love with him in spite of everything."

Gustav patiently tries to evoke Martina's lust. But this search for her responsiveness becomes intrusive. She sighs: "One never hears anyone complain about an unselfish man who wants response all the time and who persists in insisting his partner feel that making love is fun." These are not just passing moods. Instead the two get fixed in their roles and cannot escape being the yes- and no-person: "You do not understand how humiliating it is to be exploited," she complains. "You cannot imagine how humiliating it is to be rejected," he replies.

Martina objects: inherent in his love is a moment of denial of her. "I envy his great passion, and I am afraid of it because it creates a picture of me that does not tally with me." She would prefer them "having each other as if one did not have each other. Making love whistling absent-mindedly and looking somewhere else. It might be the only form of love that does not give me claustrophobia."

Martina begins to feel that Gustav restricts her freedom to explore other relationships. Paradoxical as it may seem, she turns to other men and she does not hesitate to have a love-affair with a married man, since she has no intention of displacing his spouse: "But what compels my hormones is curiosity. They will go out roaming, making new discoveries, yes, conquests of new territories." "I think that it would be nice sometimes to be able to bring home a man, as it is the only way to make new friends - making friends by making love. So far as I can see around me, friends are recruited among lovers. But that way is blocked for me. Hormones and hormones, but I have social needs as well."

Gustav is depressed and jealous. After some time he confesses to having a love affair. Martina feels jealous and deceived. They end up in a balanced state of mutual infidelity and frustration. When the situation becomes unbearable they decide to part. However, their previous partings were only partial since they could not resist the temptation to meet. Their separations ended in reunions, thus confirming that they were predestined to remain a couple. In spite of their differences and other partners, in spite of the pain they inflicted on each other, their intimacy is exclusive. They speak the same language, share the same intellectual interests. There is no one they can confide in in the same way they can in each other. They have the same sense of humour. Their sincerity, or if you like, their ruthless honesty, has brought them very close. Somehow, their relationship is self-evident.

Nevertheless, Martina is divided: "I want to have him, sure, I want. Only I do not want him to get me ... What I can't stand are the marital rights. That Gustav on the whole should have any rights, legal, moral, de facto, or customary rights

in me. That idea gives me eczema." Martina is aware that the gift of love tacitly assumes a gift in return.

Their ruthless dialogue continues: "We talk and talk until our faces go blue and there is no aspect of our sex life that we have not explored and analyzed thoroughly, but we only end up concluding that our needs are incompatible. And having spoken sexualia for two hours there is nothing, nothing in the world, that I have less lust to do than go to bed with him."

"Of course, we have always hurt each other by being outspoken. As is well known, such outspokenness binds people together. We do not persist in bringing up the past, we have never harped on the same string of old injuries. But the general feeling of having been hurt remains, the feeling of having been maltreated, and this fixation makes one want to hold out."

Martina does not know that the time is running out. When Gustav tells her that he wants to separate she does not take it seriously. She hardly believes that Gustav intends to marry someone else, and believes even less that another woman will give birth to his child. It takes time for Martina to realize that Gustav has gone. She had not noticed that he had changed; become more cynical and even arrogant, more like her. When he refused to be rejected and held in contempt by her, Martina lost her power over him. She feels utterly lonely and isolated. There is no lust left in her episodic love either.

In a recent interview (Kärnborg 2000), the author, Gun-Britt Sundström, maintains that her novel is primarily concerned with moral issues. It is about being loved. In most relationships one party loves more than the other. How does one cope with that? How does one avoid exploiting another human being?

Besides legal and economic power, there are other kinds of power. Asymmetrical love gives the beloved one, i.e., the party who loves less, existential power over the loving person —power to reject and receive. The beloved one possesses power to heal and hurt the loving one. Polar dimensions like independence-interdependence, autonomy-unity, separateness-relatedness, individualism-familism/ grouping, encapsulate moral dilemmas between I and we.

In addition to love, sexual partnership is a significant part of the marital relationship. Yet the liberation of sexuality substantially means liberation from marital constraints. While the marital bed has lost much of its exclusiveness, the cultural centrality of sexuality has increased.

Individualization of Sexuality

The cultural meaning of marriage has been reinterpreted along the historical route from an authoritarian agrarian era to an industrial epoch of egalitarian struggle, from class to gender conflict within an educative service society — which in turn is now engulfed by a global information society. The procreative instinct plays a minor role while the cultural focus is on sexuality, a sexuality freed from the inhibitions, prohibitions, and obligations of the past. The sexual commitment itself has undergone a similar process of individualization, like so many other social institutions, cohesive groups, and old loyalities.

It appears to me that one can discern three "revolutionary" phases in sexual individualization.The first embraces the medicalization of sexuality in the nineteenth century. An old moral regime was overturned and replaced by a scientific one (Foucault 1976). The historical transition meant a transfer of power from the

church to the clinic. Something called sexuality was installed in terms of biomedicine and the biology of reproduction.There was a gradual progression away from the social body of relationships towards the physical body of sensation and pleasure. This move towards the human body, either in the name of reproductive health or sexual desire, paved the way for the individualization of sexuality.

The second sexual revolution in the 1960s and 1970s solved controversial ethical issues simply by biotechnical means (by stopping the monthly ovulation by manipulating hormones or preventing the egg from developing in the uterus, or by never letting the sperms spread inside). This separation of sexuality and procreation led, as we have seen, to the spread of a permissive sexual culture and diversification of family forms. The institution of marriage lost its previous significance. Childless sex increased individual freedom. Women were declared sexually equal to men, and they became sexually more accessible to them.

If intercourse rarely aims at procreation, does the gender of the involved persons matter at all? Globally, the gay and lesbian movements called heterosexuality into question. The third phase, "the sexual-revolution-in-the-making" was introduced by movements which challenge heterosexuality. According to Manuel Castells (1997), the current challenge is characterized by the delinking of marriage, family, heterosexuality, and sexual expression or desire. These four factors, linked under modern patriarchalism for the past two centuries, are now in the process of autonomization.When gender no longer matters as a rule organizing desire, individualization has proceeded further. In Giddens's words (1992), "sexuality becomes the property of the individual."

We know very little about sexual cultures in our own societies or about the social contexts in which sexual interactions take place. We need better understanding of sexual meanings, of "their shared, collective quality not as the property of atomized or isolated individuals, but of social persons within the context of distinct, and diverse, sexual cultures" (Parker and Gagnon 1995). The emphasis of research is shifting from sexual practices to the cultural rules and power relationships that construct them. The focus is moving towards the social organization of sexual interactions, and circumstances that influence men's and women's interpretations of their sexual experience. Regrettably, the national surveys on Sexual life in Sweden that were conducted in 1967 and 1996, deal with frequencies and distributions. The social and cultural contexts in which sexualities are conceived and constituted have to be deduced from key frequencies.

A selective elaboration of the survey results (Nordenmark 2000) generates interesting findings from comparisons between five age groups and between men and women. They reveal distinct sexual generations, i.e., age-bound attitudes and values that bear witness to changes over the past three decades but that also indicate that people stick to the values of their generation to a certain extent.

Nearly all Swedes make love, or as the official documents put it, are sexually active, thus giving sexual activity the appearance of folk sport. The median value of sexual partners has increased considerably since 1967, especially among women. According to the 1996 study, women have had sexual intercourse with 4.6 partners compared to 1.4 in 1967. The corresponding figures for men are 7.1 partners compared to 4.7 in 1967. In other words, women have caught up to the average male in 1967, while men have progressed to higher numbers. Usually, people accumulate sexual partners up to the age of 40. In 1996, those who were between 31 and 40 years have had 7.5 partners. A small number of people report

large numbers of sexual partners. The investigation reveals that it is not rare, neither is it the rule, that people have multiple concurrent sexual relationships. Thirty eight per cent of men report that they have had sexual relations with someone other than their steady partner during marriage and cohabitation, and 23 per cent of women report such experiences. Eight out of ten women, compared to seven out of ten men, say that they would prefer to live with a permanent partner without having other sexual affairs.

Most young women (18-24 years) prefer to live together with a man, while the young men prefer to live singly but to have a steady girlfriend. In older age groups, the preferences are reversed: elderly men prefer to live with a woman, while relatively more elderly women would prefer to live single but have a steady partner — or to just be single (Nordenmark 2000).

How much satisfaction do people derive from their sexual relationships? When asked about their most recent intercourse, 60 per cent of women, compared to 70 per cent of men, report having had an orgasm. This is one the most significant and persistent gender differences in the results. There is another major difference as well: Women's lust varies over time. Women of all ages feel lust sometimes rather than often, while men's lust is more stable. Most men under fifty often feel lusty. In the ages 18-25 among men, 65 per cent often feel lust and 35 per cent sometimes, while among women the figures are reversed (Nordenmark 2000).

In the ages when couples often have small children (25-34 years), 27 per cent of women report that their lust had increased compared to five years earlier, while 38 per cent now have less lust than before. The same pattern of increase and loss of lust for women and persistent lust for men repeats itself in middle age (35-49 years). Further, men consume more than twice as much pornography as women. They masturbate more often than women. Somewhat unexpectedly, women report more sexual fantasies that involve women and not only men, while similar sex fantasies are rare among men.

What then about emotions? It is more common today than thirty years ago for people to have sexual intercourse without being in love. This change is most marked among women. The proportion of women who have engaged in loveless sex but fallen in love afterwards has doubled. Instead of legitimizing a sexual relationship, love may evolve after intercourse. Sexual intercourse has become a kind of initiation rite to a potential love relationship, simply a way of getting to know another.

It is a popular belief that the young are more advanced in and relaxed about sexual matters than the adult generations. However, the empirical picture is partly gloomy, partly promising. In Sweden, the historical controversy about the ideals of premarital abstinence versus sexual permissivness seem to have led to an unwillingness to acknowledge any problems, with the exception of those concerning health. Guilt and blame are disregarded in favour of a supportive or at least a neutral attitude. As a reaction against the repressive sexual regime in the past, moral neutrality is seen as progressive and human. However, in the long run it leads to withdrawal from confronting problems of sexual intimidation, gender asymmetries, and forced and degrading sexual acts. There are indications that especially young girls do not fare well.

A group of female journalists in their thirties have published a book bearing the slang title *Fittstim,* meaning a "Shoal of Vaginas" (Norman-Skugge et al.1999). They narrate the sexual pressures, harassments, and degrading attitudes

they have been exposed to since puberty. They bear witness to sexual mobbing at school and the indifference of the teachers and the adult population towards these practices. They tell about teenage boys pressuring their girlfriends to practise fellatio and to have anal intercourse. It appears that adults are becoming more alert to young girls' problems.

The 1996 Swedish survey on sexual life only included the ages from 18 to 74 years, thus excluding adolescents. Yet, in 1990, a survey was conducted focusing on adolescents born in 1973, then 17 years old. According to the findings (Edgardh 1999) more than 90 per cent of both male and female students reported having fallen in love and being attracted to the opposite sex. The majority of the boys (54 per cent) and the girls (65 per cent) had already had their first sexual intercourse. Among other findings, the study identified a group consisting of "early starters", i.e., girls who had their first intercourse before the age of 15 . They are a minority of 16 per cent. Compared to "late starters" (debut after 15), they constitute a group at risk as can be seen from the comparison below

	Early starters (per cent)	**Late starters (per cent)**
Reported abortion	15.2	5.4
Had 5 lifetime partners	38.0	7.2
Had sex on first date	22.6	8.0
Experience of oral sex	93.8	10.1
Experience of anal sex	83.0	8.2
Habitual smokers	44.0	22.9
Had experimented with drugs	12.9	5.9
Had got drunk	69.3	64.2
Reported sexual abuse	20.2	10.9

The early and late starters resemble each other only in having got drunk. Otherwise, the figures illustrate teenagers' range of sexual interaction and risk taking.

Some teenagers develop friendships in their couple relationships. They have access to advice and they can bring their partner home overnight. There are others who cope more or less successfully with the asymmetries embedded in the conceptions of manhood and womanhood. Different sexual experiences are not randomly distributed, but follow common paths of gender and class.

Asymmetries pile up frustration and reserve. Currently, words like sharing, symmetry, and likeness tend to be interpreted as justice and gender equality. Despite being politically incorrect, gender asymmetries are, as we have seen, very common. They hurt and provoke and invade lovers' interactions. They become acute ethical issues. How does prevailing culture guide people who are beloved in considering the exposed position of those who love too much or in vain? Are there ethics involved in evoking love and lust?

Two sociologists, Giddens and Bauman, represent different standpoints in regard to obligations towards an intimate partner. They also debate individual liberties (development of the self) versus bonds of duty (responsibility towards the Other).

Giddens (1990, 1992) has coined the term "pure relationship": it refers to a situation where a social relationship is entered into for its own sake, for what

each person can derive from a sustained association with another. The relationship has no external anchors, no other motives or interests to support it. The relationship is continued only as long as it delivers both parties enough satisfactions for each individual to stay within it (1992, p. 58). When one (or both) of the partners have drained the sources of intimacy and there is nothing left to explore, they part from each other. Thus, the pure relationship contains a paradox of commitment and reserve.

Giddens is well aware of the distress and mourning that follows the break-up of an intimate relationship: Love shock has a "psychological travelling time." Becoming resigned to the break is normally only achieved in the later stages of withdrawal, once grief and blame have been dealt with (1992, p. 103). However, Giddens offers comfort to the abandoned partner by referring to psychotherapists who say that learning from what went wrong can turn the pain into growth and provide one with insights and coping skills that enhance one's next relationship (Gullo and Church 1989).

Are we accountable for evoking love in others? Are we free to escape when our partner has become "addicted" to us? Does our self-development have priority when the person who loves us becomes boring, runs into trouble, repeats herself, regresses? Is it a concern of the parting person if he stirs up previous losses and traumas? Bauman (1993) refuses easy ways of evading moral bonds: "In my responsibility for the Other, being responsible for my impact on the Other plays a crucial, indeed, the bonding role ... I may have solicited reciprocity in love, I may have succeeded in opening my partner towards me, I may have made my partner dependent on my response to her response to my caress. My moral duties to the partner in love multiply and swell as the consequence of my love. My love is consequential, and I accept it together with the new and growing responsibilities which follow."

One can argue that Giddens's main mistake is his failure to see the commonplaceness of asymmetrical love. He describes the emptiness and hollowness of routinized marital life based on habituation and addictive ties, projections and compulsive relationships, destructive co-dependencies and female subordination: all those traps that pure partners avoid by parting. By using psychotherapeutic language, Giddens eludes any claims of moral bonds. For him, the very existence of such bonds is psychologically damaging. He argues for the autonomy and self-development of the individual. The concept "emotional autonomy" marks clear boundaries against any appeal to reciprocal dependencies.

In opposition, Bauman disputes a parting where "each partner may not only terminate the love relationship, but also announce the moral insignificance of the act ... and of the now estranged Other". He objects to pure relationships "for being emancipated from the social functions which intimate relations were once meant to serve, and also for having disposed of the bonds of moral duty, that constitutive act of all morality, my (unlimited) responsibility for the Other" (1994, p.107). While Bauman guards love as a long-term project, Giddens affirms episodic love.

Giddens advocates for the freedom of the beloved one, Bauman considers the impact of rejected love on the lover. Sundström (1976) for her part describes how the encounters over time may reverse those roles. She also shows how difficult it is to keep "pure sexuality" clean.

Continuity and Change

According to modernization theories, the small nuclear family evolved with modernization. The story goes that the young couples were liberated from the authority of elders and free to make their own future. The small family was mobile and could move where the husband was offered the best opportunities. In reality, the nuclear family can be traced far back in the history of northwestern Europe. It preceded industrialization. Thus, the independent Western family model is deeply rooted in the past and, contrary to common beliefs, is not modern at all.

The husband and wife were the mainstay of family. The focal position of the spouses was also peculiar to northwest Europe. The conjugal bond was seen as the strongest of all relationships: it overrode all the relations of blood. Marriage was for life, "until death them do part." It implied dependency and oneness, "one flesh and one blood," under the authority of the husband.

What then is the modern family like? I have looked at present-day families in Sweden in an attempt to identify cultural continuities and changes in the conjugal relationship. The strong bond between husband and wife has loosened and has lost its historical significance as the strongest family bond. The weakening of the marital unit had already begun when the 1920 Marriage Law abolished male guardianship and raised the wife's position from subordination to equal partnership and, thus, sanctioned fairness and an element of individualism and self-interest.

The subsequent establishment of the dual-earner family based on self-supporting adults further increased the economic independence within marriage. Although not depending on each other economically, the spouses had joint responsibility for the wellbeing of their children. In principle, this meant less childrearing and family work for the mother, more for the father, and access to public childcare to relieve them both during working hours. As parents, the spouses still depended on each other and this dependency created discord and unmet expectations. Immemorial images of a gender-bound division of work in a complementary order were replaced by common arenas for performance, services, competition, and promotion with, principally, no regard for gender.

As if this were not upheaval enough, a new revolution waited around the corner. While feminity and masculinity were amalgamated by political reform, new mass contraception made it possible to separate sexual intercourse from procreation. Access to contraception soon solved severe social problems, such as the discrimination against "illegitimate" children and unmarried mothers, illegal abortions, unwanted children, the misery of worn-out mothers, couples unable to support more children, and widespread sexual repression. Suddenly, old restrictions were abolished and consent for sexual gratification was largely extended to previously excluded categories — adolescents, the unmarried, and extramaritally. The last category was not fully approved, but was on the whole tolerated. Underage sex is still taboo. The main remaining regulation is the demand for mutual consent. Accordingly, as long as you do not harm other people you are free to express your desire in any way you like.

When old problems find a solution, new ones usually make themselves known. When old forms of repression are done away with, new forms of restraint may take over. Which new problems have followed in the wake of "liberation"? There is an increase of freedom and choice, a right to explore and accumulate sexual experiences. Sexual relationships are less exclusive and they entail fewer

obligations. However, sexuality includes my relation to myself and my relation to the partner. This raises complexities of coping with asymmetries in love, and lack of complementarity in men's and women's needs. A culture that strongly affirms individual autonomy risks denial of responsibility towards the other/s. Sexuality is rarely "pure" but mixed with other motives, interests, and pressures. It is structurally compartmentalized in the sense that different age groups and classes have their own habits and attitudes (Lewin 1994). Partners still meet with different expectations when they move out from the protecting compartment of the like-minded.

It is worth asking whether sexual liberation and transformation of the gender division of labour counteract each other. The sexualization of culture brings the confirmation of feminity and masculinity to the forefront, while educational and labour market policies try to eliminate the impact of gender. The centrality of sexuality and the resultant polarized gender roles on the one hand, and the emphasis on the construction of equality on the other, work in opposite directions. No other group is more exposed to unwanted attention and sexual harrassment than young girls. Yet there are corruptive gains in being sexually attractive. It appears that an insight into unresolved issues is gaining ground.

There is a lack of awareness that the current "liberation" is as much socially constituted as the moral regime of the past. Nowadays, there are new parties taking part in this constitution: mass media; porno-industries; advertisements, etc. Love and sexuality activate existential issues of meaning. These are often repressed. That might be the main problem of liberation.

Marriage as an institution has partly eroded. If we understand decadence as a situation "in which central symbols of an institution ... have become 'empty' or 'hollow'— that is, have lost their earlier power of providing meaning and identity" (Berger and Berger 1983; Lewin 1986), marriage has lost much of its previous symbolic power. Cohabitation without formal marriage is an accepted alternative. However, many Swedes marry at a later stage when they already have children or feel that their relationship will last. Today, many of them choose a church wedding to mark the significance of the occasion.

The privatization of marriage and the institutionalization of cohabitation are in a way the extension of the tradition of leaving the couple itself to reach consent and arrange the relationship. They did not depend on kin or others to intervene on their behalf. Premarital cohabitation has by tradition occured in certain Swedish regions and is also known as "Stockholm marriage," thus bespeaking both rural and urban forerunners.

Although the focus here is on current unstable couple relationships, we should keep in mind that the majority of marriages in Sweden are stable. For instance, 65-75 per cent of children grew up with both their biological parents in 1997. Nevertheless, separations and divorces are sufficiently common to be visible. People encounter parting couples among their relatives, neighbours, friends, and workmates. Weekly magazines and evening papers maintain their sales with stories of divorces and new partners among celebrities. Children see their friend's parents moving apart. Such prevalence serves as a reminder of the risk that love may not last forever. Who dares to invest in a long-term commitment? Fear of separation may lead to an attitude of reserve, an anticipatory belittling of the significance of the Other. The prospect of being abandoned encourages autonomy and even the initiation of the betrayal of the relationship.

Authorities and public opinion are alarmed by the high rate of parents who part. There is apprehension of the weakening of human bonds. If primary relations are substitutable, if a parent just moves out, if mothers and fathers can replace each other with someone else, does not the child feel betrayed by not being taken into account? Who is there to be trusted? Nonetheless, there is another view emphazising the gains of divorce: people are not doomed to stay in dumb and unresponsive marriages, to endure neglect, to be constantly underrated and scolded, not to mention being abused. People have a right to choose to live single or to hope for a more self-fulfilling relationship. Divorce makes it possible to reconstruct one's life, and it may be intended to improve the lives of the children.

It has been suggested (Moxness 1991) that we view the family as a continuous lifelong process containing phases of cohabitation, marriage, separations and divorces, single parenthood, being single, remarriage or cohabitation, and diversely composed households of related people who regard themselves as family. In such a holistic view, family is not understood as a given unit, but as systems of relationships between the members of the family. They do not need to have a common goal. Divorces and separations are not isolated events. They are integrated parts of life. They do not annul parents' contact and responsibilities for their children. On the contrary, the crucial issue is the mother's and father's collaboration in the interests of their children. What the loss of mutual love and caring between parents may mean for children is rarely discussed.

The bond between parent and child is one that transcends individual interest. While the marital unit of common interest is allowed to split, the link between parents and their offspring is seen as the lasting one.

In the 1980s, sociologists became more aware of the presence of family circles and generational networks. The common home as a definition of family has limited utility in studying family life. Family relationships cross household boundaries and include generational circles as well as joint custodial circles (Liljeström 1988). The family circle may be dormant for a long time, but it comes to life again in crises, such as divorce situations. For instance, the grandparents' generation may look after children or provide housing for a parting son. Loose boundaries of the family concept and the family's greater fluidity represent one element in the new thinking in Nordic countries. A closer look at this fluidity reveals that parenthood is the backbone of the family circle. While marital bonds loosen, generational bonds are less affected.

The minor role that kinship plays in public ideology is consistent with tradition. Yet, this absence of kin is in a sense deceptive. The family is, as already noted, demarcated in housing statistics as those members who share a common home. But family relations are dispersed over several households whose members interact, visit, and support each other, share meals and memories, and exchange services, for example babysitting and the care of elderly parents. Why does kinship hide in the shadow of public ideology? First and foremost, because it assumes unpaid female services and is, therefore, perceived as an obstacle to equality between men and women. Public ideology discounts gifts of love or duty within an extended family circle — at any rate until men do their share of unpaid caring.

A further continuous element is the late birth of the first child. Today, economic reasons (given the income-related level of parental insurance) and the wish for autonomy encourage delayed motherhood, whereas in the past delayed marriage and childbearing were a rational means to limit the number of children.

The decrease in childbirth following the recession in the 1990s indicates that a Malthusian evaluation of costs for having or not having children is still valid.

Other changes are female economic independence and childless sexuality, both of which have led to greater autonomy between partners in a couple relationship. There is a remarkable continuity in the emphasis on independence and individual rights. Indeed, these features seem to have become stronger in light of the assumed irrelevance of parental models and the strong ethos of self-development expressed, not least, in Gidden's vindication of pure relations.

Apparently, the new assets the modern couples command have increased their individual autonomy, their ability to make choices, and to rewrite their autobiographies. One salient theme is the redefinition of the couple relationship, the weighing of gains and costs of staying together or parting.

Many of our most elementary relationships that used to be taken for granted have been socially reconstructed and given new meaning. The "new meaning" of gender and sexuality as defined by policies and public debate has not yet been settled. However, changes in family and gender relations are not unique to Sweden, but only a local version of much wider processes that started in Western industrialized countries, but which have been disseminated over large parts of the industrialized globe.

A Male Family Crisis

The roots of the northwest European marital couple go far back in history. What then are the prospects for couples as we enter the twenty-first century? The sociologist Manuel Castells (1997) has undertaken an impressive global overview of the ongoing transformation towards an information society. He defines current gender relationships, delinking of sexuality, and eroding institutions as alarming. Castells interprets the ongoing transformations as challenges to patriarchy: "Patriarchalism is a founding structure of all contemporary societies. It is characterized by the institutionally enforced authority of males over females and their children in the family unit. For this authority to be exercised, patriarchalism must permeate the entire organization of society ... Without the patriarchal family, patriarchalism would be exposed as sheer domination ..." (p. 135)

The challenges in Western or Westernized industrial and urbanized societies are similar to those in Sweden. They arise from the massive incorporation of women into paid work and their access to contraception and, thereby, to childless sexuality. Two broad movements bear witness to a new social and sexual conciousness — the feminist movements struggling against male hegemony and the gay and lesbian movements calling into question heterosexuality as a universal norm. Each of them hits one of the two pillars which bear up the family as an institution that makes men and women interdependent. The feminists attack the complementarity of a gender-bound division of work. The homosexual movements undermine the heterosexual order and thereby the sexual interdependence between men and women. The patriarchal family faces a crisis that manifests itself in divorces or separations; single-parent families facing hardship; increasing diversity of family forms; crises of social replacement; deteriorating relationships between men and women; lack of trust; antagonism; psychological and physical abuse; anxiety; rape; and violence.

As Castells sees it, the situation is more complicated for men, who have been socially more privileged and now see their negotiating power in relation to their wives decline. We do not know what kind of men will replace the patriarchs, if, indeed, they are replaced. He argues, (referring to J.Stacey 1990) that if there is a family crisis, it is a male family crisis and goes on to ask what other sources of emotional and social support remain for men. First, he suggests male bonding and gayness as possible solutions. On closer examination, he rejects them as viable options for most men. Rather, he sees that the most acceptable, stable, long-term solution is to renegotiate the heterosexual family contract to include, above everything else, full sharing of parenting. Castells underlines the urgency of renegotiations: The main victims of this cultural transmission are the children who become increasingly neglected. Their situation may even worsen because of poverty or because women, looking for autonomy and personal survival, begin to neglect their children in the way men do.

Swedish policy falls squarely into Castells's global frame. However, what is specific to Sweden is the role played by the welfare state and the strength of legal and sociopolitical individualism (Dahlström 1988). The welfare state has acted as an ally to women and has also supported single parents. Discrimination against women on the market is due to women's caring for children and the elderly, their readiness to respond to the needs of others. Therefore, Swedish policies have sought to put parents on an equal footing and promote new forms of parenthood. Initially, this was a crude strategy for making women and men equal on the market. Later, the significance of the policies has deepened. Feminist scholars (Chodorov 1978, 1989; Dinnerstein 1976) have argued that the differentiation of parental roles itself provides the psychological device that keeps reproducing the mother as the main parent and the absent distant father in the early childhood of each generation.

Obviously, Castells's recommendations are in line with the intentions of Swedish policies when he calls for reconstruction of the family under egalitarian relations and underlines the responsibility of public institutions in securing material and psychological support for children as possible ways to "alter the course towards mass destruction of the human psyche that is implicit in the currently unsettling life of millions of children" (p. 235). Here, one has to remember that Swedish children are less exposed to extreme poverty and neglect than children in societies lacking welfare measures. Likewise, there are signs of a male crisis in Sweden too, although they are less pronounced than in the U.S. Swedish policies support fatherhood and the childrens' right to be in touch with both their parents.

Nevertheless, this chapter has put its finger on the cult of individualism and personal autonomy that seems to overshadow the interests of the family as a unit and any willingness to compromise for common ends. Such an attitude among women gets public support in the name of equality. Today, if parents take time to reflect upon their constant lack of time, and if they consider working less than fulltime or postponing a career, the "workfare state" attempts to blackmail them by withdrawing social benefits that are linked to income, including future pensions. They are made aware of the limits of choice. Thus, in Sweden, the renegotiations may have to reach a tripartite agreement between mothers, fathers, and the state, an agreement that lays the foundations for a more socially sustainable everyday life for women, men, and children.

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What the History of Family Counselling has to Say About Family Values

ANNA-KARIN KOLLIND

The purpose of this chapter[1] is to outline how values concerning family and marriage have changed in Sweden over the past century. Generally, any attempt to write a history of values has to contend with the challenge that there seldom has been a uniform value system in any one area. Values concerning family and marriage are no exception. Such values have varied between social classes, political groups, and between regions. Even laws, that from one point of view express generally accepted societal norms, can be obsolete, or become the subject of controversy and so no longer express such general values. It is my opinion that value changes in particular societies can be illuminated only in relation to specific social groups or phenomena. The changing values concerning family and marriage that will be delineated here are in one way or another associated with family counselling or its forerunners. Thus, my focus is on ideas connected with activities directed to preserving or at least ameliorating marriages or family relations.

I concentrate on family counselling in Sweden and its ideological and cultural contexts. My presentation is historical in the sense that I describe specific time periods in the history of counselling in order to show important shifts in conceptions of marriage and in techniques used to influence married people. The presentation will take the form of snapshots rather than being a detailed historical analysis. My chief purpose is to take family counselling as a point of departure for a discourse on changing family values. As will be seen, there have been, and still are, certain inherent tensions in these values, primarily between individualism and community. These tensions have been expressed by changes in the laws, but also in values concerning what is right and wrong in procedures for intervening in marriage matters, and in the goals of such intervention. Another obvious tension concerns shifts from hierarchical to more horizontal relations between state authorities and citizens, as well as between men and women.

The chapter is divided into four parts. The first starts at the beginning of this century with a discussion of changing ideas about how disharmony and quarrels between husband and wife should be handled. Then follows a section about the kinds of vision of family life and society that inspired groups of Swedish intellectuals to engage in creating counselling centres. In the third section, the new emphasis on the social-emotional relationships in families that emerged in the

1 This chapter is a highly shortened version of a book I have written about family counselling in Sweden. See Anna Karin Kollind: *Äktenskap, konflikter och rådgivning. Från medling till samtalsterapi,* Stockholm: Carlssons Bokförlag 2002.

1950s is discussed. The final section is devoted to ideals and techniques related to the triumphs of the psychotherapeutic approach and the new ideals concerning couple relations that emerged in the 1970s.

Forerunners of Family Counselling — Techniques of a Patriarchal Society

Some decades ago, sharp criticism was directed towards professional groups like social workers, psychiatrists, psychologists, and counsellors for having invaded, colonized, and enfeebled families. By making them dependent on experts, these professionals were claimed to have undermined family members' trust in their own capacities and responsibilities (Lasch 1979; Donzelot 1979). Subsequent attacks on the welfare state have periodically relied on similar arguments. From such arguments, one easily gets the impression that it is only in the twentieth century that family life has become a target for controlling interventions by public agencies. This might be true in some parts of the world, but not in the Nordic countries, and certainly not with respect to relationships between husband and wife.

Until 1920, when a new *Marriage Law* was passed in Sweden, an elaborate regime of intervention in the life of husband and wife had existed for centuries. This regime went back to at least the seventeenth century and comprised the various techniques that were used by church authorities, primarily clergy, in their efforts to actively reconcile fighting and quarrelling spouses. Old church law prescribed a schema of techniques for this, with escalating penalties. The first procedure was for the priest to give the fighting spouses a "warning." If no change resulted, a second warning had to be given, and then a third. Edifying talk and commands combined with threats were important aspects of these warnings, and they could be given added weight by bringing in a group of local authorities to participate in "warning" the spouses. In this sense, public humiliation was part of the corrective technique. Local authorities supervised spouses who promised to change their behaviour. Different types of corporal punishment could follow if the spouses did not change their ways. A still stronger punishment was a forced but temporary separation of the spouses in bed and hearth, and the ultimate sanction was excommunication.

According to the law, these punishments had to be accompanied by prayers in church during which parishioners joined in to influence the troubled spouses to change their behaviour. In sum, influence was exerted by using edifying commands, threats, and punishments in combination with prayer. The aim of these interventions was twofold: to penalize what was regarded as criminal acts but also to effect reconciliation between husband and wife.

These techniques to stabilize and guard the holy matrimonial estate were not dead letters in the law book, but were actively used by clergy and councils in many places in Sweden (Nylander 1961; Losman 1986). Their use highlights the salience of marriage in the patriarchal society of agrarian Sweden, where marriage, household, means of support, and tax levies were strongly connected with each other. Grave strife between spouses could ruin their capacity to manage the household and could lead to impoverishment, so that the spouses could become a poor-relief burden on the parish (Losman 1986; Löfgren 1974).

This system of sanctions was gradually moderated. Already in the eighteenth

A young woman speaking about her marital problems to the family counsellor.

century corporal punishments were replaced by fines, and in the next century the number of prescribed warnings was reduced to two, but the right and duty of the clergy to intervene in domestic affairs continued until the new *Marriage Law* was enacted in 1920. With this act, the whole traditional system of intervention in the conduct of husbands and wives disappeared. In preparing the new law, the prescription was laid down that no societal authority should intervene in such domestic matters. Contending couples now had to solve their problems by themselves, it was said (Ekeberg 1934).

In its day the new *Marriage Law* was radical in several aspects. The most important innovation was that husband and wife were looked upon as two individuals with the same rights and obligations. The married woman was recognized as a person in her own right, and not as subordinate to her husband. Thus the law initiated gender equality within marriage.[2]

Another radical and related element was the changes in the rules of divorce. According to the Lutheran conception of justice, divorce was allowed under two specific conditions, adultery and desertion. Even though the grounds were gradually extended, there were still many legal restrictions and barriers in the way of divorce. Many of the techniques used to correct the behaviour of squabbling spouses were also used in relation to divorce, such as the system of warnings. All in all, divorces were very uncommon. In 1900, only 0.06 per cent of married women got a divorce. With the new *Marriage Law* even the divorce laws were reformed (indeed, these reforms actually occurred in 1915). Here I emphasize two aspects of the reformed divorce laws, both pointing to radical shifts in the conceptualization of marriage and divorce.

The main intention of the reforms was to remove some of the obstacles to divorce. Prior to the reforms, the upper classes had the resources to use the loopholes in the law to obtain quick divorces — a ritual journey to Copenhagen was

2 For a detailed presentation of the background and content of this law, see Kyle, this volume.

taken as a sign of desertion. Poor people had to go a longer and more humiliating route. The old system of "warnings," with its element of punishment and shaming treatment, gave way to a more preventive view. Compulsory mediation was introduced as a barrier to what were thought to be too rash and hasty divorces. The task of the mediator, a member of the clergy or an appointed civil mediator, was to examine the cause of the marriage breakdown and to attempt to find a way to reconcile husband and wife. The lawmakers emphasized that the mediation should be conducted in a friendly atmosphere, and that the humiliating elements of the former system were to be avoided. However, the mediation was essentially a liberalized and softened version of the old system of warnings, and its actual practice was dependent on the personal style and ideas of the individual mediator.

From an international perspective, the new Swedish divorce laws were seen as radically liberal (Glendon 1987). One of their controversial elements was their allowance of divorce on the grounds of "deep and permanent discord" between the spouses. In such cases, both husband and wife agreed upon the divorce and no one was found guilty of the breakdown of the marriage. No court was entitled to examine or decide upon the validity or relevance of the reasons for the divorce. Except for the mediation, which was compulsory in these cases, the court had no interventionist role to play. In cases of agreement between the spouses, their wishes had to be respected and accepted by the court without further examination. The acceptance of a mutually agreed decision by the spouses was an absolute innovation, as was the acceptance of no-fault as a legitimate principle in cases of divorce.

All these reforms meant major change in the views on matrimony. By the beginning of the twentieth century, there was little left of the centuries-old regime to safeguard matrimony that had been built on hierarchical relations and that included forced interventions, threats, and punishments. It is debatable whether this regime can be called a forerunner of family counselling. The word "counselling" itself belongs to a new and different discourse and is not applicable to the older order, but from a functional point of view there are similarities between the practices. Both are constructed to support a family unit that is deemed to be basic to the society. In the older society it was the matrimonial order, a unity built on hierarchical relations. But what kind of family unit was judged to be of primary importance to society when family counselling was created?

Visions Among Supporters of Marriage Counselling

Family counselling is one of many types of social services and protective arrangements associated with the welfare state that have been constructed in this century around the reproduction of human beings. It began in Germany in 1919 as a professional activity, and was established in the next two decades in England and the U.S. before spreading to other Western countries. The professional groups most active in promoting this new type of social service in all these cases were doctors, social workers, clergy, and teachers. In the U.S., even academics, such as professors of sociology and psychology, played an active part in the initial phase. These professional groups had in common a strong belief in the positive role scientific knowledge could play to help people live a better life. The new sciences of psychology, psychiatry, and sociology were seen as an important means to guide these new counselling activities.

An important aim of the new approach was, of course, to help people handle difficulties in their marital lives, to support them in coming to grips with the agonies and conflicts of marriage, and to enable them to continue their marriages. The professional groups that initiated and developed family counselling were firmly convinced that ongoing societal changes towards industrialization and urbanization put great burdens on family relations and marriage. Counselling activities were looked upon as new way to meet these difficulties and to help human beings and families to come to terms with the many disruptions flowing from social change. From this perspective, family counselling was regarded as a remedy against some of the evil consequences of the modernization process. But from another point of view, this new service also was seen as a means of providing people with scientifically based knowledge on sexuality, contraceptives (although the 1911 law forbidding the sale and distribution of contraceptives was not abolished until 1938), and on rational economic and household management. Another important aim was to make people more aware of the finer psychological aspects of family relations. In other words, family counselling was looked upon both as remedy against the effects of the modern society and as a means to reform and modernize family life and people's attitudes in accordance with the demands of the new society.

The American mental hygiene movement was a key influence on Swedish intellectuals in the 1930s and 1940s as regards their interest in guidance clinics and family counselling. The mental hygienists strongly emphasized large-scale preventive measures to ensure the mental health of the population. The science of psychology, social psychology, and psychoanalysis were seen as important tools in transforming the environment in different sections of society so as to better fit the needs of children and adults. These new systems of knowledge were, however, not only means to ameliorate the mental health of human beings; they were also seen as an important means to transform and improve the whole of society. Professional groups like doctors, social workers, educators, and the clergy were actively engaged in the Swedish mental hygiene movement. Their goals included increasing popular knowledge of psychological issues, getting municipalities to start child guidance clinics, and also establishing a bureau for psychological advice to adults, a key step in what was to be called family counselling.

Organized women's groups, the feminists of the time, played an active role in such initiatives. One of these women, teacher and theologian Emilia Fogelklou, was the first to institute such practical activities. Her views and ideals, her way of looking at family counselling, give a sense of the ideas and visions held by some of the persons who were active in these projects and illustrate the more general ideas of her time.

Like many enthusiastic supporters of the mental hygiene movement, Emilia Fogelklou was interested in the impact of the environment on the mental growth of children. For her, the overshadowing role of childhood in mental development was comparable to an ongoing silent revolution. In her writings on these issues, she underlined the importance of the wider social relations in which a child is embedded, such as the school and the family. Her writing about the family was never idyllic. According to her, parents were often people of goodwill, but were ignorant; possibly emotionally unresponsive, deeply conflicted about how to bring up their children, and created an atmosphere of arbitrary despotism for their children, etc. Upbringing was often aimed at drilling the child to adapt rather than at liberating its inherent potential.

Fogelklou was one of the more radical exponents of her time of a freer education and a new, more liberating approach to upbringing. This, however, demanded re-education of adults — parents, teachers, social workers, workplace superiors, etc. During her visit to the U.S. in 1930, Fogelklou had seen examples of study-circles on family issues, parental education, etc., and hoped to be able to transfer these to Sweden. In her opinion, everyone in society needed to be re-educated so as to see the importance of personal relationships, mentalities, and psychological conditions. In those days, many mental-hygiene intellectuals talked of the "famous Swedish psychological illiteracy," meaning a total lack of psychological insights. It was against this backdrop that Fogelklou and other intellectuals saw the need for different forms of guidance or counselling. They did not believe in the existence of a spontaneous need for such things among people. Rather, the contrary was the case, since people were not expected to dare to talk about their relationship problems in a rational way with professionally trained people. This was one of the deficiencies that had to be addressed. (Kinberg 1941; Fogelklou 1936)

For Fogelklou, mental hygiene and the new form of upbringing were not only intended to create free, candid, and fearless children. For her they were also meant to create conditions for a new and better society in which the ability to cooperate was an overarching goal. Teachers, for instance, had to be changed from being mainly authoritarian figures with powers of punishment and interrogation into professionals acting in the service of liberation. Freedom and equality had to be substituted for suppression, blind obedience, and servility. In her opinion, counselling, parental education, courses in psychology, as well as settlements, youth centres, and wider social policy were active initiatives to transform an old society into a new one in which cooperation and a democratic and equal community could be developed (Fogelklou 1936, 1941, 1945).

When Fogelklou described earlier society, she wrote about a society in which all relations between human beings were fixed by rules of tradition. Such fixed rules of conduct and behaviour between humans no longer existed in modern societies, so that there were extensive feelings of uncertainty among the people. The uncertainty in the new world applied not just to parents' relations with their children but also to relations between husbands and wives, and to love relationships. According to Fogelklou, industrialization and individualization had meant liberation, especially among women, from the "determinism of the family." However, the corollary was disturbance of issues of community in marriage as well as in society. The topic of togetherness, of how to create a kind of community within the new conditions of individualization, was, according to her, one of the most basic issues of the century. The real and challenging task, she argued, was to create a community that allowed multiplicity and dissimilarity as a basis for unity and community. The *Marriage Law* of 1920 represented for her — as for so many feminists of her time — an important step in the direction of marriage based on equality. Even here the basic challenge was to create a unity, a mutual association, out of two different individuals with different needs and wishes.

Among the pioneers of family counselling there was a strong belief in the new psychology and its possibility to create a new kind of human being, less inclined to make harsh judgments and condemn, more apt to be empathetic and look for rational reasons to understand other humans. The hope was that people who were supplied with new knowledge and insights should be able to create better com-

munities. Thus, psychology was expected to contribute to the creation of a pluralistic society that allowed for differences among human beings, but within a context of a preserved community. In other words, a new kind of collectivist association would come into being that would allow for a higher degree of individuality. Of course, psychology-based counselling was also thought to function as help and support for unhappy human beings. Nonetheless, it was regarded as a means to bring up into being new human beings and citizens who would be emancipated from habitual traditions and outdated patriarchal structures.

Beyond these common assumptions, there were diverse aims and interests among the different groups that set up counselling agencies. Especially the church wanted to reform the compulsory mediation for divorce. It argued that mediators had to be educated in psychology and psychotherapy in order for mediation to be efficient and professionally conducted. Courses to inform people and make them better prepared for marriage were held on a significant scale. At the time, mediators, whether clerical or civil, had no such education at all (Nordqvist 1950; Arbin 1950). Another objective, mainly associated with the Social Democratic Women's Association, was to create agencies that could advise housewives on home-related issues, such as the most efficient way to handle economics, sewing, cooking, home furnishing, caring for children, etc. (SOU 1947: 46). This was to be combined with psychology-based counselling.

Still another strong interest was abortion. In the1940s, the Swedish policy to prevent illegal abortions was based partly on threats of punishment and partly on plans for an expanded social policy that would help prevent illegal abortions. Influential policymakers argued that illegal abortions would be brought to an end through a general support system that would make it easier for unmarried or poor mothers to give birth (Hatje 1974).

In the mid-1940s, a new view of abortion issues emerged in the report of a state commission on the subject (SOU: 1944:51). A new socio-psychological frame was adopted. The explanatory model, originally presented by Gunnar Myrdal, combined an objective, a subjective, and a normative picture of reality. The norm for desirable action is stated at the outset, yet, "in order to be able to influence the woman's action you have to learn to understand her thoughts and emotions." A new branch of counselling was established, namely "abortion counsellors" who were to duty-bound to persuade women to give birth to their unwanted children. Thus, illegal abortions were anchored to an individual-oriented psychologizing approach, namely "the motives of the abortion client." As complicated psychological aspects, feelings, and relationship issues were frequent reasons for women wanting to abort, there was a need of some sort of family counselling: social policy measures were not enough. Especially the Social Democratic Women's Association promoted a policy of joint family and abortion counselling (Hatje 1973; Liljeström 1974). In this way the new social psychology was used for liberating as well as repressive aims.

These different interests had, however, one thing in common, namely their stress on the need to improve the psychological insights of the public and of the professional groups whose task was to guide the public on issues of marriage and family life. The combined actions of these different interest groups contributed to the establishment of family counselling agencies in the 1950s.

Discourses on the Emotional Quality of Family Life

The state was not an initiator of family counselling agencies in Sweden. Their establishment was rather due to the different professional groups associated with the mental hygiene movement and to diverse political groups. They all worked on the task of influencing municipalities, county councils, the state, and the church to support this kind of social service agency.

In the early 1950s some municipalities and church communities took the initiative to establish the first agencies of this kind. It is of interest to look more closely at the motives of the time and the arguments that were raised. A new type of discourse on family matters had found its way into even local politics. According to this discourse, the preservation of marriage was no longer to be wished for at any price. To preserve a conflict-ridden marriage was even seen as being harmful to the rising generation. This discourse rests on the view that the social-emotional relationships of families determine the welfare of the family members, especially the later social and mental adjustment of the children. Now the emphasis was put on the quality of the family community. A new conception had found its way into the thinking on marriage and family matters: the welfare of children depends on the way they are treated by their parents, or rather their mother, and on the emotional atmosphere in the home.

This type of discourse is clearly manifest in the views of the Swedish State Commission appointed in 1955 to investigate the issue of family counselling. The task of this commission was to investigate the need to build a system of family counselling throughout the country, what form such counselling should take, and the role of the state in the process. From our perspective, the interesting thing is the values on marriage and family that were manifested in the reasoning that underpinned the commission's recommendations.

In the commission's report, the increase in divorce was seen as an alarming sign of the ongoing weakening of marriage. At the same time, though, it was noted that divorce per se was not necessarily to be seen as destructive. Even if several scientific studies had shown the harmful effects of divorce on children, this harm could not without reservation be ascribed to divorce. It could just as well derive "from the time of unhappy marital family life." Most probably, it was said, "permanent grave conflicts in the home" would have more damaging effects on the harmonious development of the children than divorce (SOU 1957:33, pp. 15ff.).

On several occasions the commission report referred to international as well as Swedish social scientific research conducted in the 1940s and 1950s that had pointed to the connection between flawed family relations and different "unhappy" consequences for the individual. Such consequences might take the form of conditions or behaviours like alcoholism, criminality, suicide, abortions, psychological neuroses, and other more general difficulties in adapting. For instance, a Swedish criminology study had shown the impact of bad family conditions during a child's period of growth and the same impact was found in the case of alcoholics. "Erotic conflicts" had been found to provoke suicide (for instance Jonsson 1944; Blomberg 1954; Ahnsjö 1941) This means that the home, the parents, and the mental climate in the family were afforded increased significance in explaining the origin of various types of social deviance. The emphasis on the qualitative aspects of family relations was not restricted to the report of the state commission on family counselling. It was also apparent in the investigations of other commissions, such as those concerning child guidance clinics and, as was mentioned earlier, the abortion issue (SOU 1957:40; SOU 1953:29).

Ideas of this kind had been formulated earlier, for instance in connection with the mental hygienic movement. But now they had the support of scientific studies, which, of course, gave them more legitimacy. Moreover, they had become part of the political discourse. This meant that they could now influence public policy.

More generally, the attention to the importance of the qualitative, emotional aspects of family relations in the period after the Second World War can be linked to the changing image of the family in the minds of Western social scientists and reformers during the first half of the twentieth century. The idea of the family underwent very basic and widespread change among these groups from being a social institution to a form of companionship. With some variation, this idea can be found in the works of continental researchers like Durkheim and in those of American sociologists like Burgess, Mowrer, and Parsons. It is also expressed by the early Swedish sociologist Segerstedt, and by writers and social reformers like Alva Myrdal, Emilia Fogelklou and many others.

All these authors contributed to the spread of a changing image of marriage: from being seen as a community of constraint, it came to be seen as a community based on free choice, love, and sympathy. The belief was that this change in marriage arose out of the transition from an agrarian to an industrial society. Earlier patriarchal conditions, with men in the superior position and women in a subordinated position, were substituted by more democratic relationships between husband and wife. In these transitions, the bonds between family members were increasingly seen as bonds of feeling, as emotionally grounded loyalties. This circumstance was thought to create vulnerable and fragile marriages (for instance Mowrer 1939; Burgess and Locke 1945; Howard 1981). However, some sociologists, such as Swedish sociologists in the 1950s, emphasized that several factors in modern society also contributed to a new stability in family life. In particular, they cited shorter working hours and increased leisure time. Moreover, the growing understanding of psychology, sociology, and biology might also contribute to such stability. According to these sociologists, increased understanding of the factors that supported family life could be consciously used to make "the family gain increased stability" (SOU 1957:33, p. 28-31; Segerstedt 1953, pp. 113 ff).

In this context, the existence or otherwise of empirical scientific support for such a perspective is an irrelevant issue. What is important is that influential intellectual groups believed that the general modernization process influenced family life in a particular way. This belief, or dominating discourse, then had consequences in the form of reforms and procedures that were seen as necessary to solve the crises of family life.

From this perspective on family change, the crises of the family could readily be seen as a societal issue, not simply a private matter. And because the modern family was mainly seen as a community of feelings of intimacy, any activity that aimed at stabilizing family bonds had to direct itself towards personal relationships between family members. Active work on reducing conflicts in marriage had to influence bonds of feeling. In such efforts, psychology and sociology were a key source of influence. An affectionate-based community demanded affectionate-oriented action, guided by psychological and social psychological knowledge. Family counselling was a prime example of such activity.

The Swedish State Commission of the 1950s had to decide if there was any need for family counselling, and still more crucial, if the state should support and at least partly finance it. Its conclusion was that counselling was undeniably something for which "society" (i.e., the public authorities or the state) had a

responsibility. Family and marriage was said to be an institution of high societal importance, and as such it was in need of the "supervision and care of ... society" (SOU 1957:33, p. 32). However, the voluntary aspect was also strongly emphasized: No one should be forced to be helped. The element of compulsion, such as with mediation in cases of divorce, should not be associated with this new type of marital support. Since modern marriage was founded on free choice, no aspect of force could be inherent in the new social service.

In its report, the commission recommended a combination of abortion and family counselling. This proposal was, however, only partly realized. In 1960 it was decided that the state should pay subsidies to municipalities and county councils to run counselling agencies in family matters. In some places, family counselling was combined with abortion counselling, in other places these two types of counselling were separated.

New Ideals of Couple Relationships

Up to the 1970s, counselling basically was a mix of practical social work and therapeutically oriented treatment. A counsellor could try to solve practical tasks, such as those concerning budgets, accommodation, or perhaps arrange a holiday home for an exhausted housewife. The main goal of the treatment, however, was to "restore the balance of a disturbed relationship," a task that was directed towards "emotional relationships." From the very start, the counsellors assumed that most often the problem concerned the relationships between couples. Still, the most common way to initiate remedial action was to see the wife and husband individually; and they were seldom interviewed together. From the beginning of the 1970s, partly from the impact of family therapy at that time, it became more common for Swedish counsellors to see couples together. As a result, counsellors got closer experience of the often unclear and broken communications between husband and wife, and issues of communication came to the fore. Problems of communication came to be seen as a most basic component of difficulties between couples.

From the 1970s, competence in psychotherapy, family therapy, and so on has greatly increased among Swedish counsellors. From then on, educational possibilities in this field exploded on a wide scale. However, there also occurred a shift in the way couple relationships were viewed. We have already seen that the visions of therapeutically guided counselling were associated with a conception of family life in modern society as an emotionally based community. In some sense, counselling can be seen as linked to conceptions of romantic love. In the ideal of romantic love, there is strong stress upon ideas of emotional belonging, of mental and sexual union. From at least the end of the 1970s, there are signs of shifting values among family counsellors and a new kind of message was enunciated. Now, the good relationship was seen as based on the ability of two individuals to maintain their independence and their separateness, on their ability to communicate and take individual responsibility for themselves; and on their ability to reach agreement and to negotiate when in conflict. These have come to be seen as crucial elements in establishing the good love relationship.

This changing message has been discernible to me in my studies mainly through the guidance and advice books that Swedish family counsellors have written from the 1950s to the 1990s. There has been at least one publication each decade of such manuals and a comparison of their contents gives a clear picture

of a shift in values. The core issue here, of course, is the relationship between community and individuality, namely, the question of how striving towards a community with solidarity and positive obligations can be combined with space for individuality and autonomy. This issue has engaged every family counsellor who published advice manuals. In a book from the 1950s, certain stress was placed upon the importance of not subordinating oneself to one's partner (Linnér 1959). The same thing was emphasized by an author from the early 1970s (Engstedt 1972). But from the latter part of that decade a new theme appeared in counsellors' writings about the relationship between individuality and community. "Two people who live together are two separated individuals. They can never be one," noted one text. It went on that it is "unrealistic to believe that we can share everything" (Burenius and Karlsson 1977, p. 77, 81). The new key in family counselling is the emphasis on the separateness of partners.

Whereas writers of the 1950s emphasized that for a love relationship to function, both partners had to work hard to understand each other's feelings, writers in the 1970s talk about the importance of clearly drawn limits. A nurturing relationship, it is said, needs "an individual with relatively clear boundaries" (Lundmark and Sandler 1982, p. 27). The whole idea that one partner could not manage without the other is said to be an illusion, a myth that creates unhealthy bonds. Instead, everyone has to stand as clear as possible from bonds and dependencies in order to be able to make real choices. "If spouses are living too tight, there is no space for a relation. Only two separate individuals can reach real closeness. If you are too close, you can't see each other" (Nilsson 1994, p. 102).

In the texts from the 1950s, some of the authors express ambivalence towards the ideal of romantic love, and one of them compares marriage to a company. To make two partners function, "co-operation, adaptation, and a well functioning organization" is needed, it is said. Another of the authors, however, suggests that real love requires some sort of devoted, ever-giving love of the kind St. Paul describes in 1 Corinthians (Nycander in Linnér 1959). Later family counsellor authors of advice books do not esteem this enduring, self-sacrificing sort of love. For them, to put another person's needs before one's own will disappoint both the giver and the receiver. "Sooner or later, the 'account' will emerge, i.e. the discontent will turn up" (Nilsson 1994, p. 102). Instead, the message is that each person has responsibility for her- or himself, for her or his own feelings, acts, and needs. In more concrete terms this implies that each one has to acknowledge his/her own feelings, not deny them; and that each one has to follow her/his own feelings and needs, not other people's expectations. Strongly influenced by family therapists like Walter Kempler and Virginia Satir, some of the authors make this point explicit by saying, "First when I can tell you in detail what I want in different situations, I leave you the freedom to make up your own mind. To hide what I want is to bind you to me. When I clearly tell you what I want and wish, I am at the same time taking responsibility for myself and my needs" (Burenius and Karlsson 1977, p. 29).

To summarize, the new ideals articulated by family counsellors in advice books over the last five decades are to the effect that there ought to be as few bonds and dependencies as possible in a couple relationship, and that each party has to express his or her own needs and feelings clearly and take responsibility for her- or himself. Conflicts should be resolved by negotiations by means of which each party presents his or her wishes and demands. Although the "relationship" is

strongly emphasized in the writings of these counsellors, individual responsibility stands out as the guiding principle. This ideal seems to come closer to relations in business and work life than to the notion of a community of love.

The sample of advice books written by Swedish counsellors over five decades is fairly small. The shift in ideals, though, doesn't seem to be unique to Swedish counsellors. Over the same period, similar ideas have been expressed in many therapeutic advice books in, for instance, Britain and the U.S. Hochschild found in her analysis of American advice manuals published in the 1980s that women were advised to "cool down" their emotional involvement in love relationships, in order to save their independence (Hochschild 1994). From a survey of American advice manuals, Illouz concludes that these manuals hold that ability to communicate seems to be a formula for success in marriage. Everything depends on the means of talking, explaining, verbalizing emotions, negotiating and compromising, and yet maintaining a basic integrity of the self (Illouz 1997, p. 50). Other surveys of the content of advice books and columns have yielded similar results (for instance Bellah et. al. 1985, p. 128; Giddens 1992).

There is no obvious cause of this change in values concerning couple relationships that is expounded in the advice literature. One possible explanation is the methods used in counselling and therapy as well as the experiences reported from practical work with couples in difficulty. Family counsellors report problems of communication between couples as a striking element, and the same seems to be true of many clients in counselling.[3] Some Swedish evaluation studies, based on reports from clients, show that many of them found the possibility of being able to talk to each other, sometimes for the first time in their relationship, as the most positive aspect of counselling (Öhman 1991; Sandin 1986; Bazghaleh and Lindau 1997). But when counsellors attempt to give general guidelines on issues of marriage based on their practical counselling experiences, they decontexualise their strategies and understandings and transform them into general ethical and moral principles for a good relationship. In this transformation an ideology is created that stresses individuality, independence, and a responsibility for one's own rather than a common cause. Looked at in this light, this ideology is mainly seen as an unintended consequence of the desire of counsellors and other therapists to generalize their practical experiences.

From another angle, however, these generalizations may be seen as further evidence of increasingly individualized values in Western societies. This is the perspective taken by the American researcher Bellah, who calls the kind of individualism advocated by therapists and counsellors "expressive individualism." By this is meant an interest in cultivating one's own self and striving to maximize feelings of authenticity and freedom. According to Bellah, psychotherapies of different shades have contributed to a strengthening of the values of individualism in American society. They have also changed the way love is viewed. Love has come to be seen in terms of a contractual exchange without binding rules, where self-assertive elements have become more dominant than self-sacrifice (Bellah et. al. 1985).

Giddens has a somewhat more optimistic view of the role psychotherapies as

3 This information is based on interviews with family counsellors who experienced the time of change in methods.

cultural phenomena are playing in the modern world. He seems to perceive therapeutic advice manuals almost as a mapping of the emerging new ideals of intimacy and partnership. The message of this literature is interpreted by him as one of several signs of an ongoing transformation of the ideals of love in the direction of what he calls "pure relationships." The ideal of a love relationship as based on intimacy, trust, and community has not disappeared, but the utilitarian element has become stronger. The continuation of a love relationship presupposes that the needs of each are satisfied. This becomes the only legitimate reason for a love relationship to continue (Giddens 1992). Beck and Beck-Gernsheim express a similar view of what is new in contemporary love. They write that if in earlier times women had to give up their expectations of a love relationship because of disappointments in that relationship, they now can stay true to their expectations and leave an unsatisfactory relationship (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 1995, p. 62).

From the perspective of Giddens and Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, the transformation of intimacy towards individualized relations and love ideals is connected to the change towards more equal gender relationships. First and foremost, this development results from the changing conditions of women. They have become less dependent on marriage as a way of life because of the possibilities deriving from better education, professional work, and their own income. Thus, gender equality and individualization seem to be related.

It would be false to say that the emancipation of women started in the 1970s in Sweden. This process had already been going on for many decades. The Marriage Law of 1920 has to be regarded as one of these steps towards change in gender relations (see Kyle, this volume). But in the 1970s, further visible change occurred in Swedish society that included changing values concerning family, marriage, and gender (see Liljeström and Bäck-Wiklund, this volume). It is obvious that marriage lost its value as a marker of social status for many young Swedes. Sexuality, having children, and living together were no longer conceived as obviously connected to marriage.

Efforts were also made to adapt the law to the new practice of cohabitation. At the end of the 1960s, a major overhaul of family law was initiated. A guiding principle in this work was that family law should not discriminate between different forms of cohabitation and should be strictly neutral in relation to moral issues. This examination led to a change in the rules for divorce in 1974. Compulsory mediation was abolished, in part because it was no longer regarded as consistent with contemporary demands and the view of "each individual's capacity to make their own evaluations of their situation" (SOU 1972:41, p. 176). In the 1960s and 1970s, there was a general liberalization of the divorce laws in several Western countries. There were fewer obstacles to divorce and wider acceptance of the no-fault principle in marital breakdown (Castles and Flood 1993). As we have seen, this possibility had existed since 1921 in Swedish law. For this reason, the historian of law, Max Rheinstein, declared as early as 1971 that Swedish divorce laws were "the fullest legal expression to date of eudemonistic [happiness-oriented] liberal individualism" (cit. in Glendon 1987, p. 184).

There is an obvious concurrency between changes in patterns of family living, in the marriage laws, and in the new messages of the counsellors: all of them stressed the rights of individuals to choose their own way of living.

Uncertainties in Intimate Relations and Training to Communicate

How then are these changes in values and ideals concerning marriage and the family to be sociologically understood? One answer points to the change towards more equality between men and women. Wouters, for instance, suggests that an "informalization" of relations between the sexes has occurred in the twentieth century owing to a decrease of the social distance between men and women (Wouters 1995). In this process, the guidelines for which patterns of behaviour are appropriate in relations between the sexes have become unclear. It is no longer evident what is the wrong or right thing to do. There is no general pattern regulated by preordained guidelines concerning appropriate behaviour. Instead, such behaviour has to be achieved through discussion. This means that intimate relationships have become less predictable, since they no longer depend on "the commands of the social scripts," but are created in a process of negotiation. According to Swaan, this "demands a new and different kind of self-control" (Swaan 1981, p. 373; also Wouters 1995). A prerequisite for success in such a process is the capacity to put oneself into another person's way of thinking, and to be able to understand his or her needs and wishes, while also being able to present one's own needs. "The shift towards steering by negotiations represents a change in the way human beings control themselves and each other, especially in direct, personal relationships" (Swaan, ibid. p. 373). The reasons for the successes of the psychotherapeutic professions are, according to Swaan, that they have supplied men as well as women with concepts and points of departure, a vocabulary, to manage this transition from "steering by commands to steering by negotiations" (ibid. p. 376).

To a high degree, the lives of human beings in contemporary society seem to be regulated by social structures, for instance technology and the organization of working life, the way the physical environment is constructed, the economy, and the organization of time. However, it is possible that individuals can manage to make more open choices in some of these structures. For example, the systems of education and some parts of working life have become somewhat less hierarchical and socially exclusive, and have opened up many more choices for individuals. It is also possible that social life related to love and the family in the latter part of the twentieth century has seen more space for choice and freedom than before. Freedom of choice, then, implies fewer preordained conventions for relationships between men and women.

Several factors have thus contributed to making family life and love relationships less prescribed and more open to choice. One factor is the relatively weak position of patriarchy. Democratic forms of political organization have had repercussions on gender relations, too. Greater similarity of rights between men and women and fewer exclusively male or female spheres, for instance in education and working life, have also affected family relations. When men and women mainly live in different social worlds, patterns of dissimilarity are reproduced in marriage and family life. When such separate gender worlds no longer dominate, they are less likely to be reproduced in the more intimate spheres of life. All in all, this situation produces an increase in uncertainties between the sexes as well as an enlargement of options.

Another important factor is the decline of marriage as an economic necessity, especially for women, and also as a marker of social status. This has also meant

that it has lost its value as a symbol of good mutual association. For such an association to exist, qualities like mutuality, responsiveness, sympathy, and love are needed. Marriage in itself has become no longer enough. It is the good emotional relationship that is called for, and if these qualities are missing, divorce or separation is preferred. In short, marriage has lost its earlier quality as an absolute value.

The undermining of patriarchy, the democratization of the political system and of gender relations, women's increased ability to maintain themselves without marrying, higher expectations of the quality of intimate relationships — all these factors contributed to the increasing unpredictability of love relations and family life. What a woman expected or demanded of a man could no longer be taken for granted, and vice versa. Neither was it any longer obvious what a man or a woman would demand of a relationship, nor what she or he found possible to endure. The lack of prescribed answers to issues of this kind creates room for uncertainties, but also for creativity, for groping towards one's own solutions. However, the latter presupposes an ability to give and take in dialogue.

Discussion of uncertainties and the need for new methods to meet them are not a of our times exclusively. In Sweden, they can be found in the 1940s in the writings of Emilia Fogelklou and also in the texts of other pioneers in the field of psychology-based counselling (Fogelklou 1941, 1945; Linnér 1959). English and American sociologists and social psychologists who expressed similar views at the time, inspired these Swedish writers. The creation of family counselling, as well as its use of therapeutically inspired methods, can be related to the above-mentioned changes in love relations and family life. Counselling's increasing emphasis on language, communication, and on the ability to take into account the perspective of the other, can be seen as part of the movement towards training for competence in negotiating intimate relationships. Training to communicate implies at the same time training to master uncertainties and to resolve issues in the absence of ready schemes or general guidelines.

Concluding Remarks

In this chapter, the change of values concerning marriage and family life has been approached by focusing on family counselling and its forerunners. These changes can be summarized as a transition from arbitration to training to communicate. This is also a transition from state regulation of family conflicts to a situation in which the responsibility of the individual came increasingly into the foreground. The trend in the twentieth century has been that the persons involved should decide issues of conflict and divorce for themselves. A more democratic form of decisionmaking was substituted for a hierarchical one. Earlier methods of control rested primarily on threats and punishments aimed at getting couples to reunite and continue their marriages. Such methods were successively displaced by different kinds of "talking-cures," the aim of which was to build up competencies in empathy and in expressing one's needs.

Threats and punishments were no longer seen as an efficient means of influencing marriages and intimate relations, nor were they conceived as legitimate. Instead, training to communicate and engage in dialogue came to be regarded as a more civilized form of influence. Historically, dialogue as a means of influence is nothing new. It was new only in relation to the order that it succeeded. What

was new was the official sanctioning of dialogue as the primary model for the reasonable regulation of conflicts between spouses, as well as between parents and children.

The history of family counselling and its changing values can also be seen as a history of increasingly individualized relationships. The change in marriage laws, especially in connection with divorce, has been interpreted in such terms (Agell 1984). Family counselling as a voluntary agency without constraint points in the same direction. The whole discourse in relation to family counselling has stressed the individualizing trends in society. I think, however, that such an interpretation is flawed. In my opinion, each one of the different phases of changing values described in this chapter includes elements of and a striving towards ideals of both individualism and collectivism. The early pioneers recognized a change towards more individualized relations but looked for new types of community that allowed for individualization. Even in the 1970s, when some counsellors gave voice to rather crudely individualized messages, there was also the desire to create the preconditions for a good sense of community between couples. Collectivism was not ignored or thought to be less important, but the means to achieve it have been constantly changing.

In the period that has been described in this chapter structural conditions for relationships between men and women have undergone deep change. The decline of gender hierarchy and gender segregation has opened up new kinds of individualized relationships, but also new types of mutual association. With the high rate of divorce and separation, a new field for family counselling has emerged in the form of supporting parental cooperation after separation. The counsellors uphold the norm about inescapable and long-lasting commitments for the good of one's children, and the child's right to be in touch with both its parents. Thus, the story in this chapter is not one of a society characterized by increasingly individualized values and less and less room for relationships and communities. Instead, it is the story of changing values that point to new means to create and maintain couples and family relationships.

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The Household and Family in Turkey: An Historical Perspective

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There are few studies of Turkey from the social sciences in which the focus is specifically on family and/or household structure, and even fewer which give consideration to family and household as part of a wider system of kinship.[1] For the past two decades these topics have been to a large degree subsumed in studies of the position of women, a dominant issue of the 1980s and 1990s, and the family has not been of great concern, apart from its undeniably pivotal role in shaping issues of gender. Most studies have focused on changes perceived to have taken place in the last 50 years in response to the major social, economic, political, and demographic changes experienced in Turkey with the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the beginning of the republican era. Generally these studies assume that the only remarkable change in kinship has been a transition from the traditional extended household to a small nuclear family-based household based on a single conjugal pair and their children. Whether explicitly so or not, many such studies have taken as a starting point an assumption (from what is generally called "modernization theory") which holds that this transition is an inevitable outcome of modernization and/or Westernization. Within this framework, the structure of the "Turkish family" has been much debated, in particular with regard to the question of whether the normative pattern is nuclear or extended and residence patrilocal or neolocal. Questions of descent are rarely considered, but when they are, the rural areas have generally been represented as patrilineal. It is also generally accepted that in the cities, or at least among their urbanized elite, descent is not patrilineal. However, the question of what the descent system might then be in urban Turkey is simply not addressed.

A review of the scholarly accounts of both rural and urban areas demonstrates that there is great variation within Turkey in terms of both descent patterns and normative postmarital residence patterns that generate the domestic cycle and, thus, household composition at any particular time. There is also well documented variation within specific regions and villages and evidence of change in response to changing economic conditions in specific regions and villages. Viewed from the scholarly literature, this highly variegated and rapidly changing character appears as a kaleidoscope of changing images from which no overall understanding of Turkish kinship and family is possible, no continuities from the

1 Duben, Kandiyoti, Ilcan, Delaney, and Rasuly-Paleczek have given considerable attention to patrilocal residence, especially in relation to its consequences for women. Even in the works of these scholars, however, descent is for the most part ignored. With the exception of Delaney, the term "patrilineal" goes virtually without mention. In the much earlier work of Stirling (1965), the descent system was of central concern and his account of it in Anatolian villages remains unparalleled.

past can be discerned, and no generalizations made. Nonetheless, the origins of today's diversity lie in the past and, to a great extent, it is possible to understand the past kinship system of dominant elements of the Turkish population. This, in turn, makes it possible to outline transitions that have led to the diversity in family structure observed today and to comment on observable trends that give indications of the course of change in the future.

In this paper, my goal is to examine variations in Turkish family and household structure within the wider framework of Turkish kinship and from a comparative historical perspective. The paper represents my conviction that an understanding of kinship, family, and household in any society must include an understanding of the cultural evolution of that system over a very long span of time. I claim in this paper that the perceived variation is in fact superficial. Turkish kinship has for many centuries been evolving from a patrilineal, patrilocal system to a bilateral, neolocal system. Apart from regional exceptions localized in some rural areas, that transition is essentially complete. Turkish descent is now bilateral and residence norms vary between patrilocal, patrilocal-neolocal, and neolocal, with an increasing tendency towards the latter. The result in contemporary Turkey is a common understanding of family and kinship that is expressed in several alternative forms of household. These alternative forms are positioned along a continuum from patrilineal-patrilocal to bilateral-neolocal and account for the observed variety. I also contend that in all major respects, contemporary Turkish patterns of kinship, household, and family are fully located within the spectrum found in the Mediterranean region as a whole.

Basic Definitions

It is a premise of this paper that concepts such as "family," "marriage," and "household" cannot be understood apart from the kinship systems in which they are embedded and that the most basic element in all kinship systems is a system of descent. This is defined as the method of allocation of persons to significant social groups based on kinship. Two basic types are recognized. The first, unilineal descent, calculates descent through either men only or women only, but not both. The second, bilateral (also termed cognatic or bilineal) traces descent equally through both males and females. In the standard classification, each of these primary types is in turn subdivided into two basic divisions. Unilineal descent is either patrilineal (where group membership is acquired through one's father) or matrilineal (where group membership is acquired through one's mother). Matrilineal descent will not be discussed in this paper because no Turkic society, past or present, nor any with which they have had significant contact has ever been matrilineal. Unilineal descent automatically produces bounded descent groups, bilateral descent does not. Calculating descent equally through both men and women results in overlapping egocentric networks of kin that do not constitute bounded social groups in the sociological sense of the word (cf. Stone 1997).[2] It is possible, however, to create descent groups through the specification of additional rules that limit membership to a specified group (for example, all those who can trace descent through either males or females to a specified individual or

2 This distinction parallels the sociological distinction between "categories" defined heuristically for analytica; purposes and "social group," which have a membership and are bounded by explicit rules of inclusion and exclusion.

couple). Although there is no standardized terminology for the divisions, it is useful to divide bilateral societies into two subtypes: those that specify named, bounded descent groups in which membership is acquired through either parent and those that have no bounded descent groups, but only kindreds, egocentric networks of kin that do not constitute "groups" in the sociological sense. In the latter case, some functions of descent groups may be carried out to varying degree by egocentric kindreds.

The traditional descent system of all Turkic peoples was patrilineal (Baştuğ 1993, 1999). Bilateral descent with no bounded descent groups is the current descent system in all European countries and, I argue, is now the descent system of urban Turkey and most of rural Turkey as well. The significance of this transition for an understanding of family and household in contemporary Turkey is a central concern in this paper. First, however, it is necessary to outline the nature of the starting point in this ongoing process of change in the Turkish kinship system, an exercise that carries us to the earliest known descriptions of the social organization of Turkic peoples.

Kinship, Descent, and Marriage Traditions of the Turkic Peoples

Turkic-speaking peoples are first encountered in written history in the Chinese chronicles of the first millennium BCE, which describe the pastoral nomadic peoples on China's northern and western borders. Throughout the period beginning approximately 2,000 years ago, waves of migration brought Turkic-speaking pastoral nomadic peoples west into the Eurasian steppes and to the borders of eastern Europe, the Roman Empire, and the Byzantine Empire that succeeded it. Beginning in 742 A.D., what some historians have called one of the most significant mass movements of people in history brought large numbers of Turkic-speaking peoples into Central Asia, northern Afghanistan, and northern Iran (Golden 1992). They called themselves "Oguz," after their putative founding ancestor, but were called "Turk" or "Turkmen" by their Russian and Persian neighbours. By 1000 A.D., the Oguz/Turkmen had begun to convert to Islam and were challenging the Byzantine Empire in Anatolia. By the end of the century they would establish the Seljuk Empire as the dominant political entity in the region, to be succeeded in the fourteenth century by the Ottoman Empire.

The basis of tribal organization among the Oguz, as among all Turkic peoples of the Eurasian steppes, was a form of unilineal descent generally known in anthropological literature as a "segmentary lineage system," without exception patrilineal in the case of steppe peoples.[3] The segmentary lineage system is a specific form of unilineal descent in which an entire people conceives of itself as descended from a single common ancestor and expresses this unity in a consensual genealogy which, in effect, defines that people as a sociopolitical entity. It is an organizational form that is particularly well suited to the pastoral nomadic way of life and, indeed, constitutes the descent system of the majority of the world's pastoral peoples. As a unilineal descent system, it is remarkably flexible,

3 The description of the descent system presented here is necessarily brief. For a more detailed discussion as well as a theoretical justification for the use of the much-debated "segmentary lineage concept," see Baştuğ 1999, 1997.

allowing for expansion into numerous divisions and subdivisions (fission) and contraction of depleted branches (fusion) as needed (Baştuğ 1997, 1999).

Like the overwhelming majority of patrilineal societies, the Turkic peoples were also characterized by patrilocal residence rules, a form of residence in which men continue to reside in their fathers' households at marriage, bringing their wives to join the household.[4] As I have discussed elsewhere (Baştuğ 1996; Baştuğ and Hortaçsu 2000; cf. Kandiyoti 1988; Stone 1997), patrilocal residence rules generate a particular form of household and extended family that inherently disadvantages women. Combined with patrilineal descent, patrilocal residence rules result in households that are formed around a core of agnates (patrilineal kinsmen) and their in-marrying wives. The household is thus the joint residence of a minimal patrilineage and is headed by the senior male. Property is for the most part held in common and viewed as the property of the lineage. The children of the males will be members of the patrilineage and their sons will remain in the household after marriage. Daughters of the household remain members of the lineage but will leave their natal household at marriage to join that of their husbands, and their children will be members of their husbands' lineages.

Patrilocal residence is not a unitary phenomenon. Patrilocal societies differ in the normative requirements or expectations as to the length of time expected of patrilocal residence and in culturally prescribed alternatives to the "dominant" norm. In the Turkic pastoral nomadic tradition, sons were married in birth order; younger sons were not permitted to marry before older brothers, a custom still strongly in force in much of Central Asia and not uncommon in rural Turkey. It was expected that sons and their wives would spend a variable period of time in residence in the tent of their father, but would then be provided with a sufficient number of animals and established in a separate tent as a separate household. Thus, older sons were provided with an inheritance and established in separate households within a few years of marriage. The youngest son, however, was expected to remain with the parents after marriage and inherited all remaining property upon his father's death. All sons were, however, expected to remain within their father's camping unit and thus local communities *(oba)* were structured as minimal patrilineages, though "guest" lineages might also be present (Baştuğ 1999; Dankoff 1972). The early Turkic pattern of patrilocal residence, then, was one we may term "early fission," in which sons and their wives were sequentially established in separate households in age order, and the youngest son remained for life in his father's tent. There was no expectation that brothers and their wives would remain under one roof until the death of the patriarch, but they were expected to remain together in a common camping unit. Access to pasture and migration routes was held in common by this group, which was ideally expected to break up only when the herd size grew to a point that would no longer permit the members to graze their animals together.

As is also the case with the great majority of patrilineal peoples, the Turkic peoples required lineage exogamy. The unit of exogamy was calculated genealogically and set in most cases at seven generations — people with a common male ancestor within seven generations were not allowed to marry. This meant that the in-marrying brides of households and camping units necessarily

4 Ninety six per cent of patrilineal societies are patrilocal. Many bilateral societies are also patrilocal, making this form of residence the most common cross-culturally.

came from a considerable distance, both spatially and genealogically. Again, as is the case with a majority of patrilineal-patrilocal societies, bride price, paid by the groom's household to that of the bride, was essential.

Patrilineal descent, the segmentary lineage system, lineage exogamy, and a form of patrilocal residence in which the conjugal nuclear family is a significant social unit, are all reflected in the kinship terminology of Turkic peoples of the past.[5] All Turkic peoples for whom adequate historical documentation exists were characterized in the past by a form of kinship terminology that anthropologists call "Lineal Omaha," which classes kin according to patrilineal affiliation but also distinguishes the nuclear family terminologically. Patrilocal residence is indicated by the term for "bride" (*gelin* or *kelin*). Found in all Turkic languages, the term is derived from the verb "to come" and means literally "one who comes." The term is used by all members of a man's household older than himself to refer to his wife. He, himself, does not refer to his wife as gelin, but uses a separate term meaning "wife." A separate term (often, but not universally, yenge) is used by younger members of a household as a kin term for the in-married brides of their older agnates (for example father's brother's wife, older brother's wife).

Patrilineal descent determines and/or conditions certain major structural features of societies in which it is found, providing the "tribal structure" on the one hand and the structure of family and household on the other. The traditional segmentary lineage system of the Turkic peoples was an organizational form that structured society from the smallest units, the household, to the largest, the tribe, and even provided the template for the structure of tribal confederations, states, and empires. There is considerable reason to believe that the kinship system outlined above remained constant among Turkic peoples for more than 2,000 years, as long as they remained predominantly or even partially pastoral nomadic (Baştuğ 1999). During the early Seljuk years, however, the tribally organized Turkmen nomads began to settle, becoming in many cases semi-nomads who were still involved in sheep herding but were also engaging in agricultural production. The process of settlement was intensified during the Ottoman Empire, even more so in the republican era, and still continues to the present, though the few remaining nomads are likely to be settled within a matter of years. Among those who have settled, whether in agricultural villages or urban centres, tribal structure has shown a pattern of attenuation and eventual loss. Increasingly, Turkey became a land of settled agricultural villages with a small number of regional centres and an even smaller number of cities, mostly positioned along the long coastline from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean.[6] Villages, often endogamous, were relatively isolated and largely self-sufficient.

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5 For a reconstruction of eight century Kök Türük (Old Turkic) terminology from the Orkhon Inscriptions, see Baştuğ 1993. For further discussion of Lineal Omaha kinship terminology among Turkic peoples, see Hortaçsu and Baştuğ 1996.

6 Pastoral nomadism is best considered as a continuum ranging from the purely nomadic, dependent on animal husbandry, to the purely settled, dependent on agriculture. It is well known in anthropology that societies or segments of them move back and forth along this continuum in response to environmental and political factors. The same may be true of tribal organization. Memories are preserved which may serve as a template for the reincarnation of tribal organization. Something like this may have occurred in many parts of Anatolia during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. According to Duben, (1985:76) this was "a time that witnessed both the dispersal of the dense net of villages that had characterized Anatolia in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and the renomadization of segments of the population" (p.76).

Under the changing political and economic conditions, tribal organization became progressively less important in integrating spatially dispersed groups and in structuring the lives and identities of individuals, eventually ceasing to exist for the majority of the Turkish population. Tribal identities and tribal polities do not appear as significant phenomena in urban Turkey after the late Ottoman period, and even then only in remoter urban centres where local "aga's" still maintained a paternalistic political order based on mutual dependencies couched in an idiom of "tribal" loyalty.

The beginnings of the dissolution of the tribal system can be traced to the establishment of the Seljuk state (Cahen 1968), and with this dissolution the force of patrilineal descent as an organizing principle was also compromised, as will be discussed below. As is to be expected, the process in the intervening 1,000 years has been uneven, reflecting rural/urban, class, and regional differences. The trend, however, is clear, and is reflected in the loss of terms to refer to tribal structure and kinship units at all levels, including that of family and household. As Duben (1985) has noted, the terms used in Turkey to refer to family and household today, *aile* and *hane*, are borrowed from Arabic and Persian, respectively. The trend is also marked in changes in the kinship terminology, indicating changes in roles associated with classes of kin and in household and family structure.

Descent, Residence, and Household in the Modern Context

Though tribal organization has disappeared, an ideology of patrilineal descent has remained deeply ingrained throughout Turkey up to the present. Not surprisingly, this ideology is more explicit in rural areas. Stirling (1965) considered that Anatolian Turkish villages were best described as being divided into shallow patrilineages of three or four generations. In some villages, but by no means all, this social division may be reflected in a spatial division into wards *(mahalle)*. Even in 1965, however, Stirling notes that the shallow patrilineages he observed were, at best, minimally corporate. Delaney (1991) leaves no doubt as to the patrilineal ideology dominant in the central Anatolian village of her fieldwork. Her informants considered themselves members of a *sülale* (a word borrowed from Arabic), a group in which membership is unquestionably acquired through males only tracing descent patrilineally from a common *kök* (root). However, Delaney also notes that the concept of *sülale* "is a way of conceptualizing descent but *the term does not refer to corporate groups*" (1991, p. 152, emphasis mine). The ideology of patrilineal descent remains, but significant, named social groups based on common descent and holding some sort of common, corporate interest are no longer to be found. There are few regions remaining where people can point to named, patrilineal descent groups. What remains is a set of predispositions (buttressed by male control of resources, still frequent initial patrilocal residence, and continuing patriarchy) that, because they originate in historical traditions of great depth, have the force of the "natural." They constitute what might be called a "patrilineal ideology" but do not generate actual patrilineages. Instead, the descent system in Turkish villages is shifting towards bilateral descent, a shift that has long since been completed in towns and cities throughout the country.

Although patrilineal descent has largely ceased to be meaningful in village life, this is not the case with patrilocal residence. Scholars are in agreement that the most important unit of kinship in Turkish village life is the *hane*, the household.[7] They have, however, shown far less agreement on the question of whether or not village households are normatively patrilocal. At first glance the empirical data seem to indicate that they are not. Census data, survey results, and ethnographic studies have repeatedly and consistently shown that the majority of rural households in Turkey consist of nuclear families (Berik 1995; Timur 1981; Delaney 1991; Starr 1989; Stirling 1965). In Timur's 1968 survey, she found that "patriarchal extended households were clearly the minority in rural areas, comprising one-fifth of the households in small towns and only one fourth in villages with less than 2,000 population" (1981, p. 63).

This demographic characteristic has led to an uncertainty with regard to household structure that I think needs to be addressed. Delaney (1991), Ilcan (1994, 1996), and Stirling (1965) speak of a norm of patrilocal residence. Other scholars, especially those working in western Turkey, have consistently noted that neolocal residence is at least possible, if not normative (Magnarella 1971; Starr 1989; Sirman 1995). In an influential article, Duben stated:

> ... there is a commonly held myth in Turkey in which the population in the countryside is believed to live in large extended family households resembling those of the past, and people in the city in small nuclear family households increasingly like those of their peers in the West (1982, p. 73).

In this article, Duben used the results of several studies of household composition in rural Turkey: (1) to suggest that the majority of Turkish households in rural as well as urban areas are nuclear; (2) that this has remained unchanged for at least the last 140 years; and (3) to challenge the notion that patrilocal residence is of significance in Turkish villages (p. 78). Part of the problem stems from failure to consider two aspects of residence and household structure, one demographic, the other normative. The first is that the nature of the domestic cycle makes it virtually impossible for all households to consist of extended families of three generations or more, no matter what the residential norm might be. Scholars such as Stirling (1965), Timur (1981), and Rasuly-Paleczek (1996) have been explicit about the problem's demographic effects and Duben in an article (1985) reversed his earlier position and acknowledged the fallacy of assuming that, because the majority of households at any particular time are nuclear, residence is normatively neolocal. In the later article he argues strongly that a norm of patrilocal residence characterizes rural Turkey.

In the same work, Duben also notes, as did Stirling (1965), Magnarella (1971), Kandiyoti (1976) and others previously that the normative pattern of Turkish inheritance is for a man's estate to be divided only at his death. In contrast to the earlier Turkic pattern and that of some European societies in the past, sons are not given a share of the patrimony at marriage and established in independent residences. Sons are expected to remain with their father after marriage, bringing their wives to the household as in-marrying brides, and to remain in residence with him as long as he lives. Upon the death of the patriarch, his property

7 Agreement is substantial, including but not limited to the following scholars: İlcan, 1996; Delaney 1991; Starr, 1989; Duben, 1985; Timur 1981; Stirling 1965.

is divided and the household is partitioned along nuclear family divisions, with the widow remaining with one of the sons. This represents a departure from the earlier Turkic pattern in which sons received their patrimony in birth order shortly after marriage. The change clearly developed in response to the change in mode of subsistence from pastoral nomadism to agriculture, and in conjunction with Islamic laws of equal inheritance for sons.[8] The patrilineal-patrilocal household that results would indeed appear to be an ideal throughout much of rural and small-town Turkey. When Timur (1981) asked her respondents their preference, 75 per cent said they would prefer to live in extended families.

Some of the difficulties of this problem may be resolved, as Delaney suggests:

> ... if the term [extended household] can be stretched to include a household composed of two married generations, whether or not both partners are alive and whether or not all married sons are living within the same complex, the number of extended households would change dramatically. In this enlarged definition most village households would be "extended" for certain periods of time during the domestic cycle, particularly but not only at the time of a son's marriage. How long a household will continue in this form depends on a number of factors, notably space, personality, and the way relationships unfold; thus time is a critical factor in any account of an extended household. The fission of an extended household need not await the death of the patriarch, as Stirling (1963, 1965) believed, but can and does occur earlier as Özertuğ has pointed out (1991, p. 163).

Nonetheless, it seems that factors in addition to the domestic cycle are involved in reducing the actualization of the patrilocal norm in rural Turkey. Both Timur (1981) and Starr (1989) indicate that extended families are more likely to be found in wealthy households with relatively large landholdings. Interestingly, Duben and Behar's data for nineteenth century Istanbul show that large extended families were found primarily among the wealthy (Duben 1990; Duben and Behar 1991). These studies suggest that adherence to the norm of patrilocal residence is governed to some degree by economic factors. A recent study, Berik (1995) demonstrates a more intricate relationship between residence norm, economic activity (especially gendered economic activity), and residence patterns. Her study of carpet-weaving villages shows a clear relationship between wealth, female carpet weaving at home and in workshops, size of agricultural holdings, and household composition. The highest incidence of extended households was found in Konya, where the mechanization of agriculture introduced great changes in landholding in the 1950s. Men work at a variety of income-earning jobs or are unemployed, whereas labour-intensive, high-output workshop weaving done by women constitutes the main source of household income. Under these conditions, households attempt to keep sons and their income-producing daughters-in-law in residence. Neolocal residence was the standard pattern where carpet production was carried out as a cottage industry at home in areas where male unemployment was high or where diversified cash-cropping created a greater gender equality in economic endeavours.

8 In rural Turkey, daughters are for the most part excluded from inheritance from their natal households, especially agricultural land. The western Aegean regions are an exception, but even here inheritance by daughters is problematic. In the Bodrum region, they may be disinherited by their brothers or be given only marginal land.

Studies by various scholars in much of western Turkey (Sacks, Ilcan, Sirman, Starr, Magnarella, and my own in Bodrum) indicate a pattern in this region of brief patrilocal residence followed by early fission or, as in the Bodrum area, direct neolocal residence. They also consistently note an increasing tendency towards direct neolocal residence. Magnarella as early as 1971 and Starr in 1989 have noted that neolocal residence is the norm in the villages they studied, although patrilineal norms are reported to have been stronger in the past.[9] Sirman refers to an "increasingly higher incidence of neolocality" (1995, p. 213).

The direction of the trend is also explictly noted by Stirling and İncirlioğlu, in their 1986 re-study of the Anatolian villages originally studied by Stirling in the late 1950s:

> A bride, strictly in 1950 and less strictly now, is expected on marriage to join the household to which her husband belongs ... an almost moral obligation. In 1950, with few exceptions, sons remained in the parental household until their fathers' death; by 1971 subsequent separation from the parental household had become acceptable (1996, p. 72).

This pattern is directly tied to the desires of young couples to set up independent households, and their ability to do so is greatly enhanced by the availability of independent income through wage labour and/or temporary migration (Sacks 1976; Olson 1995; Ilcan 1998). This trend is even clearer in the gecekondu, the large residential settlements created by migrants from rural villages that are found in all Turkish cities. Overwhelmingly, the dominant pattern of residence at marriage in the gecekondu areas is neolocal, whatever might have been the norm in the villages of origin (Baştuğ 1979; Bolak 1995; Erman 1997).

The data on prevalence of extended families versus nuclear families shows highly mixed results. Nonetheless, village studies in Turkey have consistently begun to indicate an increase in expectations of early fissioning of patrilocal households and/or direct neolocal residence. The statistical incidence is, as would be expected, uneven and influenced by local factors such as landholding patterns, women's' economic value, and wage opportunities that accord couples a measure of economic independence. The trend, however, is unquestionably towards neolocal residence. At the same time, however, it is important to note that patrilocal residence remains in many regions the "ideal." Furthermore, I believe it safe to argue that throughout rural Turkey patrilocal residence is always an option, one that no one would regard as unusual should it be exercised.

Bilateral descent, with no formal descent groups but highly significant bilateral kindreds, appears to have been the *de facto* descent system of Turkish cities at least since the late Ottoman period (Duben and Behar 1991). Data are lacking, but I speculate that the majority of the urban population was calculating descent bilaterally at a much earlier time. At present, Turkish cities are unquestionably bilateral in descent and neolocal in residence.

The Turkish Family in Mediterranean Perspective

Although the Turkish kinship system is a bilateral system, this does not imply that it is identical to that of Western European countries. Indeed, these are not

9 My own research conducted between 1987 and 1992 in the Bodrum area, the same region studied by Starr, confirms this pattern.

identical to each other. The Germanic peoples of northern Europe have been characterized by bilateral descent since at least the fall of the Roman Empire (Stone 1997). Murray (1983) has convincingly demonstrated that this was also the case for the later Anglo-Saxons and Franks and that, although kindreds were significant, their bilateral descent system included no form of bounded descent group. Gottlieb (1993) demonstrates that during the period from 1350 to 1800 marriage was regarded as synonymous with the establishing of a new household (i.e., neolocal residence) and couples postponed marriage until they had sufficient resources to establish an independent household. Thus, northern Europe has been characterized by bilateral descent, an absence of bounded descent groups, and neolocal residence since at least the early Middle Ages (cf. Gaunt 1997). This was not the case for the European Mediterranean region where, as in Turkey, residuals of patrilineal descent remained strong. Indeed, the continuation of patrilineal descent groups, such as the *sterpa* of Corsica (Quastana and Casanova 1986), the *casata* of southern Italy (Minicuci 1986), or the Serbo-Croatian *zadruga*, is reported sporadically throughout the region today, as is patrilocal residence. Thus, descent as well as numerous other aspects of kinship, family, and family dynamics is markedly different in Europe's southern, Mediterranean region as contrasted to northern and northwestern Europe (cf. Barbagli, LeBras, Segalen and others in Gullestad and Segalen 1997, and Reher 1997).

In spite of its strong historical and regional ties to the Islamic Middle Eastern world, Turkey is a Mediterranean country and its culture has been profoundly influenced by Mediterranean traditions. Many aspects of Turkish kinship show far more similarity to kinship patterns in Spain, France, Italy, and Greece than they do to the enduring patrilineal descent system of most of the Arab Middle East and much of the Arab Mediterranean littoral (cf. Duben 1985). They also resemble patterns in the Mediterranean region more than those of the original Turkic patterns still normative in Central Asia.

The most outstanding of these similarities is a strong bilateral familism. It is a culturally unquestioned norm in Turkey that close family members are responsible for each other and even, in many cases, for distant kin. Kinship loyalties are strong, as are expectations of support from kin, while non-kin are regarded with neutral reserve, if not active distrust. Ties between parents and children, between siblings and the children of siblings, are expected to be, and generally are, extremely close. Children of both sexes remain with their parents until marriage, and close ties involving frequent interaction are maintained after marriage. Families often make considerable effort to live near other kin and routinely exchange goods and informal services. Most individuals thus grow up in an environment involving frequent, even daily, interaction with a wide network of kin, including not only parents and siblings, but also grandparents, aunts and uncles, and cousins. Kinship networks are extended bilaterally, including consanguineals and affinals equally on "both sides," and mobilized as needed to obtain access to and control over resources. In fact, a large network of kin is a major asset in and of itself, often of crucial importance in finding employment and securing government services in both rural and urban areas. As Duben and others have remarked, this pattern shows no indication of lessening with increased urbanization or industrialization (1992, pp. 93-4).[10]

10 Paula Holmes-Eber (1997) describes a very similar state for Tunis, as does Reher (1997) for Spain.

Nuclear families are also functionally less separate than those of their north European counterparts and interaction is relatively more intense, involving a wider set of kin.[11] Close relatives, especially parents and their children and siblings, often have keys to each other's homes and may enter and leave freely. Property may be regarded as joint property, regardless of who has paid for it or who holds the title. Güler Fişek (1982) has described this functional closeness as follows:

> The nuclear family system, instead of being a complete unit with clear boundaries, appears to be more or less enmeshed in a visible functionally-extended family network, so much so that we may even conceptualize the Turkish nuclear family as a subsystem within a larger extended family system, from which it is imperfectly differentiated. The lack of clear boundaries is especially evident with regard to the rules governing economic support and decision making. This state of fusion between the nuclear and the extended families is also reflected in the idea that often it is not the spouses who join together in marriage, but the two extended families, with the spouses providing the joining interface (pp. 310-11).

Though one may disagree with Fişek's characterization of this pattern as "pathologic" (a position influenced by current social theories ethnocentrically drawn from European and American prototypes), the family dynamics portrayed will be immediately recognized by all familiar with Turkish family life (cf. Özdalga, Erder and Sunar, this volume; and Duben 1985). The Mediterranean pattern, and its contrast with northern Europe, is forcibly stated in the following quotation from Reher (1997). Although he is referring to Spain, the passage might equally have been written about Turkey:

> [The notion that Europe is coursing towards a convergence of family form] is a type of neo-modernization discourse in which economic and social change torches all vestiges of cultural and historical difference. This is hardly likely because historical roots run deep indeed. Differences among family systems in Europe are very old and are not likely to disappear in the near future ... So far [the emerging Spanish family] gives every indication of being a traditional one from the European point of view. It is traditional not only in the measurable ways, ranging from low divorce rates to high levels of support for the elderly, but also traditional in the less tangible way in which parental authority and family coherence are maintained. Spaniards continue to care for their dying parents, just as grandparents care for the young offspring of their working children. Children continue to be the centre of everyone's attention ... parents continue to support their children at home no matter how old they are, as long as they are not married, and children frequently give money to their parents (p. 291).

The Honour-Shame Complex

In addition to developing similar patterns of kinship within a bilateral structure, the Turkish kinship system also adopted the "honour-shame complex," which is traditional throughout both the Mediterranean culture area and the Middle East, encompassing Moslems, Christians, and Jews in this region. As numerous scholars have pointed out, concepts of honour and shame are not unique to the Mediterranean. What is argued to be unique is the particular view

11 See Erder, this volume, for a comparison of European family types.

of both male and family honour as being dependent on the sexual comportment, in particular the chastity, of its women (Davis 1977; Giovannini 1987; Gilmore 1987).[12]

Although the complex is most often stated in terms of "male" honour, I would argue that the indigenous (emic) premise of the complex is the notion that "honour" is an asset and "shame" a liability that is corporately held by extended families. Males suffer loss of honour as the public representatives of the family, but the loss extends to the entire bilaterally extended family and even to neighbourhood or village. As Campbell (1964) noted early in the discussion, this makes women the "weak link" in the chain of "masculine virtue." It also ensures that, with everyone's honour at stake, they must be controlled and guarded.

Though the range of kin encompassed in the "honour-holding" unit is smaller in cities, the view of honour as a family possession is standard throughout the Turkey. The honour-shame complex is not present in pre-Islamic Turkic culture. Significantly, the Turkish word for "honour" in this sense is *namus*, a word borrowed from Greek. Apart from the compound *namuslu* (which be might be glossed as "properly behaved"), *namus* always refers to the sexual behaviour of women and is not to be confused with "reputation," for which a separate, Turkish, word, *ün*, exists. It is also almost invariably used as a plural possessive, *namusumuz*, "our honour," reflecting its character as a family resource.

As is the case throughout the Mediterranean region, the greatest visible manifestation of a family's honour is the sexual conduct of its women. Traditionally, the only way of remedying the stigma of inappropriate behaviour in the Moslem regions was the ritual murder of the offending woman, a sanction also practised traditionally in some of the north Mediterranean regions as well.[13] Although it is extremely rare in cities and disappearing from most rural areas in Turkey as well, so-called "honour killings" are still reported in the press, as witness the examples provided by Sunar (this volume).

With the corporate family reputation at stake and the severity of traditional sanctions, it is not surprising that families in Turkey monitor the behaviour of their women, in particular that of their daughters, with a scrutiny that, from the point of view of northern Europeans, borders on the obsessive.

> The corporate control over female sexuality becomes strikingly evident in the large number of different individuals who see themselves as immediately responsible for ensuring women's appropriate sexual conduct. Parents, siblings, near and distant relatives, and even neighbors closely monitor the movements of the postpubescent girl, firmly imprinting the notion that her sexuality is not hers to give or withhold (Kandiyoti 1987, p. 326).

Similarly, Quastana and Casanova (1986, p. 156) state, "The 'protection' of women's virtue is a family matter mobilizing not only the father and the mother, but also the brothers, uncles and cousins." Giovannini relates that one of her

12 The honour-shame complex has been much criticized (for example Herzfeld 1987, Goddard). However, as Marueen Giovannini has stated, throughout the Mediterranean "some striking parallels exist which cannot be ignored" (1987, p. 61). The majority of Mediterraneanists would seem to agree (see, for example, the articles in Gilmore 1987).

13 Lazaridus, 1995, reports the following case in rural Greece: "... in 1949 a man, who still lives in the village, killed his sister, who at the time was only 24 years old, because, she was going out with men. As Takis' mother, a prominent craftswoman, told me, 'he killed her "gia logous timis" ("for reasons related to honour")'. She then explained that such incidents were common at the time, and that the man, after spending 17 years in prison, returned to the village."

Sicilian informants "confided that he had not slept soundly since his daughter attained puberty" (1987, p. 69). I have heard similar laments and witnessed similar anxiety from more than a few well-educated, middle class urban Turks.

Conclusion

Peter Kundstadter (1984) suggests that there are two opposing views of household structure and socioeconomic base. The first, generally referred to as "modernization theory" (cf. Özdalga, this volume), is the prevailing view, though based on largely untested assumptions. This view suggests that since specific forms of descent, residence rules, and household composition are causally associated with specific modes of subsistence, industrialization, advanced technological development, and "modernization" will inevitably be accompanied by nuclearization of the household. This view is often supported by renditions of European history in which household type is seen to evolve from "extended" to "nuclear." A contrary, but seldom stated view, holds that in spite of a necessary congruence between cultural norms concerning kinship and economic structure, kinship roles and family and household are deep-seated, resistant to change, and may persist for millennia, as, for example, the Chinese patrilineal, patrilocal household. Kundstadter concludes that the factors determining household structure/composition are complex and cannot be reduced to a simple case of modernization/urbanization causing nuclearization. His article gives excellent examples from four different ethnic/linguistic groups in northwestern Thailand, which, while experiencing "modernization" in the same national milieu, have retained their very different kinship systems.

In the Thai cases provided by Kundstadter, economic change has been sudden and abrupt. The Turkish case provides us with a view of changes in kinship reckoning and household structure and composition over a long period of time. It is also a case of a patrilocal, patrilineal people who have in all urban areas, and many of the rural areas as well, developed bilateral descent, neolocal residence, and nuclear families but have also strongly preserved patrilineal, patrilocal traditions in other rural areas. In the Turkish case, the transformations that have led to (or are leading to) the constellation of bilateral descent, neolocal residence, independent nuclear families, and a bilateral kinship terminology appear to have begun long before "industrialization," "modernization," or "Westernization" could possibly have been a factor. The transition to bilateral descent cannot, therefore, be viewed as confirmation for the so-called "modernization theory" which proposes that kinship institutions will inevitably become bilateral as an outcome of industrialization and "modernization." Likewise, the significance of kinship ties and kin networks in Turkey, while similar to the bilateral kinship pattern of southern, Mediterranean Europe, stands in sharp contrast to that of northern Europe, in spite of the rapid industrialization and urbanization of the past fifty years.

"Modernization," if by that is meant economic transition to industrial and post-industrial capitalism in an increasingly interconnected world economy, will undoubtedly bring changes in kinship structure in specific localities, but the results are likely to be far more complex than the naive formulations of "modernization theory," with its crude undertones of ethnocentrism, racism, and culturalism would imply. Kinship systems and cultural patterns of familial mutual dependence/autonomy and involvement/detachment display astonishing cross-

cultural variability. To presume that any pattern other than the relatively isolated nuclear family of northern Europe and its outposts is the logical and only outcome of increasing technological capability, is so patently ethnocentric as to be undeserving of comment, were it not for the fact that implicit versions of the theory continue to inform both popular and academic discourse.

Descriptions of "others" are never without consequence. As Rayna Rapp has put it:

> The language of family life is highly political. It is used to blame the poor for their lack of respectability in turn-of-the-century New York or "outcast" London. It also informs the discourse on how the evolving social services redistribute responsibilities between the private sector and the state in twentieth-century France. And, of course, it is key to the struggles over civil rights for Black Americans following Daniel Moynihan's 1965 report, The Negro Family (1987, p. 124).

I would add that the "language of family life" plays an identical role in the discourse of international relations. Notions of descent (patrilineal or matrilineal especially), "tribalism," and extended families are used to cast as "primitive" nation states as well as peoples. They may also be used to justify programmes that have as their goal the transformation of family structure to conform to north European notions of what properly constitutes kinship and family.

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Urban Migration and Reconstruction of Kinship Networks: The Case of Istanbul

SEMA ERDER

Urbanization and demographic transformation in Turkey have resulted in increased mobility, differentiation, and the formation of new patterns of social life. The geographical distribution of the population has changed entirely, not only with migration from rural to urban areas, but also with migration between cities within Turkey and emigration from Turkey to other countries, especially in Western Europe. Within Turkey, the overwhelming dominance of migration from the inner and eastern parts of Anatolia to the western and southwestern regions has generated a population pressure that has increasingly aggravated regional inequalities (SIS 1996, 1997, 1998; UNDP 1997).[1]

Like most other countries with a large population and a rich historical heritage, Turkey has a very heterogeneous ethnic and religious make-up. Studies identify more than forty ethnic groups in Turkey (Andrews 1989). This relationship has also been reflected in migration patterns, which have had a notably composite character. Population movements to western regions have brought migrants who are not only marked by their rural but also by their specific cultural and class backgrounds. As a result, migration has meant that very heterogeneous social and cultural groups have become mixed in the rapidly growing urban areas.

Another important aspect of the urbanization and migration processes in Turkey is that they have taken place in an environment where public administration is notably weak. Traditionally, Turkish urban institutions were organized to fulfil the limited demands of a mainly agrarian society. These institutions are, therefore, insufficient as responses to the urgent and considerable demands of new urban groups. Table 1 gives an example of the deficiency of the public welfare system in Istanbul, the biggest urban centre in Turkey, with a population of 9.2 million (1997). Public homes for children and the elderly serve only those who are "without family," i.e., who lack relatives and/or are living alone.[2] Even though

1 The population of Turkey has increased from 24.1 million in 1955 to 56.4 million in 1990 and the urban population has increased from 7.3 million to 31.8 million during the same period. According to the latest census of the State Institute of Statistics, the population in Turkey was 62.2 million in 1997.

2 According to the official figures, for the 18, 000 children living under the protection of the state in Turkey in 1999, there are 95 public homes and 77 public nurseries. These children are either without families or come from families that are not able to raise the children on their own. These families are either single parent (divorced, widowed, etc.) or disabled .) families (with handicapped, alcoholic, poor parents, etc (the Istanbul daily Milliyet,, 1 July 1999). Other data tell the same story: the number of children taken care of by the police in Istanbul has increased from 191 in 1998 and 267 in 1999 to 815 children for the first eight months of 2000. Of these 815 children, 519 were street vendors and beggars, 164 were thinner abusers, 92 were street children, 37 had been abandoned by their families, and 1 had been raped (the Istanbul daily Radikal,, 8 September 2000).

Table 1: Public Welfare Service Institutions in Istanbul (1999)

	Number	Capacity
Orphanages	2	180
Public Nurseries	8	1040
Pension Houses	5	918
Daycare Centres	2	430
Women's Shelter	1	16
Rehabilitation Centres (for handicapped children)	3	73

Source: Istanbul Directorate of Social Services. July 1999.

commercial and voluntary organizations (NGOs) grow in number, they are still insufficient to meet demand and are mostly used by the well off.

As a corollary of the lack of public institutions, there is a widely held conviction that all the needs of individuals ought to be met within family and kinship relationships. For example, leaving older members of the family in an old people's home is still widely considered to bring shame on the family, even among the urban elite. The family has traditionally been regarded both by individuals and the state as one of the most respected and reliable social institutions in Turkey. The state has left nearly all responsibility for social support and solidarity to the family, and has thus unburdened its responsibility for social welfare on to "the family," which has been supported by legal, political, and ideological means. Thus, traditionally weak urban institutions, together with persistent pro-family values, have prevented the development of new types of organization capable of responding to the new demands of rapidly developing urban and metropolitan areas.

The Danish sociologist Esping-Andersen has in his analyses of different welfare systems called attention to the "familistic variant of conservative model" (Esping-Andersen 1990 as quoted in Mingione 1996:20-2). Even though Esping-Andersen's study does not explicitly include the case of Turkey, the model derived from from Italy and Spain constitutes a meaningful starting point for the analysis of family relationships in Turkey (Figure 1). Characteristic of this model is the fact that family and other forms of voluntary support play a greater role than the state and the market in supplying welfare services. The Swedish case, on the other hand, is defined as a social democratic model where there is strong emphasis on the welfare state, whereas the U.S. represents a liberal model where the market has special importance.

In a family-oriented conservative society, household and kinship systems are overloaded with responsibilities, since the state and the market are equally inefficient in providing welfare services. This situation has significant effects, not only on the poor sections of the population, but on society at large as well. Even though the Turkish authorities very rarely provide an official definition of the ideal "Turkish Family," a closer look at official discourses indicates the implicit assumption of such an ideal. This model, consisting of a male breadwinner, a housewife, and two children — preferably a boy and a girl — is a modified version of the modern nuclear family. As such, it is assumed to take on more responsibilities, to be more

Figure 1: Models and Variants of Welfare Systems.



Source: E. Mingione (ed.) *Urban Poverty and the Underclass*, Basil Blackwell 1996, pp. 21.

generous, in a sense, than the more autonomous, Western type of nuclear family. The problem, however, with this officially accepted concept of the "decent family" - implicit in many public announcements and advertisements - is that it exists as a reality only in selected groups within the upper urban strata, while family relationships among the majority of the population look quite different. This official family is also influential in academic circles, where focus more often than not is put on positive relations based on "altruistic solidarity" than on the chaotic heterogeneity and the shortcomings of existing family life.

As most Turkish policymakers and bureaucrats belong to the professional urban middle class, their experience and, thus, their perception of the ideal family is culturally biased. This culturally biased image and perception influences overall public policies. The American sociologist Bokemeier makes a similar point in relation to a study carried out in the U.S. by stressing how an idealized image of the "normal" family may lead welfare policies astray (Bokemeier 1997).[3]

In Turkey, which is a populous, multicultural, and dynamic society, the existence of a rich and colourful variety of family types and, thus, familial relations is especially striking.[4] Thus, besides urban middle class families (see Sunar's chapter in this volume), a spectrum of various types of families and familial relations, from

3 According to Bokemeier: "... social policies of modern welfare states have tended to take for granted the existence of a 'normal' or standard North American family with male breadwinner and a female homemaker. This nostalgic ideology influences policies" (Bokemeier 1997:16).

4 For an illustrative study expressing the heterogeneity of the Turkish family structure by class and culture see TTTV 1998.

pre-modern, to postmodern, may be observed. In spite of these diversities, public discourse persists in representing the typical Turkish family as a uniform, stable, and socially protective and supportive (generous) institution. As will be shown in this chapter, which is based on data from two surveys carried out in Pendik and Ümraniye, two suburbs in the eastern part of Istanbul, the reality is much more complicated, dynamic, and conflict-ridden.[5]

Informal Settlements

Because of the weakness of formal urban institutions, the creation of urban space has displayed certain distinct features in Turkey. Thus, nearly half the urban space has been created by informal networks, which means that neither open market mechanisms nor state institutions have played a decisive role in this process.

The informal housing areas, so common in the Turkish urbanization process, are mainly created on the peripheries outside the municipal boundaries, either by de facto occupation of public land or by exploiting the lacunae within the less formalized, more flexible village law.[6] "Land developers" or agents in this process are either the pioneers of certain communal, religious, or political groups or just mafia-like commercial groups that have access to the political and administrative system. It should be emphasized that the purchasers on this market are not the poorest, but the relatively successful migrants who at least are well off enough to pay for the land and the construction of buildings.

The customers in this market get information and are mobilized through informal networks, which are especially available in the city. Familial, communal, cultural, and religious networks, which are based on trust and acquaintance, play an important role in the process of settling and surviving in these areas. Nowadays, we may claim that there are two different types of urban housing markets, and thus "housing classes" (Saunders 1981, 1984), one formal, the other informal. In addition, each separate category is also differentiated within itself.

Depending on their power, class position, cultural background, and their own personal abilities to satisfy their demands, new urban dwellers make full use of all assets available in cities. The result is that formal and informal markets, formal institutions and informal networks have come to coexist in urban settlements. To define this situation as an indication of a dual structure would be wrong. We are not facing a structural bipartition, but a new form of urban structure that is based on the interaction and thus simultaneous articulation of both formal and informal institutions.

First of all, it is important to point out that even though the new urban space is produced at the very margins of the pale of the law, i.e., with the help of informal networks, the inhabitants of these areas are at the same time citizens who have the right to vote en masse and thus have the power to make demands for municipal services of the public authorities. Even though the procedures for these claims do not follow the proper channels, they are widely considered to be legitimate, since they contribute to the articulation of the larger political system.

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5 For a brief summary of the focus and methodology of these particular field surveys, see the Appendix at the end of this chapter.

6 The rigidity of urban legislation also has effects on the development of informal housing areas. As the urgent demands for housing on a mass scale were not met by ineffectual administrative urban institutions, rural areas surrounding the cities became an attractive informal land market.

A thoroughfare in Ümraniye

Shops in Ümraniye.

Source: *İstanbul*, vol. 23, 1997.

Not unexpectedly, the housing sites created in this process are marked by poor quality. However, by participating in local politics, the inhabitants of these areas keep up the hope of changing these conditions. These efforts include mobilizing the inhabitants politically through bargaining with political and administrative cadres, making use of informal networks, and exhibiting the poverty of the physical environment in the mass media in order to summon the support of public opinion. Thus, a minimal amount of infrastructure and public services, such as electricity, sewage, water, transportation, and primary schools are obtained through a combination of hidden and open strategies.

The case of a district headman *(muhtar)* from Ümraniye serves as an illustration of this process. After going bankrupt in his hometown of Gaziantep, he moved to Istanbul and began a successful career as the founder of a *gecekondu* area. This former businessman, who had also got involved in politics, described his experience in the following way (Erder 1996, pp. 68-9):

> People in this area do not only know me as the first gece-kondu settler here, but also as the founder of this whole *gece-kondu* area. Following these developments, I also set up an Association for the Building of a Mosque *(Cami Yaptırma Derneği)*, and thus I became the promoter of this construction project. In addition to that I have also helped a rich and influential friend of mine from Gaziantep, now living in the central part of Istanbul, to build a school in this area. I have also spent a lot of effort, using my own social and political network, in installing telephones and electricity and building asphalted roads. Thanks to these services, people elected me as their headman *(muhtar)*.

When the party with which this *muhtar* was affiliated left government in 1992, the Istanbul governor forced him to leave his office, based on the claim that he had been selling state property illegally. As can be seen, local politics is both vivid and highly competitive in these areas. And since the local political cadres are responsive to their urgent demands, the inhabitants of these areas do not perceive themselves as marginal, but rather as solid middle class citizens.

The result of these mixed processes has been that urban settlements are now considered to be "chaotic," meaning that they are areas where order and disorder, rigidity and flexibility, authoritarianism and populism have come to coexist. This situation is not only characteristic of the urban poor, but of nearly all segments of the urban population, including the elite. In this respect, the variations between different urban areas are only significant in terms of scale and comprehensiveness. One reason for this is that the globalization process, which is based on a neoliberal ideology favouring privatization and anti-welfare programmes, influences the urban area as a whole by tending to accelerate the growth of informal structures. This observation is not only true of Turkey but of other countries as well all over the world (e.g., Pahl 1988; Mingione 1985, 1991, 1996; Wilson 1996; Esping-Andersen 1996).

Due to the widespread influence of informal networks, a certain degree of public awareness has developed in Turkey about the precariousness of existing physical and legal conditions in many housing areas. That attentiveness may be seen as the promising side of the coin. The obverse side, however, is that much less attention is given to how the organization of daily social life develops, and its impact on individuals and society at large. It is to that question that the analysis will now turn.

Informal Solidarity Networks

The problems faced by Turkish society in coping with the organization of public life are complex and differentiated. Since the existing structural rigidity in the relationship between state and society, together with newly developing global processes, prevent the reorganization of public life by means of formal institutions, informal networks tend to take the upper hand. Urban areas have thus developed into arenas marked by a kind of amalgam of divergent old and new institutions and relations, based on traditions of autocratic state-society relations, authoritarian administrative rules, powerless local administrations, populist political party policies, and traditional communal values and networks.

Upper class urban dwellers are more competent to reach, develop, and dispose of existing formal urban institutions, be they private, public, or voluntary (NGOs) than lower class urban dwellers. Still, it is true that there are many customers on the market for informal housing land even among the upper middle classes, but as a rule elite groups are more successful in finding their own solutions to problems related to semi-legal proprietorship.

For people from the lower classes the situation is different. The need to develop informal networks is greater and, therefore, more widespread. The importance, therefore, of familial solidarity networks is immense, not only during migration but also during the process of settlement and survival in the urban area. In its capacity of being the most reliable and important institution, the family, together with the circle of wider kinship relations, persists as the main channel for information, support, and solidarity. This "traditional" institution, even though its form and functions undergo change, is the main, most often the only "cultural asset" for the poorest segments among the migrants. Thus, clusters or networks consisting of migrants coming from the same areas are common. Such clusters of relatives or people coming from the same village or local community combine in reconstructing informal networks that are beneficial for finding houses, jobs, financial assistance, schools, medical care, etc. These groups are also supportive in daily interfamilial relations and helpful in such family matters as matchmaking (SPO 1991; Gökçe et. al. 1993; Ayata-Güneş and Ayata 1996; Erder 1996, 1997).

Similar networks have also been observed among immigrants from rural Turkey to other countries, especially in Western Europe. However, since the social milieu is quite different, and the Turkish immigrants are not considered as full citizens in the countries of migration, their relations with the state and the entire society have developed in a different manner. Therefore, the experience of the Turkish immigrants in a country like Sweden, for example, is quite different from those of their relatives or villagers in the informal housing areas in Turkish cities (Köksal 1986).[7]

Table 2, which is based on findings from my Ümraniye (Istanbul) survey of 1994, summarizes the frequency of informal networks. In this metropolitan suburb, which is in the process of being transformed from a village to an urban site, the informal housing market is highly active. As illustrated by the table, kinship and

7 Research on Turkish workers living in Stockholm-Rinkeby was conducted by this author in 1982. This research was also concentrated on the interaction of informal networks with formal urban institutions (Köksal 1986, 1991). A systematic comparison of the results of this research has to be saved for another paper. In this chapter, I will only give some suggestions related to possible similarities and dissimilarities.

Table 2: Informal Relations in a Peripheral District of Istanbul (Summary Table) (%)

	D.1*	D.2*	D.3*	Total
Have Relatives	88.2	97.9	90.7	92.1
Have Countrymen	66.7	76.6	87.0	77.0
Close ties (relatives)	53.0	44.7	63.6	54.7
Close ties (countrymen)	19.8	31.9	42.6	31.6
Trust in relatives	56.9	51.1	74.1	61.2
Trust in countrymen	31.4	44.7	57.4	51.3
Trust in neighbours	51.0	57.4	63.0	61.2
Trust in close friends	39.2	55.3	59.3	51.3
Trust in Istanbulites	17.6	27.7	33.3	26.3
Housing through family	43.1	40.4	61.1	48.0
Work through family	47.1	59.6	48.1	51.3

* The survey was carried out in the following subdistricts: D1 at the district centre, D2 between the centre and the periphery, and D3 at the outskirts of the same municipality. Same designation also for tables 3 and 4, this chapter.

Source: Erder, S. (1996). *Istanbul'a Bir Kent Kondu: Ümraniye.* Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları. (Compiled from various tables)

townsmen networks are available for the majority of households in this area. However, further examination of the data indicates certain differentiations and patterns of hierarchical stratification even in the formation and functioning of these relations, both in terms of where people live spatially and with whom they share their daily life.

In spite of the fact that the whole area was mainly developed by relatively poor migrants for whom the support of informal networks was crucial, it was still possible to observe differentiation within this group itself as to how crucial the informal networks in fact were. Thus, even within this limited and generally poor area, segregation occurred in such a way that informal relations based on trust and acquaintanceship seemed to play a more important role on the outskirts. Since kinship systems are socially constructed, the structure and meaning of "family and extended familial relations" seemed to vary significantly between different cultural groups and strata. The qualitative data from the Ümraniye study support this impression of a marked heterogeneity in the meaning of "family and kinship" for different classes and cultural groups.

The most important observations concern peasant family and kinship relations, which are usually defined as "traditional" and where age and gender define the hierarchical structure. It has been widely observed how these types of relationships have been transformed and/or reconstructed in the new urban contexts. What has happened is that rather than being reproduced in their traditional form, these relations have been transformed to "quasi-" or "pseudo-kinship" relations that take into account and build upon the existence of so-called "distant kin-

Waiting for mother to come back from work. A young boy with his grandmother. Ümraniye.

"House for sale", Ümraniye.

A small street in Ümraniye.

Source: *İstanbul*, vol. 23, 1997.

ship," which genealogically is highly imprecise. Reproduction of the old "traditional" familial networks that are common in the villages is almost impossible in an urban milieu. Change is mainly not in the direction of the modern nuclear family as assumed by so-called modernization theories. Neither is it in the direction of one uniform type of family. Instead, what is striking is the great diversity of networks that are reconstructed. So, informal relations are not limited to relatives and fellow countrymen only; they are also extended to include other types of informal relations, such as close friendship and neighbourhood relationships. Various forms of face-to-face relationships and relations based on shared experiences seem to have played an important role in establishing the new "close ties" between households. "To share the same fate" seems to be the key experience needed to establish the desired - and needed - "trust" between households.

Reconstruction of Family and Kinship

As mentioned before, family and kinship relations play a major role in Turkish society as institutions providing economic and social support for family and kin members. In periods of deep economic, social, and cultural restructuring, such as urbanization, these relations become more critical and strategic as avenues through which individuals cope with traumatically changing conditions.

The results of the field surveys referred to in this chapter confirm the contention that family and kinship relations are the only "cultural assets," or to borrow a term from Bourdieu, the only "social capital" (Bourdieu 1995) available to migrants to meet the various needs that emerge in the urban area. This is especially true for those who come from the poor sections of the population who are not so keen to make use of scarce resources in the form of public welfare institutions and market facilities. However, even for groups that mainly rely on their family and kinship relationships in coping with the challenges of the new urban life, these relations do not always work in a totally uniform manner. In practice, family and kinship support is most often neither fair nor stable nor particularly generous. As a matter of fact, the relationships are rather loosely defined and the identity of those who one may rely upon in the new urban milieu may, therefore, shift. This situation was captured in the interviews carried out in the Ümraniye study: these pointed to the presence of a great variety of definitions, formations, and meanings of family and kinship relations. As an example of how vague the "relative" may be, mention can be made of a thirty-year-old, poorly educated housepainter from Tokat who came to Istanbul at the age of thirteen, then worked for some years in Zonguldak before doing his military service, after which he came back to Istanbul. This man, whose wife was from the same village and who had been supported by his relatives when he settled in Istanbul, claimed that he could count more than 100 households of "relatives" in that city. The number of fellow countrymen *(hemşehri)* was about the same. According to him, all these people came from his village and were either close or distant relatives. He had 40 to 50 relatives/fellow-countrymen-villagers in Ümraniye and there were 15 such households in his own quarter *(mahalle)* with whose members he used to socialize (sit and chat in each other's homes) during the evenings (Erder 1996, p. 252). One conclusion from these data can be drawn by referring to the Italian sociologist Mingione, who writes, "... familial relations are changing sets of social relations

which establish mutual obligations aimed at helping its members to survive ..." (Mingione 1991, p. 132). However, it is necessary at this point to make a distinction between "intrafamilial" and "interfamilial" relations in terms of their participants, contexts, and functions.

It is especially within intrafamilial relations that one most frequently finds solidarity relations, described by interviewees as "generous" relations. Solidarity in domestic life is mainly the domain of female members of the family and is limited to the house and the neighbourhood. However, this "generosity" does not seem to carry over to life outside the family proper. The reason for this is the relative isolation of women from public life. It may seem strange, but women are often more isolated from public life in the cities than they are in the villages. The impacts of urban life are drastic, since women are lifted out of productive agricultural activities and placed in a milieu where they have to adopt the status of housewife.

So, even though women are active in forming intense and lively neighbourhood relations, these networks are mostly limited to household chores and childbearing activities. What is more, in the urban context adult male members desert the domestic domain more than is common in the villages, because of the long hours needed for breadwinning and other social activities. Women are thus left more to themselves, and the neighbourhood milieu is drained of traditional male authority. Being partly freed from traditional patriarchal pressure, together with the fact that urban women live in a more varied environment and meet other women with varied origins and experiences, may bring about a certain degree of liberation in their lives. On the whole, however, women are ill prepared for city life and are neither familiar with its risks and prerequisites nor aware of the requirements of urban institutions. The overall effect of these changes is that the traditional social control mechanisms through kinship relations that were prevalent in villages can no longer be fully reproduced in these new neighbourhoods. As far as childbearing is concerned, the impact of this situation on the socialization of the second generation is immense. In the "alien" environment of the city, children are, often by themselves, obliged to resort to low quality educational facilities, an exciting and adventurous street life, and informal workplaces willing to employ child labour.[8]

"Interfamilial" relations, on the other hand, are constructed outside the house and in a wider circle of people. These relations are usually set up to seek solutions to problems other than those immediately related to household chores, such as working and housing opportunities, and relationships with public and political institutions. These networks are constructed between the adult male members of the extended family and are closed to women and younger members of the family. Table 3 gives an example of the position of women and youngsters in local decisionmaking activities.

The research results show that interfamilial kinship relations cover many aspects of daily life. The effects of these relationships stretch beyond the particular households into society at large. In this process, some types of family relations have developed into sheer power relations, rather than developing into supportive "altruistic solidarity relations" (Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984). This means that informal networks that have originated in familial relations may develop into relationships with very different functions and meanings, both in people's private and public lives. Thus, the effects of these informal interfamilial relationships cut into local

8 Statistics on juvenile delinquency received by the police indicate that 78 per cent of these children are living with their parents (SIS 1997:7).

Table 3: Effectiveness of Some Local Groups and Institutions regarding Decisions on Local Issues (Replies of Household Heads)

	D.1	D.2	D.3	Total
Headmen	72.6	70.2	70.4	71.0
Municipality	68.6	70.3	61.1	66.5
Religious leaders	43.2	38.3	40.7	40.8
Teachers	45.1	36.2	38.9	40.2
Local tradesmen	47.1	29.8	35.2	37.5
Head Official of District	49.0	34.0	26.0	36.2
Politicians	41.1	29.8	35.2	35.5
Officials	29.4	23.4	31.5	28.3
Women	25.5	31.9	25.9	27.7
Youth	15.7	10.6	13.0	13.2

Source: Erder (1996). T:72. P.p. 280.

daily life, working life, and, what is more striking, into political life as well. However, the pattern, range, and effectiveness of these relations differ according to the characteristics of the numerous cultural groups. To reiterate, the force and significance of family relations are not limited to the private domain but reach into the public domain in a manner that varies between various cultural groups and social strata. Thus, familial relations do not develop uniformly and may appear in the guise of "male-dominated household relations," "male-dominated political life," "male-dominated working life," "political patronage," "ethnic relations," "religious sects," and even in some cases of "mafia-like organizations." Turkish migrants living in Sweden, on the other hand, utilize informal networks only for "internal communal" issues, a situation that also sets them apart as a distinct group in Swedish society. As immigrants, their interaction with formal Swedish institutions is different and creates new structures, which may be defined as "ghetto institutions," and patterns that usually do not exist in Turkey (Köksal 1986, 1991).

"Kinship Goes Ethnic"

Newly constructed networks, which are not formed by family or kinship members in the strict genealogical sense but by fellow villagers and fellow countrymen in a much wider sense, take on the character of "quasi-" or "pseudo-" kinship relationships in the new urban milieu. Based on different kinds of affinity and shared experience, these new family- and kinship-like networks constitute a step towards the formation of new communities based on ethnic, religious, and cultural similarities. An apposite description of this tendency is given by Faubion, who, in a review of kinship studies, uses the expression "kinship goes ethnic." Faubion summarizes this process well when he claims that what occurs is a "dissolution of kinship into the politically and economically more serviceable idiom of ethnicity" (Faubion 1996, p. 79).

At this point it should be emphasized that cultural and ethnic belonging are not permanent, but an expression of changing sets of relations in an ongoing interaction process. Thus, even traditional ethnic relations have a tendency to change and be redefined in the urban environment according to new experiences (Erder 1997).[9] The dissolution of traditional kinship relations has many contradictory tendencies. When, traditional ethnic relationships dissolve in a migrant urban setting, they may turn into new types of ethnic relations, since urban migration means that various traditional cultural groups start to interact with each other and share daily life in the same neighbourhood. In this process, many traditional cultural groups with differing origins and histories have to live close to and share daily life with people who were alien to them before. New sets of relations are constructed in urban areas that consist of a combination of different cultural groups, even though they may be taken for traditional cultural groups at first glance. For example, many traditional cultural groups such as Kurds, Alevis, Bosniacs, Circassians, Lazs, and Bulgarian Turks begin to live together even though they did not do so before. While they may have some prejudices against each other, they form new sets of relations in order to survive. It is obvious that their new environment is more colourful than before, a situation that forces them to establish new sets of relations (Erder 1997).

In addition, new cultural groups have come into being as a result of the changing dynamics of interaction between various cultural groups and institutions. For example, veiled girls, pro-Islamic groups, Alevis, and Arabesque music all represent new urban phenomena. In a similar way, Turkish immigrants in Stockholm (Rinkeby) have also developed new cultural tastes and patterns, even though this pushes them into the category of"ghetto dwellers" in the Swedish context. The way of life of Turkish immigrants in Stockholm, therefore, develops differently both from that of their relatives back in the village and their relatives in Turkish urban centres.

Moreover, it is the contention of this study is that there are striking differences in patterns of familial network and solidarity in urban areas inside Turkey. There are numerous types of solidarity networks, and these differ according to participants, defined problems to solve, and power and influence. What is more, not all informal networks may be gainful or open to all members and they may not serve all needs. On the contrary, informal relations may be very selective, competitive, and guided by distinctive priorities.

Reconstruction of Daily Life in Informal Urban Settlements

Table 4 gives brief information on the effectiveness of the interfamilial networks that are fundamental to public life. The table shows that only one-third of families are integrated into the so-called "broad circle" of more advantageous supportive networks, while the rest remain within the less powerful "limited circle." In line with this finding, the qualitative data indicate that some families feel excluded from the networks that are effectual in public life, and define themselves as "lonely and

9 In this part of the chapter the findings of the second field study will be represented. As outlined in the Appendix, the main focus of this survey was urban conflict.

Table 4: The Broadness of Family and Kinship Relations

	D.1	D.2	D.3	Total
Limited circle	72.5	66.0	64.8	67.8
Broad circle	27.5	34.0	35.2	32.2
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Erder (1996), p. 256.

isolated," even though they share the neighbourhood with relatives and/or members of the same cultural group. It is thus possible to live within an environment of kinship groups, townsmen, and other potential supportive groups without being part of the protective social network. Thus, within the framework of informal solidarity networks, which are expected to strengthen the bonds of group solidarity, a new inequality is created between the "haves and have nots." In his fieldwork in a Chicago ghetto district, Wilson has observed a similar inequality between the native blacks and the Mexicans (Wilson 1996). Another example comes from Stockholm (Rinkeby), where Turkish migrants utilized the facilities of informal networks more than other migrant groups living in the same area. However, the result was also that they were more isolated than other immigrants both from other migrant groups and from the entire society (Köksal 1986).

Among families living outside the wider network of informal relationships, i.e., who remain within the less protected and weaker "limited circle," there are also some autonomous households that function as more independent nuclear families. However, there are also families that, for various reasons, are truly excluded from wider supportive networks. Not unexpectedly, they are the most needy ones whose members are either old, retired, handicapped, jobless, widowed, or who lack young adult male members. On the other hand, some families belonging to the "broad network" may be defined as "climbers." These families have the advantage of possessing young adult male kinship members who can be mobilized on the job or housing markets. Thanks to intensive contacts in the informal and job markets, these families have a much greater chance to be successful and as a result become relatively better off.[10] According to the research data, some families also distinguish themselves in urban local politics by mobilizing the "energy" of their networks into votes during elections.

Generally, the most intense and widely ramified interfamilial relations occur within "climber" households, with their numerous young adult kin and/or male quasi-kin members. However, these relations may not be mobilized for all issues, such as housing, municipal services, schools, and medical care, but only for certain selected matters that may have priority for that group. For example, some networks only occupy themselves with issues of settlement, whereas others deal with questions related to the job market. It is also worth noting that the hierarchical,

10 As Asiama has also observed, the residents of informal areas are not homogeneous, as the existence of "rich slum dwellers" tends to indicate. Thus, as he claims, the definition of the urban poor has to be re-evaluated in urban areas (Asiama 1985). Similar tendencies could also be observed in the Rinkeby study. Some of the ghetto dwellers who were living in the broad circle had been more successful in economic terms both in Sweden and in Turkey (Köksal 1986).

selective, and competitive relations formed within these informal networks easily turn into political power relations.

To sum up: First, interfamilial networks based on ethnic, religious, and cultural similarities are created during the urbanization process. The basis of shared belonging does not have to be the same as it used to be in the rural migrants' places of origin, but is most often redefined and given a different meaning related to the new experiences in the urban areas. Second, the same informal network does not cover all problems and concerns, neither does it encompass all households or individuals in the same area or belonging to the same cultural group who are in need of protection. Thus, there are households and individuals who fall outside the informal network of protective mechanisms, and who are neither recognized by public organizations nor by informal networks.

Articulation of Formal System through Informal Networks

As mentioned before, the physical and social development of many new housing areas is organized neither by individuals nor by formal market or public organizations, but by informal commercial,[11] cultural, or political groupings. Informal groupings are active not only during the process of settlement, but also in the establishment of daily life. This process is not a peaceful one and is, therefore, not an easy endeavour for its participants, since it is carried out amid struggles and continuous negotiations with political and public institutions. These complex relations are a trademark of these areas and render them completely different from other parts of the city in terms of physical and legal conditions and of the quality and routines of daily life.

Local informal networks, lively social movements, and unconventional ways of dealing with "supra-local" (Leeds 1994)[12] institutions are the main characteristics of these areas (Erder 1997). Any type of relations with supra-local institutions, such as central and local government agencies, political parties, media and other private and public organizations, is considered legitimate by public opinion, since these relations are viewed as a necessary articulation of the formal municipal system at large.

Relations with the formal system have dynamic as well as paralyzing characteristics. During the course of the establishment of a new urban area, the local informal group's changing priorities play an important role. For example, during the first phase of the land development process, local groups prefer to operate in an environment lacking in strict legal regulations. However, after settlement is completed, integration within the urban system becomes a necessity in order to access public services and funds. Hence, after settlement has been completed, selective relations with the formal system begin to be established and the land developers and other local communal leaders start to act as the purported founders of a municipality. The endowment of a new municipal administration is one of the important tasks for the

11 As mentioned before, the development of housing areas that are located in the suburbs outside of the urban legal system is organized by informal groups. Some of them are commercial groups that organize this process for profit by selling the land to needy people. Being involved in a highly risky process, these groups have to provide "guarding services" to the purchasers during the settlement period. Thus, they have acquired the label "mafia" in public opinion.

12 In the second survey (Erder 1997) the approach that was developed by Leeds was applied. In his approach, interaction of "local and supra-local" relations have a special importance (Leeds 1994).

"founding fathers" of these new urban sites, since it constitutes the start of the integration of these areas into the formal urban system and the legitimation of its very existence. Thus, during the settlement period, the interests of local informal groupings are mainly concentrated on issues of controlling and arranging land and construction activities, whereas in the more settled period interests shift to other issues related to the regulation of daily life.

Priorities for local activities may depend on the urgency of the needs of the specific area and the political, ideological, and/or cultural preferences of leading local informal groups. However, it is generally true that issues related to the legitimation of these areas,[13] including the provision of minimal physical infrastructure, such as water, electricity, sewage, roads, and transportation, have always been considered a high priority. Other issues, such as health, childcare, and education often seem to be secondary in the priority list of local leaders. Exceptions to this pattern may be found among some pro-Islamic communal leaders, for whom religious activities, such as building mosques or arranging informal religious courses for children, may have higher priority than other basic daily needs.

Political mechanisms are vital for these complex negotiations. As mentioned before, even if they live in areas outside legal jurisdiction, these groups comprise citizens who have the power to vote and the right to demand public services from the state. Their democratic rights as voters cannot be ignored, since people living in the kind of urban areas discussed in this article form half the urban electorate.[14]

Politics, especially on the local level, is of crucial importance to residents of informal housing areas, and they are active and effectual in urban political life. However, their expectations and modes of making demands differ in many respects from those of the citizens in formally integrated urban areas. Even though claims are not directed through formal channels, they are widely considered as legitimate, since they contribute dynamically to the articulation of the democratic system at the wider, national level. Local political cadres are often responsive to these spelled-out demands. Even though this situation may result in populist policies that pave the way for political clientship and patronage relationships, local leaders play a major role in the relations with the political and administrative cadres at the national level. Mass social movements that mobilize local inhabitants are important forces in voicing the urgent demands to the public. Using the mass media, locally based social movements are able to exert pressure on political parties and government institutions. But public agencies and funds cannot meet all the immense and unconventional needs of these areas. Furthermore, neoliberal policies favouring reductions in public expenditures have also contributed to this deficiency.[15] The state and

13 Granting legal rights to these lands has to be done by public institutions. Thus, establishing a municipal administration is the first step of the articulation process, and physical planning activities and legalizing deeds are the next steps. Usually it is nearly impossible to apply the regular and standard norms of physical planning procedure, as these areas have been developed in very irregular ways. This is a long and sometimes desperate process, which seemingly will never come to an end. Thus, in general, minimal infrastructure and municipal services are provided through negotiations with public agencies before the legalization process has reached an end.

14 This is another crucial point that has to be considered when looking at Turkish workers abroad. In the Rinkeby study, it was observed that Turkish residents had limited interest in Swedish political life. They were no active participants in Swedish politics, but residents were isolated and considered themselves as temporary residents. However, even from afar, they were greatly involved and interested in Turkish political life (Köksal 1986).

15 Eckstein has observed a similar tendency in public expenditures in Mexico City, especially after the introduction of neoliberal policies. She defined these areas as "squatter settlements of despair" (Eckstein 1990).

other public institutions are neither capable of nor willing to respond to all kinds of rapidly rising demands.

In general, demands for legal rights to houses or landed property, minimal infrastructure, and basic services like schools and health centres are considered to be non-political and legitimate, even if they are provided haphazardly. Other types of demands, however, based on particular cultural identities such as Kurdish or Alevi,[16] or arising from certain radical political tendencies, may be considered ideologically improper or politically incorrect by public agencies. In other words, government agencies and/or ruling political parties do not always take the same view of the demands of different cultural, ethnic, religious, or political communities. Thus, state agencies are not systematic and impartial, but rather selective in relation to particular demands. Such practices usually result in perceptions of nepotism and feelings of inequality and alienation among residents of informal housing areas, feelings and perceptions that are the seedbeds of conflict that sometimes has ethnic dimensions. It is well known in urban sociology that municipal services are one of the main areas of competition and that unequal distribution of welfare measures is an important generator of urban movements and conflict (Mingione 1981; Castells et. al. 1983).

However, these conflict-generating tendencies are balanced at the grassroots level by the availability of various networks that are open to groups with different identities. As a matter of fact, a newly settled multicultural environment may offer possibilities for new "coalitions" of cultures and new forms of interaction between them. Thus, apart from the emergence of new cultural groups, different combinations or networks in the commercial, cultural, and political sphere are created that help to reduce tensions. The fact that some groups become carriers of a multitude of cultural and ethnic belongings, leads to even more new combinations of identity and increased flexibility in the creation of alternative networks.[17]

Compared to traditional ethnic groups and/or urban ghettoes in the West, the informal networks of modern Turkish metropolitan areas represent much less rigidly structured systems.[18] Networks in the newly established areas of a city like Istanbul are ad hoc and flexible, and easily change with the addition of different members and the adoption of different intentions. An individual may enter or be part of several networks at one and the same time, but for different objectives. Consequently, many cultural groups have different ways out of the social isolation they experience. Some of these informal networks lay the ground for new urban movements by giving rise to new cultural identities.

In sum, some interfamilial networks have a tendency to expand into cultural groupings that may include ethnic relations. The strengths as well as the limitations

16 For example, demands may be related to veiling from new Islamic groups or demands for separate religious education from Alevi (non-Sunni) groups, etc. Demands from various cultural groups, such as pro-Islamic, Alevi, and Kurdish groups, etc., may be considered overtly "ideological" and therefore inappropriate or politically incorrect by the authorities.

17 Multiple identity has a safety valve effect on these tensions. For example, it is possible for some Kurds who are seeking solidarity in urban areas to enter into pro-Islamic networks, and preferable for them to stress their Islamic identity, since these networks are less troublesome. Similarly, it is preferable and possible for the Alevi to enter into networks formed by secular groups.

18 Ghetto dwellers usually live in a network that is not as flexible as these informal networks. Besides, all aspects of daily life are provided for within the ghetto networks. Thus, social control among members is also stronger in ghetto life. The degree of conflict with the outer world is mostly dependent on the degree of ethnic discrimination (Köksal 1986).

of extended familial relations may lead to the formation of new groups based on shared ethnic, religious, and cultural experiences. The lack of efficient public institutions and the prevalence of populist policies combine to create new urban inequalities and new sources of urban conflict that sometimes overlap with ethnic or religious conflict. However, multicultural environments, multiple identities, and the emergence of new cultural groups lay the ground for the creation of alternative networks that seem to have a mitigating effect on potential conflicts.

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Appendix

Brief information on the two field surveys in Istanbul.

Survey I: A Squatter Town in Istanbul: Ümraniye (in Turkish, Erder 1996).

The focus of this study was mobility structures and networks of migrants in relation to informal housing and job markets. This field survey was conducted in one of the peripheral areas of Istanbul, Umraniye, where the transformation from a village to an urban site has taken place and where informal housing activities were intense.

This survey was designed as a three-step research project and both quantitative and qualitative techniques were used in each step. The first and second phases of the survey were on the development of the political and administrative structures in the area. The process of founding formal urban institutions, struggles between local power groups, changes in the priorities and tendencies, etc., were examined. The third phase of the field survey was on the "households" residing in the area. In this phase of the survey, migration, work, and housing histories and the effectiveness of familial networks for the households were investigated. For this phase of the survey, a zone was selected covering three subdistricts from the centre to the outskirts of the municipality, to capture the inner differentiation within the area. The structured interviews and in-depth interviews provided information on the differentiation and stratification within the migrant groups and, thus, on their mobility channels.

Survey II: Urban Conflict and Informal Networks (in Turkish, Erder 1997).

The main focus of this study was to identify major areas of conflict between urban groups. For this purpose, observations have been made on issues and major sources of urban inequality; effects of unequal access to urban facilities on the construction of daily life; local informal networks; social movements, and the modes of relations with supra-local institutions.

This study was a qualitative research project mainly based on in-depth interviews with local informal groups and representatives of supra-local institutions, such as municipality, political parties, educational and health administrations, labour office, media, etc. The survey was undertaken in a district of Istanbul (Pendik) where heterogeneous urban groups were living. Both urban middle class and the poorest sections of rural migrant groups could be found in the same district. Living in the same district, these differing groups were the clients of the same supra-local institutions. This situation provided the opportunity to observe and to make comparisons about differing modes of relations with supra-local institutions. For this purpose, interviews with the representatives of local and supra-local formal institutions and with informal local groups were undertaken. This provided information on the perceptions, motives, and modes of demand of differing local groups. In addition, they provided insights into the perception and responses of the officials to these demands. Thus, the analysis of these information sources made possible the identification of conflict areas between differing urban groups and supra-local institutions.

Couples, Children and Families in Pictures

Turkish village teachers getting married in Samsun in 1965.

A fisherman and his wife and their children
in Bergen, Norway.



These pictures date from 1905, the year when the union between Sweden and Norway was dissolved. In 1911, the eldest daughter left for Sweden to marry a Swedish sea captain. The same year, the eldest brother emigrated and settled in America, followed a year later by a younger brother. Only the elder brother was able to return to visit his relatives in Norway and Sweden. Shortly after his return from an eagerly and long awaited family reunion in 1960, and in the middle of making preparations to go back to his home country for good, he died in South Dakota at the age of 70.

A miller and his wife and their children, Svärdsjö, Dalarna County, central Sweden.

The picture of the children dates from 1910. The picture of the parents was taken in 1920, when husband and wife were 58 and 53 years old respectively.

An Istanbul lawyer and her husband,
their children and grandchildren.

Marriage in Istanbul in July 1945.

As a graduate of the Faculty of Law,
Istanbul University in 1943.

As mother and father of two, Istanbul 1951.

As mother of four, of whom the last two siblings are twins, Ankara 1953.

As bearded widower surrounded by children and grandchildren in Istanbul 1991. Seated on either side of the ageing grandfather are his twin daughters.

Student family in Göteborg, Sweden

With the first-born in 1947.

As father and newly fledged student in July 1947.

As student nurse, accompanied by the eight months old child during a summer practicum, July 1947.

Father's graduation in May 1950.

Mother of three in 1953.

The first car in 1956. A symbol of family union?

The mother with her three unmarried grown-up children, 1972. Individual autonomy at its peak for both generations?

As grandfather and grandmother: Providing care for the new generation (1985).

A loving couple, Istanbul 1944.

With the first-born: pride, happiness - and life-long responsibility, Istanbul 1946.

A crowded birthday party: the baby girl (third of four children) one year old in 1956.

The older sons getting ready for circumcision in Gölcük, Kocaeli, in 1954. The woman to the right is the children's grandmother.

As grandfather and grandmother in Ankara in 1982.

A stylish wedding in Istanbul in 1986

The wedding procession descending the staircase to the crowd waiting below in the big reception lounge.

Nephews taking part in the wedding dance.

Mutual treat for mutual sharing?

Village style wedding in İstanbul, in 1992

Henna being prepared (bowl with candlelights) in front of the bride.

The bridegroom joins the ceremony.

The henna is "burnt" into the hands of the bride and bridegroom.

A gasoline station worker from Ankara getting married in his home village in the province of Yozgat (1990).

The bride waiting at home for the bridegroom, with a red scarf over her face.

The bridegroom collects the bride from her home.

The newly married couple seated in front of a table and ready to receive the wedding gifts. The bridegroom's father is has his hands on the shoulders of the young couple.

Bread being prepared for wedding feasts.

Wedding celebrations.

A Nordic wedding in 2001

Getting married according to a revived, old-fashioned wedding style, including long white dress, horse carriage...

... and church ceremony.

Choosing a more casual form of marriage ceremony (Oslo 2000).

Waiting for the mayor, who will conduct the civil marriage ceremony.

First cohabitation, then marriage. With mom and dad at their marriage ceremony.

The threefold "couple" joined by grandmother and grandfather.

Celebrations at an informal garden party.

Circumcision ceremonies and celebrations*

Being the center of attention (İzmit, 1965)

Receiving gifts after circumcision, (Konya 1966)

Getting ready for circumcision by being entertained and driven around the city. A *gecekondu* area in Ankara in 1983.

* Circumcision (usually performed when the boys are between 4 and 12 years old) is an important event in any Turkish family.

Children at day-care centers.

Male teacher at a day-care center in central Sweden (1998).

To be allowed to do things on your own at an early age (Göteborg 1972).

Outdoor activities at a day-care center in northern Sweden, 1975.

Larger groups require stricter discipline: Zeytinburnu, Istanbul in 1975.

FAIRNESS AND EQUITY

The Family and the Welfare State: A Route to De-familialization

MARGARETA BÄCK-WIKLUND

The history of the welfare state goes back to the beginning of the twentieth century, but the core components of the contemporary welfare state were put in place during the 1960s and 1970s. The conditions of family life are tightly coupled with the institutionalization of the welfare state. At present, the dual-earner family is well established and the parents share responsibility, workload, and caring for dependents with the welfare state. Family instability is extensive and the fastest growing family form is the single parent family. In addition, more and more families are reconstituted in new combinations. The household's welfare and caring responsibilities are eased either through state or market provisions. This situation goes hand in hand with a social policy that renders women as autonomous individuals with shared responsibility for family income, or able to set up independent households.

Here, I examine the unfolding of the welfare state and focus on family policy. The introductory sections deal with some of the main principles for the analysis of welfare state regimes as an interaction between market, state, and family. The ideological heritage and political goals will be presented along with some of the strategic reforms introduced.

In the following sections the main elements in contemporary Swedish family life will be reviewed. These include the provision by welfare state institutions of childcare and of opportunities for fathers' participation in childcare and for women's gainful employment. In the final sections, I analyze the family in terms of the dilemma of how to protect individual autonomy versus family life as a common project.

From Welfare State to Welfare Regime

The welfare state is to a large extent responsible for the reproduction of the labour force and for the support of the non-productive part of the population (Gough 1979), but it is possible to discern different types of welfare state. The discourse about the welfare state opened as a question of public expenditure, but Richard Titmuss' classic distinction between residual and institutional welfare states soon forced researchers to explore the content of welfare states, and to raise questions concerning who is eligible for the services offered; the quality of the benefits and services; and whether the welfare programs are targeted or are universalistic. The residual welfare state is assumed to limit commitments to marginal and deserving social groups. The institutional model, on the other hand, addresses the entire population. It is universalistic in its approach and embodies an institutionalized commitment to welfare. It also aims at extending welfare

commitments to all areas of distribution vital for societal welfare (Esping-Andersen 1990).

According to the original Titmuss typology, Sweden, along with other Nordic countries, is classified as an institutional welfare state (Allardt 1986; Esping-Andersen and Korpi 1987). In an analysis of Swedish family policy from 1960 to 1990, a modified version of the typology was applied to the political parties and their ideologies of the time. The traditional Social Democratic Party has dominated Swedish policy for almost half a century. Its social policy fits well with the institutional welfare state approach and is accordingly classified as "generous institutionalism." This means, "a system, which includes all public contributions with high standards, directed towards the whole population. It offers social service and aims at security outside the market based on economic and social needs" (Hinnfors 1991, p. 17). The Swedish welfare state at present is built on general benefits instead of selective means-tested benefits. Universalism was to a certain degree included in the design of the welfare system from the beginning. Along with that, other characteristics of a Social Democratic government developed, such as comprehensive risk coverage, generous benefits levels, and egalitarianism.

As a development of the classical ideas articulated by Titmuss, Esping-Andersen (1999) creates a new typology. He takes into account de-commodification (i.e., the state builds a protective buffer between the individuals and the market, and thus increases their independence of market compulsion), social stratification, and employment as keys to a particular welfare state's identity. The analysis focuses on pensions, sickness benefits, and the creation of work and it is based on the interaction between the state, the market, and the family. However, the family as such and a thoroughgoing gender perspective are not part of the analysis. Esping-Andersen finds welfare state regimes clustered by regime types: the liberal, the corporatist, and the social democratic welfare state regime.

The United States is the model within the liberal or residual cluster. The social insurance system is fairly weak, with a minimum of transfers, and entitlement to social assistance is very strict and means-tested. It is targeted at a clientele with low incomes, often in combination with a social stigma. The individual is responsible for his/her welfare and traditional liberal work-ethic norms are still valid. This welfare system minimizes de-commodification and helps to build and sustain a segregated society. Family policy as such does not exist, either as a system directed towards families or towards individual family member (Esping-Andersen 1999). Instead of support to dual-earner families to balance family and work, employed married women are blamed for marriage break-up and for neglecting the needs of children.

Corporate states are predominant in countries where the church has a strong position, such as in Austria, France, Germany, and Italy. Along with a public discourse of preserving traditional family values, there is a social insurance, which is openly gender-biased, in that it excludes non-working wives and provides benefits that encourage motherhood. As in the liberal model, services that aim to help parents balance family and work, such as care, are conspicuously under-developed in corporate states.

The social democratic welfare state regimes conforming to the institutional model are the smallest cluster. They comprise the Nordic countries, where the state has a strong position. Social insurance is based on citizenship and universalistic principles, thus providing a maximum of de-commodification effects.

The goal is to prevent segregation and dualism between state and market, which means that middle-class people are also service users. The Nordic countries have a generous family policy, with Sweden representing an advanced design. The two most salient pillars in family policy are parental insurance and public daycare. Together, these systems help families to reconcile family and work, and at the same time they illustrate the most distinguishing trait of this regime type, notably its fusion of welfare and work. This type of regime can be characterized as follows:

> The social democratic regime's policy of emancipation addresses both the market and the traditional family. In contrast to the corporatist/ subsidary model, the principle is not to wait until the family's capacity to aid is exhausted, but to preemptively socialize the cost of familyhood. The ideal is not to maximize the dependence on the family, but capacities for individual independence. In this sense, the model is a peculiar fusion of liberalism and socialism. The result is a welfare state that grants transfers directly to children, and takes direct responsibility of caring for children, the aged, and the helpless. It is accordingly committed to a heavy service burden, not only to service family needs but also to allow women to choose work rather than the household (Esping-Andersen 1990, p. 28).

Individual Independence as De-familialization

Esping-Andersen's typology from the early 1990s has had a tremendous impact on welfare state analysis. However, the central concept of de-commodification leads to a gender-biased discussion that relates to male workers. This is because most women at that time had not entered the labour market and become commodified. As a consequence, women and their unpaid work in the family were excluded from the analysis as a source of welfare. Accordingly, the typology has been criticized from a feminist perspective, because it presupposes that families rely on the standard male production worker as expressed in the male-breadwinner model (Sainsbury 1994; Lewis 1993). By taking this critique into account, Esping-Andersen (1999) has moved on and included the families', and particularly women's, economic contributions into his analysis.

In his revised comparison of welfare states, the distinction between state and regime is emphasized and the family's and women's economic activities are included. The aim is to establish a social foundation for postindustrial economies and a better understanding of the dynamics of the crisis of the welfare state, which most Western countries have faced since the late 1970s. In this broadened perspective, the contemporary welfare state crisis is not only considered as state failure but also as the functioning versus dysfunctioning of the family and the labour market. The societal welfare outcome is then seen as the total within which the inputs from all these three institutions are combined.

Given this context, Esping-Andersen introduces a new typology that refers to degrees of "familialism" versus "de-familialization" The familialistic regimes lean on the principle of subsidiarity, and the state is only supposed to intervene when the supporting networks within the family have failed. Familialization goes hand in hand with an almost nonexistent family policy. De-familialization on the other hand is a concept used "to capture policies that lessen the individuals' reliance on the family; that maximize individual's command of economic resources independently of familial or conjugal reciprocities"(Esping-Andersen 1999, p. 51).

Esping-Andersen uses the concept de-familialization and de-commodification as ways to discuss degrees of dependence. He baldly states that "the Nordic welfare state regimes remain the only ones where social policy is explicitly designed to maximize women's economic independence" (ibid. p. 51). Since women as mothers often have limited possibilities to be economically independent through paid labour, their de-familialization depends on the division of labour between the welfare state and the family.

The division of labour is a classic theme in social science. It can be applied to illustrate the relationship between the family and the state, but with some further distinctions. The first distinction is between labour and responsibility. Responsibility is an overarching concept and does not necessarily include one,s work, but means that the state provides the family with different benefits and resources. As part of this responsibility, the state provides the family with public daycare for children and public services for elderly people, work and care that once were provided within the family. A further distinction relates to the gender division of labour within the family. Since the 1960s gender equality has been an official policy goal, both in everyday family life and in public life as well as on the labour market.

Throughout the discourse on the welfare state the following main principles have emerged, and these serve as guidelines for this chapter. The most important principle is the fusion between welfare and work, where most of the rights and entitlements of the welfare state presuppose employment. This is one of the founding factors for how family welfare is produced. Both men and women are supposed to support themselves economically and, therefore, the state provides institutionalized solutions, such as care for children and the elderly, to help families balance family and work. Along with welfare institutions, the fusion of welfare and work has strengthened each family member's individual autonomy, but weakened his/her dependence on the family: in other words it has been conducive to de-familialization.

First Stage of Swedish Family Policy

The first stage in Swedish family policy was when the state began to take responsibility for the organization of everyday family life to make domestic work more efficient and to create equal living conditions for children. These objectives were also the main components of the vision expressed by Alva and Gunnar Myrdal when they launched their family-friendly policy in the mid-1930s. Their idea was to ease the burdens of families with children and promote the birth of more and healthier babies. It is possible to discern the influence of socialist utopians in those ideas (Hirdman 1987). Alva Myrdal was very much in favour of state responsibility for the upbringing of children through publicly run, specialist-governed childcare institutions, which she considered would do a better job than ordinary mothers with no education (Myrdal and Myrdal 1935).

Parallel with these radical ideas about state intervention in family life, was the traditional emphasis on the mother as the primary caregiver to small children. Women and motherhood as such were considered to be important tools, and well-educated upper class women together with male pediatricians joined in a campaign to educate working class women about how to prepare nutritious food, have clean and neat homes, and be good mothers. The campaign was launched in

the name of science (Ohlander 1993). The family became an object of interest and an arena to be invaded from different angles by different professions, and an object of social engineering.

Gunnar and Alva Myrdal published "Population Crisis" *(Kris i befolkningsfrågan)* in 1935, when Sweden had the lowest birth rate of all Western democracies. They suggested that unless the government took concerted action, Sweden would not be able to sustain itself in demographic terms. They called for a pro-family policy, which was to include programs such as improved pre- and postnatal care, birth control, family education, childcare, redistribution of income on the basis of family size, and other social services designed to aid parents. The Myrdals started a debate that led to the establishment of a Population Commission, which produced a number of proposals, most of which were never implemented

Among the Population Commission proposals that were implemented, were those based on the "principle of care" as a basis for entitlement to social benefits (Sainsbury 1994). Most of the benefits introduced were attached to motherhood. During the 1930s, several general rules that affected women's lives were introduced. In 1937, maternity grants *(moderskapspenning)* were established; in 1938, maternity assistance in kind *(mödrahjälp)* and contraceptives were legalized; in 1939, the law stated that gainfully employed women could not be dismissed because of pregnancy, childbirth, or marriage. Notwithstanding the policies focusing on women as mothers, as early as the 1940s Alva Myrdal was arguing for "companionship marriage" *(kamratäktenskap)*. She did not limit herself to leisure-time companionship but included the sharing as two comrades of parental duties on an everyday basis (Myrdal 1944).

In 1948, a general child allowance was introduced for all families with dependent children. This is a universal, non-means-tested benefit. It was and still is the symbol of generous institutionalism in Swedish social policy, and includes everybody without stigmatization. The child allowance is a cornerstone of family policy but was initially introduced to solve "the population crisis." It was also the first important step towards parental insurance that gradually included the acceptance of women's right to work and to have a family.

Before the Second World War, extensive plans for new public housing for families with children were made. To achieve this goal, housing policy became another important instrument in Swedish family policy. At that time, many families lived in very poor conditions, and children's health was obviously at risk. Better housing conditions were also seen as an incentive for people to have more children. However, the Second World War delayed the implementation of these plans.

After the war, the situation for women changed dramatically. There was a severe shortage of labour in industries and women entered the labour market. An expanding public sector eventually directed political attention to the position of married women. Women were about to become economically independent, but who would take care of the children? In 1955, three months maternity leave was introduced through maternity insurance. The labour movement at that time was in favour of keeping women out of the labour market. This was also the Social Democratic strategy, namely, to build a strong welfare state where economic justice among different classes was the most important goal, not women's rights and gender equality (Acker 1992). However, within the Social Democratic Party there were also strong proponents of women's rights along the lines advocated by Alva Myrdal and Viola Klein in "Women's Two Roles" (1957), that is, as

Table: 1 Gainfully employed women according to age 1976, 1985, and 1995 (percentage unit change in relation to previous observation).

	1976	1985	1995
16-24 years	73 %	68 % (-5%)	51% (-17%)
25-34 years	72 %	81 % (+9%)	74 % (-7%)
35-54 years	77 %	85 % (+8%)	85 % (0%)
55-64 years	49 %	57 % (+8%)	59 % (+2%)

Source: Labour force statistics, in Wennermo (1998).

"new women" with combined responsibilities for family and work. Along with the Social Democrats, there were other liberal women's movements which had been established as early as 1885 and for whom women's rights and gender equality had always been on the agenda. These issues were common ground for different women's organizations, even across political parties. However, the ruling Social Democrats tried to prevent women's rights and gender equality from being achieved (Acker 1992).

The debate during the 1950s revolved around the question of whether women should start careers and become professionals or should remain housewives and homemakers. The issue permeated all levels of society and all media from tabloids to social science research, where the gender role as a concept was introduced. Through the use of "role," the idea was to escape biological determinism and to emphasize that gender was being expressed in accordance with historical and environmental factors, and so was open to negotiation and change. In this tradition, the idea of symmetrical gender roles was launched, with men and women supposed to share responsibility for family, economy, and childcare on an equal basis (Dahlström 1993).

This first stage in Swedish family policy has been labelled "the housewife contract" (Hirdman 1990). In public debate and in political documents, home and family are often used as synonyms. But home/family is also related to motherhood and femininity in opposition to public life and masculinity (Pateman 1989). "The home" is the symbol of a good life, responsibility, and care, and in Swedish political discourse it has also been applied to the state as the "People's Home." This is a semantic trick that equates the state with an economically secure, responsible, and caring home that embraces everybody, but with an intrinsic gender bias.

Even though this first stage in Swedish family policy rests on a gender contract where women were housewives and men breadwinners, Swedish women had, compared to their counterparts in many other countries, strong positions and notable individual independence. Women's right to work and to have a family was recognized by law in 1921 (see Gunhild Kyle in this volume), but it appears that economic forces and growing demand in the labour market were the strongest incentives for political reforms, such as public childcare and parental insurance. Politically, women's rights were not primarily a question of care, but of wage labour and care, and gradually two discourses developed: "The first was about economy, growth, productivity and class, and the second was about women, children, family and the welfare state and care." (Acker 1992, p. 283).

Second Stage

The second stage of Swedish family policy was initiated during the 1960s. With more and more women in the labour market, the quest for childcare became urgent and was accompanied by an intense debate about "sex roles." The official ideological goal became the *dual-earner family* with symmetrical gender roles. Economy, work, family, and children now became parts of one political discourse about wage labour and care. However, opinion in the Social Democratic Party was divided on these issues, one view resting on the traditional male breadwinner model with women as housewives and homemakers, the other in favour of a dual-earner family with gender equality and shared responsibility between spouses. The first group advocated the introduction of a childcare allowance *(vårdnadsbidrag)* and a continuation of the male breadwinner model. The other took a stand in favour of a system to ease the burdens for working mothers through public childcare for small children and paid maternal leave. The Conservatives were strongly opposed to the introduction of a childcare allowance, in keeping with their more general negative attitudes towards state intervention and allowances.

As the political situation was unclear, the Social Democratic Party deliberately chose to defer a decision pending the outcome of several ongoing commissions. The LO (the blue collar organization), a branch of the socialist movement related to the Social Democratic Party, claimed to support working mothers, since to them it was obvious that the dual-earner family was here to stay. They took a firm stand and argued that the state should take responsibility for the rapidly changing conditions of working families with small children. They favoured a system based on a dual-earner family with public daycare and better possibilities for paid maternal leave.

During the 1960s, family policy improved gradually and entitlements were now directly related to women as wage earners. Mothers were entitled to three months of paid leave upon the birth of a child, and in 1962 paid leave was prolonged to six months (SCB 1994:1, SCB 1995). With more and more working mothers, the quest for childcare was, along with gender equality, in the mainstream of political discourse. The Conservatives and the Social Democrats slowly began to change places. The Conservative Party became the proponents for the introduction of childcare allowances (vårdnadsbidrag) as a pro-family means for each family to choose and organize care and economic maintenance. They also strongly opposed collective public daycare and state intervention, because this was seen as a reduction of individual freedom and autonomy and a threat to traditional family life. The Social Democrats strongly advocated public childcare for all children below 6 years of age and parental insurance pay-outs that would almost match salaries and wages (Hinnfors 1991). Thus, to the Social Democrats, the state had responsibility for families and children not only through different benefits but also through the provision of actual services, such as publicly provided childcare.

In 1974 the Social Democrats introduced a "new" family policy, with the dual-earner family as an official goal. Maternal leave was replaced by parental leave and also became liable to taxation. From now on, new principles for entitlements were introduced. Both parents became entitled to six months leave together. Payment comprised 90 per cent of wages. Up to 1990, parental insurance was gradually increased to 450 days, of which only 90 days received minimum

payment and the remaining 360 days were at 90 per cent of salaries. In the same year, parental insurance faced reductions for the first time, after more than three decades of continuous expansion. During the 1990s, there were several cut backs in and changes to parental insurance because of the weak Swedish economy. In the mid-1990s, both the welfare state and the economy were in severe crisis. In 1998, with a stronger economy, the ruling Social Democratic Party started to restore the system and even to introduce improvements.

Several welfare reforms have improved living conditions for working parents, especially those emphasizing gender equality and women's autonomy. Some of the most important reforms are parental insurance, the 1975 law on free abortions, the 1971 law on separate taxation, and the 1980 law on gender equality. Free abortion gave a woman the right, until the eighteenth week of pregnancy, to decide for herself if she wanted an abortion or not. Prior to this law, the medical profession had made decisions about abortions, but these were now considered to be the woman's own individual choice. Through the separate taxation law, men and women became individually responsible for the family economy as well as for their own. This was an important step away from the traditional family model with the man as breadwinner. The taxation rules also favoured part-time work, and are often seen as an explanation for the pervasiveness of part-time work among Swedish women (Sundström 1987). The first law on gender equality was introduced in 1980. The law had a prehistory stretching back to the 1970s and was mainly related to working life and the labour market (Proposition 1987/88:105). At the beginning of the 1990s, the law was broadened to include family life. The overarching goal was that men and women should have the same rights and opportunities in all walks of life: to work and to economic independence and to take part in political activities, labour unions, and other activities in working life and in society. Shared responsibility for children and domestic work was also part of this goal.

The Modern Dual-earner Family

In most Swedish families both men and women are wage earners. Families with sole male breadwinners have become obsolete and have been replaced by the dual-earner family. Compared to most other countries, Sweden has gone far down this road, and men and women are represented almost equally on the labour market in Sweden today. Between the 1960s and 1980s, the housewife almost disappeared. During the same period, the largest increase in female labour force participation was by married mothers with small children. At the end of the 1960s, about 70 per cent of married mothers were housewives and about 30 per cent were in the labour force. By the beginning of the 1980s, the relationship was almost reversed: 20 per cent were housewives and 80 per cent were in the labour force (Axelsson 1992). Seen from the child's perspective, about 80 per cent of the children below 17 years of age have a mother in the labour force. Whether a mother is working or not varies according to education and ethnic background. Almost half of children below 6 years of age with less educated mothers will have a mother who is not employed. It is also more common for children with one or both parents born outside Sweden, or living with only one parent, to have a parent outside the labour force (SCB: 1999:3)

Swedish women are wage earners to a large extent, and they have changed the

traditional pattern where young unmarried women were working and older married women were housewives and homemakers. During the 1960s and 1970s, even married women became wage earners to an increased degree. They started their professional careers later than before, because of longer education, but they remained on the labour market as working mothers, and they stayed even when their children had left home. During the 1970s, women below 30 years of age worked longer hours than older women did. This difference has decreased as the latter group has increased its working hours. These changes have contributed to increasing economic inequalities between different households. The winners are the dual-income households with grown children, while young working parents have lagged behind (Wennermo 1998).

Because of the fusion between welfare and work, the massive unemployment of the 1990s has had an immense impact on family welfare. Unemployment was the fastest growing factor in households' loss of welfare. It also increased the gap between high- and low-income households (SOU 2000:3). The National Board for Consumer Issues (1998) has studied economic developments during the 1990s for different types of household. The results show that all households, single- or dual-earner, with two or more children and with moderate or low income, dropped close to or below the poverty line for shorter or longer periods during the 1990s. In an audit of the impact of welfare issues in the 1990s, a government commission has concluded that the Swedish welfare state has largely handled the crisis well. However, families with children, young people, and immigrants have suffered considerable welfare declines (SOU 2000:3).

During the first part of the 1990s the dual-earner family in Sweden had, along with Iceland/Ireland, the highest total fertility rate (the measure of the number of children each woman will have during her life) in Europe. From the Second World War until the beginning of the 1960s, the total fertility rate was over 2 children per woman in childbearing age. (In order for a population to reproduce itself, each women needs to have 2.1 children.) After that it dropped for a period to the same low level as during the 1930s, between 1.7 and 1.8 children. Most European countries followed a similar pattern until the 1980s. In some European countries the total fertility rate started to increase during the 1980s as it did in Sweden, but it never rose above 2 children per woman. In Sweden, in contrast to other countries, the total fertility rate continued to increase. In 1992 it was 2.1. However, in 1994, at the time of the economic crisis, it began to decrease and in the late1990s it was even lower than in the 1930s (1.4 to 1.6), when Sweden had the lowest birth rate of all Western democracies. In the mid-1990s the unemployment rate rose from 2.7 to 8.2 per cent in less than three years (1991-93) (SOU 2000:3). This was a remarkable jump and unique in the international context, and the economic crisis dominated political and public debate.

Ever since the 1930s, issues of population policy have been on the political agenda along with issues of pro-family policy. A high percentage of working mothers and a high total fertility rate are generally seen as incompatible. The Swedish example during the first half of the 1990s seemed to prove the opposite, namely that women could have the right to work and have a family: this situation had long been pursued as a political goal. The generous family policy seemed to be part of the explanation of the new situation (SOU 2000:3), but this trend has been broken. An analysis of women's decisions to become mothers indicates the possibility of new patterns of family life and parenthood in which both the welfare

Table: 2 Parents of small children (1-2 years of age), their labour force participation and unemployment rate 1990-98. Per cent.

Year	Labour force participation		Unemployment	
	Women	Men	Women	Men
1990	85,2	96,4	1,8	1,4
1992	84,2	93,6	7,7	5,9
1994	79,5	92,4	10,7	8,2
1996	78,9	92,8	12,5	7,5
1998	77,4	91,5	10,3	5,4

Source: Labour force investigations, SCB (1999).

state and the labour market are important factors for the outcome. It seems that the propensity to have children is related to the situation on the labour market (Söderström et. al. 1999).

Over the last two decades, women in Sweden have tended to have children later and later in life. With more and more time being spent on education, and the need to have a job to qualify for parental insurance benefits, this tendency has been regarded as a rational choice. The rise in the birth rate during the 1980s included women of all childbearing ages. During 1990s, when the birth rate began to fall, it was women below 30 years of age who experienced the largest decline. If this change is permanent, the likely result will be that more and more women will never give birth to a third child. An analysis of these new patterns shows a relationship between the number of children borne and factors affecting the family economy. Gainfully employed people are more likely to have children, particularly if they are well educated and well paid. The reverse is true for less educated, low-paid, or unemployed women, who tend to put motherhood and children on hold (Hoem 2000).

The Welfare State as Provider of Childcare

One way to reflect on the division of labour between the welfare state and the family is to look at working mothers and their access to public childcare from the child's perspective. Sweden has a total of 832, 000 preschool children. The following information is for a cross-section of working mothers, and reflects their relationship to the labour market and to parental insurance in the mid-1990s (SCB 1994:2):

- 74 per cent (615, 680) of all preschool children had working mothers (in the labour force)
- 18 per cent (149, 750) of these children had mothers who are on parental leave
- 56 per cent had mothers who actually were in work
- 6 per cent of all preschool children had mothers who were unemployed
- 20 per cent of the preschool children had mothers who were non employed, i.e.,outside the labour market.

Actually, while 56 per cent of all preschool children had mothers that were at work (and not on any kind of leave), 44 per cent, almost half of all preschool children, were probably cared for by their mothers. In Sweden, many children still have their daily care provided at home - mainly by their mothers. More than half of those mothers who actually worked, worked part-time. Compared to most other Western countries Sweden has a large number of mothers working part-time. Through the extended social security system, the Swedish welfare state is responsible for the well being of small children, but most of the work is still carried out by the parents (notably the mothers). In 1998, one-third of all children 5 years and below, living in nuclear families, were cared for by the mother at home (SCB 1999:3).

A little more than 50 per cent of mothers who have preschool children work part-time: this is still the predominant pattern. It is also more common for well educated women to be working mothers, and they work longer hours as well. In the late 1990s, about 80 per cent of all children have mothers that belong to the labour force. But the main trend during the 1990s regarding working mothers with small children is that their number is decreasing. One explanation is, as mentioned before, that many children have parents born outside Sweden and belong to groups that have suffered unemployment, among other things, as a result of the economic crisis, The last years have shown that those who are outside the labour market, or only loosely connected to it, put childbearing on hold compared to better situated groups.

In parallel with the increasing number of working mothers, the welfare state has developed public childcare for small children. In the mid-1960s, 18,000 places in public childcare were available (Hinnfors 1991). At the end of the 1990s, the number had increased to 400,000 (SCB 1999:3). It was in the 1970s that the scope of collective childcare was significantly enlarged. Childcare in Sweden has become a right by law for parents who work or study or whose children have special needs. During the first two decades of public childcare, it was more common for children of middleclass parents to participate in it. However, the differences between different social classes seem to have disappeared (SCB 1999:3). Most children between 3 and 6 years of age have a place in public day-care. The share has multiplied over a twenty-year period, with 18 per cent in 1975 and 76 per cent at the end of 1996 (*Upp till 18*, 1998).

Fathers' Participation in Childcare

Division of labour is also an issue between sexes in the family. Family policy, along with the law for gender equality, aimed at a symmetrical gender order in the family. In the text below, parental leave and gender differences are used as an indicator of the division of labour between men and women in the family.

Men take parental leave to a much smaller degree than women do. Out of a total number of days of parental leave in 1992, men took 9 per cent. This share increased to 10 per cent in 1998. In parallel with these slow changes, the number of men on parental leave is gradually increasing. Between 1981 and 1985, about 22 per cent of married fathers took parental leave. The equivalent figure for 1992 had increased to 38 per cent (SCB 1994:1). In 1998, the figure was 32 per cent of all men eligible for parental insurance, including cohabiting fathers (RSV: S 2000).

A common notion is that fathers do not take parental leave when the child is very small. However, this pattern is slowly changing. More and more fathers stay at home for a period during the first half-year of the child's life. These fathers also tend to use more parental leave days than other fathers do. Since many families with children in Sweden are immigrants, ethnicity has also to be taken into consideration. In families where both parents have Swedish backgrounds, almost half the fathers took parental leave. They can be compared with families where both parents have a non-European background. In those families, only one in five fathers took parental leave. Parents from the other Nordic or European countries fall between these two poles (RRV 1994:1). It seems that parenthood is constituted along class as well as gender lines. High-income men spend more time being fathers than low-income men do. Men employed in the public sector and living in urban areas take a larger number of days on parental leave than other men (Widerberg 1993).

Another way to look at the symmetrical gender order in the family is the distribution of domestic and paid work, which is still remarkably differentiated by gender. In a family with children below 7 years of age, men generally spend twice as much time involved in labour market work as women. The opposite is true of domestic work, where women spend twice as much time as men (SCB 1992). During a ten-year period, 1983-94, the differences between the sexes with regard to domestic and market work have decreased. Young men have reduced their time in labour market work and increased time spent on domestic work. The tendency for young women goes in the opposite direction. The changes are small and women spent more time on domestic work in both 1983 and 1994 in families with children. Children tend to affect gender equality in a negative way. When it comes to childcare, there is hardly any change, and women are still the primary caregivers, but the differences between men and women have decreased slightly (Flood and Gråsjö 1997).

A recent study of the distribution of domestic (childcare included) and market work between Swedish men and women in families with small children shows that that less than four of ten families practised gender equality or semi-equality (38 per cent), and the remainder were traditional or even patriarchal (62 per cent) (Ahrne and Roman 1997).

The welfare state has institutionalized solutions for mothers and fathers to balance family and work on equal terms. The outcome is still gender-biased, even when men become more involved in childcare and domestic work. Everyday parenthood practices are polarized along class and traditional gender patterns. Well-educated, publicly employed, urban males are more likely to share parental leave with their wives than other men are. It is also the well-educated women who to a larger extent share parental leave with their partners. Laws and benefits to promote gender equality were meant as a social revolution both in family and working life, but so far the process is proving rather slow to take effect.

Family Structures in Transition

Sweden has a population of almost 9 million people. At present, about one million families include children below 17 years of age. If young people between 18 and 21 years are included, the number of families increases to 1.2 million. In Sweden, it is common to have children and live together without being married. Of

these 1.2 million families, 57 per cent are married couples, 19 per cent are cohabiting and have common children, and the remaining 24 per cent are single-parent families. Many of the married couples started their families as cohabiting couples.

An increasing number of divorces over the years has transformed many nuclear families into to single-parent families (mother-child or father-child) or into reconstituted families. Seventy per cent of the children below 21 years of age live in a traditional nuclear family, 24 per cent live with one parent, generally the mother, and 6 per cent live in a reconstituted family. It is generally the women who bring their children into the new family. The reconstituted family has the highest number of children, generally around three, and in 14 per cent of the cases there are four or more children, compared to the traditional nuclear family where only 4 per cent have four children or more. In the traditional nuclear family the same proportion of families (4 per cent) have one or two children. Most families will have at least two children and almost 90 per cent of all 10 year-old-children in Sweden live with at least one sibling (SCB 1999:3). A more detailed picture of different family types is given in the Table 3 below.

The welfare state has a long tradition, both through family law and the Social Service Act, to regulate children's well being and the way parents cope with parenthood. If there is any suspicion of child abuse or neglect, an investigation is made by the social service authorities. For a long time these investigations had the sole focus of determining whether the mother was good enough to satisfy the child's needs (Lundström 1993). This practice has changed, and now there is a strong emphasis on seeing that the child has access to both parents. The "best

Table: 3. Children 0-17 years of age in different family types, 1998. (Thousands)

The children live with	Number	Per cent
Both biological parents	1,462	75
Lone biological mother	304	16
Biological mother and stepfather	104	5
Lone biological father	48	2
Biological father and stepmother	16	2
Other/ data missing	11	0
Total	1 943	100

Source: Demografisk rapport, SCB (1999:3).

interest of the child" is always the issue in matters of custody. This principle has been included in Swedish law since 1915, and has gradually been given greater emphasis. The economic maintenance allowance for children given to divorced parents rests on the same principle. In the 1970s, the child's right to both parents became a public issue due, among other things, to the increasing number of divorces and reports from researchers and clinicians of the negative consequences for the children involved (SOU 1997:116). In 1983 a new law prescribed joint custody for the children when the parents divorced and where the parents so agreed. However, where one parent opposed joint custody, the court had to rule in favour of separate custody. Public opinion in favour of the view that children need both biological parents grew stronger. In 1998 the law was changed, and the court can now rule in favour of joint custody, even if one of the parents wants separate custody. The court, representing the welfare state, has the superior right over the individual parent to interpret and rule on what it considers to be the best for the child.

The way people choose to organize their relations throughout life varies considerably. In Sweden today, married or cohabiting men and women often choose to separate. Every year, more than 50,000 children and young people experience the separation of their parents. Parents born outside Sweden are more likely to separate than Swedish parents. On the other hand, about 90,000 men and women form new couples each year, of which some will choose to marry and others will choose to cohabit. The propensity to form a relationship varies according to education and gender. It is obvious that both class and gender are of importance when it comes to forming a new relationship and a family. Less educated men marry and form families to a lesser degree than higher educated men. For women, the pattern is not as obvious as for men (Sellerfors and Nilsson 1993).

The single-parent family is the fastest growing family form in Sweden at present. In the mid-1980s, 8 per cent of children 6 years or younger lived with a single parent, compared to 13 per cent in the mid-1990s. For teenagers (up to 17 years of age), the situation has changed dramatically. In the mid-1980s, 16 per cent lived with a single parent compared to 25 per cent in the mid-1990s (SCB 1999:3).

Few other Western countries have received as many immigrants as Sweden over the last few decades (Pressmeddelande från SCB 99:254). Many of these are young, and almost one-third are between 25 and 34 years, ages when most young people become parents. As a result, one-fourth of children below 17 years of age have one or two parents born outside Sweden (SCB 1999:3). This is a new situation and along with the variety of family forms there is also a rich mixture of cultures and traditions that affects family values and contemporary family life.

The Route to De-familialization

Since the 1930s, state intervention has gradually shaped everyday Swedish family life. During the formative years of state intervention, some principles that are still in effect were laid down. Benefits became universal, and means-tested benefits were phased out in the late 1950s and 1960s, but entitlement to services was increasingly related to wage labour. Women were entitled to social rights on the basis of citizenship and not as dependent wives. They were recognized as individuals in a society that was otherwise basically paternalistic in nature. A

major landmark was when Sweden adopted its first national old age insurance scheme in1913, the entitlement principles for which were individual, regardless of sex, marriage, and labour market status. Nevertheless, the principle of individualism should not be overstated, even though the recognition of a married woman's pension right was radical for its time. This right was also a recognition of the principle of care and that a woman's work in the home should entitle her to social benefits (Sainsbury 1994).

Swedish family policy in the 1960s took a real turn towards the dual-earner family and collective public childcare — in other words, there was a shift from the breadwinner model to the individual model. The goal was to create a symmetrical family where men and women should on an equal basis be wage earners and share domestic work. However, the official policy to change relations between the sexes, in terms of market and domestic work and the relationship between children and parents, has not been successful. Social reproduction is still heavily gender-biased. The gender-segregated practices of modern parenthood in contemporary Sweden are accentuated along gender, class, and ethnic boundaries. But even if the traditional gender roles persist, parental insurance along with other welfare subsidies has meant considerable economic advantages and possibilities for working parents and a focus on women's autonomy. Even though the fit was not perfect, Nordic feminists have argued that the Swedish welfare state as a part of the Nordic welfare model is "women friendly," with extensive possibilities for women to work and have a family (Hernes 1987). With lessened reliance on the family, women became economically independent at one level but at the same time gradually become more dependent on welfare state institutions.

Family life as a political target has implications for relations between men, women, and children. Traditional role models have been questioned and new ideas for motherhood and fatherhood, along with new gender identities, have been launched. But this has also meant that public institutions have had to be endowed with a new ideology. On a discursive level, many radical ideas have been introduced, but everyday life practices do not change as easily. As opposed to general family policy, many of the local-level public institutions that deliver services have long kept their traditional gender-segregated practices. The results of several research projects show that the implementation of new ideas and practices has run into difficulties in local institutions such as social service agencies, marriage counselling schools, health centres, and daycare centres (Kullberg 1994, Kollind 1995).

It is possible to discern different ideologies that existed in parallel in policy design. The predominant Social Democratic Party did not have a coherent ideology in family matters but expressed an ambiguous view of the distribution of functions and responsibilities between family and state. The ideology of Swedish family and gender policy has also gradually changed from the family based on complementary gender roles to a symmetrical family where men and women are supposed to share everything on an equal basis. In general, there also seems to have been an idea that most of the family functions should be gradually transferred to public institutions. Over the years the family structure has slowly changed, and the 1990s family can be characterized as mainly privatized, dependent on services, subsidized, individualized, and vulnerable, but fulfilling a number of important functions (Dahlström 1992).

The welfare state provides individual security outside the market based on both economic and social needs, and has consequently taken the route to *de-familialization*. The traditional nuclear family is still the predominant form but shows signs of instability, such as the high divorce rate along with the fluctuations in the fertility rate over the years. Labour market work is key to parental insurance and public childcare. Even if it is hard to prove that policy design affects people's everyday behaviour, there are several studies that show how women in particular have adjusted to the rules in the different institutionalized systems. The strategy for young women is to get a good education and a well-paid job before they become mothers. Such a combination will furnish them maximum compensation in parental insurance and later access to public childcare. The timing and spacing of children are related to the rules of the parental insurance system (Hoem 1993). As a result, the period of childbearing for women has decreased. Women give birth later in life and during a shorter period. In 1998, 1 per cent of all newborn babies had a mother under 20 years of age. A decade earlier, the corresponding figure was 5.4 per cent. In 1998, one-third of all newborn babies had a mother between 25 and 29 years and one-third had a mother between 30 and 34 years of age. The contemporary trend is also that less educated women tend to postpone children, as their situation on the labour market is insecure (SCB 1999:3).

The fluctuations in fertility rates indicate a relationship between the labour market and the family, notably women's decisions about when to have children. This becomes even more salient when one takes into account the fact that the welfare state in itself embodies the women's labour market. The relationship between the state and the family is a double-bind, and through the different cutbacks in public expenditure, including childcare and parental insurance, this relationship may have added to family instability. The Swedish situation in the late twentieth century exemplifies a welfare regimen that has to face several challenges, such as family instability, the lowest fertility rate ever in history, a dysfunctioning labour market, and growing pressure on the welfare state. The outcome for the welfare of the family stems from the fusion of welfare and work that is doubly dependent on the labour market: this makes families extremely sensitive to economic fluctuations. At the same time, through an extensive range of benefits the welfare state has contributed to the modernization of family life and has opened up new possibilities for both women and men.

The Dilemma: How to Protect Families and Promote Autonomy?

The development towards increased individualism should not only be seen in light of Swedish policy on family- and gender equality, but also in relation to the discourse and theories about modernity. Research in that tradition shows that individuality and individual autonomy are strong trends in all modern Western cultures. The sociologist Ulrich Beck argues that we are facing a new individualism:

> Not market individualism, not atomization. On the contrary, it means "institutionalized individualism." Most of the rights and entitlements of the welfare state, for example, are designed for individuals rather than for families. In many cases they presuppose employment. Employment in turn implies education and both of these presuppose

mobility. By all these requirements people are invited to constitute themselves as individuals: to plan, understand, design themselves as individuals. (Beck 1998).

It seems that Swedish family policy, through its institutional generosity, has encouraged the new kind of individualism stated above. Parents reflect, adjust, and make decisions with the welfare state as a frame of reference. This is partly due to the fact that the welfare state's institutions do not target families in the first place, but individuals. Wage labour, education, and mobility are given priority in people's lives. It is the individual as such who, independent of tradition and family, is supposed to choose a place to both work and live. The outcome is a paradox: the collectivism that to a large extent founded the welfare state simultaneously produces the new kind of individualism, which seems sensible to variations in welfare state institutions and changes and tends to see these as a challenge to family life.

To be part of a family seems to be more precious than ever, but many parents simultaneously develop gender-specific strategies as autonomous individuals, with the child as an extension of themselves. At the same time, the child is the parents' joint project. Modern family life has to handle these contradictions and find a balance between individual and family responsibilities. Moreover, the family has to come to terms with the whole range of trends affecting society - "increasing equality between the sexes, the widespread entry of women into the labour force, changes in sexual behaviour and expectations, the changing relationship between home and work" (Giddens 1989, pp. 89-90).

In the discourse on family values the modern family is portrayed in terms of moral decay and family breakdown, but in a changing welfare context it can also be seen in terms of a transition of morals and values (Bäck-Wiklund 2000). The family most people live in is de-familialized and has a relationship to the state and the labour market in a welfare regime context. It is this context that is the starting point for understanding contemporary family life.

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Equality - a Contested Concept

ULLA BJÖRNBERG AND ANNA-KARIN KOLLIND

This chapter is based on an exploratory study of the principles or rules that men and women apply when they explain or give reasons for their way of organizing domestic work and their domestic economy, what equality means to them, and what they find "fair" or "unfair" in their domestic life. The findings come from an empirical study of Swedish couples — wives and husbands or cohabiting partners.

We interviewed 22 couples that shared households and had children. Women and men were interviewed separately. The couples were chosen from a random sample for a study that was undertaken in 1992. It consisted of five-year-old children, their mothers, and the man in the household, usually the biological father of the child (Björnberg 1997). A new sample was used for the qualitative interviews. All the husbands and wives were employed. Nine women worked part time, most of them working 80 per cent of full time.[1] Fifteen couples were classified as middle class and the rest (seven) as working class. Just two men and four women had more education than their spouses. Thirteen men and four women had a higher income than their partners. The couples had stayed together for at least ten years at the time of the interview. Thus, one can say that their relationships were relatively stable.

It is a well-known fact, supported by a multitude of investigations, that even in dual-earner families women do considerably more housework than men. Researchers have tried to explain the tenacity of this pattern, as well as account for the often hidden and unconscious strategies that couples use to avoid recognizing apparent incongruities between the principles of equality and lived reality.

An overarching hypothesis of ours is that "norms of reciprocity" have a significant impact on family relationships. The more family relationships are subject to de-institutionalization, while at the same time being embedded in an image of the family as a project where responsibilities, tasks, and even money are matters to be negotiated, the more family interactions are linked to such norms. Assumptions regarding reciprocity are embedded in apparent incongruities between principles of equality and lived reality

We are primarily concerned with the strategies that husbands and wives use in order to handle divergent opinions about the division of labour and money in the household. Conflicts are vital elements in everyday life among our couples, but most of them try to avoid open conflicts and fights, especially in front of the children. Our interest has been in studying the different reciprocities and

1 The full study includes three areas of distribution within the family: domestic work, including the sharing of paid and unpaid work and the sharing and managing of money; important matters regarding childrearing; and other important family decisions, such as the purchase of capital goods and personal expenses. The study addresses the way in which conflicts and different opinions on important matters are dealt with. In this paper the third area is not dealt with. The role of close kin, parents of the couple, is included in the full study.

exchange patterns that they use when solving matters of distribution and allocation of work and money. This focus might give the impression that our studied couples are harmonious and at odds with the image of highly conflicted couples in a country with a high divorce rate. To what extent this is the case is hard to say. We are, however, in a position to give a glimpse of how partners who have managed to stay together for at least ten years have developed reciprocal strategies and mechanisms whereby inequalities are reproduced. Most probably, not all of our couples will stay together for another ten years.

Gender Equality

Feminist researchers have not made it clear what gender equality brings in its train, and how it affects family members' everyday life. The practical implications of equality as a striving for some form of symmetry and balance have by and large been neglected. A common approach in studies of the distribution of housework has been to look at the amount of time men and women put into housework. In such studies, equality is essentially defined in terms of likeness or sameness. (Ahrne and Roman 1997). But sometimes, other definitions of gender equality can be discerned. Equality can, for instance, be defined as mutuality, responsiveness to each other's needs, and fairness (Schwartz 1994; Knudson-Martin and Mahoney 1998). In yet other studies influence in decisions and distribution of power are regarded as essential components of equality (Risman and Johnson-Sumerford 1998).

We are primarily interested in the "indicators" adopted by the interviewed couples themselves. Thus, we want to find out how the couples understand and apply gender equality in family life. In sociology, this kind of approach is often labelled *"Verstehen"* or ethnographic, meaning that one tries to avoid imposing a priori defined notions on what is studied (Atkinson 1990). In cross-cultural psychology and social anthropology this approach is sometimes referred to as an emic approach (Berry 1989). The variety of definitions of gender equality in studies of couples and family life reflects the fact that this is an essentially contested concept. The diverse conceptualizations of equality that can be seen among researchers can be assumed to be as prevalent among ordinary people, too.

We find it important to study the scope of the individual's need for autonomy and independence and how such matters are combined with the need for relatedness. We address these issues at a relational level, focusing on the way couples deal with strivings towards autonomy and interdependence. We will show how several kinds of strategies are used in attempts to solve these opposing aims. What will also be shown is that the Swedish couples studied are greatly devoted to community values in spite of their living in what is generally regarded as a highly individualistic society.

Different Forms of Reciprocity

A central point of departure in our understanding of family is that it is a site of negotiations. These negotiations are often tacit and hidden - people are not even aware that they have reached an understanding regarding the sharing of work and distribution of resources.

Negotiations are about reconciling opposing interests, about giving and taking,

exchanging values, or balancing different values. Basically, these negotiations are gendered. That implies that the outcomes of the negotiations are supposed to confirm certain assumptions about what is appropriate and in accordance with being a man or a woman. Accordingly, the outcome reinforces or reproduces the prevalent gender order. The gender order is, however, not a fixed scheme "out there" but also the subject of negotiations and change at the interpersonal level. The negotiations are embedded within a context of family, which means that certain norms regarding what families stand for in terms of social relationships have to be taken into consideration in everyday life.

In an attempt to synthesize various strands of theoretical thought, Fiske (1991, 1992) suggests that in the social world there exist four elementary forms of social relations based on different kinds of reciprocities. Although this typology is all-encompassing in its claims, our ambition here is to restrict the presentation to the give-and-take processes between family members, especially between husband and wife.

One form of elementary social relationship distinguished by Fiske is a hierarchical one ("authority-ranking"), which can be based on a diversity of variables, like age, gender, birth and blood, wealth, etc. Between related parties of different status, a common model of exchange is for superiors to receive more from inferiors than the latter get back. This kind of exchange is based , at least implicitly, on a norm of responsibility to provide for the needs of inferiors. To a high degree, family relations are ranked according to age, birth order, and gender, as we all know. Parents control their children, and elder sisters and brothers often have higher status than younger ones. Generally, the husband has more control over property, he has the last say in big decisions, and broader powers, etc. It is this gendered ranking pattern that is challenged by the ideology of equality.

In a second type of elementary social relationship, dubbed "communal sharing" by Fiske, group belonging is heavily emphasized. Reciprocity is grounded in belonging to a certain group, being one of "us," and what one gives and what one gets are not based on any explicit balancing. In this kind of exchange one does not keep account of how much each one gives or gets, and actions between members of the specific group are not even perceived in terms of exchange. Balance is not relevant here, neither is thinking of actions in terms of negotiations. This kind of reciprocity comes close to a "gift economy," in which creating, keeping, and reproducing social relationships are regarded as the primary aim (Cheal 1988). An example from the emotional sphere is the ideal of romantic love. The concept of selfless love and mutual caring; of sharing values, interests, space and bodies; and ideas of intimacy that mean merging the self in a deep belonging that transcends each individual, are variants of "communal sharing." Emphasis is placed on the family in terms of emotional ties, love, and a strong sense of belonging.

A third form of social relations is called "equality-matching," a model of balance and mutuality. In these relations there is an egalitarian motive, an aim for even matching. Fairness, equality, and balanced reciprocity constitute a guiding theme in "equality-matching." Even balance may be attained in the distant future. In the family sphere, the ideology of companionship marriage is a good example of "equality-matching." It states that spouses should have the same rights, do equal amounts of childcare and housework, and have an equal say in decisionmaking. Friendship relations may be regarded as the prototype of "equality-matching."

The characteristics of the fourth form of reciprocity are exchanges based on

considerations of costs and benefits, "market-pricing" in Fiske's vocabulary. In this kind of relationship, services, labour, things, or other valuables such as sex and care are exchanged for something else that is regarded as a fair deal — money, work, services, other valuables, and so on. In market pricing, symmetry or balance is not important, but agreement on a deal is, with each party wishing to get the most out of the deal. Bargaining, bartering, negotiation, and contracts are typical elements in this type of exchange, as is the calculation of advantages and drawbacks. In the personal sphere, many examples of "market-pricing" can be found in marital arrangements between partners from wealthy families. Negotiations between the partners and their families regarding money, estates, services, etc., with the aim of gaining as many benefits as possible, fall into this pattern.

Gary Becker's assumptions about the family (1993) provide an excellent example of this sort of rationality. In his analysis of the family, the relative benefit of alternative actions for the household or the individual is always at the centre. Basically, there is an assumption that human beings have a calculating attitude towards most of their relationships, including their family relationships.

A large part of the discourse on family matters in the last few decades revolves around issues concerning social-psychological tensions between men and woman in a time of transition, when claims to democracy reach deeply into intimate relations (Hochschild 1989; Haavind 1987; Giddens 1992). It is a delicate matter to balance the give-and-take between partners when no measures of evaluation can be taken as standard and forthright bargaining is not looked upon as acceptable. There is an inherent instability in these relations because of the constant risk of an equal relation being transformed into an unequal one.

It has been suggested that in intimate and close relationships the overarching rule of justice is needs-oriented, in contrast to other kinds of relationships where the underlying exchange is more in line with principles of equality or equity (Clark and Chrisman 1995). However, needs as a basic rule are not upheld at any cost in close relationships. In specific circumstances, a situation can be regarded as transgressing a symbolic border, so that this rule is no longer defined as valid.

Equality in Domestic Work and Management of Money

In this section we will present our interview results. We recount the distribution of domestic work and what women and men regard as equal, how their own practices have turned out, and their satisfaction with the outcome. We look into economic sharing, joint or shared accounts, and expenditures to establish the extent to which the individual's economic scope for action is achieved.

Regulative Principles of Sharing Domestic Work

The sharing of domestic work was regarded as something inevitable and none among the women and men stated explicitly that domestic work and childcare are naturally part of a woman's duty as mother and wife. Thus, everybody espoused a basic norm of equality. Contrary to this general norm, however, almost all women took the main responsibility for and undertook most domestic work. In many cases this was apparent to both partners. However, it was not perceived as unequal, but as a practical solution balanced by other circumstances in the relationship. In some cases, this kind of inequality was regarded as "normal." Thus,

the principles by which equality in domestic work was evaluated often contained some points of tension or ambivalence.

When men and women talked about their way of sharing domestic work and evaluated its fairness or lack of fairness, they used four principles: joint responsibility; measuring the amount of work; sharing tasks according to pleasure and distaste; and sharing according to skill.

Taking Joint Responsibility

When both husband and wife see what needs to be done — and see to it that it is done — then joint responsibility is regarded as existing. This is expressed as a general norm of equality, but also as a norm at the level of interpersonal relationships. If, however, this norm is challenged in an obvious way by one of the parties, thoughts of measuring and calculation arise in the person who experiences the imbalance.

Taking full responsibility for something does not imply doing the same tasks or devoting the same amount of time to domestic work. The respondents did not stress similarity in this sense in talking about joint responsibility. They stressed that both should see what should be done and take responsibility for that which is in their joint interest. This principle was regarded as important in evaluating equality in marriage, indeed, as probably the most important one. The implication of joint responsibility is that "joint-ness" is constructed as an overarching category, and is not to be confused with the extent to which partners do similar amounts of work.

Measuring Work in Terms of Time and Amount

Doing the same amount in terms of duties and/or time was present in the discussions of equality. However, doing exactly the same chores was not seen as a reasonable principle, nor was applying justice in terms of equal weighting. Measuring equality with a yardstick was regarded as impossible. One reason for this hesitation in measuring and weighing was the uncertainty about how to equate different chores, about knowing when the contributions were commensurate. How, for instance, do you compare cleaning with driving the kids to football training? By considering the time it takes? Should only time be taken into account or should the unpleasantness and discomfort of some duties also be considered? So calculation of inputs into common domestic duties were perceived as very difficult. Nevertheless, both men and women made such calculations more or less openly.

In addition to practical difficulties in measuring and weighing, was the norm that inputs into work should not be weighed and measured at all within couple relationships. There were many and strong objections to such instrumental reasoning. "Counting pluses and minuses is not the important thing, but quality and the fact that both contribute." An interpretation is that such record keeping is seen as violating the principle of love and caring for one another. These norms seem to be based on the principles of the gift economy within families as discussed, for instance, by Kaufmann (1992). The type of rationality that is associated with calculation is regarded as incompatible with the rationality associated with ideals about community.

In some cases, rational calculation could also be regarded as a violation of basic gender identities. For a woman to start measuring and weighing the quantity

or quality of the work that her husband does for the home could be seen as violating the basic power relationship. According to cultural norms of gender order, the inputs of the husband are conditional, for he is the one to define what is enough (Delphy and Leonard 1992; Haavind 1987). Helping is good, but being evaluated or even undervalued by a woman goes too far, and becomes a challenge to the interpersonal power or status relationship. Although nobody in the sample talked in these terms, this does not mean that such considerations were necessarily absent.

Besides, to start on a track of continuous measuring and evaluation of similarity in time and input into domestic chores and childcare could also undermine the position of the woman. It could mean that other aspects of the joint assets are dragged into the total evaluation, and since women normally have less income than their partner, they might get the worst of it in the end. In our interviews there was no open talk in this direction, even if we explicitly raised such issues in our interviews.

The Principle of Pleasure and Distaste

Feelings of pleasure and distaste were used as a kind of regulator for perceived imbalances in sharing domestic work. Domestic work and domesticity was to a large extent talked of as duty, something that had to be done, and duty was associated with distaste. Both women and men regarded much domestic work as distasteful, dreary, and hard. This is why many of the principles for dividing domestic labour are a matter of handling pleasure and distaste in a way that can be regarded as equivalent. In talking about domestic labour, the chores most identified as distasteful are cleaning, keeping things in order, doing the laundry, and driving children to their activities. Balance becomes a matter of sharing distaste or pleasure or exchanging unpleasant chores for pleasant ones.

Dislike for something could also mean that one tends to relegate this chore to the other person. If both dislike, for instance, washing up, this chore can be divided according to the calendar - both would share the work they don't like. Another solution is that common dislikes be done jointly: this could inject some element of pleasure into the distasteful task. Still another way to handle dislikes is to do the distasteful work so badly that the other person takes over. This strategy was, however, often associated with conflicts and quarrels and even more distastefulness.

Another tendency was for pleasure/distaste to be used as a means of exchange. For instance, one man noted that he does more domestic work than his wife, but since he likes most types of domestic work, he still regards the division of labour between them as "fair" or at least as not "unfair." In this case the principle of pleasure compensates him for doing more than she does.[2]

Sharing According to Skills

Skill and competence in domestic work were closely associated with pleasure and with control. However, the division of labour on the basis of competence and skill was not mentioned as much as was pleasure/distaste and similarity/dissimilarity. Couples preferred a sharper division of labour based on competencies,

2 In this couple (which was unusual), the wife admitted that she did less domestic work than him, but she did not want to change the imbalance. In his view, the imbalance arose in part from his formal status being lower than that of his wife.

although this was seldom the only principle for sharing. Considerations of feelings of pleasure and displeasure and striving for control are often also included in such labour divisions.

Nobody admits to having no skills in doing domestic chores, but some people do some things better and this also means assuming control. The discourse around competence among our couples was far removed from the arguments pursued by Gary Becker (1993) on the division of labour in households on the basis of comparative advantages in families.

We identified the above four principles as the most common in the narratives of the interviewed men and women. We could not find clear-cut gender patterns in the way they were used. However, since women carried the main responsibility for domestic work, the arguments regarding control were more common in the discourses of women. Women often stated that they wanted to control the quality of domestic work and work that was done for the children.

Styles of Sharing and of Balancing

We were able to discern three typical ways of discussing the distribution of work at home: one that emphasized that it came up spontaneously or "naturally;" one that it took the form of negotiations and agreements; and one that maintained that "it just turned out to be the way it is," an attitude that seems to be based on a traditional gender-ascribed distribution of work.

Some of the "spontaneously" minded individuals underscore that they have not felt any need for agreement on allocation of chores, since both of them do what needs to be done in the home. Some women, who were very disappointed in their husbands' contributions to the home, still argued that his help should be forthcoming spontaneously for it to be worthwhile. To be spontaneously oriented, does not simply mean to apply a principle of joint responsibility in practice, but also that "equality" is and should come about by itself. Equality is not something to be bargained over or to make contracts and agreements about, because it should come spontaneously. This attitude comes close to "embodying" the idea that acts of sharing are regarded as emerging from the essence of human nature. We call it responsiveness in orientation.

On the other hand, we do have examples of individuals, mainly women, who look upon agreements and settlements in a positive way, as creating good solutions to real or potential conflicts at home. These persons do not stress the "spontaneity" of equality. In their opinion, good settlements and agreements on sharing housework should be fashioned. Their talk about agreements and contracts as being important to an equal relationship is not just descriptive. It expresses moral issues too: how things are, how should improvements be promoted, how can good things be achieved.

The third type of talk, namely, "it just turned out to be the way it is," basically indicates that equal sharing is not an issue. Even if it is not openly expressed, both men and women with this orientation regard domestic work as the woman's domain. She is the one who does the bulk of the housework and men can relieve her burden by offering her some help. It is a striking finding that almost all women in these relationships seem to be unhappy and dissatisfied - they are the most dissatisfied of all the women in our study. This category of woman expects help from her husband in housework, not because he should acknowledge equal sharing but because she

wants him to support her. Such support is seen as a gift, a form of relief from her exhaustion from doing the double shift.

This kind of relationship is connected with that type of authority ranking in terms of which the woman gives more unpaid work, service, and care than she receives. This is often acknowledged and regarded as unjustifiable by both partners. The men were aware of the situation and expressed uneasiness in front of the interviewer. They were also aware of the fact that their approach was problematic for the couple's relationship. Nevertheless, they were themselves satisfied and were not inclined to change the situation. Thus, these men are ambivalent, since they still pretend that their relationships are equal. They regard being equal in terms of equal value, or of their time debt to their wives becoming even in the long run. Only two of the men were fully aware of the incongruity in their relationship and admitted frankly that it was unequal. These men and women are acting out gendered stereotypes in their styles of sharing.

Empirical Examples of Rules for Allocation

Does "fairness" then have different meanings for couples (or individuals) with diverse orientations? Does "fairness" mean that allocations of tasks are done in different ways? Or, following Fiske's terminology, is spontaneity as a discourse typical of couples of a "communal sharing" type, while the more "agreement-oriented" arrangements exemplify the "equal-matching" or maybe "market-pricing" type? Characteristic of the first type, according to Fiske, is a preoccupation with meeting needs, while adherents of the second look for similarity or sameness between what one gets and gives in exchange as basic principles of reciprocal action. As a matter of fact, the couples' discussions of how they share household work reveals a huge diversity in how they look upon and cope with fairness and equality in the allocation of housework. To illustrate such differences in reasoning we introduce a few couples as examples. They can be labelled as cases of "making agreements," "exchanging values," and "gender-marked obligations" respectively.

In the expressions of the "spontaneously minded" couple there are certain formulations that recur over and over, namely, "what is needed to be done is done" and "we do many things together." For instance, the woman says: "It never happens that someone says, now you really have to do this or that, but both of us see what needs to be done, and often we talk about it, saying, 'No, now we have to tidy up.'" "The one who is available at home does the things that have to be done." When asked if they do roughly the same amount of work, the man answers, "Such justice doesn't exist. But we know what needs to be done. The one who comes home first does the laundry." "We don't have your sphere or my sphere, instead we do what is needed." Both he and she underscore the fact that they often do house chores together, and the prospect of doing things together is given positive value in itself.

The woman in this couple doesn't think in terms of justice or injustice in relation to household work, and she has never thought in terms of compensation. "I have never thought about whether this is fair or not. For me it is so natural that there are surely things to be done, and then one has to do them." "It happens that I do the cooking several days in a row because we need food, but I never have thoughts like, now I have done this, you have to do that. I don't think we ever talked that way that I can remember." The man dissociates himself in a very

explicit way from a concept of justice that means equality. According to him, justice breeds envy and a watchful eye on one's rights to ensure that each gets exactly the same as the other. And he promotes a needs-based concept of justice: "Words such as equality and equality and justice are misunderstood. What one has to see to is that everyone gets what he or she needs, and no one feels a lack of anything." He is applying a needs-based norm of justice.

Meeting needs, doing things together, and needs-based justice are recurring themes in the words of this couple. The picture they want to uphold needs no division of work, nor any specified arrangements to get things done. They have a "we-oriented" image with strong principles of care and mutuality. Since both of them hold this moral view, they have developed a sense of equal partnership.

When it comes to the "agreement-oriented" couple, the picture is quite different. They make very specific arrangements concerning who is responsible for what. According to both of them, she does the shopping, the laundry, and all the planning, while he does the cleaning and tidying up. He repairs the home and the car and very often does the cooking. It seems that the wife rather than the husband initiates these arrangements. According to him, she has been on guard for her interests and quick to express her dissatisfaction when an arrangement does not work. She believes that she spends more time on housework than her husband, but she doesn't reckon this to be unfair or unjust. How come? What kind of underlying rules did this couple apply when they created their kind of domestic division of labour?

According to her, the reason she does the shopping and planning is that she does it better, because she has a competence in these areas that he does not. According to her husband, shopping is not just something she is good at, it is a "passion" for her. It is not just differences in competence that shape their choices, but also what gives pleasure and displeasure. This woman has chosen to do the laundry and let her husband tidy up and clean the house. She spends more time on the laundry than her husband does on housecleaning, but this time imbalance is not, according to her, unfair, because she escapes the tidying-up, which to her mind is distasteful. She likes shopping, planning, and laundry work and this is what she has chosen to do. The husband likes to repair things and get them in order and he also likes cooking, and that is what he has chosen. He dislikes tidying-up, but not to the same extent as his wife, so he does it. However, he follows his standards of tidiness, not hers, which are much higher than his. She, on the other hand, has to accept his standard and lower time commitment in exchange for being spared this loathsome work.

Obviously, there is some sort of balancing of inputs and outputs in the arrangement of housework in this family, which views equality as an important principle of justice. The primary principle is choosing to do the more pleasurable tasks. The second principle seems to be escaping the most repellent tasks. If an even exchange is not possible, one may have to pay in some other currency, for instance in spending more time on other tasks. But how then does one manage tasks that nobody likes or will take full responsibility for? In this family, it is the washing-up. They have solved this problem by an even split: each adult has equal "washing-up days" a week, and even the children have a day each for this boring task. This kind of community comes close to "equality-matching."

In their reasoning and ways of sharing, the above two couples seem to represent, on the one hand, a communal-sharing type oriented towards needs, and on

the other, an equal-matching type with elements of a market-pricing relationships and an orientation towards a mixture of equality and equity. However, to a certain extent such a stark picture hides the fact that the needs-oriented couple also talks and thinks in terms of equality and equity. For instance, when the man says that his contribution to domestic work will even out in the long run, he implicitly works with an equality-based justice principle. And correspondingly, in the words of the agreement-oriented couple, a more or less implicit needs-oriented argument can be discerned. When for instance the man agrees to do the cleaning, which he doesn't like, he simultaneously addresses the needs of his wife. Also, when they temporarily change the arrangements through circumstance and take on each other's tasks, they do so out of a concern for the common needs and the needs of the other partner. So, communal sharing and equal matching together with market-pricing elements seem to be merged in both types, although they differ in the way they are presented.

In the third type of discussion about the distribution of domestic work, reflections of justice are needs-based, while mutuality rests on notions of gender-marked obligations. To illustrate, we have chosen a case where the woman has a slightly higher status than her husband. She is a manager of a shop selling clothes and her husband is an employee at a petrol station. She has chosen to do everything that her husband dislikes and she thinks that she should do everything and is grateful for the assistance that he gives her. Furthermore, she is afraid of his aggressiveness. She is aware of the unequal distribution of domestic work but claims that it does not disturb her and equality is not important. The husband presents himself as a family man and as a dominant person. "Yes, I have noticed that I can impose my will on everybody. I don't even need to get angry, they do what I say because if I express a view on what they have to do, they do it." Equality is for him a matter of influence and he has delegated much influence over economic matters to his wife - but paying bills and keeping order seem to be a matter of delegation of work. He is very satisfied that his wife (and his mother, who is also involved in the domestic work) runs everything at home and he does not mention any kind of balancing. She is satisfied with the situation, since her mother-in-law gives her much help. "Without this support I could not have made it." She does not expect too much from her husband. She compares herself to other women and concludes that she is lucky. This couple represents an "authority-ranking" type of relationship.

However, the relative satisfaction of this woman is an exception, since the majority of women in this category are unhappy with their situation. The really satisfied women are those who regard the division of labour as emerging spontaneously or by agreement.

Economic Management, Pooling, and Splitting

Economic management is the second key issue in how equality in the family is understood and dealt with. The economic analysis of the household economy is based on a wide series of questions about how the couple organizes its economy. The guiding theme was to obtain a picture of the individual's scope of action and control regarding spending and saving for joint and personal needs. We also used vignettes to encourage interviewees to reflect on how they evaluate principles of individualism versus communality in economic matters. One vignette concerns a

couple with separate economies. She earns more than he does and they share expenses equally with the consequence that she retains more for personal expenses than he. Another vignette, called "the gift," is about a wife who receives a gift of personal money from a relative and wants to undertake a journey on her own. Does she have the moral right to spend the money on personal matters and decide on her own about spending the money? How should one deal with this situation? The men and women are also asked to relate the vignettes to their personal experiences. We asked the partners to reflect on their own attitudes towards spending and saving and to compare their own view with that of their partners. In addition, we wanted to know about decisions and conflicts in economic matters and their perceptions of economic equality in a couple relationship.

In the Swedish marriage context, both partners are obliged to support each other according to their respective abilities. They also have a right to know about the incomes of their partners. Normally, the assets are to be regarded as joint and will be split equally in case of divorce. Partners can also establish a marriage settlement that grants separate property rights to certain valuables or property.

The couples in this study were earning their own money from paid work. In most cases, the men earned more than the women. But there are also examples of women earning more than men, but the earning differences were in most cases not very large. The fact that both partners contributed to household expenses made it interesting to explore how they organized consumption and saving for joint and personal purposes.

Before presenting our results, we want to review other studies and discuss how styles of money management within marriage have been categorized. In a study by Pahl (1989), economic management was categorized into four main management styles: housewife management, where the husband leaves all his money to the wife to manage and spend; husband management, where the man keeps all the money except for pocket money for his wife; housekeeping management, where the husband gives a certain amount to his wife and manages the rest by himself; joint management, where both partners manage all or most of the household money.

Results from a recent Swedish study show that the "housekeeping management" and the "husband management" styles do not exist at all in Sweden and the "housewife management" style only to a very small extent (Roman 1999). Data from a comparative study between Sweden and Britain suggest that some couples practise separate or independent management, but joint management is most common. Eighty-two per cent of the Swedish households and half the British households have some kind of joint pooling. However, there are great variations in the way joint pooling is practised among households in both countries. The authors distinguish between three styles of joint pooling - one with mainly female management (27 per cent in Sweden), the second with mainly male management (35 per cent in Sweden), and the third with purely joint management. Joint economy in a very pure form was practised in only 20 per cent of the studied households in both countries (n=1162). The underlying criteria for these categorizations are based on a question about who had the last say on decisions of economic matters (Roman and Vogler 1999).[3] The authors suggest that the male-dominated man-

3 The couples that were classified as purely joint were those where both partners agreed they were equally responsible for managing the pooled money in Britain and in Sweden for those in which the respondent selected a 'both equally' option on the management indicator.

agement style was most prevalent among couples where the husband earned more than the wife.

The results from our study confirm that different models of joint management were preferred and practised in all households. Joint pooling and management also means highly differentiated practices among our couples. The kinds of management style we found have similarities with those discerned in the Swedish/British study, but our principles of classification are based on more indicators of pooling, saving, and spending for joint and personal needs. Our categories are also based on the perceptions of both husband and wife. The results of the interviews suggest that economic decisionmaking is complex and highly dependent on the kinds of spending or saving - for the household; for children; on personal matters; on capital goods; on clothes and other current goods and services.

Our results indicate that the perceptions of economic equality are related to the style of money management, to the degree of communication about joint spending, and the scope for individual economic activity. The results also suggest that for some couples joint management has not been self-evident from the beginning of the relationship, but has been part of a process. For instance, one woman described the development from completely separated economies into a completely joint economy, which she saw as symbolic confirmation that their relationship was long-lasting and reliable. Among many couples, the style of joint management that they develop is based on advice from banks, which they consult about accounts and savings.

However, for most couples the joint management of household economic matters includes different models for separate spending and saving as well. To illustrate the variety of forms we give examples that represent the most common patterns.

Separated Economy with Strict Divisions between Joint and Individual Spending

Both partners in this couple have a similar professional education as teachers, but he no longer works as a teacher. Both are full-time workers. He earns somewhat more per month after having changed jobs. They rent a flat, he owns a motorboat, and she owns a car. He has inherited money, which is personal.

The couple has relatively separate economies. They have a joint account for joint expenses - recurrent bills and food - and the rest is personal money kept in their separate accounts. Despite different incomes, both pay the same amount to the household account. Both save the same amount of money in a joint account. Each of them also has roughly the same amount in an account for retirement security. The clothes for the son are paid from a separate account, which is fed by the child allowance. The husband occasionally pays more for current expenses, since he earns more than she does. Like many other couples, they have a history of an even more separate economy, without joint accounts for household expenditure. The reason they don't want a completely joint economy is that they want to have control over what is left in their personal accounts. The wife claims that a joint economy would mean continuing communication and control over spending. She argues that the way in which they have organized their domestic economy gives her individual scope for economic activity. For instance, when she wants to buy something for herself she takes the money from her own account, or, if there is no money left, she borrows from the joint account or postpones the purchase. However, since her income is low because of debts from her studies, she

cannot spend as much on her own needs as her husband can. She does not question this model except for her low salary. The husband has the same opinion - he argues that he is not to blame for her having less money for personal expenses, but that the "system" that pays her such a low salary is. He claims that their model is good: "Yes, I want to have it like this. I don't want to share money with anybody. We share that which has to be shared and then we have our own money. She does not ask me when she wants to buy something and I don't ask her. There has to be a personal responsibility." The gift vignette is viewed by both in a similar way - the receiver has the right to use the money gift at her own discretion, and this matter does not need to be discussed.

This couple has a model that is similar to the one in our vignette on sharing money and they find it good, because it makes possible the splitting of household and individual spending. Without a doubt, the man has the economic power and lives at a different level from his wife. He frankly admits this and claims that this is legitimized by his earning capacity. In terms of sharing domestic work this couple is categorized as a "communal sharing type," but in sharing money they adopt a "market pricing" model. Both claim to live in an equal relationship and both are committed to what is "natural" in sharing domestic work, both in practice and as an ideal.

Male Control of all Spending

Both partners are workers and have a similar education. He earns more than his wife but the difference is not large. She works 80 per cent of full time and would like to work full time. Both claim that they live in an equal relationship. They jointly own a flat and he owns a car. She argues that their economy should be common. He is against a joint economy, but claims that both should have the same standard of living. However, he wants to control the economy of the household, including her expenses. The model of sharing that they practise leaves her very little for personal expenses. Household consumption is divided so that she pays for food and clothes for the child, and all amortisation and interest costs are drawn from her account. He pays all recurrent bills, monthly costs for the flat, and insurance. She saves the child allowance in an account for the child, but has no money of her own left for saving. He saves in a household account and also saves personally by buying and selling shares. She collects all the bills and gives them to him for his signature and posting.

Their model yields unequal scope for economic action. She has to ask her husband for money for her personal expenditures. She says that this does not bother her, even though it allows him to interfere in her judgements about what to buy. This attitude is also present in their reflections on the gift. She argues that the right to use the gift is conditional and requires the positive consent of the husband. He argues that the use of the gift is conditional and has to be "earned" and related to other needs of the family.

In terms of economic sharing, this couple represents a classic male-dominated style, an "authority ranking" model, with the husband claiming the right to have full control over money and exchange. In terms of domestic work, however, the couple represents a "communal sharing" type of reciprocity. Both husband and wife are committed to spontaneous action and practise this model in full agreement with each other. She regards their relationship as equal, since her husband does not dominate her and because they share domestic work without her needing

to nag: "It comes naturally." To do similar amounts of domestic work is not feasible for her because her view is that equality cannot be judged in terms of principles of uniformity. Women and men are not similar. He expresses a similar view but claims that he is able to compromise, because he is trained in conflict management. Thus, he can control the situation at home.

Joint Pooling - Two Cases

In the first case, both partners have a similar education. He earns a little more. Their work is a mixture of self-employment and paid work. Both work full time. They have no debts and no savings. The husband says that if they had money left they would probably save it in personal accounts, but usually everything is spent. Both of them have separate accounts, but with mutual access to them. Both claim that the money that they have is viewed as "our money" and they share the bills between themselves. He pays for the flat and his office and she pays the other bills. She is more careful about spending and tends to feel guilty about spending on personal consumption. They have conflicts over money and their expenditure habits. He makes more decisions on his own, not for personal consumption but for the household and the children. She tends to be more oriented towards a joint economy than he. However, their reflections regarding the "personal gift" represent complex reasoning about the conditions under which personal spending would be fair, taking into consideration what the other partner has or doesn't have — that is, balancing of resources.

The model adopted by this couple is probably related to their insecure incomes, which vary from month to month. They regard their economy as scanty, and expenses must be negotiated and agreed upon. This couple has adopted an agreement style for sharing domestic work both as an ideal and in practice. This model is also used for money, without the very strict division applied by the two previous couples. In terms of domestic sharing, this couple was categorized as "equality matching," and we consider it appropriate to classify the pattern of economic balancing in the same way.

The second couple's social position is similar. The wife has a higher education than the husband. She is working as manager in a technical division within the municipality and he is a manager of a store selling petrol. Their basic salaries are similar, but he earns more because he has a bonus salary. Both of them work more than full time. She has personal debts, he has none. They each own 50 per cent of the house, but his contribution to the purchase was larger than hers. They share amortization and interest costs but he pays a higher share than she does. She owns a car that he paid for. They perceive their economic situation to be good but they work long hours and feel short of time for children and family life. Both parties react strongly to the vignette about separate economies and claim that they have always had a joint economy. He argues that separate economies are legitimate if the relationship is weak and she argues that separate economies are "like a preparation for divorce." "We talk about our money, we never talk about my or your money." Both have their personal accounts and a joint account for bills. Money for this account is transferred from their personal accounts - more from his account. She initiates all decisions about savings but he implements them and, in practice, he manages their savings in their insurance accounts. Both save in their personal insurance accounts, but he saves more and she has reacted to this and initiated a revision of their savings.

Regarding the gift, she thinks in terms of economic equality, and the right to use the gift personally depends on whether there is a need to compensate the economically "weaker partner." Thus, personal use of the gift is conditional for her and related to what is fair in a wider context of sharing. He argues that such gift should be used jointly.

Both keep track of each other's personal spending and comment upon it. She regards herself a more active spender than he, yet large purchases are decided upon jointly. She reflects more actively on matters of equality, equity, and compensation than he does, which could be related to the fact that she earns less than he does. Both regard their standard of living as equal.

The judgment of this couple is that they are unequal when it comes to domestic work, because she does the lion's share. She believes in agreements, but is dissatisfied with how they share. He is obviously not sensitive to his wife's agreement approach and thinks that their division of labour "just turned out the way it has." He is aware that domestic work is a problem in their relationship, but he basically thinks that their solution is fair - he works more than she (he 60, she almost 50 hours a week). As the situation has transpired, he has achieved more economic strength than she. This is what the wife wants to challenge.

Female-managed Pool

The next couple introduces us to a wife who has a higher socioeconomic position than her husband, higher education, and a somewhat higher salary. Both parties work full time. Both regard their relationship as fairly equal. Both have a personal sphere for spending that is hidden from the other, even if she regards him as more open than she is. The couple has made an economic plan that deliberately grants both of them similar amounts for personal spending. However, she does all the economic management. This means that she has access to his personal account, but he has no access to hers. She pays for all household consumption while he pays for rent, petrol, and food. They have a joint savings account, which both partners pay into. Regarding the money gift, they both argue strongly in disfavour of personal use. He would react with anger if she used the money for herself and she would only take advantage of the gift if he gave his consent.

This couple allows the woman quite wide scope for economic action, but she accounts to him for all spending at the end of each month, which gives him ample control. Regarding consumption for the household, they both see themselves as active in different kinds of purchases - they claim that they have no conflicts but there are power struggles in the sense that they pull in different directions when it comes to some expenditures. In analyzing the sharing of domestic labour, their overall impression is that she tries to cope with a subordinate position at home. She does all the domestic work that he dislikes. She is grateful for what he does and gives him great credit for his contributions, yet she is exhausted and finds it sometimes unfair that he does not relieve her of her duties. He possesses personal power and a strong sense of community, combined with a dominant masculine attitude.

Comparing Discourses

A comparison of the discourse about sharing domestic work and economic sharing suggests similarities. In some cases there is talk about "the one who has

money pays," "it is the same wallet," and "it is after all joint money." These sayings suggest that disposing of money jointly is more important and that personal disposal has to be secondary. To give priority to communal values corresponds to the sharing of domestic work in a spontaneous way where joint needs are primary - the one who sees what needs to be done does it; the one who has money pays. To nag about your money or my money is from this perspective greedy, and contrary to the principle of a gift economy. The narratives about money management contain examples of couples who initially applied these principles, but who set up separate accounts for different purposes. This change was motivated by the difficulties of keeping track of and controlling the flow of money, which left little for saving. That is why these couples ended up with different accounts for specific purposes, and agreed about how much each party would transfer to the joint accounts or pay for joint consumption. Rational reasoning rather than reciprocity was the starting point for such agreements.

But the agreements still contain more or less explicit ideas about reciprocity. In the first example, the principle of "similar amounts" to the joint account regardless of incomes and personal debts is pure equality reasoning. It is regarded as fair that the one who has more money (the man) keeps more for personal use. In the second example the principle is the same, but she gives all she has for joint consumption and, in addition, he has granted himself the right to control all consumption, including hers. She does not regard this as unequal and claims that she lives in an equal relationship. For her, equality is strongly connected with mutuality and a strong sense of community. She receives money from him and we can interpret her understanding of herself as a person who receives gifts, which makes her worthy. Equality means not needing to nag, but the existence of a self-emerging mutuality. Nobody dominates the other.

In the third example the couple has a diffuse division of expenses. The wife argues strongly that all money is communal money. He agrees with this but allows himself somewhat greater economic autonomy than she does. She talks about balancing inputs for the household and includes this in her balancing of all types of activities. Personal expenditure must be included and weighed against communal expenditure. They express the wish to make more explicit divisions, but they strive in different directions. In the fourth example the tendency is similar, but this couple has made a more explicit division of what is joint and what is personal. The sharing model grants similar amounts for personal needs and his contribution to the communal expenditure is larger, as his incomes are higher. For her, it is important to reason in terms of compensation. Active balancing is more important for her than for him. The husband argues for communal sharing with stronger moral ardour.

The last example is interesting because the wife manages the household economy altogether, including his personal expenses. The example is not unique in our data. This couple is similar to the preceding one in arguing for the principle that both should have the same amounts for personal expenses. This is discussed as a principle and is also applied, since each of them creates a sphere for private spending. She controls his expenses, since he has to ask her for money.

We note from the examples that most types of joint economy are connected to agreements over how spending will be shared. Having a joint economy means that the partners reach agreement on how much money should be transferred from each partner to cover current bills or expenditures. Some couples have sev-

eral joint accounts with mutual access. Some of the sharing patterns give little scope for the wife's personal spending. Despite the practice of different management styles, we observe that all styles are represented as a form of fair sharing. The sense of having a joint economy hides the fact that the men seem to have more autonomy in spending than their wives. We note a tendency for women to subordinate their personal spending to the joint expenditures, for instance using personal savings for joint spending and repressing personal consumption. Further, it is mostly women who save for the children.

Another tendency is for men to save more in personal accounts. This is related to their higher earning power but also to the kinds of splitting that is done, where wives pay for day-to-day shopping and make decisions over what is needed.

A prevalent pattern in the studies is that women administer the bills, but it is interesting to note that administration of bills does not seem to be a gender-marked activity: some couples regard it as part of domestic work and consequently the women are in charge, while other couples see it as part of the male activity of economic control.

Another interesting observation is that the sharing of the domestic economy does not seem to be linked explicitly to the sharing of domestic work. Some couple's sharing of domestic work is quite uneven, whereas the sharing of domestic money is seen as equal or joint. However, we note that patterns of sharing money are to a greater extent subject to explicit acts of balancing than those for sharing domestic work. It is interesting to note that having a joint economy is not always associated with equality, since it might create a pattern of surveillance and control over how spending is done. Having a split economy is not necessarily associated with equality either.

Equality - an Essentially Contested Concept

Normative concepts like democracy, equality, and welfare are complicated issues when dealt with in depth. It is easier to agree on the negative aspects of unequal relations than agree on the meaning of equality. Nevertheless, most men and women have to relate to and to make sense of an equal partnership in one way or another. The purpose of this paper has been to highlight some salient aspects in the discourse on gender equality in families from the perspective of how women and men in everyday life develop a sense of balanced or fair reciprocity in their relationships. The variety of definitions of gender equality in other studies of couples as well as our own reflects the essentially contested nature of the concept. The diverse conceptualizations of equality that can be seen among researchers are as prevalent among ordinary people, too.

At the outset of this chapter we argued that "norms of reciprocity" influence the relationships between family members. The results of the study confirm that assumptions about reciprocity are active components in negotiations between husbands and wives, although they may remain hidden and ambivalent. When the men and the women talk about how they organize domestic work and the domestic economy, they describe a model that they have developed according to practical circumstances and family and personal needs. Reciprocal arguments are hidden behind notions of love and a non-calculating ethic. One major finding is that conceptions of equality tend to be gender specific and emphasize different moral principles. Family cultures evolve from moral considerations tied to the distribution

of domestic labour. We have so far discerned three principles: principles of responsiveness; principles of agreement; and principles of gender ascription. Persons living by the principle of responsiveness tend to regard equality in relation to personal qualities. Mutuality rather than equality is basically regarded as the ultimate goal. Being responsive to the needs of the other as well as to joint family needs is what an equal partnership should be. Adherence to this moral principle also means emphasizing personal virtues and qualities. If both parties adhere to the principle of responsiveness, a mutual sense of fairness develops, regardless of whether the distribution of work is fair in terms of time or the amount of work.

Agreement-oriented individuals tend to adhere to more individualized principles. Equal partnerships should involve agreements and more or less explicit acts of balancing. Negotiations about time and pleasure are important elements and the sense of fairness evolves around the propensity of each to keep agreements. These couples may also face the fact that outcomes can be unequal or dissimilar in terms of time and amount of work. Balance depends on the kind of trade-off that is made and the currency that is used.

Among these couples, the currency used in exchange transactions is primarily pleasure and distaste. We have been surprised to find that pleasure and distaste are salient in the language of sharing or distribution of domestic tasks. It has been argued many times that women do more work at home because they have greater skills and higher standards. On the basis of our findings, we argue that the skills depend on the kinds of standards that are applied. Having higher standards is associated with having higher skills, regardless of whether the person expressing higher standards also has the higher skills for doing domestic work. We would argue that skills are related to motivations, or pleasure and distaste.

We think that individuals use these currencies in exchanging responsibility and work because using the yardsticks of time spent on work and amount of work done violates the norms of the gift economy in families. Pleasure and distaste are more closely related to needs, and are more in accordance with the gift economy in couple relationships.

The third type of principle, gender ascription, goes far back in history. The goal is not equality, but rather to sustain and reproduce gender values in work and family, although these values are no longer explicitly espoused. The kind of reciprocity that couples strive for in these cases is primarily what Fiske calls "authority ranking." The aim is to contribute to the status of the husband. The couples applying this type of reciprocity are the most problem ridden and ambivalent, since the burden falls squarely on the women, who feel tired and frustrated. The distribution of responsibility and work is highly conditional, depending on the goodwill of the husband. The lack of reciprocity creates problems, not necessarily in terms of conflicts between partners but in terms of a sense of humiliation experienced by the women.

We also found that the sharing and distribution of domestic money is linked to moral principles embedded within the overarching principle of having a joint economy. The patterns of sharing and dividing money are complex and not congruent with the ways in which domestic work is distributed. Among some couples, the sharing of domestic work is uneven, whereas the sharing of domestic money is experienced as being quite joint. An overall impression from the results is that regardless of the pattern that has been developed, men tend to have more economic space than women. This is, however, our interpretation, and not the

interpretation of the women or men themselves. Mostly, the women tend to accept their models for sharing and regard them as fair.

An orientation towards joint responsibility was more common among women, while among men the orientation towards responsiveness and gender ascription was just as common. These two orientations can easily be combined as long as men are involved in domestic work without the woman's having to nag or to point out that he is responsible as well. Thus, a family culture evolves where the core is a sense of mutuality rather than equality. This can be viewed as a way for both partners to hide the fact that women take the main responsibility and do the bulk of domestic work. They believe they are being equal.

Political rhetoric on equal partnership places great emphasis on equal sharing, doing similar amounts of domestic work and childcare. This public discourse often forms a point of reference in the couples' everyday lives. Our study suggests that this kind of determination of equality or equity is not in line with how the couples actually understand these phenomena. In the allocation of domestic work and money, it is mutuality and fairness and not equality or equity that counts. This means that equality combined with responsiveness and mutuality serves as an active element in the process of allocation. In other words, the kind of individualism that is linked to values of equality coexists with ideals of communality.

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Who Rules in The Core of The Family?

TORGERDUR EINARSDOTTIR

In the wake of modernization and cultural change, existing marks of individuality and autonomy in family life — as well as in other fields of existence — have been strengthened (Giddens 1991, Beck 1992). This has made the family an exposed unit. International data reveal an increasing frequency of marital crises, as does Manuell Castells's (1997) overview of the ongoing transformation of modern societies. His suggestion of the potential end of patriarchalism encourages questions about the premises for such an outcome. In this chapter, family transformations will be traced from within the family unit

A common approach in current family research is to view the family as a playground for negotiations, as elaborated more thoroughly by Björnberg and Kollind in this volume. However, we are far from the optimistic notions on "symmetrical families" put forth by Young and Willmott (1973) and their prediction of increased equality between men and women. These expectations have been replaced by critical and sophisticated studies, extremely diverse in theoretical and methodological terms.

This chapter highlights the ongoing turmoil in family relationships looked at from within the family unit. My main objective is to construct a theoretical model that attempts to bridge the somewhat fragmented picture that has emerged from extant studies. The model aims at grasping the wholeness of family dynamics and interactions by focusing on what I call the inner core of the family and its components.

The theoretical model is matched against empirical data, which consist of qualitative interviews from two separate studies. The first set of interviews was with Swedish doctors, nurses, and assistant nurses and their spouses (approximately 50 couples), and the second set was with eight Icelandic families participating in an Icelandic pilot project on fathers on paternity leave (Einarsdóttir 1998). In both studies, wives and husbands were interviewed separately. For purposes of clarification, the overall context of the present discussion needs to be mentioned. My theoretical approach draws on empirical data from two Nordic countries, Sweden and Iceland. Notwithstanding internal differences in other respects, Nordic countries share common features as advanced, modernized welfare states, and gender relations are at a more equal level than in the rest of the world. This chapter, thus, traces tendencies that may be evolving somewhat differently in other parts of the world.

In the first part of the chapter, I present the theoretical background. It is based on a vision of how to overcome the unfruitful tension between studies that take an explicit stance in support of either men's or women's positions. Thereafter, I launch a theoretical model presenting a new classification of modern families. This discussion is followed by detailed clarifications by reference to empirical

examples. In the second part, the theoretical model is linked to historical trends and some important findings from the rapidly expanding research on men and fatherhood. The chapter concludes with a discussion that addresses theoretical issues of gender power and matches them to the model.

The notion of male power is becoming increasingly influential in feminist research. A leading Nordic feminist scholar, Widerberg, has claimed that the male-power perspective may be the "dynamite" required to challenge male-dominated social sciences (Widerberg 1992: 278). In accordance with this contention, feminist scholars have viewed family relations as gendered relations embedded in patriarchal relationships. Family ties and marriages are seen as subordination, dependency, inequality, and exploitation of women (Jackson 1997). The relations between spouses or cohabitants are commonly framed — implicitly, or explicitly — as antagonistic relations, mostly to the benefit of men (cf. Roman 1999a, 1999b). As a response to this, some studies that focus on men attempt to rectify this feminist approach (cf. Clatterbaugh 1990, Gillis 1993).

These two genres tend to talk at cross-purposes and often appear as incompatible and contradictory. Nevertheless, they share an underlying assumption that relations between men and women as a zero-sum game. That means that the interests of the parties are seen, at least partially and sometimes totally, as conflicting: a gain for one is a loss for the other. In line with this, the dialogue between the two genres often falls short in quantifying and assessing the respective contributions and debts of men and women.

The very modest aim of this chapter is to include the insights of both perspectives, while at the same time reaching beyond their contradictions. The model of the inner core includes tentative steps to embrace "consensus" and "conflicts" simultaneously. The model further attempts to illuminate the voices of both men and women. Theoretically, this contribution is inspired by an approach developed by the Norwegian researchers Holter and Aarseth, whose influential study on men's life context (1993) explicitly explores family life from the viewpoint of men.

The Family is Born with the Child

One of the benefits of Holter and Aarseth's male-oriented view is that they can explore the mother's role and influence in the family without disregarding patriarchal structures. A vital point in their argument is that a fundamental change takes place when a childless couple becomes a family. In a sense, the family is "born" with the birth of the child. From then on it is no longer possible for both parents to act solely in their own interests.

When a childless couple has a child, their position as independent, negotiating individuals — in accordance with increasing individualization and modernization — is restricted. A new sphere has come into play within the family. An inner core has emerged that requires a form of communication and language different from that which applies to a childless cohabiting or married couple. The child breaks the logic of individualization: it inevitably links one person to another and it cannot be abandoned, in contrast to most other modern projects. The child is in a sense "anti-modern," to use the terms of Bäck-Wiklund and Bergsten (1997, p. 193). Because of the mother's close relationship with the child and her continuous communication and interaction with it, she is the one who gains an understanding of the rules that apply in the new sphere, the inner core.

Family life is made up of many different components, some of them diffuse and complex. There are material and practical aspects, such as housework and housework supervision, but also social and psychological aspects, such as interaction, communication, expression of emotions, and the creation of atmosphere. The different parts of this wholeness require different qualities and levels of performance, and they further comprise a large social space, not easily defined or recognized. Many separate parts of this whole have been explored and rigorously analyzed in other studies. But, however stringent such approaches may be, a narrow and detailed focus on particular parts tends to miss something. This "something" is the wholeness of family dynamics that the concept "the inner core" is attempting to grasp. The aim of conceptualizing the inner core is to come to grips with the overall character and intensity of some of the main features that give the family its specific spirit.

For the sake of simplicity and analytical clarity, I highlight two overarching aspects of family life, notwithstanding other distinct areas of importance. The first is the logic of the interaction between spouses and its impact on the social atmosphere of the home, and the second is the division of and responsibility for housework, practical arrangements of everyday life (including childcare), and the parental role. The parental role, and especially the father's role, will be explored more thoroughly later, in relation to the discussion of evolving trends and men as fathers. The other issues will be discussed below.

In real life all these aspects are interwoven and they are only analytically discernible. Certainly, the differences among the aspects are manifold, such as the allocation of economic resources, decisionmaking, and sexuality, to name only a few. The larger the number of aspects taken into consideration, the more complicated the picture. However, it is my conviction that these other aspects will not disprove my point, but rather reveal differing emphases in different approaches, as my model attempts to show.

Logic of Interaction and Division of Housework

What is referred to here as the "logic of interaction" between the spouses relates to a vital ongoing discussion on the principles of sharing, based on the notion of the family as a negotiating unit. Many different approaches exist, many of them revolving around different kinds of "economies," like debt economy, gift economy, and economy of gratitude. (For further discussion, see Björnberg and Kollind 1997; Einarsdottir 1998).

Holter (1997) has made a distinction between three elementary forms of mutual interaction. Two of these are widely known forms of transactions of reciprocity, and they will be used in the following discussion. On the one hand, there is the "gift," and on the other, there is "commodity exchange" (1997:176f). The gift is, roughly speaking, a personal transaction from one to one: in its purest form it applies to friendship and is imbued with obligation. Commodity exchange is an anonymous transaction from many to many (the market): its main features are freedom and elements of exploitation. These two forms of interaction are related to, although slightly different from, the terms "communal sharing" and "market-pricing" used by Björnberg and Kollind in this volume.

The logic of the gift is the opposite of the logic of commodity exchange. We believe gifts to be unconditional, with no expectation of reciprocation — gifts connote altruism and generosity. But while no demands are made, the gift is still

a source of influence to the giver. She gains influence, she "owns" a little of the receiver of the gift, places him or her under an obligation, as witness the phrase "one good deed deserves another." While the two contrasting "economies," with their different "goods," are depicted here as mutually exclusive, they both need to be seen as an indissoluble part of family life. The gift economy may be seen as dominant while family life is in harmony, but the debt economy appears when conflict occurs. This means that fluctuations and ambivalence, conflicts and consensus, are present in all families. I will try to unravel the conditions for the different configurations.

The second component of family life that will be dealt with here is the division of housework and its relation to paid and unpaid work. This is a highly important aspect of family life, not least from the viewpoint of negotiations, although in many cases it causes unease when it is discussed openly by spouses. Certainly, the matter of housework is not an original issue in family studies — some may even find it archaic. It has suffered from unfruitful research approaches, which tend to reduce it to time budgets or "equal sharing" schemes in more or less quantitative terms. Björnberg and Kollind's discussion in this volume of how spouses themselves conceptualize the meaning of equality and fairness is one way to overcome this limitation. My own contribution below is also an attempt to overcome these limitations. Although my theorizing follows a different path from theirs, our lines of reasoning are, however, fully compatible.

I have, in another context, classified the division of housework into complementary, overlapping, and identical divisions of household tasks and caretaking. That distinction is inspired by recent research (Hochschild1989; Roman 1994; Ahrne and Roman 1997), but is at the same time an attempt to overcome the normative overtones that imbue other classifications (Einarsdóttir 1997). Thus, "complementary" refers to what Hochschield has labelled "traditional"; "overlapping" replaces Hochschild's "transitorial" sharing, meaning that the division of work need not be a step in any direction, but a pattern in its own right; and finally the term "identical" is suggested instead of Hochschild's "egalitarian" sharing, which is highly normative. This term is used when both spouses do similar things, except for a small number of tasks that only one of them carries out.

The reason for explicitly conceptualizing the division of housework is that the same pattern can be found in different family types, seen from the viewpoint of the inner core. The crucial point here is that the inner core is made up of the interconnections between different aspects: it is the combination of interaction logic and division of housework and responsibilities that endows the inner core of families with their wide differences in spirit.

The Family-centric Model

In Holter and Aarseth's male-oriented study, we find explicit emphasis on the mother's influence, which at times excludes men from the family. The mother's central place in relation to the child bestows on her a sort of central position in the home. Her actions are no longer solely a matter of her own interests as an autonomous individual, but she henceforth represents the whole. She places the interests of others in the family above her own, she seeks to coordinate the needs of the others, and she holds together a totality that would otherwise break down into its component parts.

Figure 1. The Inner Core of the Family



This social unit, which is born with the child, represents a whole (totality) that is more than the sum of its parts. The intrinsic character of this whole makes it very vulnerable to extensive deconstruction, theoretically as well as in real life. As soon as we have analyzed the parts in detail, we risk overlooking important qualitative features, as mentioned above. The same is valid for family dynamics themselves: the more the spouses regard family life as consisting of detachable and tangible entities that can be negotiated and transferred, the more vulnerable the family dynamic.

To understand the intricate features that make up the inner core, they should be thought through as the difference between a "home" and a "household." The farther we depart from market-like interactions, commodity exchange, and the closer we come to the gift, the more the household becomes a home, and the stronger and more integrated the family unit will be (Holter 1997:110). The following model attempts to visualize how the different forms of interactions and mutuality within the family evolve into distinct constellations of the inner core. As mentioned above, the model includes division of housework, paid and unpaid work, childcare, management, and organization of everyday life. It attempts, however, to transcend the detachable, the concrete, and clearly defined pieces of work. This is, in other words, an attempt to feature what is left when the totality is deconstructed and the division of distinct tasks is analyzed down to their smallest components. The focus is on two aspects. The first is the configuration of the inner core in terms of who is responsible for it, namely the wife, the husband, both of them, or neither. The second aspect is the dynamics and the logic of the interaction: to what extent it does embody understanding and mutual give and take and to what extent it does embody conflicts and discrepancies between wishes and reality. In other words, does the interaction of family members manifest market-like transactions (exchange) or mutual reciprocity (gift)?

The cells can be visualized as ideal types. They are not to be seen as static but as highly dynamic, and people are expected to move between cells. The horizontal axis refers to the mother and the vertical axis to the father. In the bottom left cell is the matricentric inner core. The upper left cell refers to a shared inner core,

where both mother and father are in the centre of the family. The upper right cell is the patricentric core, which is an extraordinarily rare exception. The bottom right cell, finally, is the centre-avoiding - or sometimes centreless — family, the household that, brutally speaking, is without an inner core.

The discussion can be seen from another angle and conceptualized as integration versus disintegration. Thus the upper left part of the figure illustrates the integrated centre, meaning qualities such as balance, consensus, coherence, and cohesiveness of the different components of the family. The bottom right part describes disintegration, signalling tension, conflict, fragmentation, and disruption of the included components. Another related problem, which will be further elaborated below, is whether the centre position is voluntarily undertaken by or forced upon the person in question. Again, the opposite poles are the upper left part and the bottom right part of the model.

In the following paragraphs different ideal-type family profiles are constructed to illustrate the meaning of the inner core. I also give more thorough illustrations of the model through living examples derived from in-depth interviews.

The Shared Family Centre: "It's equally important to both of us."

The shared family centre is the ideal family type. The wife and husband collaborate and are jointly responsible for the welfare of the family. Both spouses shoulder the administration of everyday life. Division of housework and paid work may, but certainly need not, be shared "fifty-fifty." Regardless of whether the contributions of both spouses are "equal" in quantitative terms, they are in harmony with the wishes of both. The work life of the spouses usually does not intrude upon family life. If it does, the spouses find compromises and solutions to everyday problems in which both have confidence. Reciprocity, a sense of togetherness and understanding, characterize this family type. This description does not constitute a glorified image of a nonexisting reality: rather we are stressing that consensus is more pronounced than conflict in this type of family.

Karin and Bengt are doctors-to-be, and they were on an equal footing in their careers when they had their first child. They have lived together for many years and their relationship is mature. Karin wants to stay at home with the child for a year, even if it means that she will fall behind Bengt in his career. Karin and Bengt have an "overlapping" division of housework, which they do not share completely equally. Neither are they sharing parental leave fifty-fifty, which Karen is rather apologetic about. Bengt does not have any objections to Karin's maternal leave, provided that he will also get his time at home. Later on, he takes paternity leave for six months.

Work is important to both Karin and Bengt. Nevertheless, Bengt is clear-sighted about his job and not overwhelmed by it: "The job isn't more than half of life," he says. Karin appears to be a self-confident person, and seems to have conscious and balanced wishes regarding her job. She is also rather independent during her maternity leave: she likes travelling on her own and frequently visits friends and relatives.

Karin's yearlong period at home is very positive. "I have never found it strenuous to be at home with her [the baby]," she says. But when she realizes that her position has become much stronger than Bengt's, in that she begins to feel like the "expert" with the child, she is keen to make room for him. Karin shows great empathy towards Bengt during his time at home, she appreciates his achieve-

ments and praises his contributions. She finds him "domestic" and "comfortable." Karin's expressions about how they organize the housework are completely free from competition and exchange logic:

> When both of us are working, we usually share. Maybe I'd cook a bit more often and then he'd wash up, or maybe he is occupied with the cars because I'm not interested in that. I don't think it can be 100 per cent equal. I think you have to do what you are good at. Of course, you have different mentalities, as Bengt often says.

After Karin and Bengt's parental leave was over, they had a period of temporary solutions with the child's daycare. Karin's plans to continue working part-time did not come to pass and she was forced to go full-time. They have a very tightly organized schedule of everyday life and both of them are tired. However, both of them emphasize the priority of the family over the job. They agree in giving the child all their free time. Bengt gives up his social activities and there is no great difference in their roles in relation to the child. "It's equally important to both of us," as Karin puts it. At the time we leave the family for the last time, they are expecting a second child - not planned, to be sure, but warmly welcomed.

Karin and Bengt's interaction is grounded in a stable and mature relationship, with considerable elements of gift logic. When arguments of "fairness" are put forward, they are so with care. The two of them manage to sustain solid and integrated feelings of common interest. Their interaction is based upon respect, mutuality, and compromise.

The Patricentric Family: "She is an independent woman, you see."

The patricentric family is such a rare exception that it hardly calls for explicit discussion. Nevertheless, it exists, and we will give an example of it below.

Marianne and Lars are in their fifties and their relationship has always been very close. Marianne is a chief nurse, responsible for a big department, and Lars works an instructor in training programs for psychiatric patients. Their two daughters are teenagers.

Marianne, who is a very industrious and alert person, is highly dedicated to her job. She began her career path as an assistant nurse and has been very successful in taking courses and diplomas while doing her job. Lars has been the more reserved partner and has not had the same ambitions regarding his job as Marianne. Despite their somewhat reversed roles, Lars does not feel that he has withdrawn or sacrificed anything.

Their roles in the home are also to a great extent reversed: we can classify them as "reversed complementarity." Their division of housework is almost "identical," with a slightly bigger share of routine work falling to Lars. He is the one with the lower dirt-tolerance and, therefore, he has the overall responsibility for picking up and cleaning. Marianne deals with the more detachable and concrete pieces of work, for example, cooking, which Lars is happy to be excused. They shared parental leave equally when they had their daughters, which was a rather unusual approach at that time. Lars has always had a strong presence in the home and his position at the centre is growing stronger the more Marianne advances in her career.

Both are happy with how they have arranged their everyday lives. Even though Lars is not very susceptible to irritation, he sometimes dislikes it when Marianne prefers to work on her computer in the evening, instead of spending time with him:

She is a very independent woman, as you probably have understood. She knows her duties and responsibilities and what she has to do the next day. And it would never come to my mind to comment on that, it is simply not my business. But of course I can get irritated if it is very messy in the house ... I want a certain order, so that all of us pick up after the meals and try to keep the tables clean, you see ... On that point Marianne is a bit different. When she has eaten she can just leave and sit down to start working on her computer. And she can be there for one or two hours. Well, sometimes, if I find it too messy, I just tidy up myself.

Marianne and Lars stick together as a coherent and quite harmonious family unit, despite Marianne's devotion to her work and unwillingness to undertake a central position. Owing to Lars's unusual participation in the home, the inner core is intact. However, theirs is a very rare exception.

The Matricentric Family I: "I want to be a mother now."

The matricentric family is incomparably the most common pattern. Here we can distinguish two tendencies marked by the broken line in the model. On the one hand, there are those women who more or less voluntarily undertake the central position in the home. In these cases household tasks may — but need not be — traditionally divided between the spouses. Think of a middle-aged wife and a husband who in some sense live in complementary worlds. The wife may have withdrawn from her career for the sake of the children and the home. The inner core of the family has positive overtones: strong elements of gift logic and generosity characterize family life, owing to the wife's contributions. Imagine further how the wife's actions are generating a "surplus value" for the benefit of all family members.

On the other hand, we have women in this cell who have not voluntarily chosen the central position, meaning that their position in the inner core is forced upon them. Imagine a couple where there are open discrepancies or hidden discrepancies that come to the surface. The wife's wishes collide with the life they live. She may feel that the husband does not understand her situation. Her domestic work is accomplished out of a sense of necessity and obligation. Tensions may arise around practical matters and social relations, and conflicts and accusations may lurk around the corner.

In this case, whatever the factual division of tasks and responsibility may be, both spouses feel that their own contribution is larger than the other's — or at least, larger than the other is willing to admit. Accordingly, both seek, consciously or unconsciously, to move forward their respective positions. Family life is imbued with competition and oppression, exchange logic predominates over every instance of gift logic, no "surplus value" is yielded.

The man's place in these two types of matricentric families can vary. Holter and Aarseth have described wives' domination of their husbands. These are men longing for greater participation in the home, but excluded from it by the wife's definition of her role, or admitted to the inner core only on her terms. There is another group of men who respond reluctantly to their wives' systematic attempts to bring them into the family core. These men may be burdened with a sense of guilt or obligation, as a response to their wives' dissatisfaction. But we also have the dominating and overbearing type, the husband that sets the standards and is not challenged by his wife for one reason or another.

Elisabeth and Göran are an example of a matricentric family. Göran is a surgeon

in mid-career, and Elisabeth is an economist in a top position in an international company located in Sweden. They are not the most typical example of a matricentric family, since they do not represent the middle-aged, traditional couple. On the contrary, they demonstrate that this kind of traditional family still exists among well educated people in the upper strata of society.

Elisabeth and Göran have two-year-old twins and are expecting another child. They had been together for a long time before deciding the time was ripe for a child. The baby they are expecting now was not planned, but is warmly welcomed, not least because Swedish parental leave arrangements encourage closely spaced births by providing full benefits for those who have another child within two-and-a-half years of the previous one.

Göran and Elisabeth's division of household tasks is very traditional: they have complementary roles and Göran is very reluctant to talk about the organization of their family life. Elisabeth, on the other hand, talks easily about it and admits that she does most of the housework. They have obviously constructed a common version of how to present their life together, and how to justify the wife's larger contribution to the housework. Both of them make similar comments about the housework, to the effect that household tasks are easy because of the washing machine and the dishwasher. These remarks appear to ironically belittle the wife's contribution in a family with two, shortly three, preschool children. Nevertheless, both of them appear quite harmonious and content with their roles. Göran, who is a rather reserved person, has a defensive attitude that is understandable, insofar as their life is at odds with the modern discourse on gender equality. Unexpectedly, there is not much ambivalence in Elisabeth's remarks:

> Either you have to accept it or you get into conflict, and see what good that does you. Today I wouldn't gain so much from it, actually. Of course, it gets a bit annoying, irritating, it always is ... But I think we've arranged it quite well, we've established a system now. We have many friends that share everything with the kids, this morning one of them sleeps in and the next morning the other one does, all kinds of weird systems, but I don't know ... You have to have an arrangement that suits you. Now I think we have found our roles and it's running very smoothly right now.

Elisabeth is determined to stay at home for the next few years, preferably until the children go to school. Notwithstanding her prestigious job and her devotion to her work, it is no sacrifice for her to take a break from her successful career. She makes that decision voluntarily, and it is based on very strong self-confidence and a strong work-identity.

> I'm going to stay at home. They have arranged it so that you can be at home with your children for several years. The job is not so important to me any more. I can come back and take another job at some time. If you just feel confident with yourself you can always come back, don't you feel that? There are so many people that identify so strongly with their jobs and have difficulty in dropping it. But I feel that I want to drop it, I want to identify myself as a mother now. That's much more important to me now.

The Matricentric Family II: "Maybe I ought to be grateful."

In the case of Elisabeth and Göran the inner core has positive overtones and the central position is voluntarily undertaken by Elisabeth. Birgitta and Lennart also

represent a matricentric family but they are the opposite of the previous couple, since the central position is not voluntary.

Birgitta and Lennart are doctors with specialist training. Birgitta is very keen to make space for Lennart when they have their first child. Their interaction, and especially Birgitta's actions, appears in the beginning to be impregnated with gift logic. She is surprised at all the new mothers who tell their husbands what they should do. Birgitta takes her role as a mother rather seriously:

> To have a child is like turning the page of a book. Life is irrevocably changed. You have a responsibility, you have a role to fulfil for the rest of your life, you'll be needed by someone and you have to put your own needs aside.

Birgitta and Lennart's division of household tasks overlaps and housework has never been a big issue. "We share the housework to a great extent," Birgitta explains. Lennart has an active role and a strong appearance within the home, and he proudly points out that he is domesticated. Lennart and Birgitta share parental leave. During that time, they appear to be understanding and sympathetic towards each other. The one who is working talks about the job and asks about the child, and vice versa. They are eager to hear what the other has to say. Both of them depict Lennart's time at home with the child positively. Birgitta feels that Lennart has "managed very well," and he - domesticated as he is - is "extraordinarily" happy to be at home. But even if parental leave is a pleasant interlude, they are both happy to return to their work. Birgitta remarks:

> I thought it was great to go to work again, especially for my self-esteem, which had been quite low during my time at home. It came back when my life became as it used to be before.

The child's birth brought about a renewal in Birgitta and Lennart's relationship that periodically generated elements of gift logic. But as times goes by, elements of exchange logic are discernible beneath the surface. Ambivalent undertones are growing stronger and stronger in Birgitta's expressions, and her annoyance is hard to overlook. She is keen to stress that she has the overall responsibility when both of them are at home, and further, that she is the one who best "reads" the needs of the child. She feels that she has an emotional advantage regarding the child and she is clearly ambivalent about whether to loosen these ties with the child or not. Birgitta puts her finger on this ambivalence when she talks about breastfeeding.

> I'm not a kind of a "super-breast feeder." Many women say that it's so extremely cozy. Sometimes I can feel that, but often I feel a bit tied down. I don't want to sit very long. It doesn't give me such an enormous feeling of pleasure.

Despite this, Birgitta frequently refers to breastfeeding as the time when she plays fast and loose. "The only cuddly time is during breastfeeding," she says, while at the same time stressing breastfeeding as a fetter. The same, clear ambivalence is also apparent in other aspects. She is, for example, jealous and grateful at the same time towards relatives that give a helping hand. Birgitta vacillates not least towards Lennart. She feels she has to devote all her free time to the child and she demands the same self-sacrifice from Lennart. She reiterates her initial views that becoming parents means that one's own needs have to be put aside. Her irritation towards Lennart is fully revealed when she lists all the housework she has to do and accuses him of "becoming irresponsible":

> Maybe I should be grateful. My feeling is that Lennart finds it nice to be released [laugh] ... I don't feel that I'm the one who wants to control things. Well, I don't know, sure, I'm the one who packs the bag and so on. So, of course, you do certain things, probably many women do. But it seems to me that he likes my having to take such a big part of it, and her [the daughter] being bonded to me, because then he can just relax and read the newspaper. It's convenient for him that she's bonded with me and he doesn't lift a finger to change it.

When everyday life has become routine again, the friction points are numerous and the couple is burdened with a whole range of conflict issues. Both feel their own jobs undervalued by the other. Lennart has difficulties in breaking into the mother-child relationship, not least because Birgitta continues breastfeeding.

Birgitta and Lennart represent a family that is evolving into ever greater disintegration. The relationship worked very well when they were two free, independent persons. When the child was born, their "togetherness" was temporarily regained. But as time goes by, their relationship is exposed to ever more trials, to which both respond with ambivalence and irritation.

Birgitta's attitude to her central role is permeated with disclosed and tacit claims of sacrifice, at the same time as her messages to Lennart are obscure and fuzzy. Lennart is both evasive and ambivalent. The family's life is strained, the balance is frail, and there are increasing elements of exchange logic and accusation. Birgitta's comment, "Maybe I ought to be grateful," reveals disappointment and unfulfilled expectations.

The Centre-avoiding Family: "Both of us do as little as possible."

In the centre-avoiding family both spouses, as the term suggests, avoid being in the centre. They may, but need not, be in top-level positions, but usually they regard their work as important. Often they are plagued by a conflict of loyalty between family and work, resulting from the higher priority accorded the job. But though the job may be the driving force in this family type, there can be other reasons for dissatisfaction. Both spouses may simply be "bored" with being at home. The organization of everyday life turns into quick and ready-made solutions, such as convenience foods and high dirt thresholds. Both spouses do as little housework as possible. Generally, the wife manages everyday life, but the central position has negative overtones and both parties tend to avoid the inner core. The spouses have located their real lives outside the family, and family life relates to "household" rather than "home."

Anna and Christer are in their early thirties and they had their first child after a three-year relationship. Anna is a doctor-to-be and Christer is a computer technician. Both are very satisfied with their jobs. After Anna's eight-month maternity leave, they take turns at parental leave for seven months, Anna taking two days a week and Christer three days a week.

Anna's time at home with the baby is filled with ambiguity. She is tired when Christer arrives home from his job, so that he may have to "take over," even if he is also tired after work. Quite often, Anna is "in a bad mood and hopeless" and she describes her everyday life in the following way:

> It fluctuated very much during the day, I can recall. It could be very nice in the morning and then if I didn't have anything to do, it could change and become very boring during the afternoon. And then I just wanted Christer to come home. Or the baby

could be yelling so much in the morning that I got desperate and called Christer and cried on the phone, and then he got unhappy and then I settled down and managed to calm her down.

Before the birth of the child, their household routines were "just as they happened." Their division of tasks "overlapped," with Anna doing more than Christer. Sometimes they shared tasks, but only if she nagged. Christer does not like housework. Anna, who is slightly more sensitive to dust and dirt, finds it "extremely boring" to clean. She cooked and did all the cleaning. Anna was also responsible for the ironing because Christer did not regard it as necessary. "Both of us did as little as possible," Christer says, when he describes the division of work before they had a child.

From the point of view of the child, Anna and Christer say they are happy to share parental leave. In the longer run, however, the organization of their everyday life becomes more complicated and uncomfortable. Christer's job is heavy and stressful, since he is not replaced when he is away from work. Even though he is happy to be at home three days a week, he does not want to extend his paternity leave to a full-time basis. Anna also finds the disruption of her job difficult.

Anna returns to full-time work when parental leave is over. They get some help from grandparents and Christer is able to work at home for a few hours a week. This arrangement allows them to reduce the child's time in kindergarten a few days a month without reducing their own working hours, which neither of them is keen to do. When they have time at home, both say that they would rather take a walk with the child than clean or tidy up the home. Anna also remarked that in the afternoon she would tend to stand by the window with the child, waiting for Christer to come home.

Both spouses feel a sense of relief when parental leave is over. They can concentrate on their jobs and they feel less torn by different responsibilities. Anna reports that both of them like to read magazines or periodicals in bed. Their relationship is relatively free from conflict, except for small irritations about hobbies and about which of them should stay at home when the child is sick. "Now life is normal again," Christer says. "Till now, it was a continuous duty."

Anna remarks:

> Even if I had worked as much as Christer when he was at home, he absolutely had to talk and describe in detail what she [the child] had done the whole day, whether she had eaten and done a poo. When both of us work, you get away from that a bit, that's nice. In a way it became ordinary everyday life again when we had both gone back to work.

Anna and Christer are an example of a couple that moves in the direction of the centre-avoiding family. They did not manage to achieve a satisfying "ordinary everyday life" when one of them was at home. Their roles after the arrival of the child became a demanding project for both of them. This transformation brought about a "state of emergency," which called for special efforts and sacrifices. Their life only became balanced again after both returned to full-time work, which allowed them to regain an organization and routine that satisfies both of them. However, this harmony is somewhat conditional: it requires that both spouses be dedicated to their jobs, and that both "do as little as possible" in the home. The central position that emerges with the birth of the child is vague and

frail. The parents are relatively equal, but their home appears somewhat "empty." When we leave them, they are planning to have another child.

Is the Family-centric Model Leading us Forward?

A question that arises is whether the family-centric model has any advantages vis-à-vis other approaches to sharing housework and responsibility? What are the analytical issues? Let us now return to some of the theoretical standpoints outlined at the beginning of this chapter. As was pointed out there, the present model attempts to transcend the quantitative elements that are implicit in the current discourse on housework by opening up a more finely tuned understanding of the qualitative aspects of family life.

The distinctions in the family-centric model between the different positions in the home can take us one step further than can typologies of the division of housework. This is indicated by the fact the couples can have similar housework patterns but completely different inner family cores. The "overlapping" division of housework is the most common in the examples above. But we saw that this pattern can lead to very different family types, depending on the logic of interaction between the spouses and their views on the inner core.

On opposite scales we have the "voluntaristic" matricentric family with traditional housework-sharing (Elisabeth and Göran), and the "centre-avoiding" family with overlapping household sharing, but an empty or boring household where both do as little as possible (Anna and Christer). The difference between the two types of matricentric family is profound. A consensus prevails in Elisabeth and Göran's voluntaristic inner core. Within the framework of their traditional housework pattern, a gift economy contributes to the well being of the family. In the case of Birgitta and Lennart's forced matricentric core, the economy of debt and scarcity is pronounced. Their pattern of overlapping housework may certainly bring them closer to "equality" than Elisabeth and Göran, but at the cost of the togetherness of the family.

When women emphasize that they really want to step back from their professional careers and enter the home to become mothers and housewives, their actions are imbued with totally different meanings and signals than is the case for women who are forced to shoulder tasks and responsibilities they have not asked for. The former group brings something extra, which we have called "surplus value," for the benefit of all family members. This spirit of consensus and understanding would be lost in the parsimonious economy of exchange.

Certainly, these women can be viewed as oppressed in some sense. What we are trying to account for, however, is the conscious and reflective assessments of the woman and her own voluntaristic prioritization of life's different values. Holter and Aarseth (1993) have discussed this in terms of women "seeing with both eyes," meaning that they are not ready to sacrifice traditional female values linked to the private sphere for career and professional success.

In the model above, and more precisely in the discussion of the logic of interaction, we are developing a concept derived from an Icelandic researcher and family therapist who has found that paid work can have different meanings for different families. It can be either a threat, causing tension between the spouses, or a resource strengthening their mutual loyalty. The outcome is unrelated to the total amount of working hours and depends more on the degree of mutuality and

togetherness of the spouses, and whether they share a common attitude towards their jobs. In the family-centric model, this concept is applied to the inner core of the family. Thus, the central position can be either a cause of friction and conflict or a source of strengthened loyalties (Júlíusdóttir 1993).

The concepts "consensus" and "conflict" in this context are relative rather than absolute, meaning that the different family types are seen in relation to each other. Certainly, family life can hardly be imagined without any conflict at all. We are not referring to families completely free of conflict or tensions. Rather, we are stressing that consensus is more salient than conflicts in some types, and conversely, that consensus is outweighed by conflict in others. This is the holistic impression the model attempts to grasp.

The discussion of "voluntaristic-" and "forced-centric" positions leads us directly to the heart of the classical sociological problems of structure and agency (Sztompka 1993). To what extent do individuals have a real choice in their actions, for which they take responsibility; and to what extent are they restricted (or, for that matter, determined) by structural restraints? Although we will not solve the problem here, let us acknowledge it, and for practical reasons adopt Merton's idea of "structural choices" (Merton 1968).

We believe, in other words, that only in exceptional cases do people have no choice at all. In the expression "forced" position, a distinction can be made between outer and inner pressure. A forced matricentric position does not need be the result of male power alone, or of the woman complying with the demands of her husband. It can also spring from inside her, owing to a deeply rooted cultural heritage and patriarchal tradition. The ambivalence and uncertainty among many women, especially with respect to their maternal role, are strong indications of this.

Where is Family Life Tending?

The family-centric model describes processes and trends in their purest forms. Needless to say reality is always more complex and nuanced. Seen from a life-cycle perspective, the positions within the model vary. Sources of balance and tension are likely to change from time to time. In the younger families, friction points arise from the reconciliation of childcare and paid work, as the spouses give meaning to their sometimes conflicting parental roles and work-identities.

In contrast, practical solutions and the logic of interaction are often firmly established in the case of older couples. Stable patterns have emerged and different forms of interaction have come to dominate, depending, among other things, on how challenges have been met within the family from one time to another. It must be emphasized that very few families fit completely into one of the cells, but they easily tilt from one cell to another. Many families are balanced between the voluntaristic and the forced matricentric positions. The voluntaristic matricentric position of the wife may also be evolving into a shared family centre.

The most important question for my purposes is where family life is tending. Are we experiencing a move from forced matricentric families towards centreless ones? Or is the main tendency from voluntaristic matricentric families towards shared ones? The most pessimistic scenario, and probably the most obviously increasing one, is, unfortunately, the forced matricentric position evolving into a centre-avoiding unit.

But why do we fear that such a trend towards centreless families is the prevailing one? On what grounds is that scenario based? One element is the reconciliation of work and family life. When women leave the home to enter the labour market, something else is needed to restore the balance. The transformation of family life has been much more complicated for men than for women, as Rita Liljeström discusses in her chapter in this volume. She refers to Castells's insightful remark that "if there is a family crisis, it is a male family crisis." Our fear that modern families are tending towards centreless units has to do with the role of men as fathers and husbands. It is to this challenging project of men's renegotiation of the family contract that we will now turn.

The Reluctant Role of Men in Family Transformation

Fatherhood and the issue of men as family members are rapidly expanding research topics. These issues are explored within highly different theoretical frameworks. Many feminists stress male power within the family and conclude that very little progress is being made (Bekkengen 1999, Lynne 1997). Studies of men, on the other hand, often point to the influence of women within the space of the family (Holter and Aarseth 1993). A moderate view within men's studies argues that men's family participation is increasing and the foundations of male power are diminishing (Nilsson 1992), whereas others, more male-oriented, maintain that men generally have egalitarian values, but are being excluded from the home and the private sphere by women (Gíslason 1997).

Certainly, empirical research reveals that values and cultural frames of reference are changing. International data show that a majority of married men with children claim that their identity is linked to the family and the private sphere (Björnberg 1994). However, there is persistent documentation that inequalities persist between men's and women's tasks and responsibilities within family life (Hochschild 1989, Vogler and Pahl 1994). One suggested interpretation is that the primary driving force behind men's "active fatherhood" is not the wish to develop family life based on equality with women, but rather the wish to gain control over reproduction. Thus, men seek contact with their children more for the sake of their own personal development (Björnberg 1994). This is in line with a study showing that when men's family role is at stake in relation to custody and maintenance, they receive public attention in the media.

As far as fatherhood is concerned, men's paternity leave has been regarded as a major indicator of change. Empirical research on paternity leave in Scandinavian countries, where men are generally entitled to parental leave, shows that progress is rather slow. Sweden was the first Scandinavian country to change maternity leave into parental leave in the mid-1970s. However, men in these Nordic countries took paternity leave to only a limited extent until they were granted an individual right to a non-transferable month in the mid-1990s (Bekkengen 1996).

One factor that has had an impact on the extent to which men take parental leave, is the woman's position on the labour market. Women with high status and income are more likely than other women to share parental leave with their spouses (Bekkengen 1999). A similar tendency has been noted in respect to men's degree of activeness in the fatherhood role (Sandquist 1993, Åström 1990).

However, quantitative assessment of men's parental leave is one thing. A dif-

ferent issue is the pattern of relations that men have with their children, and the impact of this on the dynamics within the family. Many studies reveal that the commonest pattern is that the mother provides the nurturing and affective aspects, while fathers are more likely to fulfil the role of a playmate, or simply undertake a hobby with the child (Lewis and O'Brian 1987; Hyvönen 1993; Moxnes 1992). This seems to be a persistent pattern, although certain findings indicate that those men who take prolonged paternity leave develop a consciousness of certain obligations towards the home (Hwang 1993, Ahrne and Roman 1997:82).

Bekkengen advances strong arguments for making a distinction between, on the one hand, housework and overall responsibility for the home, and, on the other hand, childcare, including paternity leave (Bekkengen 1999). According to Bekkengen, relations between men and children, and relations between men and women, are two different types of relationships, and they can be separated analytically, though not on the practical level. Men can develop a deeper relationship with their child or children without necessarily becoming more egalitarian towards their wives. Bekkengen claims that the emphasis on men's relations with their children can provide men with the "best of both worlds": they can make the choice of achieving a deep relationship with their children without having to be involved in the private sphere. Thus relations between men and women, Bekkengen concludes, must be conceptualized as a power relationship.

I have, in another context, discussed the dilemmas of modern Icelandic fathers concerning this issue (Einarsdóttir 1998). They tend to be involved in those household tasks they like, to the extent they decide for themselves. Many of them choose the children, but tend to pick and choose from other responsibilities. These are certainly not new findings, but my line of reasoning takes a different direction from Bekkengen's. I made a distinction between the "babysitter" on the one hand and the "house-husband" on the other. In practice, babysitters are those who tend to distinguish between housework and childcare. They view paternity leave (and in fact, family life in general), as a sort of "buffet" from which they can pick and choose. They choose, almost without exception, the children, but often have mixed feelings about other elements.

Another group of fathers, the house-husbands, are more involved in the inner core of the family and tend view paternity leave in ways similar to the perceptions of women, i.e., as an "inclusive package" in which running the home is not distinguished from childcare. An example of this is the father who is so used to doing things around the house that he hardly notices what he does.

My view is that men who choose the "buffet-deal" instead of the "inclusive package" have to deal with certain contradictions, since housework and childcare (like caring within families in general) cannot easily be broken down into unrelated tasks. To take but one example, we may consider the case of the child that refuses to eat and demands a particular meal that must be prepared with ingenuity and care. When does cooking for this child cease to be housework and evolve into caring work?

I further suggested that it is the mother's overview or holistic approach that constitutes the female influence in the family. In fact, the family-centric model is a theoretical elaboration of that position. Consequently, the men who vote for the "inclusive package" are those with the most real influence — not least regarding the children. And conversely, the men with a "strong" position vis-à-vis their wives, in terms of not participating in housework, are stuck in a paradoxical sit-

uation. Their preference for the "buffet" deal may yield a "strong" position in an old-fashioned, patriarchal sense, meaning that they can pick and choose among household tasks. But this position is, in effect, on the margins and reduces their impact on everyday life, relationships, and decisionmaking concerning the child. They face the truth of the adage that "one cannot have one's cake and eat it".

The difference between Bekkengen's and my interpretations derives from different theoretical approaches. From my viewpoint, she overemphasizes the notion of male power, whereas I try to include it as one of many dimensions and conceptualize it within a bigger framework. Thus, when I state that women's influence comes from their holistic overview of and approach towards family life, the question arises whether more sharing by men means less power for women? The answer depends on the premises on which they share work, which is a point Bekkengen misses. Women with a "forced" matricentric position may very well be subordinated, in the sense that their husbands set standards, pick out what they want, and leave the rest to the wife. In the Icelandic study on men on paternity leave, we have an example of this: In a family with a shared central position, the wife was so willing to let the man in that she provided him with a clearly dominant position. She stands aside to the point that the balance is threatened, as is exemplified by the man's attempts to control her breastfeeding of their infant child.

Concluding Remarks

The most urgent question we have to face at this point is the risk of both spouses leaving the inner core empty. The historical trends discussed by Castells (1997) and referred to at the beginning of this chapter indicate rising divorce rates and increasingly frequent marital crises. We have in this chapter discussed the inner premises and consequences of this tendency.

Men have not responded to the rise of women's paid work by renegotiating their family participation to any considerable degree. Men in general are moving very slowly into family life. And when they do, it is — sad to say — often to satisfy their own needs for a relationship with their children. The historical trends unravelled in the empirical data reveal the risk that women will follow in men's footsteps and not vice versa.

If we relate the family-centric model to the different theoretical standpoints discussed earlier, i.e., feminist approaches and men's studies, we could say that they overemphasize different trends and, consequently, certain types of family in the model. The "voluntaristic" matricentric position is overstated in much of the male-oriented research, and stresses that men are excluded from the family life by women. In contrast, the "forced" matricentric position is overstated by many feminists, who strongly emphasize male power. What both of them have in common, however, is the undervaluing of the cell in the model in which we can expect a shared family centre. What is worse is that both neglect the risks of centre-avoiding families. This may arise from the common underlying assumption of the gendered zero-sum game.

For this reason, I am not inclined to isolate male power as an underlying theoretical assumption, as Bekkengen does. Rather, I find it more fruitful to include antagonistic interests and conflicts between men and women as one feature among many others in the relationship between the sexes.

Maybe it has to be stressed that it is not a linguistic trick to translate women's oppression into influence and power. This question is of fundamental importance. If there is no grain of influence or power bestowed on women, and male power is viewed as all-embracing, the gender-power approach itself becomes analytically ineffective. This assumption also means that women are without means to influence the evolving trends we now witness. The patterns we have depicted are based on interviews with people with healthcare occupations. However, they are by no means specific to these groups. Similar trends are found in all classes, as indicated by my Icelandic study on men on paternity leave. Nevertheless, further research is needed in order to better understand the impact of class positions and how the interaction of spouses can be conceptualized against a background of class-based resources.

This chapter has attempted to introduce new paths in the discourse of family interaction. The discussion implies that well-known patterns of sharing household tasks, parental leave, and such detachable matters, can be taken a step further and scrutinized in terms of the logic, or spirit, of interaction. By this we are trying to come to grips with a whole that is more than the sum of its parts. We have seen different configurations emerging from the same or similar patterns of division of housework. The importance of this new approach may be symbolically demonstrated by the position of Anna and Christer's interaction. Ironically, they probably represent the most "equal" couple of all in our examples, in terms of quantitative contributions. But their "equality" is realized in "the worst of worlds": they are running a household with an "empty" inner core, and with their "real" lives located outside the home.

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Change and Continuity in the Turkish Middle Class Family[1]

DIANE SUNAR

The Traditional Rural Turkish Family

> In a small Turkish village, far away from the city, young Zeki has just returned home after completing his military service and is helping his father with the farm. He can't help noticing that Aysun has developed into an attractive young woman while he has been gone. Although it is a small village, the two young people do not know each other well. Zeki begins to watch for the time that Aysun will go to fetch water or do other chores that take her out of the house. Aysun doesn't miss the fact that a young man is paying her attention, and she begins to arrange her chores so that she has a better chance of "accidentally" running into him. Before long, without much conversation, they are in love with one another — from a distance. Zeki persuades his parents to ask for Aysun's hand. But unknown to Zeki, Aysun's family has been negotiating with a family from the next village who are offering a handsome bride price, so they refuse Zeki's offer. The young couple are crushed by the news (separately). In desperation, Zeki asks Aysun to run away with him, and she consents. Her family is scandalized and outraged at the betrayal, and her older brother tracks them down and kills them both. Turning himself in to the police, the brother confesses the murder but says he is not sorry because it was the only way to restore his family's honour.

This drama is the core plot of innumerable Turkish movies, and audiences seem never to tire of this tragedy in all its variations. It is also played out with some frequency in real life: some version of this story can be found in the Turkish newspapers almost every week. Why does this story resonate so strongly with Turkish audiences, the vast majority of whom have never encountered such a drama in their everyday lives? One reason is probably that it embodies such a large number of elements of Turkish culture while at the same time exposing their internal contradictions. A grasp of these elements of Turkish culture will be very useful in trying to understand the significance of parental behaviour in urban middle class families (even though the social norms governing urban life are in many ways quite different from rural norms), so let us examine them here briefly, with a fuller discussion to follow.

Zeki has returned to the village and is helping on his father's farm: In traditional Turkish society, sons are expected to stay with their families and con-

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tribute to them economically. They are also expected to shoulder responsibility for taking care of their parents in their old age.

The young people do not know each other well: Traditional rural Turkish society is highly sex-segregated, with men spending most of their time in the company of other men, and women in the company of other women. In addition, young people are kept pretty much away from members of the other sex in order to prevent premarital liaisons.

Zeki's family asks for Aysun's hand in marriage: Traditionally, young people do not select their own marriage partners. Rather, the choice is made by their parents, who are presumed to be wiser in these matters. Some concession may be made to young people's feelings, as in the case of Zeki's family, but the final decision rests

The family from the other village offers a better bride price: While brides are not actually "bought," the amount of money or goods offered by a prospective groom's family, either to the bride's family or to the young people themselves, can be crucial in deciding whether or not to accept a marriage offer.

The young couple run away together: "Abducting" a bride is a solution of desperation for young men who cannot secure the bride they desire through payment of bride price and permission from the bride's family. There is the hope that they may marry and that the parents will accept the situation in time. However, it is a dangerous solution because the girl's chastity is cast into doubt, with negative effects on the family's reputation (namus or honour), and a respectable marriage with an acceptable bride price becomes impossible.

Aysun's brother kills the fugitive couple: Loss of honour requires restoration through blood. Underlying this norm is a broader understanding that tradition and authority must not be defied.

This drama is not unknown in the West — in somewhat different form, it unfolds in stories from *Romeo and Juliet* to *West Side Story* — but particularly in modern times it has taken on a different twist, metamorphosing from tragedy to comedy: the couple succeed in their rebellion, and they live happily ever after while the selfish, short-sighted parents either get their well-deserved punishment or come to approve the match in the end. Rather than being simply a vindication of young love, however, the comedy version can be read as a proclamation of individualistic values, in which individual happiness is more important than family harmony, self-fulfilment is more important than obedience, and choice is more important than tradition. Likewise, the story of Zeki and Aysun can be read as a reminder of communal or collectivistic values in which stability is more important than passion, the individual exists in relation to the group (particularly the family), and rebellion against tradition and authority can only lead to unhappiness for all.

The subject of this paper is not young love or choice of marriage partner, but rather the childrearing practices of urban, middle class Turkish parents. However, the romantic drama of Zeki and Aysun offers us a quick insight into the tra-

ditional cultural world that will serve as a point of reference and contrast in discussing the cultural world of the Turkish urban middle class family.

In order to describe or analyze change, one needs to define a baseline of stability. Therefore, let us describe somewhat more systematically some of the main features of the traditional Turkish family. These features seem to have remained relatively stable over very long years, although they now appear to be undergoing a process of transformation, particularly among the urban population.

As is obvious in the Zeki-Aysun vignette, one of the most striking characteristics of the traditional Turkish family is the extent to which it is male-dominated: it is a patrilineal, patrilocal, and patriarchal system (see Bastuğ's chapter in this volume for a discussion of the historical roots of these traditions). The family line is traced from father to son and sons are expected to remain in (or near) their father's home, and to bring their brides into the paternal household. Ultimate authority in the family rests with the father. Also, brothers — particularly older brothers — are in part responsible for protecting their sisters, and grown sons are in part responsible for their mothers. Their authority over the women is acknowledged in turn.

The dominant value in the system is *namus*, or honour, which is maintained in large part through the men in the family being in control of the sexual behaviour (chastity) of the women (Kağıtçıbaşı and Sunar 1992; Meeker 1976; Sunar 1999). As Peristiany (1965) and others have pointed out, honour, far from being a feature unique to Moslem societies, is a value common to most southern European and Mediterranean cultures. While the power of honour as a value has declined with industrialization and urbanization, throughout the region it maintains a strong hold on family relationships and relationships between the sexes, particularly in rural areas. Turkish society, entering into the industrialization and urbanization processes at a relatively later date than most other southern European societies, has continued to be governed by honour norms and male dominance in the family longer and perhaps more visibly than the others have.[2]

A second striking feature of traditional rural Turkish culture is that family relationships are characterized by a high degree of material and emotional interdependence. As Kağıtçıbaşı's research clearly shows, rural families value children in large part for their potential material contributions to the family's welfare. To some degree, children are valued for their labour potential while still children, but more importantly, they are expected to take care of their parents in their old age. In a pre-modern economy, with no public arrangements for care of the elderly, aging parents have no recourse but to depend on their offspring (Kağıtçıbaşı 1982; 1990). Accordingly, children are reared to feel great attachment, respect, and loyalty towards the parents.[3]

Traditional Practices in Childrearing

Based on the features of male dominance and material/emotional interdependence, two important sets of traditional practices in childrearing can be

2 Kyle's contribution to this volume notes that the move away from patriarchy is recent in northern Europe also.

3 For fuller discussions of these characteristics of the Turkish family see, among others, Kağıtçıbaşı and Sunar 1992.

identified: those that contribute to differentiation and stratification between the sexes, and those that bind the child into the interdependent family network.

The wide difference in status and power accorded males and females results in a number of differential attitudes and practices directed towards children. For example, in rural areas there is a strong preference for having sons rather than daughters (see Kağıtçıbaşı 1990). This preference derives in large part from the expectation of greater economic contributions by sons, but it is reinforced by other aspects of the cultural system, such as the desire to carry on the male line and the status that accrues to the mother of a son.

Ataca (1989) has documented differential treatment of sons and daughters in many areas of family life, even in urban middle class settings. There is a widespread tendency to educate sons more than daughters: official statistics show higher literacy rates and higher levels of educational attainment for males than females at all ages. Males and females are separated both physically and symbolically (see, e.g., Olson 1982). Their work roles are highly differentiated, and the status value of a particular task depends strongly on whether it is "men's work" or "women's work" (Kağıtçıbaşı and Sunar 1992).

Maintenance of family honour requires considerable restriction of female behaviour, and compared to boys, girls are much more closely supervised and limited in their permissible activities, particularly in later childhood and adolescence (Başaran 1974; Ataca 1989).

The honour tradition not only underlies male dominance but contributes to the closely knit relationships of the traditional family as well, because honour belongs to individuals, not as individuals but as members of families. Thus each person is dependent on the behaviour of all the rest of the family for his or her status as an honourable member of the community. This feature of the traditional Turkish family suggests that it should be classified as a "collectivistic" institution (as defined by, e.g., Hofstede 1980, Triandis et. al. 1985), and it is one of the bases for Kağıtçıbaşı's conceptualization (1985) of Turkish culture as a "culture of relatedness."

The dual interdependencies can function smoothly only if parents socialize children to feel their responsibilities and loyalties to the family keenly, subordinating their own interests and ambitions to the needs of others in the family group. This leads to strong emphasis on the authority of the parents, especially the father, obedience by the children, and surveillant control over the behaviour of everyone in the family. It also leads to cultivation of sensitivity to the needs of others in the family and a lack of emphasis on individualistic achievement. Conflict within the family is minimized, and feelings of closeness and loyalty are stressed.

The extent of closeness is demonstrated by a series of studies by Fişek (1991) and her students (e.g., Levi 1986) that have shown that "enmeshment" rather than individuation of family members is typical of Turkish families. Conceptions of and experience of the self are inseparable from conceptions of and experience of close family members. As Fişek argues, the negative connotation of "enmeshment" is probably inappropriate when describing a normal, typical cultural pattern: the term was coined to describe Western families with unusually permeable boundaries among family members. A term such as "close-knit" as used by Kağıtçıbaşı and others is preferable in describing Turkish families.

Control of the individual's behaviour in the traditional family is typically external, based on anxiety and shame, rather than internal or based on guilt, and

physical punishment is the most common parental response to disobedience and other misbehaviour (Kağıtçıbaşı, Sunar and Bekman 1989).

In bare outline, then, these are the features of family relationships and child-rearing practices that form the traditional basis against which we may compare current trends. The main purpose of the present paper is to identify some of the elements of this system that show either stability or change in the urban middle class context, and to assess some of their effects on the child.

The Middle Class Urban Family

Despite enormous demographic change over the past thirty years, the population of Turkey continues to be largely rural, either by current residence or by origin. Although roughly 70 per cent of the Turkish population now lives in cities, a very large proportion of city dwellers were born in villages, or are the children of village-origin parents. Most social scientists interested in modern Turkish society have acknowledged this fact by concentrating either on rural villagers or on the rural-to-urban migrants who live in shantytown *(gecekondu)* areas surrounding the larger cities. The studies reported by Bolak and Erder in this volume are examples of this focus on *gecekondu* life. Until very recently, the urban middle class has seemed to be a small and unrepresentative group, hardly worth studying because of its relatively small numbers and its somewhat marginal status.

However, present-day Turkish society is marked by great geographical and social mobility. In addition to rural-to-urban migration, there is rapid growth and change in indicators such as literacy, income, and consumption patterns. Despite a trend towards ever-greater disparity between the top and the bottom of the economic scale, the urban middle class itself appears to be undergoing a period of rapid expansion and dynamic change. Thus the middle class seems likely to be the "wave of the future": to attain middle class status is the basic aspiration for a large segment of what is now the "lower," i.e., rural-origin class. The middle class also serves as a model of behaviour, tastes, and expectations for the much more numerous lower class, both through leadership by example and through the strong urban influence in mass media. If we were to anticipate the directions in which the large population of rural-to-urban migrants and their descendants are likely to go, then we should begin to study the middle class and identify trends that have begun to appear there. This paper will take up part of this challenge by examining some of the changes in the urban middle class family that have taken place within the last three generations, as well as some persistent differences between rural and urban families.

The portrait of the urban Turkish family that will emerge in the following pages is based on a series of cross-generational studies of childrearing practices that have been carried out over the past several years at Bogazici University under the direction of the present author. Some of these studies have been presented in whole or in part elsewhere.[4] These studies have focused on the practices of parents in bringing up their children, and on the consequences and correlates of these practices in the lives of the children.

In these studies we have paid particular attention to gender issues in parental practices: How are the practices of mothers similar to those of fathers, and how

4 Ataca 1989; Ataca, Sunar, and Kağıtçıbaşı 1996; Ataca and Sunar 1999; Pehlivanoğlu 1998; Sever 1985; Sunar 1986; Sunar 1994; Sunar, Pehlivanoğlu, Bayraktar, and Townes 1998.

are they different? Are sons and daughters treated the same way by their parents? What are the similarities and differences? The outcomes and correlates have also been examined with an eye to gender similarities and differences in areas such as self-esteem, sex-role identification, and sex-role stereotypes. At the same time, each of these questions has been examined in a time perspective by comparing the experiences of three generations.

More specifically, parental practices have been examined on two of the most basic dimensions in childrearing: first, the emotional relationship between parent and child; and second, parental control of the child. These two dimensions, under various labels (such as warmth and control, affection and discipline, and the like) emerge in almost every study of parenting practices, indicating that they are significant and that they represent aspects of the parent-child relationship that are universal. We can expect both of them to be implicated in producing sex differentiation and interdependency.

The basic research design (Sunar 1986; 1994) compared three generations of 113 middle- and upper-middle class families with regard to the practices used by mothers and fathers with sons and daughters. In the following sections, the generations will be referred to as the Child generation (14-16 year old students), the Parent generation (parents of the students), and the Grandparent generation (grandparents of the students). Other studies by Sever (1985), Ataca (1989), and Pehlivanoğlu (1998) supplemented the basic study by adding further variables and comparison groups. Sever studied three generations of females — teenage daughters, mothers, and maternal grandmothers; Ataca studied perceptions of equalitarian versus traditional treatment of sons and daughters in an urban middle class sample of women, and their effect on self-esteem and fertility in the daughters; and Pehlivanoğlu compared practices of upper middle class and working class urban parents and their effects on their teenage children.

Four main measures were used in the studies. The first was the Child Rearing Practices Report (Block 1965). On this measure, respondents rate the degree to which certain behaviours and practices characterized their mothers (the Mother version), their fathers (the Father version), and themselves with respect to their children or prospective children (the Child version). The other three measures were Coopersmith's Self-esteem Scale (Coopersmith 1975), the Bem Sex Role Inventory (Bem 1972); and items from the Value of Children survey (Kağıtçıbaşı 1982). In addition, all participants were interviewed.

Childrearing Practices in Urban Middle Class Families

In terms of childrearing practices, perhaps the most striking overall finding was the degree to which mothers and fathers were perceived as adopting the same practices. Considering the large number of items (91) on the Child Rearing Practices Report and the fact that the three generations were pooled, the consensus that emerged was remarkable: fathers and mothers were very similarly described in terms of the items which were rated as describing them best and those which described them least well. While certain differences were found between the practices of mothers and fathers, and across the generations, some of which will be discussed in detail in the following sections, uniformity of practice, or at least uniformity of perception, appeared to be the rule.

As noted above, fathers and mothers were very similarly described in terms of the most descriptive and least descriptive of the 91 statements. Six of the top ten items were the same for both mothers and fathers, and seven of the ten lowest-rated items were the same for both mothers and fathers. Looking at a narrower band of high and low items, three of the top seven items for mothers are also among the top seven items for fathers, and five of the seven lowest-rated items are the same for both mothers and fathers. The three statements most strongly endorsed for both are the following:

- *My mother (father) expected me to be grateful and appreciate all the advan tages I had.*
- *My mother (father) let me know she (he) appreciated what I had tried or accomplished.*
- *My mother (father) wanted me to make a good impression on others.*

In rating their behaviour with their own children, parents emphasized two of the same items: giving appreciation to the child for effort or accomplishment, and wanting the child to make a good impression on others. Also, one of the statements rated highest by parents as describing their own behaviour towards their children was the statement rated highest for mothers by children:

- *I find some of my greatest satisfactions in my child. (Some of my mother's greatest satisfactions were gotten from her children.)*
  Another was one of the statements most highly rated for fathers:
- *I encourage my child always to do his/her best. (My father encouraged me always to do my best.)*

All three generations and both sexes portray a family atmosphere dominated by close and highly positive maternal involvement with children, parental appreciation of the child's efforts, and a reciprocal demand for the child's appreciation of the parents and what they provide. At the same time, the family's reputation and the child's contribution to it are of prime importance.

The five items that were seen as least descriptive for both mothers and fathers were the following:

- *My mother (father) punished me by putting me off somewhere by myself for a while.*
- *My mother (father) felt I was a bit of a disappointment to her (him).*
- *My mother (father) believed physical punishment was the best method of di cipline.*
- *My mother (father) was reluctant to see me grow up.*
- *There was a good deal of conflict between my mother (father) and me.*

These five least descriptive items listed above were also rated similarly when parents rated their own behaviour towards their children. In addition, one of the lowest-rated items was also among the lowest-rated for mothers:

- *I have strict, well-established rules for my child. (My mother had strict, well established rules for me.)*

Another was one of the items rated lowest for fathers:

- *I often feel angry with my child. (My father often felt angry with me.)*

These low-rated items give a picture of families with little conflict between parents and children, and parents avoid both the setting of strict rules and the use of physical punishment and isolation of the child as a means of discipline. It would appear that parents do not allow disciplinary concerns to interfere with the intensely close relationships they have with their children. These items also reinforce the picture of support for and pride in the child and his or her efforts and accomplishments.

Thus there appears to be considerable consensus between mothers and fathers and across generations in certain dimensions of childrearing behaviour. At the same time, of course, there were some differences in perceptions of mothers and fathers. The most-endorsed items for mothers that were not among the top ten for fathers were the following:

- *My mother gave me comfort and understanding when I was scared or upset.*
- *My mother discouraged me from fighting.*
- *My mother always made sure she knew where I was and what I was doing.*
- *My mother enjoyed seeing me eat well and enjoying my food.*

The most-endorsed items for fathers that were not among the top ten for mothers were the following:

- *My father believed that I always told the truth.*
- *My father was the one with the most authority over the children.*
- *My father felt it was very important for me to play outdoors and get lots of fresh air.*
- *My father trusted me to behave as I should, even when he was not around.*

These items are consistent with traditional roles for mothers and fathers, with mothers being highly involved in care and supervision of their children and fathers taking a more distant but authoritative role.

The least-endorsed items for mothers that were not among the bottom ten for fathers were the following:

- *My mother had strict, well-established rules for me.*
- *My mother sometimes used to tease and make fun of me.*
- *My mother liked to have time for herself, away from her children.*

The least-endorsed items for fathers that were not among the bottom ten for mothers were the following:

- *My father helped me when I was being teased by my friends.*
- *My father gave up some of his own interests because of his children.*
- *My father expected me not to get dirty while I was playing.*

Once again, traditional roles for mother and father are revealed in these items, with the mother's positive involvement being emphasized, compared with the father's relative distance and encouragement of some independence in the child.

The image of the family that emerges from these most and least descriptive items is one that is generally harmonious, non-punitive, supportive of the child, and sensitive to evaluation by the outside community. This image shows continuity with the traditional family described in the introductory section in some important respects. The emotional attachment and loyalty of the individual to the family discussed there would seem to be promoted by such a family system. The lack of well-established rules is also reflective of the personalized nature of authority and decisionmaking in families whose members' self-definitions are relational and comparatively undifferentiated (Fişek 1991).

More specific findings regarding the emotional relationship between parents and children, including love and affection, anger and conflict, and encouragement of emotional expression or self-control are presented below, followed by findings regarding parental use of authority and control, including style of discipline and encouragement of autonomy and dependence.

Emotional Relationship

The "emotional relationship" between parents and children includes two important aspects. The first is the quality of the relationship, defined by the emotions the parent shows to the child — warmth, affection, and love, as well as anger and negative emotion. The second is the amount and kind of emotion the child is allowed or encouraged to express towards the parents.

Warmth and Affection towards the Child

All of the studies suggest that there is a great deal of warmth and affection in the Turkish middle class family, particularly between mothers and children. Responding to the Child version of the Child Rearing Practices Report, parents of both sexes and across three generations perceive themselves as being close and affectionate with their children.

Looking at the responses to the Mother and Father versions, participants of both sexes also perceive their parents as warm and affectionate across the three generations. However, there are both generational and gender differences. The child generation perceives more warmth and closeness from both mother and father than either the parent or grandparent generation (which do not differ from one another). That is, there is a trend towards more open expression of positive emotion towards children in the present day. Mothers are perceived as more affectionate than fathers are by both sons and daughters of all three generations. On the other hand, daughters perceive their fathers as more affectionate than sons do, again across the three generations, while sons and daughters perceive their mothers as equally affectionate.

Responses to the Value of Children questions support the picture of a generally warm family life. Urban middle class respondents of both sexes and across three generations rate "having someone to love" as an important reason to have a child, in contrast to the rural emphasis on "having someone to help you in your old age." This is a continuing trend, confirming Kağıtçıbaşı's (1980) Value of Children results showing large differences between urban and rural respondents in the values attributed to children.

Although the degree of emotional warmth perceived by all generations was generally high, there was some variation, which allows us to assess whether it has

implications for personality later in life. The clearest effect is that greater maternal warmth is associated with greater self-esteem in children. Over three generations, expression of affection and closeness by mothers contributed to higher scores on the measure of self-esteem. The robustness of this effect can be seen in its persistence, even after 50 years or more, in the grandparent generation. Perhaps equally interesting, fathers' affection and closeness are not significantly related to self-esteem for either sex or any of the three generations.

Somewhat surprisingly, identification with conventional sex role characteristics appears not to be related to parental affection for either males or females. Indeed, very few of the mother's behaviours and attitudes tapped by the Child Rearing Practices report were related to sex-role identification for either males or females. Likewise, the father's behaviours had only a slight impact on males' masculine sex-role identification. In contrast, females' feminine sex-role identification was strongly affected by their fathers' childrearing practices. However, most of the items related to feminine sex-role identification had more to do with control and discipline than with affection and closeness.

Expression of Anger towards the Child

On the Child Rearing Practices Report, one of the most consistent results across generations was the low rating given to items regarding parental anger and conflict between parents and children. As noted above, these items were almost universally rated as "not descriptive" of either mothers or fathers. In addition, parents of both sexes across all three generations rated the items as not descriptive of themselves.

There were small sex differences on this dimension: fathers were perceived as somewhat more angry than mothers were, and sons were somewhat more likely than daughters to perceive fathers as angry.

Interestingly, although few parents were perceived as being frequently angry, parental anger had a considerable impact on the child's self-esteem, across the three generations. The more the parents were perceived as angry and in conflict with the child, the lower the child's self-esteem was likely to be. Like the effect of maternal affection, this effect also shows considerable staying power, being reflected in responses of the grandparent generation as well as the younger generations.

Emotional Expression in the Child

Turkish culture has traditionally valued self-control and a sober demeanour. However, parents' tendencies to encourage or restrict emotional expression in children have changed over the three generations: each generation shows an increase in encouragement of or tolerance of emotional expression in comparison to the previous generation. Daughters perceive their fathers as more tolerant of emotional expression than sons do, while mothers receive similar ratings from both sons and daughters. These results apply mainly to the expression of positive emotions: very little parent-child conflict is reported in any generation, suggesting that control of negative emotions is strongly encouraged.

Encouragement of positive emotional expression is positively related to the child's self-esteem, while open conflict is negatively related. This suggests that the important factor influencing self-esteem is probably positive emotional tone rather than freedom of expression per se.

Parental Control

"Parental control" comprises three sub-dimensions: (1) the extent to which the parent exercises authority and control; (2) the style of discipline and punishment used by the parent; and (3) the extent to which the parent encourages autonomy or dependency in the child.

Exercise of Authority and Control

Two rather different types of control emerge from the items of the Child Rearing Practices Report (CRPR). The first could be called "authoritarian control," reflected in the following items:

- *My mother (father) believed that children should be seen and not heard.*
- *My mother (father) did not allow me to get angry with her (him).*
- *My mother (father) had strict, well-established rules for me.*
- *My mother (father) did not allow me to question her (his) decisions.*

The second might more properly be called close surveillance, reflected in items like the following:

- *My mother (father) watched closely what I ate and when I ate.*
- *My mother (father) always made sure she (he) knew where I was and what I was doing.*
- *My mother (father) used to control what I did by warning me of all the bad things that could happen to me.*

Although enforcement of strict rules is part of the authoritarian cluster, this is not a prominent feature of childrearing in the urban Turkish family. Both fathers and mothers exert control over their children on a more intuitive and personalistic basis. In fact, overall scores on authoritarian control items are relatively low, except for the item concerning prohibition of child anger. That is, comparatively few of these urban, middle class respondents have experienced a highly authoritarian parental style. Nevertheless, there are clear generational and sex differences in the use and experience of authority and control, in both senses. Authoritarian control has significantly decreased over the past three generations, and it is significantly lower in the middle class than in the working class. Daughters are, on the whole, kept under closer surveillance than sons are, particularly by their mothers, while sons are more likely than daughters to be controlled in an authoritarian manner by both parents. Fathers are perceived as more authoritarian than mothers are, while mothers are perceived as more closely controlling than fathers are.

Style of Discipline and Punishment

In clear contrast to the rural/lower class, middle class parents avoid the use of physical punishment as a means of discipline. They also avoid techniques involving isolation of the child, preferring techniques that keep the child engaged with the parent. Instead of "power assertive" punishment (Hoffman 1979), the emphasis is on reward for desired behaviour and, to some extent, on shaming and threats of withdrawal of love. Style of discipline is directly related with self-esteem in later life: children who perceive their parents as physically punitive have lower self-esteem, while those who perceive their parents as using reward

and reasoning have higher self-esteem. This effect is pervasive, applying to children of both sexes, parents of both sexes, and all three generations.

Encouragement of Autonomy Versus Dependency

Both males and females across all three generations perceive both mothers and fathers as expecting the child to be grateful for the advantages s/he had. Likewise, both parents in all three generations are perceived as wanting the child to make a good impression on others. These two values reflect and underscore the primacy of the family over the individual. Accordingly, both sons and daughters are trained to be respectful and obedient. The following CRPR item was rated as "somewhat uncharacteristic" for both mothers and fathers by both sons and daughters in all three generations:

- *My mother (father) encouraged me to be independent of her (him).*

However, there are some sex and generational differences in other aspects of the encouragement of independence. Two of the CRPR items most relevant to the issue are the following:

- *My mother (father) let me make many decisions myself.*
- *My mother (father) respected my opinions and encouraged me to express them.*

For these items, there are generational differences, but no sex differences. Participants from the Child generation perceive both mother and father as encouraging independence to a greater extent than those of the Parent generation, and they in turn perceive both their parents as encouraging independence more than those of the Grandparent generation. For all three generations and both sexes, scores on these items are positively correlated with self-esteem.

Sons perceive more encouragement to develop autonomy than daughters do, particularly from their fathers, although this sex difference has decreased to some extent across the generations. This is seen clearly in response to the following item, which was endorsed more strongly by male respondents and by the Child generation:

- *My mother (father) realized that she (he) had to let me take some chances as I grew up and tried new things.*

In both sexes, greater encouragement of autonomy is associated with higher self-esteem. Equalitarian treatment of daughters has another important effect in adult life: daughters raised in an equalitarian atmosphere have fewer children than those raised in a more traditional manner.

The interrelated issues of control, discipline, and encouragement of autonomy are closely related to identification with conventional sex roles and attribution of conventional sex role stereotypes to others. As noted above, few items for either mother or father are related to sex-role identification for males. The parental behaviours that make a difference in masculine identification for males, over the three generations, are the following:

- *My mother threatened punishment more than she actually gave it.*
- *My mother thought scolding and criticism would make me improve.*
- *My father talked it over and reasoned with me when I misbehaved.*

- *My father realized he had to let me take some chances as I grew up and tried new things.*
- *My father believed in starting toilet training as early as possible.*

Taken together, these items suggest that masculine sex-role identification is facilitated by a father who encourages autonomy and uses reasoning rather than punishment and by a mother who does not present a very inviting model for imitation. However, none of these effects are very strong, and clearly other influences — probably culture and peer-related — are more important.

The items that made a difference in feminine sex-role identification for females are quite different in content, and there is a dramatic difference in the effect of mother and father behaviours. Again, only two maternal items have a significant (although relatively weak) effect: those regarding letting the child take chances while trying new things, and appreciation for the child's efforts and accomplishments. However, nine paternal items are strongly related to feminine sex-role identification, and all are concerned with some aspect of control or discipline. In addition to items listed above regarding strict, well-defined rules, controlling the child's behaviour through warnings, and expecting the child to be grateful and appreciate her advantages, the following are closely related:

- *My father taught me that in one way or another, punishment would find me when I was bad.*
- *My father trusted me to behave as I should, even when he was not around.*
- *My father gave me extra privileges when I was good.*
- *My father preferred to stay home when I was young rather than leave me with a stranger.*
- *My father punished me if I expressed jealousy or resentment towards my brothers or sisters.*
- *My father did not allow me to tease or play tricks on others.*

These items give us a picture of a father who is highly involved in regulating his daughter's behaviour, whether through warnings, rewards, or punishments, and who has a clear image of the kind of daughter he desires — gentle, gracious, and grateful, a perfect little lady.

I have presented the findings according to the type of parental practices (affection and control). However, let us briefly recapitulate the findings according to the outcomes for children in terms of self-esteem and sex-role identification.

The factors most reliably associated with higher self-esteem included mother's (but not father's) affection and closeness; encouragement by either parent of expression of positive emotion in the child; encouragement by either parent of the child's autonomy; and use of reward and reasoning as a means of discipline by either parent.

Parental practices appeared to have little impact on masculine sex-role identification by males, although feminine sex-role identification in females was closely related to the father's controlling behaviour towards his daughter.

Continuity and Change

To put the findings into perspective, and to seek overall patterns of continuity and change, it may be helpful first to digress into a more general discussion of

culture and its influence on childrearing practices. Within the cross-cultural psychology literature, there has been in recent years very extensive discussion of a cultural dimension generally labelled as "individualism-collectivism" (originally identified in Hofstede 1980). "Individualism" describes cultural arrangements in which the person is likely to subordinate the group's (family's) interests to his or her individual interests, and to perceive the self as unique and separate, while "collectivism" describes cultural arrangements in which the person is likely to subordinate his/her interests to the interests of the group (family) and to perceive the self primarily as a group member rather than as a discrete individual.

While individualism-collectivism is generally regarded as a cultural dimension, it is to some extent defined in terms of psychological tendencies, such as emotions, perceptions, values, and self-construals, which in turn are seen both as resulting from participation in the culture and as constituting that aspect of the culture. This, of course, has implications for childrearing, which is likewise assumed to have the dual aspects of helping to perpetuate the culture's values and practices and at the same time resulting from them. In other words, parents raise their children under the influence of their values, emotions, and self-construals (derived from their own upbringing in the culture) in such a way as to instil or evoke similar values, emotions, and self-construals in the children. Thus parents in an individualistic culture encourage and approve the child's independence, criticize and otherwise discourage its dependent tendencies, and set boundaries that make clear the essential separateness of each family member. Likewise, parents in a collectivistic culture encourage and approve the child's interdependence with the rest of the family, criticize or otherwise discourage its independent tendencies, and blur any boundaries which might reduce awareness of the essential connectedness of each family member with all the rest.

Where does Turkish culture lie on the individualism-collectivism continuum? Earlier research (such as Hofstede's original study) suggested that it could be placed near the collectivistic end of the spectrum. However, Turkish research carried out in the 1990s, mainly with urban samples, suggests that it may be more properly regarded as lying about midway between the two extremes (Göregenli 1995; Anamur 1998; Kılıç 2000). If this is the case, we could then expect urban Turkish childrearing practices to be a mixture of individualistic and collectivistic practices. Kağıtçıbaşı's classification of family types under different economic conditions (Kağıtçıbaşı 1996; also see Kağıtçıbaşı's paper in this volume) leads to a similar prediction. Her portrayal of the emotionally (but not economically) interdependent family, designed to describe families in a culture making the transition from an agricultural economy in which the family is the main unit of production to an urban, industrial economy, predicts "a combination, or coexistence, of individual and group (family) loyalties" (Kağıtçıbaşı 1996:89).

The three generations studied in the research reported in this chapter span the time during which Turkey has moved from a largely agricultural economic base to a largely industrial and commercial base, with the accompanying rural-to-urban demographic shifts. Although all three generations are urban, it would still be reasonable to expect the grandparent generation to be closer to the values of the traditional Turkish family, both in their own experience of being brought up and in their rearing of their children. Differences among the generations, particularly differences between the grandparent and the child generation, should have much to tell us about how economic and demographic changes are being reflected

in childrearing practices. Also, similarities across the generations can tell us which practices are less affected (or more slowly affected) by such changes.

Continuity in Traditional Patterns

Examining responses to the Child Rearing Practices Report across the three generations, we see that there were no generational differences on half the items describing mothers. Although the number of items showing no difference on the Father and Child versions was somewhat less — but still more than one-third of the total items — they showed great overlap with the Mother items. A total of 29 items showed the same pattern of stability on both Mother and Father versions, and 17 were the same for all three versions. A majority of these were items rated as relatively less descriptive. That is, to an important degree, the continuity consists of continuing not to do certain things. Examples of these items are the following:

- *My mother (father) helped me when I was being teased by friends.*
- *When I got into trouble, I was expected to handle the problem mostly by myself.*
- *My mother (father) tried to keep me away from children of families who had different ideas or values from hers/his.*
- *My mother (father) sometimes forgot the promises s/he made to me.*
- *My mother (father) thought it was good practice to perform in front of others.*
- *My mother (father) was reluctant to see me grow up.*
- *My mother (father) felt I was a bit of a disappointment to her/him.*
- *My mother (father) deprived me of privileges to punish me.*
- *My mother (father) gave me extra privileges when I was good.*
- *My mother (father) did not want me looked upon as different from others.*

Here again we see the supportive, flexible, low-pressure family style described above. However, another set of items with higher ratings shows us a different aspect of continuity in urban Turkish childrearing. This aspect can probably be best summarized as parental worry about the child, exemplified in the following items:

- *My mother (father) worried about all the bad and sad things that could happen to me as I grew up.*
- *My mother (father) worried about the state of my health.*
- *My mother (father) used to control what I did by warning me of all the bad things that could happen to me.*
- *My mother (father) felt it was important for me to play outdoors and get lots of fresh air.*

Parents in all three generations were perceived as trusting the child, with fathers being rated somewhat higher than mothers:

- *My mother (father) believed that I always told the truth.*

Perhaps not surprisingly, parents rated themselves as slightly less trusting than their children perceived them to be. Nevertheless, they gave themselves relatively high ratings on this item.

Two more items with moderate ratings showed continuity across the three generations:

- *My mother (father) encouraged me to keep control of my feelings at all times.*
- *My mother (father) encouraged me to do things better than others.*

Despite the great similarities between mothers' and fathers' behaviours, a clear role differentiation appears, with mothers being much more involved and controlling and fathers being much more distant and trusting — but retaining the final authority. This role differentiation is also consonant with traditional patterns.

To summarize briefly, findings from these four studies point up several areas of continuity in middle class urban family life. All three generations report parental behaviours that support the importance of the family over the individual. Likewise, all three generations report considerable emotional closeness in the family, especially between mothers and children, and to a lesser extent between fathers and daughters. This atmosphere of closeness is accompanied by low levels of parent-child conflict, flexibility and avoidance of hard-and-fast rules, and avoidance of physical and other coercive punishment. There is notable consistency in differential treatment of sons and daughters, with sons being given more autonomy while daughters are more closely supervised and controlled. Despite this difference, compared to rural and rural-origin groups, female children are attributed higher value by urban middle class parents in all three generations.

Changes from Traditional Patterns

While there are important areas of continuity, there are important differences from traditional family practices as well. In four areas of childrearing, there was increasing endorsement of items across the generations, with similar patterns for Mother, Father, and Child versions.

First, encouragement of effort and achievement was perceived to be greater in each succeeding generation.

- *My mother (father) encouraged me always to do my best.*
- *My mother (father) let me know s/he appreciated what I tried or accomplished.*

Second, each succeeding generation was perceived as encouraging greater independence in decisions.

- *My mother (father) respected my opinions and encouraged me to express them.*
- *My preferences were usually taken into account in making plans for the family.*
- *My mother (father) let me make many decisions by myself.*

Third, each generation of children was perceived as being given greater encouragement to think, question, and in general to pursue independent self-experience.

- *My mother (father) encouraged me to wonder and think about life.*
- *My mother (father) felt I should have time to think, daydream, and to loaf sometimes.*

- *My mother (father) encouraged me to be curious, to explore and to question things.*

Finally, each generation perceived greater encouragement of emotional openness.

- *My mother (father) encouraged me to talk about my troubles.*
- *My mother (father) used to tease and make fun of me.*

Just as some practices have increased across the generations, some have decreased as well. These changes can also be grouped into four categories.

First, there is a considerable decrease in anxiety about sexual matters.

- *My mother (father) did not believe young children of different sexes should see each other naked.*
- *My mother (father) dreaded answering my questions about sex.*

Second, both authoritarian control and surveillant control are perceived as decreasing across the generations.

- *My mother (father) did not allow me to question her (his) decisions.*
- *My mother (father) felt it unwise to let children play much by themselves, unsupervised by grown-ups.*

Likewise, the emphasis on religious (and other supernatural) explanations has decreased over the three generations.

- *My mother (father) sometimes explained things to me by talking about supernatural forces or beings.*

Finally, there was increasing disagreement with the following item over the three generations:

- *My mother (father) enjoyed having the house full of children.*

This might reflect smaller family size, greater involvement in activities outside the household (including maternal employment), less contact with relatives and neighbours, or a variety of other factors.

To summarize the changes observed over three generations, there is a clear trend towards greater psychological value of children, as compared to instrumental or material value. There is also a marked decrease in authoritarian control by parents, with greater use of rewards and reasoning as methods of discipline and greater encouragement of independence in the child. There is a trend towards increased encouragement of emotional expression across generations, although with continued suppression of negative emotions within the family. Despite continued relative restriction of daughters, a trend towards increased equalitarian treatment of sons and daughters can, nevertheless, be observed.

Perhaps the most striking change is the progressive eschewal of physical and other types of coercive punishment. Such a difference is in line with the high psychological, as opposed to economic value of children expressed by this sample

(Sunar 1990). It may be conjectured that close, harmonious family relationships are better promoted by this more rewarding, less punitive approach. However, this does not necessarily imply a shift from external to internal control in the urban family. Rather, it probably implies a move towards the use of anxiety over loss of love rather than anxiety about punishment as a means of control. While this may shift the emotional tone of control in a positive direction, control may continue to be essentially external.

Comparison with the Traditional Turkish Family

At the beginning of this chapter, some salient features of the traditional Turkish family and the cultural values it is embedded in were illustrated in a fictional story of illicit love. Does this story have anything to tell us about the urban middle class family? Let us review the elements of the traditional story and compare them with urban practices.

(1) The expectation of labour or other economic contribution to the family by adult children, as illustrated by Zeki's helping on his father's farm, has largely disappeared. Not only responses to the Value of Children questions, but also demographic trends such as lower birthrates in urban areas, indicate quite clearly that children are desired by urban parents primarily for their psychological value rather than their economic value.

(2) Separation of the sexes in urban settings is much less strict than in rural areas. The great majority of middle class urban young people attend coeducational schools, at least up to their middle teen years. Also, compared to their rural counterparts, young urban women are much less restricted and protected. Thus, unlike Zeki and Aysun, young middle class men and women are much more likely to be well acquainted with the other young people of both sexes in their schools and in their neighbourhoods.

(3) Arranged marriage is rapidly declining in urban areas, and the institution of the bride price simply does not exist in the urban middle class. When interviewed, many more of the Grandparent generation than of the Parent generation respondents indicated that their families were actively involved in their marriage decisions, and none of the Child generation respondents indicated that they expected or desired their families to be so involved. In view of these trends, "abduction" of brides has no rationale and is, therefore, virtually nonexistent in the urban middle class. While families may approve or oppose their children's choice of marriage partner, and while the family's attitude may carry considerable psychological or emotional importance for the child, typically the final decision rests with the child rather than the parents.

Although honour remains an important cultural ideal, in urban middle class practice, the relative autonomy afforded young people in the management of their affairs, including their marriage decisions, means that dramatic means of enforcement, such as the murder in the introductory vignette, are not called for or employed. If Zeki and Aysun had been members of the urban middle class rather than rural villagers, they would have been free to become well acquainted, they could have announced their marriage intentions freely, and even if her family had not approved they could have gone ahead with their plans without fear of reprisal. No one would have perceived their elopement as a serious breach of the family's honour, and no one would have sought to punish them for flouting

authority and tradition. In short, the comedy version of the drama - with the young couple being vindicated - would be more likely to be played out on the urban middle class stage. In other words, even if collectivistic or communal values have not disappeared, they have been heavily moderated in the urban middle class by a new emphasis on love, personal fulfilment, and happiness.

From the point of view of children, the middle class urban Turkish family displays a number of important strengths: highly stable family structure, emotional closeness, general uniformity of practice between mothers and fathers, support for the child's efforts, encouragement of achievement, change in the direction of greater value placed on daughters, and more equal treatment of daughters. From the point of view of individual development, on the other hand, some limitations are posed by the priority accorded to family harmony, preservation of the family's reputation, suppression of discord, and general discouragement of autonomy, particularly for daughters. The overall picture is consistent with that of a culture moving from a more collectivistic orientation towards a more individualistic one. In many respects, the Turkish middle class family would seem to have made, at least for the time being, a rather remarkable synthesis of some of the more positive aspects of both collectivistic and individualistic cultures (such as close relationships combined with strong encouragement of the child's achievements) while avoiding some of the most negative aspects of both (such as authoritarian discipline and interpersonal alienation). However, it is highly unlikely that this synthesis will persist unchanged very far into the future. Indeed, one of the most important points to emerge from these studies is that the current situation for Turkish urban families is the product of a complex and dynamic set of changes and stabilities.

As the traditional pattern of mutual obligations, based in the last analysis on material interdependency (Kağıtçıbaşı 1982), continues to lose its material base, and as individual pursuit of fulfilment and achievement begin to assume the status of rights, we may expect to see accelerating change in childrearing patterns in the direction of greater encouragement of individual autonomy. On the other hand, it is likely that the highly intimate mutual emotional dependencies within the family will persist for the foreseeable future, resisting the encroachments of economic and technological development through their deep impact on the self-construals of each family member.

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Family Work in Working Class Households in Turkey[1]

HALE BOLAK

There is still a relative scarcity of culturally situated studies of the interrelationship between paid work and the allocation of family work in households where women are gainfully employed. This is particularly true of how women strategize to negotiate the contradictions of being full-time workers inside and outside the home. Critical mediators of how this negotiation takes place include relationship dynamics, cultural constructions of gender, access to kin and other support systems, household composition, and situational imperatives, including work schedules. These factors inform women's expectations about, and the negotiation of, family work. Analyses of the complex lives of urban women from specific Middle Eastern contexts are particularly needed to problematize the notion of "working women" and Orientalist accounts of "cultural difference." Thus, in this article, I address the negotiation of family work in the households of blue-collar women in urban Turkey from a perspective that highlights the structural, cultural, and symbolic barriers to equality.

Although full-time paid employment by women is generally associated with greater involvement by husbands in family work, women generally have the greater role in family work and the greater overall combined burden of domestic and paid work. International comparative research suggests that there is no simple and direct relationship between increased labour participation by women and change in domestic relationships. In fact, entrenched gender ideologies, such as the sharp segregation of male and female spheres in Japan, can be a major obstacle to change (Stockman, Bonney and Xuewen 1995).

There has been a growing emphasis on the symbolic and gendered meanings of paid and unpaid work. In the nineties, the most productive lines of research have focused on the relationships between how people understand family work, perceived fairness of allocation, and relationship satisfaction. Men's and women's beliefs about *who* should be responsible for what, their agreement on the relative *importance* of female earnings, and the extent to which they perceive the responsibilities of breadwinning and family work to be *interconnected*, have emerged as some of the factors that influence men's involvement in family work in dual-earner households. For example, Hochschild's (1989) concept of the "economy of gratitude" has been used as a critical mediator of men's participation in family work (Pyke 1994). Unfortunately, there are still relatively few qualitative and longitudinal case studies exploring household dynamics, the subtleties of marital negotiations, and the strategies and choices men and women make to cope with the demands of their situation.

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1 A previous version of this article has been published in *Gender and Society*, see Bolak 1997.

My own approach to understanding class-based and culturally mediated expectations and internal negotiations concerning family work draws on some important previous work, including that of Hochschild. Thompson (1991) has focused on the particular outcomes women desire, the standards/referents they employ, and the justifications they raise to explain the unequal distribution of family work. Potuchek (1992) has explored the possible linkages between gendered boundaries and the processes by which they are created, negotiated, contested, and defined within families.[2] She has posed the question of whether the "renegotiation of breadwinning responsibility [is a] part of a larger process of redefinition that encompasses other gender boundaries, or is the breaching of one gender boundary compensated for by the reinforcement of others?" (p. 558).

Depending on the cultural, socioeconomic, and marital context, a change in the man's provider status may or may not lead to a questioning of gender roles or loss of respect for the husband. For example, based on their research among industrial homeworkers in Mexico City, Beneria and Roldan (1987) argue that "the boundaries of awareness and aspirations to renegotiate the contract are restricted to the normative expectations held" (p. 150). Their research showed that the women with increased economic leverage did not question gender roles per se, but only men's non-performance of their normative obligation to provide for the household.

My research on urban Turkey provides cultural data aimed at exploring the potential benefits of addressing questions about family work within a comparative perspective. This article analyzes the negotiation and diverse patterning of family work in working class households in Istanbul involving wage-earning women who are absent from the home for eight-hour shifts five or six days a week. In each case, the women's employment was critical to the maintenance of their households. Data collection for this qualitative study involved separate interviews with 41 blue-collar women and their husbands, as well as informal observations in these households over a two-year period.

The Social Context

The working class households in this study are situated in the broader context of a Muslim and officially secular patriarchal state. Patriarchy, a problematic yet useful concept (Acker 1989), has been historically elaborated in the context of the industrialized Western world. With her dynamic framework of 'patriarchal bargains,' Kandiyoti (1988) has argued for a culturally and temporally grounded articulation of patriarchy, including the Turkish case, under the system she identifies as "classic patriarchy," characterized by the patrilocally extended household in which the senior male holds authority.

Historically, women's experiences in Turkey have varied along many lines, particularly the rural/urban cleavage, and have shown further diversity within the urban areas (Kandiyoti 1982). As a common thread, the force of tradition continues to limit women's visibility in the labour force. Women still make up 54 per

2 A note on terminology: For the purposes of this article, I use the terms "provider" and "breadwinner" interchangeably. By "family work," I refer to the different tasks and responsibilities associated with housework and parenting. My use of the term "couples" is not limited to married couples, although couples' research is still overwhelmingly biased towards the study of "marital" relations. My own research is no exception in this regard.

cent of agricultural workers and 80 per cent of unpaid family workers (including those who work on the family farm). Those women who work outside agriculture, make up only 16 per cent of the total labour force. While the increased economic pressures of urban living make wage work more common data collected in the nineties showed that 6.2 million of the 7.2 million women over 12 were still considered "housewives" (Arat 1994).

The widespread capitalist development that began in the 1950s effected a large-scale migration to urban centres, transforming the society in many ways. This trend has been further intensified since the 1980s, as a consequence of the civil war in southeast Turkey. With the economic restructuring of the society, the rates of urban unemployment and unstable employment have gone up, making it more and more difficult for the household to survive on one income alone. The traditional urban ideal of married women remaining at home and occupying themselves exclusively with family work, or as unpaid family workers, has been increasingly challenged by the economic pressures of urban living. Women's employment has become increasingly crucial to the maintenance of the economic status quo, and women's wage work prevents downward mobility in low-income households (Özbay 1995; Sönmez 1996). Another cultural development that has occurred in tandem with urbanization and increased dependence on women's paid work has been a gradual loosening of traditional ties of support and authority among different generations of men (Bolak 1997).

Ethnographic studies of households and families in urban Turkey exploring these dynamics are still rare (Bolak 1997; Erman 1998; White 1994). Erman's research on migrant women in Ankara explores their diverse experiences, with particular emphasis on how city living enters the definition of gender and the distribution of power in the household. It specifically asks whether migration to the city improves or undermines women's position vis-à-vis men, and suggests that the experience of a radical disruption in everyday lives as a result of migration does have the potential to open up opportunities for women for more power and autonomy. But whether women benefit or not depends on the particular social, cultural, political, and economic contexts that they live in. These contexts include the particular Islamic sect they identify with, the demands made on them to assure family survival and achievement, where they are in their the lifecycle, the status and economic wealth of their family, and their relationship with that family.

Family work is a critical site for the construction and renegotiation of gender relations in the household, and thus a fruitful area for qualitative research. Compared to the industrialized West, families in Turkey rely more on kin support. For example, a husband's potential contribution to family work depends upon the availability of grown daughters and other female kin for help (Kandiyoti 1982). In fact, this specific social and cultural context may require a three-tiered conceptualization of family work, with the availability of kin-support influencing the participation of men in family work. A cross-cultural study on the value of children (VOC) conducted in the U.S., Turkey and six countries of East and South East Asia, found women's perceptions of "role sharing" with their husbands to be lowest in Turkey (relative to their expectations). This reflects the intra-family dynamics of the patrilineal and patrilocal household structures of the Middle East, characterized by the subordination of women (Kağıtçıbaşı 1986).

It is in the patriarchally extended rural household that the family roles of men and women are most highly differentiated by gender and generation. Urban patterns,

however, are under-researched. Some early research yielded mixed data: Holmstrom's (1973) comparative study of different types of urban families in Istanbul revealed the transitional position of rural migrant families; their decisionmaking and family work allocation patterns falling somewhere between upper-middle class families and rural families. Erkut's (1982) research on middle class couples identified relatively little conflict over the unequal division of family work in the household, and explained it in terms of the prevalence of traditionally arranged marriages and few alternatives to the family mode of social reproduction.[3] Attempts to capture the micro-level dynamics between patriarchy and urban women migrants in Turkey have suggested various factors that affect the position of women in their families, their expectations, and the allocation of family work: urban employment, higher levels of urban exposure and education, non-traditional marriage, immigrant status (from the Balkans), and employment prior to marriage (Bolak1997; Holmstrom 1973; Ecevit 1986; Kağıtçıbaşı 1982; Kuyaş 1982).

The seemingly paradoxical expectations such as "both men and women should contribute to the family income" and "home is where women belong" (meaning women should not work outside the home) are perhaps best reconciled by those urban women who manage to generate extra income for the household through the piecework they do for the garment industry. The fact that they do this at home, in their "spare time," maintains traditional ideology and structures of gender, and has a particular bearing on women's perceptions of their labour (White 1994). White finds that where female labour is seen as an extension of women's traditional roles and activities, women may also not consider themselves as "working" and hence may not demand a renegotiation of gender relations, preferring instead to trade their labour for the social support and security provided by kin and family.

The significant contribution of urban women to the household budget as wage earners outside the home provides an occasion for observing the interplay between economic pressures, cultural expectations, and household dynamics. In another paper based on my study, I talk about how the cultural construction of female employment and of male authority mediate the potential benefits of women's monetary contributions towards increased autonomy for women and more egalitarian relationships (Bolak 1997). While being a principal provider does not necessarily bring increased leverage, it does often contribute to a rethinking of asymmetrical power relations based on gender: patriarchy is normatively accepted as a "cultural script" without having to be internalized.

In this chapter, I focus on the cultural mediations in the implications of wife's provider status and husband's inability to bring in a family wage for the construction of gender relations, including family work: How does the fact of women's

3 Basing women's provider status on their relative "monetary contribution" to the household budget alone proved to be inadequate. An important component of this status resides in the employment stability and continuous contributions to the household income. The contribution of the stably employed women to the household made fluctuations in male income and employment possible, and their relative earnings during the last year was an imperfect measure of their relative contribution to the household. A more comprehensive assessment yielded the following: (a) in 24 of the 41 households, the wives had made the major monetary contribution to their households, while in 8 households, men had made the major contribution, and the contributions of husbands and wives were about equal in the remaining 9 households; (b) in 28 households, women had been the only stable providers in the recent past (and 23 of these women had also been the major providers), while in 10 households both husbands and wives had been stable providers, and in 3 households, both had been unstable.

major contribution to the household affect the constructions of paid work and unpaid work? How do the negotiations around family work fit into the context of continuities and discontinuities in the sociocultural fabric. While historically gender- and generation-based expectations have been fairly rigidly defined in Turkey, urban women seem to have assumed additional responsibilities since the 1980s. For example, traditionally men could be counted on for their contribution to grocery shopping, children's education, and kin relationships. Research in the last two decades suggests that women's responsibilities in internal and external household affairs have increased, as the high rate of inflation heightened men's preoccupation with making money and drove them further from fulfilling their domestic obligations (Kıray 1985; Özbay 1995). There has also been a gradual weakening in the norm-based boundaries regarding gender and intergenerational relations in the urban context, suggesting the possibility of diverse outcomes in different domains of marital and family life, especially when the traditional responsibility of the male as "major provider" is disrupted.

Field Research

This project used a case study approach in the tradition of qualitative family and household research. The relative scarcity of ethnographic work on blue-collar households (and couples data in general) guided my decision to do a small-scale in-depth study based on interviews with married women factory workers and their husbands. I located women wage-workers by doing screening interviews in five factories, each representing one of the five branches of manufacturing industry with the highest concentration of women labourers.

For the purposes of my study, households in which the wives had had the major responsibility for the livelihood of their families in the recent past were selectively over-sampled. In these households, women work full time five or six days a week. Since most have shift work, their evenings are spent at work at least every other week. Wives are the major providers in 58 per cent of the households, and the only stable providers in 68 per cent of the households.[4] In 60 per cent of the households, husbands were either unemployed or had shift work/flexible hours that imply their potential availability at home. Finally, families were predominantly nuclear and relatively young, with only a small minority of households having co-resident kin or older children to assist in housework and childcare. In other words, the families provided the conditions associated with a higher likelihood of male participation (Berk and Berk 1979). Except for one recently married couple, all the households had children.

Women respondents' ages ranged from 22 to 38, with a mean of 31. On average, they had been living in Istanbul for 19 years. Except for the six who were born in Istanbul, most had arrived in Istanbul before the age of 18 and had entered wage work when they were about 17. All but two had some elementary school education, although only half had an elementary school certificate. In general, husbands were a little older, with longer residence in the city and relatively more schooling. This composite profile of women workers suggests that the majority had their childhood socialization in their hometown or village and their adulthood socialization including entry into wage work in Istanbul. Consequently,

4 I develop this thesis in a separate paper (Bolak 2000).

these women would be expected to have multiple reference groups informing their perceptions, expectations, and strategies. Most of these women would have been socialized by hard-working mothers who juggled a wide range of social and economic obligations that blurred the line between domestic and non-domestic, who held that "you do what you have to do," and who were not reliant on men. This socialization affects women's perception of men as relatively incompetent and peripheral to the running of the household and exists alongside earlier dreams of an easier life in the city and the more liberal ideals about marriage they encounter in the workplace.

The circumstances that prompted women's entry into wage work were diverse. Although the average length of employment for these women is 12 years, quite a few of them started working in their teens. A majority of women have worked without break, sometimes taking maternity leaves in between. When we look at the patterns of male and female employment over time, we see that the contribution of the stably employed women made fluctuations in male employment and income tolerable.

The data collection was carried out over a period of 18 months in 1986 and 1987. A series of separate tape-recorded interviews I did with the women and their husbands constituted the main source of information. In addition, I took field notes at the factories and at people's homes, where, with a few exceptions, the in-depth interviews took place. Sometimes young children were present, but the interviews were carried out with ample privacy. I interviewed 30 of the 41 women twice, and 27 cooperative husbands agreed to one interview each. The two-to three-hour interviews were semi-structured and followed a life-history format. I started by asking open-ended questions and followed them with probes and closed-ended questions, depending on the nature of the information spontaneously offered. Key aspects of prepared interview questions addressed current family and marital life, focusing on, but not limited to: gendered expectations, family work, power dynamics and emotions involved in interpersonal relationships, management of finances, and social networks. Each person provided time-use data for work days and non-work days. Family work was assessed through time-use data, check lists, and attitudinal measures.

The transcripts were coded for not only who performed what aspect of family work, but also for such qualitative data as expectations, negotiations, and the relative satisfaction or discontent with the allocation of family work. The qualitative data were analyzed from the interview transcripts using a grounded theory approach (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Corbin and Strauss 1990). Particular attention was paid to the overall assessment of the existing arrangements, the explanation of asymmetrical contributions (as role differentiation or inequality), and comparisons of the arrangement between households.

While doing the field research, my status was simultaneously that of an insider and an outsider. In another paper, I develop in depth some of the processes and problematics of being an insider/outsider as a researcher (Bolak 1996). Based on my research, I contend that for researchers who are positioned as relative "insiders," whether indigenous or bicultural, such aspects of the researcher identity as gender, class, professional and relationship status are especially salient, and are perhaps even more so in Middle Eastern contexts. For example, very early in the research process, I began to note how my researcher role was facilitated by my perceived *difference* from the women workers. In general, the men I interviewed

saw themselves as more urbanized/worldly/educated than their wives and hence more compatible with me. Most attempted to appear non-sexist, as they expected me to have liberal views. For example, they told me they would "help" their wives more with housework if they only knew how or if they had more time.

I also argue that the insider/outsider position can be a useful vantage point for "rethinking the familiar" (Reinharz 1994). In this position, I was also able to both "notice" and "problematize" the familiar and obvious, including some common assumptions about the working class world. For example, instead of assuming that workers have internalized the dominant gender ideology, I probed to see who they thought should take on breadwinning responsibility and why the men did not participate in domestic chores. Although these women worked long hours at unskilled jobs, I did not assume that they would rather "sit at home" or that they worked solely to help support their households. My desire to understand the variations in how individual men and women coped with the demands of their situation and negotiated their options sensitized me to question the obvious. At the same time, I was probably more cognizant of complexity and variation than a cultural outsider would have been.

Negotiating Family Work

My findings support the observations of Turkish researchers of women's increased responsibilities in the internal and external affairs of their households since the 1980s (Özbay 1995). Along with grocery shopping and kin work, children's socialization, discipline, and education have become increasingly defined as exclusively "female" responsibilities. The following quote illustrates vividly one woman's struggle to meet this challenge:

> When we come home, our first priority is dinner. After that, I attend to my daughter's schoolwork. My husband isn't able to help much; I myself learned from reading her books with her. I went to school for one year, but now I'm at the fourth grade level like my daughter. I studied along with her and learned all the information. My daughter can't study alone. Ever since first grade, I got her used to studying together; we do her homework together. If I have work to do in the kitchen, she sits there at the little desk we had the carpenter make for her and asks me, "Is this right or wrong?" as I do my work. If I know the answer, we're fine. If I don't, then we look in the books. If we still can't do it, we go to the neighbours — they're in college. We go to them with our pencils and notebooks and ask them what we don't know. Then, when my work is done, I go to bed.

Sometimes, this same woman will have more work to do before she can go to bed. She not only takes responsibility for all the housework and parenting, but may on occasion help her husband, who brings work home (making pens) for a little extra income. Another woman who lives with her husband and daughter at the school where he works as a janitor helps him with his custodial duties after she comes home from work.

One of the theoretical concerns that guided my analysis was the question of how the boundaries of breadwinning and family work are negotiated in tandem with one another. Although women are typically overburdened, and may even do a triple shift (as in the case of these two women), how these negotiations are carried out is varied and is the main focus of my analysis.

Patterns of Family Work

Based on the qualitative analysis, I constructed a typology of patterns by which family work is negotiated. These patterns are delineated less by the absolute amount of participation by men and more according to the general discourse about men's sharing family work and the relative mesh between expectations and actual sharing. When I placed the households in the following three categories, I identified an almost equal number of households in a "traditional coping" group (16/41) and a "women's struggle for equity" group (17/41) and fewer in a "sacrifices towards equity" group (8/41). I continue with a discussion of these three patterns.

1. Traditional Coping

In roughly 40 per cent of households, the women's role as provider has not been a critical basis for the renegotiation of family work. Women may expect, both as an expression of caring and as an acknowledgment of greater family demands, that their husbands will "help" with task accomplishment. Indeed, most of these households are characterized by what has been called manager/helper dynamics (Hochschild 1989; Mederer 1993). Yet these women refrain from using their financial leverage to press demands for greater male participation and often take on what they consider to be men's responsibilities.

Conflict is not a visible reality in these households and the reasons are several. The primary reason has to do with women's overall assessment of their marriages. Women's expectations of greater male participation in family work is tempered by the fact that, although most men disappoint their wives by not being successful providers, they are not regarded as irresponsible, but rather as "good family men" caring for the well-being of their families. Thus, if men assume a few traditionally "male-type" responsibilities, such as grocery shopping and managing the finances, women are grateful. These men do contribute relatively more to traditional male parenting tasks than men in the next group, the "women's struggle for equity" group. Yet, where the need for male participation is most acute, it often falls short of women's expectations.

While men are more avid defenders of tradition when it comes to female employment, how traditionalism affects their views about participating in family work varies (Hochschild 1989). In this group, men and women generally agree on what spouses are supposed to do and construct men's involvement as a "favour" to their wives. Those who categorically refuse to "help" constitute the minority in this group. Here are two different responses:

> Where I come from, it [doing housework] wouldn't be received well. If I went 40 years without food, I still wouldn't cook or do the dishes. Maybe if my wife were sick and some cooking had to be done, then I would make tea and cook some eggs. In case of an emergency, we do what's human of course. But doing this and that just because my wife works, that won't do.

> Since the woman works, the man should do everything at home including washing diapers. We don't do it, that's a different story. But if the woman is working and contributing to maintaining the family, her husband should help her too. If I knew more, I'd contribute more too. Also, my wife doesn't ask for much help.

A second reason has to do with the relative autonomy enjoyed by some women who see their husbands as not seeking complete control. DeVault (1990)

argues that to the extent that women feel that they have some choice over what to do and how to do it, they will construct their work in terms of a compromise that seems fair. These choices "provide a rationale for deference: women emphasize their freedoms and minimize their adjustments to others ... [T]he sense of having had the opportunity to choose makes it difficult for these women to press claims in their own interests" (p. 196). Some are strong women who have assumed control somewhat willingly, mostly out of impatience with men's shortcomings, such as "ineptitude" or "lack of initiative."

> There's nothing for him to do. A man can't wash the windows, he can't set the table. Doing the dishes, ironing are all my work. It doesn't work for me to have him go to the store because he would get something for 400 liras that I would find for 100.

These women successfully combine the strategies of "doing it all" with "playing helpless" every now and then. For example, this same woman insists on not lighting the stove:

> I could light the stove, too, but I didn't take it on. I thought, if I did it, he would get used to my doing it. I put on a sweater and wait till he lights it. My sister is 38 years old — she does everything — now she looks like she is 50 years old instead. Her husband looks like he is 20. She got worn down and now her husband neglects her and loves someone else. I let my husband light the stove, bring up coal. Also, I don't buy his raki [a popular hard liquor] or his cigarettes, lest he might get used to that too.

Finally, the pattern of traditional coping is sustained largely through the availability of female kin, and in a few cases grown daughters, who assist in childcare and housework. Thus, the context that is conducive to maintaining a traditional pattern usually involves some version of a female support system. I find it telling that 11 out of the 19 families in my sample who have at least one girl child, and 8 of the 10 families who have all girls are in this group. Thus, less male participation is required for housework, and gender specialization is enforced by the increased responsibility of the women and girls for socializing the younger children. One woman points out that:

> Unless I'm really pressured, I prefer not to have the man do any work. When the children were young, he used to help me with childcare; he used to set the table, help with cooking. Till a couple of years ago, he used to help and he stopped when the girl grew up.

Women's mothers are especially reliable sources of support, although help from mothers-in-law and temporary recruitment of sisters and sisters-in-law from the village for the purpose of childcare is also common. Neighbours are asked to fill in for brief periods of time in the absence of more viable options.

My study supports the argument based on previous work in Turkey that every form of intra-female support system must be exhausted before any modification of male role expectations occurs (Kandiyoti 1982; Kıray 1985). However, coresidence with in-laws or sending children to stay with their grandparents in the village are becoming increasingly unpopular options. Only when the two families live under separate roofs does this arrangement work. Kin support, in other words, has become a mixed blessing in some households, especially among younger couples. One woman complained about her old fashioned in-laws who harassed her son for wanting to learn English and made it hard for him to do his

homework. For another young man, the tension created by living under the authority of his wife's father (also his uncle) outweighed the benefits of kin support. Deciding that privacy and independence were more important than the assistance with childcare, the couple moved back to the school where the husband is a custodian. Now the man takes care of his daughter during the day while his wife is away at work, and she helps him with his custodial duties when she comes home.

2. Women's Struggle for Equity

A discourse of conflict characterizes the second group of households comprising another 40 per cent of the sample. Women in these 17 households feel disappointed and betrayed by expectations that they alone must shoulder both the responsibility for providing and for internal household affairs. In contrast to the husbands in the "traditional" group, these husbands are considered irresponsible — not only because they have they proven to be unreliable as providers, but because they also fail to meet their domestic obligations. In these households, women's expectations are in direct contradiction of the realities of their marital lives. The women describe their husbands as "selfish," "wraith-like," and "carefree/untroubled" (which has a negative connotation in Turkish). Younger and more urbanized women, as well as older and more conventional women, report their frustration at the inequities that force them to assume provider responsibility in addition to housework and childcare. The younger women resemble the group in Erman's (1998) sample identified as the "struggling young women" who are trying to break away from traditional gender roles.

One woman protests in disbelief and rage at her husband's incompetence:

> The other day, I am cooking, my hands are greasy, and my son wants my help to go to the bathroom. My husband walks in the door and I tell my son to ask his father instead. I assume that he helped him, only to find out the boy is still waiting to go to the bathroom and my husband has gone and sat down. Now he was right there, would he have fallen from manhood had he helped him to the bathroom? This is a perfectly reasonable expectation. Now what can I do when something like this happens? What can I possibly do but get frustrated and yell? He says, "A man can't do it, wash your hands and you do it." I know that a woman should respect her husband, but this is too much! Can he be that incompetent that he cannot even take his own kid to the bathroom? What kind of backwardness is this?

As in the case of this household, the tension between the women and their husbands often involves a conflict of gender ideologies, with the man using his authority to resist his wife's desire for a more egalitarian division of labour. Another man who perceives his wife's employment as a "privilege," gets the kids dressed up if she is late to work, but will not do so on the weekend when she wants some relief from them.

The actual configuration of family work depends on the relative bargaining power of each spouse in the negotiations. The most serious confrontations occur in households in which the men cannot easily ask their wives to quit working and women can claim some leverage as providers. The following couple's accounts reflect a typical scenario of tit-for-tat, where the gendering of different responsibilities is contested:

She:
I sometimes get angry at him and say, "So and so's husband does the shopping even though she doesn't work, but here I am going to work and going to the market place, too." He says: "The grocery store (much more expensive) is closer than the market place. Go and buy from there." ... He does things like electrical repairs, fixes something that is broken, he does only his work, he doesn't help me. For example, he never goes to the store. Since it's always been this way, I'm used to it, but sometimes I go crazy. His aunt's daughter was here visiting from Germany for a month. One day when I had a lot of work to do, I gave him money and asked him to get some yogurt from the store. He didn't go. Then, some time later, he was fixing the leg of the bookcase and he said to me, "Hold this for me so we can fix it." Well, I told him it wasn't my job. I said, "If going to the store is not your job, repair work is not mine!"

He:
Let's say I didn't help her — she considers going to the store or to the market place as men's work — if you ask me, she says this to make me mad because I refuse to go. She also sees tending the stove and bringing up coal as men' s jobs too. She says, "If you do this, I'll do that."

Q: Do you think she's right or wrong in saying that?

He:
She may be right, but as a man you think of her as wrong so that your manhood isn't slandered. What else is there to do when you're made angry like that? You try to outwit her accusations and come out "on top like olive oil!"

The tone of these negotiations is usually confrontational. The women's strategies are, once again, informed by their options. When one woman decides to change from a day job to a shift job (even though this means taking a pay cut), her husband is forced to take their son to daycare and spend more time with him. Other women refuse to cook or do their husbands' laundry unless men leave them money or bring groceries. One woman decides to forego her pension payments and quits when the company gives her the option to leave with a settlement. Yet another woman, bitter about her husbands' insistence on using housework and childcare as bargaining chips for her sexual favours, files for a divorce. Here are two excerpts from this couple's interviews:

She:
The only thing I insist on is the well being of the household. I tell him, "Look, you know more about their schoolwork, spend a couple of hours with them everyday." Let's say they came home at 5:00p.m., he can sit with them till 6:00p.m. He says "Did my father help me study?" and closes the subject. It's very rare that he helps them — only if my older son comes to him and insists on his father's help. If he sat with them for one hour a day they wouldn't have failing grades. I get very frustrated. Another issue, this wall ... I kept pushing him, telling him that we should do it, and it still didn't get done. I saved my bonuses, advances and paid 100,000 liras for the materials: he didn't give the workers any money.

He:
It's her hobby to have things done at once. There was this issue with the wall around the house. She keeps telling me to do it, accuses me of not doing it. But I don't have the money, it will take time to put together that kind of money. These are constant problems for her, endless problems at that.

Some couples share a traditional background that is being increasingly challenged by the circumstances they find themselves in. Women who had to adjust to being wage workers for "strangers" resent their husbands' s refusal to do the grocery shopping — a man's task back in the village. In response to my question about what makes a good husband, these women agree that "the husbands of working women should help them at home." As for what makes a good wife, one woman responds: "In our religion, a woman is expected to obey her husband, but it's not so in our house," intimating a mutual breach of traditional expectations. Some of the more conventional women express their frustration about their husbands' lack of involvement in household responsibilities:

> There's nothing that women don't do! They just don't go to the military, that's all. We are the ones who go to work outside, who go to the market place. The only thing we don't do that the men do is military service [mandatory for Turkish men].

> Chopping coal, lighting the stove are men's jobs and so is shopping. It is not like home [the home town or village] here, people work; so sometimes women go to the market place too. But at home, men do the shopping. Women just buy their own clothes, things for their daughters' dowries — what men can't buy.

Men's avoidance of even their most basic responsibilities such as grocery shopping, carrying coal, and tending the stove explains women's lack of concern about their husbands being stigmatized for doing housework. The men, on the other hand, feel they are forced to do housework, and either resist or perceive their participation to be adequate. One man's attitude towards cooperation is defensive because his wife expects him to do things that other women from their village would not ask their husbands to do:

> If you want to know the truth, you shouldn't do everything that a woman asks you to do. If you do this much today, she'll ask for more tomorrow, so you have to set the limit.

> In some households, the men are ordered around as if they are the women and not men, like "Go to the store, get this, get that." Women treat the men not as men, but as their assistants. I'm against that: I think there should be a difference between men and women.

As predicted by research elsewhere, for women, appreciation and responsiveness matter in family work more than who does what task (Hochschild 1989; Pyke 1994; Thompson 1991). Thus, the reason why the absence of male participation is more of an issue in the second group is not only because the men in this group do relatively less, but because women's evaluation of their husbands as generally unresponsive and irresponsible heightens the conflict over the lack of men's participation. They consider the domestic arrangements unfair and feel indignant about it. For example, they resent their husbands' complaints that the house is "not tidy enough," and compare themselves to their husbands ("I do more than you do"), an attitude which shows a stronger sense of entitlement (Thompson 1991). In most of these families, both parties feel a scarcity of gratitude. An older man who just got laid off from a good job as a custodian complains that "if I cook, she wouldn't eat it because I might not have made it to her liking. She has to do it and we have to wait till she does, even if it means waiting five or ten hours." Mutual perceptions of ingratitude are inimical to a smoother adaptation to new arrangements, especially in the context of social change that generates much confusion and conflict of values between the differ-

entiated roles of rural society and the somewhat more interchangeable roles of the urban society (Levine 1982).

Finally, relative lack of access to female kin for support, as well as the high percentage of dependent children (mostly boys), makes the conflict more visible as well. Marital dynamics and the successful use of a female support system are interrelated, such that when women have less leverage in marital conflict, recruiting the mother-in-law's help is usually not a viable option. Furthermore, 16 out of the 17 families have at least one boy child, which accounts for the heightened conflict over family work, both because there is more expectation of male participation in parenting and there is less help from daughters. In these households, there is also a prevalent pattern of asymmetry in the husband's and wife's relationship to the needs of the household.[5]

3. Sacrifices Towards Equity

In the final and smallest group of households (8/41), comprising around 20 per cent of the sample, a somewhat stable pattern of sharing is established. Once again, all but two of these households have at least one dependent child and no co-resident kin to help with housework and childcare. All but one of the women have shift work, and three of the couples work alternate shifts to be able to take turns with childcare. As Ferree (1984) argues, "Such arrangements reflect more than pure economic necessity" (p. 71); they involve some amount of choice as well as adjustment to changing responsibilities. For these couples, a relative consensus exists about the complementarity of intra- and extra-household responsibilities, the benefit of her employment, and the need for some "sacrifice" on his part. Asked to comment on her husband's participation in family work, one woman says, "If he lets me work outside, he has to take care of the children while I'm at work," interpreting her husband's contributions as sacrifice.

I do not want to suggest that all the husbands in this group are eager participants in housework and childcare, for they are not. But they are easy to distinguish from those men who tell their wives they can work only if they are able to juggle domestic and work responsibilities. Typically these couples construct an ideology that is a blend of "equity ideals" and "child centredness" (Coltrane 1989). Here are some responses by men:

> Men can do women's work. There might be things he can't do, but it is a matter of good will. You can do anything you really want to do. It's a matter of thinking of the other person. If women work outside, men should do more at home than I'm doing now: they should do half the work.

> Why should a man sit down and the woman work? She's a human being, too. I don't expect her to do more work. Whether she works outside or not, a woman should have as much say as I do.

Women mostly concur:

> He used to pick them up when they cried, fed them, he even changed their diapers.

5 This relationship is confounded, however, by the fact that some of these men were taking up odd jobs here and there, and not spending much time around the house. Due to the lack of a benefit system for the unemployed, work in the informal sector without job security is a more typical phenomenon in Turkey than is long-term unemployment. This causes a difficulty in comparing the data with findings of other studies (Pyke 1994; Shamir 1986) of the relationship between unemployment and participation in family work.

When my son was very young, I was working in the factory and he was working in construction. Since it was contract work, there were times when instead of going to work, he would stay at home with the children. We raised the kids together.

He does it out of love for his wife. Even if somebody sees from outside that he's doing work and says, "The woman should do that," it doesn't bother my husband. He doesn't go by what other people have to say. He does it of his own accord, without me telling him.

The base-line understanding is that this is a partnership, and primarily for children's sake. Husbands spend a considerable amount of time with their children, attend to their schoolwork, give them their meals, put them to bed, as well as participating in other household tasks when they want to. Apart from assuming their traditional obligations to make the monthly budget, they cannot be relied upon to share household tasks. Since most of the sharing desired by wives concerns parenting tasks, these become a trade-off for fathers who do not want to do housework.

The men who have made the choice to alternate shifts with their wives in order to share parenting do not necessarily have a gender ideology that corresponds to this practice. Again, these practices are informed by an ideology of child centredness rather than gender egalitarianism per se. In fact, when, at the end, I asked a man if he would like to train his son to share family work in the future, he protested and said, "I want to raise him like a man. If he wants to learn, he can do so in the future." In a couple of households, sharing family work is associated with relatively high levels of marital satisfaction and egalitarian decision-making. In three others, male participation is a relatively new phenomenon, brought about by the "rehabilitation" of irresponsible men who until recently were uninvolved fathers.

Towards an Integrated Perspective

The relationships between provider status, women's expectations of sharing family work, and the actual configuration of family work are complex and are mediated by cultural constructions, namely how women perceive and are perceived in their role as providers and the characteristics of the marital relationship.

Allocation of Provider Roles and Family Work

Except for those unwilling providers whose provider status is not appreciated, women generally neither expect their husbands to be the sole providers, nor do they shelter them from domestic responsibilities. Given their circumstances, most women see providing as a joint responsibility, although in an ideal world they would have liked their husbands to carry more of the burden. While their expectation level is low in an absolute sense, employed women also do feel relatively more entitled to a fair distribution of family work. Almost all women desire male participation in parenting tasks, and especially in tasks traditionally associated with men. Women's expectations of male participation in housework, on the other hand, show more variation according to the women's general life experiences and evaluations of their marriages, particularly of the relative contributions of themselves and their husbands.

Women's comparisons of their husbands with men "who help even though their wives sit at home" suggests the presence of at least as many women on the shop floor who brag about their husbands helping them as those who complain that they do not. Thus, the factory setting does not promote the "traditional" ideal. In fact, most of the women interviewed mention that their thinking about sharing family work has changed since they started working. Women's attitudes towards male privilege change over time, as their girlhood dreams of serving their husbands become less appealing. The following quote reflects a typical sentiment:

> He didn't get used to doing anything [around the house]. For a year after we got married, I didn't work. Then, I didn't want it: in fact I would reprimand the women who let their husbands do housework. Even if my husband wanted to do something, I wouldn't let him do it. Now that he is used to my doing everything, he doesn't help ... If it's something he can do, I'd like him to do it, I'd like him to help me now. If I weren't working, I wouldn't want it. On the weekends, I get overwhelmed by laundry, dishwashing, guests, and so on. Then I want his help.

Thus, expectations of and conflicts about the absence of male participation in family work are related to how provider responsibility is discharged. First of all, the greater the relative economic power of the women, the greater is the expressed conflict over unmet expectations. This is evidenced by the higher concentration of women who are primary providers (13 out of 17 versus 7 out of 16) and stable providers (15 out of 17 versus 8 out of 16) in the "women's struggle for equity" group as compared to the "traditional coping" group. Secondly, the most predictable pattern of sharing seems to take place in households in which the woman is a stable provider and her contribution equals or exceeds that of her husband. These households are in the category identified above as "sacrifices towards equity."

It is also safe to suggest that the man's failure to fulfil his role as a provider increases the potential for conflict. In the majority of the households where the woman is the primary as well as the only stable provider, the husband's participation in family work remains occasional. Unemployed husbands in this study are, on the whole, more likely not to participate in family work.[6] In six out of ten households where husbands remain at home, marital relations are characterized by frequent conflicts over family work, and male participation is limited to occasional help with cooking and cleaning. Time availability per se does not affect the level of male participation. In fact, male unemployment, intermittent work, self-employment (with flexible schedules) correlates with more conflict over family work. There are four times as many unemployed or irregularly employed men in the conflict group as in the traditional group (12 out of 17 versus 3 out of 16).

On the other hand, men's regular employment and especially shift work tends to diffuse the potential conflict over their lack of participation in family work. More than twice as many men are in regular employment in the "traditional coping"

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6 Based on her work in Naples, Parsons (1969) argues that without economic opportunities, paternal authority loses its basis of legitimacy and hence its strength as a socializing force in the southern Italian family. Similar to Parsons' (1969) findings in southern Italian families, Turkish mothers have a greater input into their children's socialization than men, although fathers retain their symbolic authority at a distance. Despite the similarity between the two cultures in terms of woman's centrality to the life of the household and her role in maintaining family unity, male authority is culturally sanctioned in Turkey just as female authority is in working class Naples.

group as in "women's struggle for equity" group (13 out of 16 versus 6 out of 17). In all but one household of the "sacrifices towards equity" group, where men's participation is relatively reliable, men are in regular employment. But as I explain in the next section, the discourse about family work has a mediated rather than a direct relationship to the issue of who provides for the household.

Cultural Mediation: Symbolic and Gendered Meanings

First of all, availability of kin support comes into play as a salient mediator of family work in a traditional setting. In fact, the presence of grown daughters and other female support diffuses the potential conflict regarding the low level of male participation in the "traditional" group. Yet women's expectations show a situational fluidity as well. For most women, the dilemma between the urban ideal of sharing family work and the girlhood dream of being perfect caterers to their families manifests itself in fluid ways: One family moves for a while to live with the woman's parents, where being waited on by her mother and sisters makes the woman feel "like a man." However, in her own household of three, she welcomes her husband's participation. In fact, he takes care of their young daughter at the school where he works as a janitor.

A more important mediator is whether women evaluate their husbands as relatively "responsible" regardless of their success as providers. In the "traditional group," whatever expectations women may have of their husbands are diffused by some redeeming qualities these men have that prevent the issue of family work from being a salient agenda item and source of conflict. Although women may internally question the inequality and feel conflicted between how they feel and how they think they should feel, there is not enough reason for defiance. In the "women's struggle for equity" group, on the other hand, women are not protective of men who do not have enough redeeming qualities and who are in fact seen as "irresponsible."

Several factors heighten the conflicts over family work, including the predominance of male children, the husbands' irresponsible behaviour as providers, and the breach of marital expectations. Women who are most dissatisfied with the men's non-participation are those who are overburdened by shouldering all the responsibilities alone, and who see their sacrifice as not being reciprocated. These are either traditional women with longer rural backgrounds, whose gender ideals were frustrated in their marriages, or younger, more urbanized women who have higher expectations of male participation in family work and are more assertive in their demands on their husbands. Their expectations of male participation in family work would be more moderate if their husbands showed more responsibility in general. Finally, in the "sacrifices towards equity" group, there is a relative consensus on the complementarity of intra- and extra-household responsibilities based on an ideology of partnership for the sake of children, and an appreciation of each other's "sacrifice."

Although women's employment definitely improves the standard of living in the household, not all couples see provider responsibility as a joint one or have consensus about the relative importance of a woman's earnings. It is only when the woman's contribution to household income is perceived to be important and the provider role is defined as a shared responsibility by both spouses that a man's contribution can be relied upon. Those couples who share household responsibilities most equitably, define the provider responsibility as a shared one.

Yet, as previous research in the West has shown (McRae 1986), there is no direct connection between perceptions of financial necessity, egalitarian ideals, and sharing of family work. For example, a husband may not feel that this wife is responsible for the long-term financial security of the family, but may nonetheless take part in housework while she is earning an income. Alternatively, while a man may see his wife's income as a contribution, he may either prefer that she did not work, or may simply not see the situation as calling for his increased involvement. Finally, female employment may be associated with impaired marital dynamics, which in turn may be more closely predictive of the actual allocation of family work.

Culturally constructed gender informs the perception of the allocation of family work as well. For example, while mothers say that they carry out the responsibility of socializing the children whether they like it or not, fathers still see themselves as the main disciplinarians. Men's economic marginality and irresponsibility towards the household also make them relatively peripheral to children's socialization. Yet this is one of the areas where especially unemployed men perceive themselves as doing more than what the women say they do. Even when the couple agrees that the woman does the actual socializing work, the man's symbolic authority as disciplinarian hangs on a shoestring:

> My word carries more authority. He listens to his mother too. The mother is closer to the child, whereas we [men] stay a little distant, a little more formal. He listens to her if she says it three times, but I only have to say it once. Dealing with his discipline is one thing, making him do something is another. I work and I'm not at home. I leave in the morning and come back in the evening, and there are times when I don't see the child at all during the day. Then, I can't be involved with his discipline.

This is an unemployed man who would still like to believe that his authority is intact. Although he is currently spending a lot of time at home for lack of money, the distinction he makes between the routine disciplinary role of the mother and the authority role of the father is based on the normative ideal of his going to work and his wife staying at home with the child during the day.[7]

A similar tendency operates in relation to grocery shopping. Quite expectedly, both the husband and the wife would like to see the man take this responsibility, as it is both a cultural and a class norm for low-income households in Turkey. It is the task that leads to the highest disagreement. It is also the task to which the wife's contribution is underestimated the most. The husbands' perceptions that they do the shopping are not corroborated by their wives, who would

7 Construction of marital issues often takes on a global form, extending beyond the boundaries of the household, and allowing the conflict to be displaced from the spousal relationship to the larger extended family, and sometimes to regional backgrounds. There is a strong conviction that people from different backgrounds cannot understand each other well, resulting in men's tendency to locate the source of their problems in "marrying out." In rejecting the option of marrying within the community, they forego the assurance of some predictability based on prior familiarity between the families. As with men's "irresponsible" behaviour, women's "disrespectful" behaviour is frequently accounted for by their family's bad influence:

> My expectations from marriage were love and respect. We're married, but very estranged. I'm from the Mediterranean, she's from the Black Sea coast; we're not compatible. Traditions and customs are different. The family structures are different. Adana and Ordu [their birth places] have nothing in common. [I ask them about the differences.] Where I'm from, people emphasize respect and love. We refer to our elders as *ağabey* [older brother] and *abla* [older sister]. Where she's from, they call everybody by their names. That offends me.

like their husbands to assume this responsibility but prefer to do it themselves, since they can better stretch the money at hand. Wives who consider their husbands as "irresponsible" complain that they do not do the grocery shopping.

Through their use of gender-specific excuses and justifications, couples construct and sustain gendered parenting and housework. Women who end up taking the major responsibility for such tasks as children's discipline or grocery shopping, trace their husbands' lack of involvement to their lack of exposure to appropriate role models:

> He's not involved with the children. I wish he'd be more involved, tell them "Do this, don't do that," show them manners, how to do chores. He goes to the coffee house a lot, he doesn't stay at home much. I tell him to be involved with the children, but I guess he didn't see any manners from his father either, so he doesn't know any better. He was very young when his father died, so I don't begrudge him this too much. I say, "He probably doesn't know any better."

> He's been unfortunate. He lived mostly with his brother. It's not the same as living with your mother and your father. I have single brothers living with my parents. When my father asks them to go to the market place, they go, even though they're not married. My husband has been married for all these years and he still doesn't know what to buy when he goes to the market place.

For the women, the construction of the men as "orphans" (literally or figuratively) or victims of unfortunate circumstances provides a gender-specific excuse and rationale for their husbands' inadequate involvement in family work. Responsibility is a salient dimension along which women evaluate men, and the locus of explanation for men's irresponsible behaviour shifts quickly from gender to the family, revealing the strong braiding of the two in informing expectations and relationships in this cultural context. This is not to argue for the greater salience of family contexts and discourses, but to underline the cultural mediation of gender.[8] To those who would argue that women would have a stronger sense of unfairness if they did not accept the justifications for men's small contributions to family work, my response would be that these women are able to hold concurrently both their explanation of their husbands' incompetence and their sense of indignation at their own plight.

Conclusions

The interface of gender, economic insecurity, and kin relationships provides a critical location for studying the changes in the family lives of rural migrants. The wage earning women in this study who find themselves shouldering not only what is traditionally defined as a male responsibility — breadwinning, but also an expanded range of unremunerated activities, are those among the urban poor who bear the brunt of social change more than their husbands. To the extent that issues around male and female employment do indeed create tension with respect to family work, and men miss the services of their wives as full-time homemakers, the situation of these households is fairly typical of working class households around the globe.

Yet women's expectations, strategies of negotiation, and the patterning of family work are also culturally mediated. This study makes a contribution towards a comparative understanding of the role of gender in perceived connections

between the responsibilities of providing and family work by pointing to a complex set of mediations. When the effects of urbanization, female employment, and men's reduced economic power provide an occasion for a shift in the boundaries between the sexes, how rights and responsibilities are negotiated depends on the context of situational constraints and opportunities as well as culturally constructed meanings of paid and unpaid work.

The questions raised by Potuchek (1992) concerning the negotiation of different gender boundaries become relevant in this context. On the question of whether the shifting of one gender boundary results in the altering of gender boundaries *in toto*, this study suggests the need to attend to sociocultural discontinuities as well as continuities. For example, marital negotiations continue to be informed by the context of extended relationships within which they are embedded. It is only when a female support system is not available, or when it becomes a mixed blessing as women's experiences in the organized urban workforce bring them into conflict with the more differentiated values of the older generation or with the more traditional socialization practices of the village, that the potential for involving men in family work emerges.

However, it is also important to note that women's employment strains the limits of traditionalism in practice, and that their normative expectations and the bases on which they evaluate men are gradually changing with their increased integration into the urban workforce. Especially female providers who have relatively high expectations and/or who have experienced a wide gap between their initial expectations and the realities of their situation define men's responsibilities in broader terms than the economic. Erman (1998) notes that when work outside the home favourably redefines women's housekeeping responsibilities, these changes mostly result from practical reality: the demands on women's time and physical endurance mean that husbands have to lower their expectations and even share some of the responsibilities of family work. Exceptions to this pattern are the young struggling women who are critical of the traditional gender roles, and who resemble the young women in the group I identify as "struggle for equity."

For the women, the shifting of one gender boundary does not appear to reconstruct other rigid boundaries in compensation. For example, the suggestion by some studies of the Western family that primary providers need to assert their femininity by controlling housework as compensation for their non-traditional behaviour outside the home (Atkinson and Boles 1984; McRae 1986) does not seem to be borne out. This suggestion may have to do with a particular construction of women's subjectivity that entails a relative intergenerational continuity with strong mothers and a psychological independence from men (Fallers and Fallers 1976).

It is safe to say that Turkish women in blue-collar work do not appear to construct family work and breadwinning as strong gender boundaries. For example, the relative diffusion of conflict over family work in the "traditional" group may have more to do with these women's relative autonomy, overall assessments of their marriages, and their access to female kin rather than the apprehension about the stigma associated with working class husbands' unwilling participation in housework that has been found in studies of working class couples in the U.S. (Ferree 1984). This stigma is neither pervasive nor exclusively associated with men's lower earnings. Similarly, while my data lend support to Beneria and Roldan's (1987) general thesis concerning the relationship between marital nego-

tiations and women's normative expectations, their generalizations concerning women's loss of respect for an unemployed husband and their lack of interest in sharing family work with men do not appear to be borne out in this sample. The fact that both the representation of unemployed men and the range of expectations on the part of women are more diversified in my sample may account for these differences.

In explaining why the conflict over the division of family work is still rare, DeVault (1990) argues for a constructionist view on "gender" and "conflict." There is indeed a need for more finely tuned understandings of the marital and cultural contexts within which the meaning of family work is constructed and fairness is negotiated. In these households in Turkey, the conflict ensuing from the women's unfulfilled expectations is heightened when the men default on both domestic and economic grounds. Finally, the way in which conflicts are perceived and negotiated, if they are perceived and negotiated at all, is mediated by a family-based interpretation of gender. This observation suggests the importance of widening the frame we use to look at gender as we rethink gender-schema theory as a theory of "Western" culture (Bem 1987).

My findings lend support to a gendered perspective that is sensitive to cultural, historical, and class-based variation. Casting our net wider to encompass cross-cultural as well as intra-cultural variation in negotiating family work will contribute to more comprehensive models of gender and more richly textured understandings of family work, while avoiding the problem of generalizing about "cultures" as coherent wholes. Qualitative case-analytical studies identifying context-specific mediations of family work are urgently needed to draw a fuller picture of how material conditions and symbolic values interact to construct a gendered division of labour.

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Epilogue: Seeing Oneself through the Eyes of the Other

RITA LILJESTRÖM AND ELISABETH ÖZDALGA

Providing a summary of the perspectives in this book on family relationships and social change is a difficult but also exciting challenge. We use this opportunity for three purposes: to comment on the different ways of conceptualizing the family; to point to some of the dilemmas in family patterns in each country; and to reflect on the direction in which different family relationships unfold, that is, we look at the more general family dynamics underlying the data presented throughout this study.

In the second chapter, where the basic theoretical parameters of this work are laid out, the Turkish social psychologist Çiğdem Kağıtçıbaşı points to "the complexity" of the family, designating it "an intergenerational system moving through time." Such an encompassing understanding of the family is not what usually comes to the minds of people living in Sweden, where the couple is most often seen as the singular core element of family life. However, Çiğdem Kağıtçıbaşı's intergenerational conceptualization of the family institution is not only telling, it is also associated to freer imagery, like that of a journey.

Our life's journey starts with the family of origin, the relational unit that probably makes the deepest imprint on us. The journey continues when we marry, become parents, occupy positions as aunts and uncles, and later as grandparents. It includes a generational transition when the aged lose some of their authority and are taken care of either by their grown children and/or by public institutions. At some point, the oldest generation is doomed to leave and their journey reaches an end. The meaning of this whole process, including the departure and the often-overlooked period immediately preceding it is an intriguing topic for cross-cultural study.

The basic dividing line between the meaning of family in Turkey and Sweden lies respectively in the emphasis on a multi-generational family network on the one hand, and the marital bond between husband and wife on the other. A a result, the contributors to this book have approached the family in Turkey and Sweden by focusing on "social interdependence" and "individual autonomy" as the concepts that generally epitomize the distinctions in family relationships between the two countries. To be sure, these concepts were never meant to function as static descriptions. The core problematic has instead been to shed light on what happens to family relationships in two different societies as they come under the spell of modernization. The advantage of comparing societies so different is that the contrasts are highlighted and the distinguishing contours of family patterns in the respective countries are emphasized more clearly. Consequently, the comparative analysis offers an invaluable opportunity to "see oneself through

the eyes of the other." This comparison also allows us to better understand the more general dynamics underlying family change in the world today and provides a good opportunity to question overly schematic, linear forms of modernization theory. Thus, for example, we have been able to argue that economic development and prosperity will not directly lead to the development of individual autonomy predicted in modernization theory. In the case of Turkey, there is strong evidence to show that where increased urbanization, higher income levels, and better education have reduced material dependencies among family members, making them more economically independent of each other, the psychological relationships are not essentially affected. The emotional bonds remain strong, in spite of relative economic independence.

In the Swedish context, on the other hand, the relationship between economic independence and psychological relatedness has developed in a more simplistic, one-dimensional way. Early pioneers of women's emancipation wanted to "liberate love from economic bondage." What should remain after economic independence was won, they argued, was love between two equals - the man and the woman. Mutuality or psychological interdependence (the sense of belonging) would then no longer be mixed with or infected by power imbalances based on economic assets. Today, when both parties in a Swedish dual-earner family have realized these goals and are able to support themselves autonomously, the expectations of intimacy, sexual satisfaction, and self-fulfilment have risen to swirling, vertiginous heights. However, as emotional expectations have increased, so also have the rates of divorce. One has to remember that while a Turkish family network contains several people with whom to share emotions and experiences, the partners in a Swedish couple easily overburden each other with their emotional and social needs. There simply are no other people available to confide in and material assets do not compensate for missing affective relations. Again, it is clear that increased economic welfare alone does not help us to understand different patterns of family change, which also have to be considered in relation to broader cultural conditions.

The cultural traditions in the two countries upon which this book focuses are different. The underlying human dimension at play here is mutuality versus autonomy, or family collectivism versus individualism, or, on the level of "self," interdependence versus independence. In spite of the fact that cross-cultural studies should recognize the existence of different traditions, there is a major bias in favour of individualism and autonomy among Western psychologists and social scientists. Authoritative schools of Western psychology claim, for example, that separation and individuation are necessary for a healthy self-development. Overlapping, connected selves are considered as "suffering" from a lack of autonomy, a state of "self" that may even be regarded as pathological. This emphasis on separation, which goes far beyond the necessary level of awareness of being a separate entity from others, fails to take into consideration what much cross-cultural research has displayed, namely that closely knit human relations and connected selves are common patterns in most non-Western societies. Research conducted in countries with family collectivistic settings and rising economic and income levels, such as countries on the Pacific Rim, suggests that the separation and individuation of family members - foreseen by many Western psychologists - simply has not taken place.

This skepticism about concepts of self that do not correspond to the Western form of individualism is not limited to professionals in academic or public insti-

tutions, but is also prevalent among common people. Take, for example, the concept of "family honour," so often emphasized in discussions of societies in the Mediterranean area. This concept connotes that if only one family member fails to live up to the moral code, shame falls on the family as a whole. In Sweden, where the ethos of individualism is strong, that kind of "collective punishment" is thought to violate the ultimate values of freedom of conscience and inviolable human rights. As these values are taken for granted, most Swedes can hardly imagine non-individualistic societies without thinking of some kind of loss, self-sacrifice, negation of self, submission, or self-denial. The question is, however, whether there are other values arising from strong social bonds that are, in fact, invisible to the individualist? Loosing your self - is this not like singing together in a chorus? Like melting into the arms of the beloved? Like parental love? Like trusting your own folks, knowing they will always stand up for you if you run into trouble? Like the artist who disregards individual fame for the sake of taking part in the creation of a greater piece of art like a tiled wall, a colourful mosaic — art that inspires successive generations for centuries?

The theory of family change that has guided the authors in this book is built on two family prototypes, "the family model of interdependence" typical of less developed, rural social contexts and "the family model of independence," most common in Western industrialized urban contexts. The first model is found in cultures of relatedness, while the second is found in individualistic cultures. Starting with these two family prototypes, the theory proposes a third family model, a synthesis of material independence and emotional interdependence (see Chapter 2, figure 3). The merit of this synthesis is that it stresses that two widely recognized basic human needs, "the need for autonomy" and "the need for relatedness" - assumed by modernization theory to be incompatible - can in fact be combined.

Let us look again at Çiğdem Kağıtçıbaşı's fourfold didactic table in the second chapter (p. 29). It is based on the two dimensions of self-relations, agency and personal distance. Agency refers to power, that is, being ruled by oneself or by others, and personal distance is defined around the poles of separateness and relatedness. The table is the expression of a theory that links together the whole interactive chain of self—family—society in order to analyze the family as a mediator in the development of self.

We can identify combination 1 as the Western model, corresponding to the independent family, and 4 as the interdependent family that stresses obedience. The synthesis or blend of those two, combination 3, stands out as the ideal that has been overlooked by evolutionist modernization theory, because autonomy

		Agency	
		autonomy	heteronomy
Personal distance	separateness	1. independent	2. separate, but ruled by others
	relatedness	3. autonomous and related	4. interdependent

and relatedness were seen as incompatible. What is important to emphasize here is that model 3 is significant because it transcends the limitations of both the independent and the interdependent family. It transcends the independent model, which celebrates autonomy but lacks relatedness, and it transcends the interdependent model, which has relatedness but lacks autonomy. The theory assumes a flow from combination 4 to 3, rather than from 4 to 1. But what about the dynamics of 1, which has been regarded as the terminus of modernization by evolutionist theory? Will the family of emotional interdependence be further diffused and also affect families with separate and independent individuals? Çiğdem Kağıtçıbaşı asks in a more extensive study on the same topic, "Is there also a shift in the postindustrial society from a family model of independence to one of emotional interdependence? As the model of emotional interdependence reflects a dialectic synthesis of the two basic human needs for merging and separation (relatedness and autonomy), such shift may indeed be the case" (Kağıtçıbaşı 1996, p. 95). Do our studies support a theory saying that both extremes are converging on combination 3? What are the prospects that Swedish families, strongly characterized by independence, will develop in the direction of a synthesis between autonomy and relatedness?

At first glance, the developments discussed in this volume do not seem to be consistent with such a shift. While Turkish families seem to be open to interdependencies of all kinds while at the same time developing a greater degree of individual decisionmaking, Swedish families seem to be firmly located in the pattern of individual autonomy. Margareta Bäck-Wiklund notes that the influence of the Swedish welfare state has been towards "institutionalized individualism" and a process of "de-familialization." In other words, the welfare state has supported individuals rather than families and has institutionally consolidated the status of individuals as less dependent on their families. The fact that individualism weighs so heavily on and seems so firmly integrated into Swedish society by no means implies that family relationships are stable. On the contrary, it seems that autonomy and separateness (1 in the figure above) open the doors to a number of indefinite alternative outcomes. It is in this context, however, that combination 2, rather than 3 (above) gains significance.

As a matter of fact, the backbone of the Swedish family, the relationship between husband and wife, has become precarious. Family bonds dissolve and diverse new family forms have entered the social scene. Children and adults face separation. The meaning of sexual relations has changed. Sexualization of culture, trivialization of sex, and postponement of childbearing may become issues of concern. The studies in this book raise diverse aspects of individualization, such as institutional individualism, economic individualism, privatization of marriage, individualization of sexuality, ideals of self-development and self-fulfilment, etc. Given the deep cultural roots of the independent and often privatized Swedish family — especially middle class families — and the associated values of individual achievement and independence in socialization, the flow seems to be from combination 1 (separate and independent) to combination 2 (separate, but ruled by others), rather than to number 3 (autonomous and related). How is this possible?

When families undergo separation and divorce, when the family bonds are split apart and many children do not have easy access to their fathers, children may be hurt temporarily or in more lasting ways. Successful relations with a former spouse, who either lives singly or has entered a new union, demand qualities

associated with relatedness, namely social skills and emotional responsiveness to the children's needs. These qualities are not precisely developed within the family model (number 1) of separateness and autonomy. When children and youth are consistently entrusted to the company of their peers, they risk being ruled by them, and the authority of parents, teachers, and adults in general wanes. Such conditions may undermine independence and facilitate control by others. As victims of conflicts among adults, of adult neglect and lack of relatedness, these children represent a development in the direction of combination 2, separate and ruled by others.

The development of the welfare state has also given rise to a tendency for highly individualized family types to move in the direction of combination 2, rather than 3. Until very recently, the state was the key and highly visible provider of the opportunities necessary for individual emancipation from family bonds. Latterly, however, people have started to evaluate their relationship to welfare state institutions in a different way, as a new kind of dependence. Thus they realize that they, as individuals, are far from independent from the welfare state's rules, regulations, conditions, dictates, standards, and interventions into the most private and intimate aspects of their lives. So far the ideology of the welfare state, promoting gender equality and justice, has had a strong following. It has been successful in maintaining an impression of emancipation and progress that has made people willing to pay the cost. In general, however, these emancipatory measures that emphasize individual rights have weakened the family as a connected unit.

The interface between self—family—society is complex. Combination 2, above, is not only valid as an alternative road for strongly independent families, but also for families marked by interdependence. Many families in Turkey who live under the pressures of migration, urbanization, unemployment, sharp social cleavages, rundown schools and economic privation, often seem to be moving in a direction different from that predicted by the model of emotional interdependence. Hale Bolak's chapter on urban working class families does not depict emotionally interdependent families, but shows evidence of conflict, material dependence, and eroding male authority in the wake of unemployment. Therefore, the flow from the combination 4, the interdependent family, may also be towards combination 2, separate but ruled by others.

In summary, we started by locating two prototypes (1 and 4) as heuristic devices for understanding how family relationships in the two countries differ. We have arrived at two different syntheses that express both our best ideals (number 3) and also our fears for the worst outcome (number 2).

Which factors will tilt the balance in favour of one or other outcome? As most studies in this book suggest, this is an open question. It is open in the sense that the outcome for each family will largely depend on the process of negotiation taking place among the spouses. As individual autonomy grows stronger, the space for mutual negotiation grows larger. Many studies in this book bear witness to this fact. Which, then, are the issues for negotiation? In this regard, Ulla Björnberg and Anna-Karin Kollind make a significant observation in their joint chapter. Focusing on how domestic work and money are shared, they conclude that "equality combined with responsiveness and mutuality serves as an active element in the process of allocation of domestic work and money. In other words, the kind of individualism that is linked to values of equality coexists with ideals of communality."

Communality, or sharing, is a key concept here. For a family in which both spouses work and there are children to be looked after, there is work that has to be done and cannot be postponed or left to someone else. The way the sharing is carried out comes to determine the very texture of the family, as is illustrated in the model developed by Torgerdur Einarsdottir in her chapter, a model built on spatial imagery of the family as made up of a core and a periphery (p. 201). Einarsdottir encapsulates the reconciliation of family and work in the following table. By applying centre and periphery positions to the parents, she is able to identify the ideal (joint centre) and worst (empty centre) families, as well as those with a maternal and paternal centre. The model derives from cases of and interviews with educated, middle class couples.

Figure 1. The Inner Core of the Family

		The Mother	
		In the centre	On the periphery
The Father	In the centre	1. Shared (Ideal)	2. Patricentric
	On the periphery	3. Matricentric	4. Centre-avoiding

The good (ideal) family (number 1) is the one in which spouses are willing to engage themselves for the common good of the family. This means both of them are located in the centre of the family. However, this does not necessarily presuppose equal sharing, but the result is a family with a strong core. The type of family that comes closest to the traditional patriarchal family in this scheme is the matricentric, that is, a mother strongly engaged (willingly or unwillingly) in the well-being of the family, while the father is located at the margin. A less common, but nevertheless real combination, is represented by the patricentric family, in which the father takes on the main family responsibilities.

A significant feature of this model is the fourth combination, the centre-avoiding family. This is the kind of family where neither spouse identifies very strongly with the work carried out within the family, leaving the centre empty. Such a family may be characterized by relative equality in terms of division of labour, but nevertheless lacks a core, making it more vulnerable than the unit characterized by a strong core. So the ideal option is based on shared responsibilities, which, in keeping with the previous model, can be interpreted as relatedness based on (not excluding) autonomy.

We are living in a time when gender lines are becoming blurred and old family relations are being questioned. Many of the chapters in this book speak about

conflicts, open and hidden, between wives and husbands. Hale Bolak, for example, explores how unemployed husbands in Turkish working class families are less willing to participate in family work. The man as a domestic partner and co-parent has entered the limelight in gender studies. Several studies in this volume highlight gender equality as a contested concept, a moral issue, and an identity crisis, the latter especially for men.

Family positions cannot be taken for granted any more and negotiations between individuals (relations of micro-power) have come to play a very important role. Well-known observers of the Western family, like Manuel Castells (1997), draw attention to an ongoing challenge to patriarchy on a global level. This confrontation has progressed to what can be identified as a "male family crisis." The crisis has to be resolved as it hurts not only women and men, but also the children. However, a crisis also creates readiness for change. Castells is spokesperson for a new family contract. A new agreement should, according to him, be negotiated, with the purpose of overcoming patriarchy and the prevalent hostility and disillusionment among Western women and men.

The present crisis is triggered by changes that have already occurred on a wide scale. Different kinds of diversified family forms, like single-parent families, networks of custody, families with two nuclei, remarried parents, etc., are here to stay. Nor should one disregard so-called family circles, consisting of relatives who, even though they encompass three to five different households, still keep in touch. They celebrate birthdays and holidays together. They share information. They baby-sit and visit those who fall sick. They support each other in need. Indeed, they show relatedness and autonomy. Yet they are rarely publicly acknowledged as "family" and they disappear from the picture when the welfare state takes over caring functions.

Other conditions, however, like violence and hostility, neglected children, poverty of single mothers, the uprootedness of men without families, deep distrust between women and men, etc., have to be counteracted and resolved. As Manuel Castells suggests, a new agreement on family is needed. The old one has lost its credibility. We confront the task of having to construct not one but several valid models or options that will correspond to the various functions families are expected to fill.

Gender roles have been a social device for the ascription of different qualities to women and men: relatedness and dependency to women, separateness and autonomy to men. Historically, women used to be ruled by men. The struggle against patriarchy emphasizes that men and women represent the same qualities. The emotionally or psychologically interdependent family, combined with the related autonomous self, may be a good place to start the negotiations about a new family agreement. This ideal does not depend on specific family forms, because it focuses both on human relations and the development of self, and every negotiation about the family has to embrace the linkages among individual/self - family - society.

"The family as a journey" expresses in metaphorical form a long-term commitment between related people. Since the family is seen here in generational perspective, the quality of the relationship between husband and wife in terms of justice and equity cannot be evaluated adequately at any limited point in time, but must be evaluated in the context of their lives as a whole (Iwao 1993). The Western view tends to break the family down by age and functional phase. From this point of view, gender studies are often biased, since they tend to concentrate

on the period in the lifecycle when families have children and incur heavy costs, that is, when family work is more demanding than during any other period of life. Such gender studies overlook the fact that people have age- and/or stage-specific understandings of family. For someone who is old enough to maintain a position amongst five generations, the oldest living in one's memories and youngest being a part of one's present life, family means having a dramatic view over a constantly changing social landscape.

Not only age, but also encounters with family patterns in other cultures influence our views of family. Seeing oneself through the eyes of the other is a challenge. The eyes of the other uncover weak spots in ourselves and expose us to alternative ways of seeing. They make us grow or shrink. The eyes of the other scrutinize and question us. We may mistrust their way of seeing us. Our cultures shed differently coloured light upon our respective national scenes and make them look different to us and to the other. The double view is thought provoking, and reminds us of the importance of historical, cultural, and contextual specificity. Looking at the family both from inside and outside one's own society makes one know much more, but also much less, as we recognize that there is so much more to know.

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Appendix:
Facts and Figures about Turkey and Sweden

Demographic and social indicators for Turkey and Sweden

TURKEY
Population
Numbers in 1 000's

Year	Women	Men	Total
1927	7 084	6 563	13 647
1935	8 221	7 936	16 157
1945	9 343	9 446	18 789
1955	11 831	12 233	24 064
1965	15 394	15 996	31 390
1975	19 602	20 744	40 346
1985	24 992	25 671	50 663
1990	27 865	28 607	56 472
2000*	33 091	33 744	66 835

* The average annual growth rate between 1990-2000 is appr. 1,5 %.

Source: Official statistics

SWEDEN
Population
Numbers in 1 000's and population growth rate (%0)

Year	Women	Men	Total
1890	2 468	2 317	4 785
1920	3 006	2 898	5 904
1950	3 535	3 506	7 041
1970	4 045	4 036	8 081
1980	4 198	4 120	8 318
1990	4 347	4 244	8 591
1999	4 481	4 380	8 861

Source: Official statistics

TURKEY	SWEDEN
Area	**Area**
779,452 sq km	449,964 sq km
Population density	**Population density**
84 persons/sq km (1999)	20 persons/sq km (1999)
Urban population (% of total)	**Urban population (% of total)**
65% (1997)	84% (1993)

Source: Official statistics

TURKEY

Percentage of population by marital status (12 years and above)

	Single		Married		Widowed		Divorced	
	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men
1955	13,7	26,7	71,9	70,4	13,5	2,2	1,0	0,7
1970	25,3	36,7	64,8	60,8	9,1	2,0	0,7	0,5
1980	28,2	38,7	62,9	59,1	8,1	1,7	0,7	0,5
1990	30,0	39,0	61,9	59,1	7,4	1,3	0,8	0,6

Source: *Women in Turkey 1999*, General Directorate on the Status and Problem of Women (GDSPW), Ankara, 2001.

TURKEY

Age of Marriage

Year	Mean age at first marriage	
	Women	Men
1935	19,7	23,1
1955	18,7	22,5
1975	20,4	23,9
1990	22,0	26,1
1998	22,9	26,8

Source: *Women in Turkey 1999*, GDSPW, Ankara.

TURKEY

Family Units and Household Types

Percentage of households by household type, 1990

Population 12 years of age and over

Household type	Per cent
Couples without children	10,9
Couples with children	57,7
Single man with children	1,0
Single woman with children	2,6
Complex households (Couples with/out children and others)	21,1
No-family households (solitaries and no-couples)	6,7
Total	100,0

Source: *Women in Turkey 1999*, GDSPW, Ankara, 2001.

SWEDEN

Family Units and Household Types

Family units by type in 1998 (%)

Children (age 0-17)

Type of family unit	Per cent
Cohabiting without children	28
Cohabiting with children	20
Single woman with children	4
Single man with children	1
Single woman without children	18
Single man without children	17
Other family units	12
Total	100

Source: *Women and Men in Sweden*, Facts and Figures 2000, SCB.

TURKEY

Level of education

Population by educational status, age 12 and over (percentage distribution), 1999.

	Women	Men
Illiterate	20,1	5,4
Literate without any diploma	8,2	7,7
Primary school	49,2	50,8
Junior high school	8,3	13,8
Vocational junior high school	0,4	0,6
High school	7,5	10,8
Vocational high school	2,7	4,7
Universities and other higher educational institutions	3,7	6,2
Total	100,0	100,0

Source: *Women in Turkey 1999*, GDSPW, Ankara, 2001.

SWEDEN

Level of education

Level of education in age groups 25-44 and 45-64 (percentage distribution), 1999.

	Compulsory		Upper secondary		Higher education	
Age group	W	M	W	M	W	M
25-44	12	16	53	54	34	29
45-64	29	34	44	41	28	25

Source: *Women and Men in Sweden*, Facts and Figures 2000, SCB.

Political participation

TURKEY

Percentage of women elected to parliament.

Year	Percentage of women
1935	4,6
1950	0,6
1965	1,8
1973	1,3
1987	1,3
1995	2,4

Source: *Women in Turkey 1999*, GDSPW, Ankara, 2001.

SWEDEN

Percentage of women in parliament.

Year	Percentage of women
1920	0
1940	4
1960	10
1980	24
2000	43

Source: *Women and Men in Sweden*, Facts and Figures 2000, SCB.

Parental allowances

Turkey

There are some parental benefits for employed women in Turkey and they can be summarised as follows:

The Situation of the Mothers of Children Aged between 0-1 under the Turkish Labour Code

- Women workers have 12 weeks of maternal leave; 6 weeks before childbirth and 6 weeks after, during which they are paid their usual salaries. It is forbidden for them to be at the workplace during this time.
- During the day, mothers of children aged between 0-1 have an additional break of one hour and a half (that is two breaks of 45 minutes) to feed their children.
- If they want, mothers can take 6 months of maternity leave without salary or payment after the 6 weeks of salaried maternal leave after childbirth is over.
- Workplaces in which between 100-150 women are employed are obliged to have a childcare centre.

Situation of Mothers under the Code for Social Insurance

The benefit of allowances for mother's health, pregnancy and childbirth expenses is available under two conditions:

- A woman who has social insurance must pay at least 90 days of maternal insurance premium during the year preceding childbirth.
- A man who has social insurance must pay at least 120 days of maternal insurance premium during the year preceding childbirth and he must marry the mother before the birth of the child.

If these conditions are satisfied, an allowance is paid to mothers for each day of their 12 weeks of salaried maternal leave before and after childbirth (i.e., they continue to receive their usual salaries plus allowance.)

The Situation of Mothers under the Code for State Officials

- Women officials have 3 weeks of maternal leave before and 6 weeks of maternal leave after childbirth. For 6 months after that they have an extra break of one hour and a half per work day for feeding the baby. They also have the option of 12 months of unsalaried maternal leave.
- An official with a spouse who is not salaried and not in the labour force can obtain a family sustenance allowance for the spouse and for up to two children.

Compiled by Esra Özcan.

Sweden

1974 Parental allowance is introduced. Benefits comprise 90 per cent of wage for 180 days, which must be used up before the child is 8 years old. Temporary allowance* is introduced: 10 days per family and year for children under 12 years old. Benefits comprise 90 per cent of wage.

1978 Allowance is now paid for 270 days, of which 30 at the minimum rate only.

1980 Allowance is increased to 360 days of which 90 at the minimum rate only. Temporary allowance is now 60 days per child and year. The "10 day benefit" for the father following the birth of a child is introduced. The benefit is 90 per cent of wage.

1986 The "2 day benefit" for visiting child (4-12 years) in day-care centre or school is introduced. The benefit is 90 per cent of wage.

1989 Allowance is increased to 450 days, of which 90 at the minimum rate only.

1990 Temporary allowance is increased to 120 days per child and year.

1995 "Mummy/daddy month" is introduced. 30 days must be used by the mother and 30 by the father. The benefit is 90 per cent of wage. Remainder can be used by either parent; 300 days with 80 per cent compensation and 90 days at the minimum rate. Temporary allowance can be transferred from parents to any other person who stays home from work to care for the child.
The "2 day benefit" is taken away.

1996 Compensation during "mummy/daddy month" is now 85 per cent. 300 days are compensated at 75 per cent of wage and 90 days at the minimum rate. Temporary allowance is now 75 per cent of wage.

1997 "Mummy/daddy month" is compensated at 75 per cent.

1998 Allowance and temporary allowance are 80 per cent.

Source: *Women and Men in Sweden*, Facts and Figures 2000, SCB.

* Temporary allowance can be used in case of a child's illness.

Political and legal reforms since the 1840s

TURKEY

1839 Equality before the law accepted through Gülhane Imperial Edict.
1842 Midwife training began at Medical School.
1845 Basic education made compulsory for boys and girls by edict.
1858 Property rights of men and women over immoveable assets accepted as equal before the law.
1859 Middle school education established for girls.
1864 Technical education established for girls.
1876 First Constitution enshrined compulsory basic education for boys and girls; basic rights regulated with the adoption of the Constitution.
1897 Women entered labour force as salaried workers.
1911 Equal punishment of adultery for men and women.
1913 High schools established for girls; women entered the state service.
1914 Women began to enter into trade and commercial activities.
1915 Regulations made for women workers' social rights and security; first university for women established.
1917 Amendments to Family Law; marriage contract to be concluded before a civil servant; age of marriage set at 18 for men and 17 for women; forced marriages declared invalid.
1923 Modern Turkish republic declared; women established the "Women Peoples' Party" to promote women's political rights.
1924 Law on the "unity of education and teaching" enacted (*tevhid-i tedrisat*); Association of Women's Unity established.
1926 Monogamous marriage made compulsory with the adoption of the Turkish Civil Code; women achieve right of divorce, child custody, and marital property rights; abortion criminalized.
1930 Women gained right to vote in and be elected for local government; first regulations made to protect women and children under the General Public Health Law; maternal leave regulated.

SWEDEN

1845 Equal inheritance rights for women and men.
1846 Widows, divorcees, and unmarried women entitled to work in manual trades and some commerce.
1858 Unmarried women over 25 years old may attain majority by court order. Marriage means a return to minority status.
1859 Women entitled to some teaching positions.
1863 Unmarried women attain majority at the age of 25.
1864 Husbands lose legal right to strike their wives.
1870 Women gain right to take high school diploma at private schools.
1873 Women gain right to take degrees with some exceptions (doctorate in law and theology).
1874 Married women gain the right the right to control their own incomes.
1884 Unmarried women attain majority at age 21.
1901 Women gain the right to four weeks unpaid maternity leave.
1919 All women gain suffrage for municipal elections and the right to hold office at municipal and county levels.
1921 Women gain national suffrage and the right to hold office at the national level; married women attain majority at the age of 21; the new marriage law gives wives and husbands equal legal status.
1922 The first five women are elected to Parliament.
1925 With some exceptions, women gain same rights as men to civil service jobs.
1927 Public upper secondary schools open to girls.
1931 Maternity insurance benefits introduced.
1935 Equal basic pensions adopted upon marriage to foreign citizens.
1955 Three months paid maternity leave for working women on birth of child.
1958 Women entitled to be ordained into the clergy.
1960 Employers and unions agree to abol-

1932 Evening Vocational and Arts Schools for women established.

1933 Women gain right to vote in and be elected to village administrations.

1934 Women gain right to vote in and be elected in parliamentary elections.

1935 First elections in which women had all the rights to vote and be elected; The 12th International Women's Congress held in Istanbul.

1938 Marriage age for minors set at 17 for men and 15 for women, with parental permission.

1945 Maternal insurance accepted; schools providing for advanced study by women graduates of vocational schools established.

1949 Regulations for women's old age pensions and insurance made equal to those for men.

1950 First free parliamentary elections.

1952 Mother-child health services created by the Ministry of Health.

1965 Law enacted on family planning: birth control made partly free, abortion declared free only in medical emergency.

1971 Equal pay for equal work principle entered into law; prohibition against employing women in heavy and hazardous conditions; the first female minister appointed from outside parliament.

1985 Amendments to the family planning law; right to abortion within the first 10 weeks of pregnancy; Turkey became a signatory to The Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).

1986 Female member of parliament joined cabinet.

1987 Committee for Policies for Women established within State Planning Organisation.

1989 Women's unit established in the Ministry of Labour; Centre for Research for Women's Problems established at Istanbul University.

1990 Advanced degree program for women's studies instituted at Istanbul University; constitutional court annulled the law requiring husbands' permission for women to work; annulment of the legal justification reducing the punishment of rape commish separate wage rates for women over a five-year period.

1964 Birth control pill approved in Sweden.

1969 Compulsory schools adopt new curriculum. Encouraged to promote equal opportunities.

1970 Secondary schools adopt new curriculum. Encouraged to promote equal opportunities.

1971 Separate income tax assessment for wife and husband.

1974 Parents entitled to share parental allowances upon childbirth.

1975 UN's International Women's Year. New abortion law: a woman has the right to decide until the 18th week.

1976 UN's Decade for Women; ordinance for equal opportunities in civil service; Sterilisation Act: person aged 25 decides her / himself.

1977 Agreement between employers and unions on equal opportunities.

1979 Right to sixhour day for parents of small children.

1980 Law against sex discrimination in employment; spouse-means test for student loan abolished; equal opportunities agreement with municipal and county governments; compulsory schools adopt new curriculum - now required to promote equal opportunities; new law on succession to the throne - monarch's first-born daughter or son succeeds to the throne.

1982 All assault and battery against women even if committed on private property subject to public prosecution; ban on pornographic "live shows" in places open to public; social security points for care in home of children under 3 years; public funds to women's organisations; new name-change law - at time of marriage, couples decide which name or names they will use.

1983 New equal opportunities Agreement between employers and unions; all occupations open to women, including armed forces.

1984 The State Sector Equal Opportunities Ordinance.

1985 UN's Decade for Women ends - strategies for year 2000 adopted; equal opportunities agreement for public companies / utilities.

mitted against prostitutes; Purple Roof Foundation for Women's Shelter established in Istanbul; women's bureaus began to be established in metropolitan municipalities; The General Directorate on Status and Problems of Women (GDSPW) established.

1991 Women's Solidarity Foundation established. Opened the first independent shelter for women in 1993.

1992 The GDSPW technical program "Gender and Development" started with UNDP support.

1993 Women's bureaus established in all labour and civil service syndicates; Department for Statistics on Social Structure and Women established at the State Institute of Statistics (SIS); low-credit applications from women accepted to promote women's entrepreneurship.

1994 First woman prime minister (Tansu Çiller); Information Consultation Bank opened by GDSPW to provide consultancy and guidance on women's protection against violence; Turkey participated in UN International Conference for Development and Population (ICDP) in Cairo.

1995 Turkey signed Beijing Declaration; Turkey participated in the 4th World Conference on Women and became a signatory without reservation.

1996 First advanced academic degree for Women's Studies granted; adultery annulled as criminal act for men.

1997 Compulsory education raised from 5 to 8 years; women obtained the right to maintain maiden names along with the names of their husbands; Department for Women in Rural Development established within the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs; Women's Status Units established within 12 provincial administrations to enhance the efficiency of services for women; GDSWP Gender and Development project extended with UNDP support.

1998 Adultery annulled as criminal act for women; husbands and wives began to declare individual incomes and taxes; Law on the Protection of the Family

1987 New law concerning joint property of cohabiting couples (unmarried): The Cohabitation Act.

1988 National 5 year plan of action to promote equal opportunities.

1989 Nordic plan of action to promote equal opportunities.

1992 New Equal Opportunities Act.

1994 Revised Equal Opportunities Act; new national policy for equal opportunities; at least one month of parental leave must be used by mother and one by father ("mummy/daddy month"); gender statistics made part of Sweden's Official Statistics.

1995 Sweden joins the European Union; UN Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing; Action Registered Partnership.

1997 First woman bishop.

1998 Act on Violence against Women (amendment of Penal Code); Act on Prohibition against Female Genital Mutilation; The Equal Opportunities Act tightened concerning sexual harassment.

1999 Law prohibiting the purchase of sexual services.

2000 Special session of the General Assembly, Women 2000: gender equality, development and peace for the twenty-first century.

Source: Quoted from *Women and Men in Sweden*, Facts and Figures 2000, Stockholm: Statistiska Centralbyrån.

enacted and measures taken against domestic violence; parliamentary commission appointed to assess status of women within the framework of CEDAW.

2001 Civil Code amended to allow the equal division of property obtained throughout marriage between husband and wife in cases of divorce; women obtained right to have an address other than their husbands'; the phrase "man is the head of the family" is removed from Code and men and women are accepted as equally responsible for the sustenance of the family.

Source: *Women in Turkey 1999*, General Directorate on the Status and Problem of Women (GDSPW), Ankara, 2001.

http://www.adalet.gov.tr/medeni/medeni_kanun.html

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

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